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Foreword 
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) 
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and 
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the 
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over 
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal 
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal 
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in 
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed 
an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In pub-
lishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, 
the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of 
British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and 
Tinker respectively .1 The successful completion of The transfer of power and The 
struggle for independence, both of which were based on British records, emphasised 
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of 
the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle 
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. In their absence, scholars both 
from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule, as well as from 
Britain itself, lack an important tool for understanding and teaching their respective 
histories. But BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by 
successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. 
Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument 
of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The 
project fs therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual 
territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, 
economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another. 
BDEEP is a sequel, not only to the India and Burma series but also to the still 
earlier series of published Foreign Office documents which continues as Documents 
on British Policy Overseas (DBPO). The contemporary volumes in DBPO appear in 
two parallel series covering the years 1945 to 1955. In certain respects the 
documents published in the BDEEP volumes will complement those published in 
DBPO. On issues where there is, or is likely to be, direct overlap, BDEEP will not 
provide detailed coverage. The most notable examples concern the post-Second 
World War international settlements in the Far East and the Pacific, and the 
immediate events of the Suez crisis of 1956. 
1 Nicholas Mansergh et a!, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 
1942-47, 12 vols, (London, 1970-1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944- 1948, 2 vols, (London, 1983-1984). 
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Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its 
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater 
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major 
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent 
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of 
the twentieth century, while having its roots in the Second World War and before. 
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, 
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems, 
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the 
growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the 
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a 
relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the 
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their 
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are 
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be 
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents 
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British 
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not 
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official 
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the 
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences, and also of the fact that the end of empire 
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than 
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP 
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents 
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents 
relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country 
or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British 
government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independ-
ence, and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. 
In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series - series C - will be 
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire 
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). The handbooks will be 
published in two volumes as an integral part of BDEEP and also as PRO guides to the 
records. They will enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the 
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published 
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. 
Volume One of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the 
Colonial and Dominions Offices (by R B Pugh) which was first published in 1964, is 
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office. It covers over two hundred years of activity down 
to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume Two, entitled Cabinet, Foreign Office, 
Treasury and other records, focuses more specifically on twentieth-century depart-
mental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental 
committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. These two 
volumes have been prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne 
Thurston, honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the 
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University of London. 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in 
individual volumes will be explained in the introductions written by the specialist 
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in 
previous series. Each volume will also list the PRO sources which have been 
searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles 
which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is 
first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense, in which the empire is viewed in 
terms of Britain's position as a world power, and of the inter-relationship between 
what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. 
Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider 
context of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the 
Commonwealth and United Nations. The central themes are the political constraints, 
both domestic and international, to which British governments were subject, the 
economic requirements of the sterling area, the geopolitical and strategic questions 
associated with priorities in foreign policy and in defence planning, and the 
interaction between these various constraints and concerns and the imperatives 
imposed by developments in colonial territories. Secondly, there is investigation into 
colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were 
specifically - but not exclusively - the concern of the leading department. In the 
period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2 the leading depart-
ment of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; 
for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Common-
wealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of 
economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and 
constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the 
civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from 
European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of 
political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of 
governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial 
dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British 
government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to 
document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular 
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source 
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which 
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major 
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these 
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in 
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate 
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the 
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be 
fully documented in the country volumes, but some especially significant documents 
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of 
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance 
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive 
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service - salaries, 
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation - within the colonial and 
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the 
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to 
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. 
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by 
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government 
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local 
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the 
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and DBPO, BDEEP is not an 
official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in 
the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the 
PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in 
preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years, 
or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records 
Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. 
Where necessary, volume editors will provide details of potentially significant files or 
individual documents of which they are aware and which they have not been able to 
consult. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general 
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological 
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India 
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the 
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have 
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the 
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any 
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first 
line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type 
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, 
committee, department) and the recipient (if any) . In headings, a subject entry in 
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. 
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator devised by the editor. This 
latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or 
where the original title is too unwieldly to reproduce in its entirety. Security 
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have 
generally been omitted as confusing and needlessly complicating, and are retained 
only where they are necessary to a full understanding. In the headings to documents 
and the summary lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not 
the title of the office (ie, Mr Lyttelton, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the 
same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general 
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 
371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the 
file. 
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were 
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials. 
FOREWORD xi 
volumes in series A, ambassadors, governors, high commissiOners and other 
embassy or high commission staff are given in the form 'SirE Baring (Kenya)'. 
Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, 
or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each part of a volume 
provides a select list of which principal offices were held by whom, with a separate 
series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the 
documents. Minor figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first 
appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square 
brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are sometimes used 
to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has 
been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been 
inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. 
Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-
command executive instructions, and some redundant internal referencing has been 
removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No 
substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. 
In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety. The footnote 
reference 'not printed' has been used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an 
annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note 
of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred 
to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Each part of a 
volume has a list of abbreviations occurring in it. A consolidated index for the whole 
volume appears at the end of each part. 
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and 
Burma series, is that BDEEP will reproduce many more minutes by ministers and 
officials. 
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office under 
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. All references and 
dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines. 
* * * * 
BDEEP has received assistance and support from many quarters. The project was 
first discussed at a one-day workshop attended by over thirty interested scholars 
which, supported by a small grant from the Smuts Memorial Fund, was held at 
Churchill College, Cambridge, in May 1985. At that stage the obstacles looked 
daunting. It seemed unlikely that public money would be made available along the 
lines provided for the India and Burma projects. The complexities of the task looked 
substantial, partly because there was more financial and economic data with which 
to deal, still more because there were so many more territories to cover. It was not at 
all clear, moreover, who could take institutional responsibility for the project as the 
India Office Records had for the earlier ones; and in view of the escalating price of the 
successive India and Burma volumes, it seemed unlikely that publication in book 
form would be feasible ; for some while a choice was being discussed between 
microfilm, microfiche and facsimile. 
A small group nevertheless undertook to explore matters further, and in a quite 
remarkable way found itself able to make substantial progress. The British Academy 
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adopted BDEEP as one of its major projects, and thus provided critical support. The 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies served as a crucial institutional anchor in taking 
responsibility for the project. The Institute also made office space available, and 
negotiated an administrative nexus within the University of London. Dr Anne 
Thurston put at the disposal of the project her unique knowledge of the relevant 
archival sources; while the keeper of the Public Records undertook to provide all the 
support that he could. It then proved possible to appoint Professor Michael Crowder 
as project director on a part-time basis, and he approached the Leverhulme Trust, 
who made a munificent grant which was to make the whole project viable. Almost all 
those approached to be volume editors accepted and, after consultation with a 
number of publishers, Her Majesty's Stationery Office undertook to publish the 
project in book form. There can be few projects that after so faltering a start found 
itself quite so blessed. 
Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a 
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial 
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony 
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the British Commonwealth in the 
University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. At the outset Professor 
Michael Crowder became general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the 
University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. 
Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general 
editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at 
the Open University. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and 
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Ashton who had 
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the 
India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and 
general editor in 1993. When BDEEP was launched in 1987, eight volumes in series 
A and B were approved by the Project Committee and specialist scholars were 
commissioned to research and select documents for inclusion in each . Collectively, 
these eight volumes (three general and five country)5 represent the first stage of the 
project which begins with an introductory general volume covering the years 
between 1925 and 1945 but which concentrates on the period from the Second World 
War to 1957 when Ghana and Malaya became independent.6 
It is fitting that the present general editor should begin his acknowledgements 
with an appreciation of the contributions made by his predecessors. The late 
Professor Crowder supervise'd the launch of the project and planned the volumes 
included in stage one. The volumes already published bear lasting testimony to his 
resolve and dedication during the project's formative phase. Professor Murray played 
a no less crucial role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in 
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and HMSO. His invaluable advice and 
5 Series A general volumes: voll Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925- 1945 (published 1996); vol2 
The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951 (published 1992); vol 3 The Conservative 
government and the end of empire 1951-1957 (published 1994). 
Series B country volumes: vol I Ghana (published 1992); vol 2 Sri Lanka (published 1997); vol 3 
Malaya (published 1995); vol 4 Egypt and the defence of the Middle East; vol 5 Sudan . 
6 Research is currently in progress for a second stage covering the period 1957-1964. 
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expertise during the early stages of editing are acknowledged with particular 
gratitude. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British 
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant 
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major 
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to 
employ a research assistant on a fixed-term contract. The principal funding for the 
project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to 
the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is owed to the 
Trustees. In addition to their generous grant to cover the costs of the first stage, the 
Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of the grant, and also 
provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton's 
appointment. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encourage-
ment. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular 
contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and 
presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtru-
sive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and 
experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and staff of the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the 
congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of 
volumes in stage one have profited considerably from the researches undertaken by 
Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants during the preparation of the records 
handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to 
acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of 
the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation 
emanating from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor of the volume in series 
A on The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951, played an important 
role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is 
acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to HMSO for assuming publishing 
responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, 
but by no means least, the contribution of the keeper of the records and the staff, 
both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the 
facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at Kew, the project would not be 
viable. 
S R Ashton 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
July 1996 
xiv 
,,- .... 
.. -
- ' # .... ... \ 
.. ,, , 
.• 
. 
I NORTH .. !. 
,·' Anuradhapura 
', ~NTRAL ': •••• 
........... PROVINCE 
: ,' .. : ...... 
, . 
. , . 
I , ... 
~-
~ : 
i$ ~ (j - _._, 
;: 
~'li • 
NORTH 
WESTERN 
PROVINCE 
. 
. 
~· : 
• ....... .. .. 
'• . ~:'CENTRAL·, •• :·EASTERN 
·~ '..' ,' PROVINCE 
,PROVINCE 
• Kandy 
--· ... 
' . z I .. • : 
0: Ratnapura' · • • • • • r--_: ~ 
u.l ·, • ~ ~ SABARAGAMUVA 
~ ',PROVINCE 
- J, • -, .. ,, , 
'. . . , 
... : 
.. 
Badulia 
• 
t'' -, 
. 
., 
. 
'•, 
' . 
UVA , 
PROVINCE : 
Sri Lanka: Provincial Divisions and Principal Towns 
XV 
Sri Lanka 
Schedule of Contents: Parts 1-11 
PART I THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE SOULBURY COMMISSION 
1939-1945 
Chapter 1 The war and postponement of constitutional reform; Indo--Ceylon 
relations, Sept 1939-Apr 1941 
(Document numbers 1-93) 
Chapter 2 Wartime conditions and the revival of pressure for constitutional 
reform; Ceylon and wartime supplies: the case of rubber production (1) , 
Apr 1941- July 1943 
(Document numbers 94-174) 
Chapter 3 The ministers' draft constitution and the Soulbury Commission: Ceylon 
and wartime supplies: the case of rubber production (2), Sept 1943-
Apr 1945 
(Document numbers 175-239) 
PART 11 TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE 1945-1948 
Chapter 4 Senanayake at the Colonial Office; the negotiating team; the Soulbury 
Report, Tamil protests and the white paper, Apr-Nov 1945 
(Document numbers 240-329) 
Chapter 5 The Indian problem, post-war reconstruction and the communist 
challenge, Nov 1945-Nov 1946 
(Document numbers 330-376) 
Chapter 6 India, Burma and Ceylon; the defence agreement, sterling balances and 
citizenship, Dec 1946-Mar 1948 
(Document numbers 377-446) 

Abbreviations: Parts 1-11 
ACTC 
AFPFL 
ARP 
BSI 
CB 
CBE 
ccs 
CD 
CDF 
CGA 
c-in-c 
CIC 
CICLU 
CID 
cif 
CIWF 
CLI 
CMG 
CNC 
CNVF 
CO 
Con 
cos 
COSSEA 
CPRC 
CRO 
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 
Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (Burma) 
air raid precaution 
Burma: Struggle for Independence (Burma documents series) 
Companion of the Order of the Bath 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire 
Ceylon Civil Service 
coast defence 
Ceylon Defence Force 
Ceylon Garrison Artillery 
commander-in-chief 
Ceylon Indian Congress 
Ceylon Indian Congress Labour Union 
Criminal Investigation Department 
cost in freight 
Ceylon Indian Workers' Federation 
Ceylon Light Infantry 
Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George 
Ceylon National Congress 
Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force 
Colonial Office; commanding officer 
Conservative Party (UK) 
Chiefs of Staff 
Chiefs of Staff, South-East Asia 
Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
corrupt gp corrupt group (undeciphered word or words in telegram) 
xvii 
xviii 
DFC 
DO 
DSC 
DSO 
EPT 
Ex Co 
FM 
fob 
GA 
GB 
GCMG 
GOC 
GOI 
gov 
gov-gen 
HE 
HM 
HMG 
HQ 
ICS 
IGP 
ILO 
10 
IRRC 
KBE 
KC 
KCMG 
kt 
Lab 
LSSP 
MC 
MP 
ABBREVIATIONS: PARTS 1-JI 
Distinguishing Flying Cross 
Dominions Office 
Distinguished Service Cross 
Companion of the Distinguished Service Order 
excess profits tax 
executive committee/committees 
Fleet Air Arm 
free on board 
government agent 
Great Britain 
Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and· St George 
general officer commanding 
Government of India 
government; governor 
governor -general 
His Excellency 
His Majesty 
His Majesty's Government 
headquarters 
Indian Civil Service 
inspector general of police 
International Labour Organisation 
India Office 
International Rubber Regulation Commission 
Knight Commander Order of the British Empire 
King's Counsel 
Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George 
Knight 
Labour Party (UK) 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
Military Cross 
member of parliament 
ABBREVIATIONS: PARTS 1-11 xix 
MSC member of State Council 
OAG officer administering the government 
OBE Officer Order of the British Empire 
PM prime minister 
PRO Public Record Office 
QMG quarter master general 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RN Royal Navy 
RNVR Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
RTC round table conference 
SAC supreme allied commander 
S of S secretary of state 
SACS EA supreme allied commander, South-East Asia 
SEAC South-East Asia Command 
SMS Sinhala Maha Sabha 
TOPI Transfer of Power in India (India documents series) 
UK United Kingdom 
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation) 
UNP United National Party 
VP vital point 

Principal Holders of Offices: Part I 
Sept 1939-Apr 1945 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Ministries 
xxi 
(a) National government (from June 1935) for the period 3 Sept 1939-10 May 1940 
Prime minister Mr AN Chamberlain (28 May 1937) 
S of S colonies Mr M J MacDonald (16 May 1938) 
S of S India and Burma Marquess of Zetland (7 June 1935) 
(b) Wartime coalition 10 May 1940-23 May 19451 
Prime minister and minister of defence Mr W S Churchill (10 May 1940) 
Lord president of the Council 
Lord privy seal 
S of S foreign affairs 
Chancellor of Exchequer 
President of Board of Trade 
S of S colonies 
S of S India and Burma 
1 All Conservative unless otherwise indicated. 
Mr AN Chamberlain (11 May 1940) 
Sir John Anderson (Nat) (3 Oct 1940) 
Mr C RAttlee (Lab) (24 Sept 1943) 
Mr C R Attlee (Lab) (11 May 1940) 
Sir Stafford Cripps (Lab) (19 Feb 1942) 
Viscount Cranborne (22 Nov 1942) 
Viscount Halifax (11 May 1940) 
Mr A Eden (22 Dec 1940) 
Sir Kingsley Wood (12 May 1940) 
Sir John Anderson (Nat) (24 Sept 1943) 
Sir A Duncan (12 May 1940) 
Mr 0 Lyttelton (3 Oct 1940) 
Sir A Duncan (29 June 1941) 
Mr J Llewellin (4 Feb 1942) 
Mr H Dalton (Lab) (22 Feb 1942) 
Lord Lloyd (13 May 1940) 
Lord Moyne (8 Feb 1941) 
Viscount Cranborne (22 Feb 1942) 
Mr 0 F G Stanley (22 Nov 1942) 
Mr L S Amery (13 May 1940) 
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S of S dominion affairs 
(c) Colonial Office: junior ministers 
Parliamentary under-secretary 
of state 
3. Civil servants 
(a) Secretary to the Cabinet 
(b) Colonial Office 
(i) Permanent under-secretary 
of state 
(ii) Deputy under-secretary 
of state 
(iii) Assistant under-secretary 
of state, responsible for 
the Eastern Department and, 
from Apr 1943, the Ceylon 
and Pacific Department 
(iv) Assistant secretary, head of 
the Eastern Department and, 
from Apr 1943, the Ceylon 
and Pacific Department 
1. Governors 
2. Officers administering the 
government 
Viscount Caldecote (14 May 1940) 
Viscount Cranborne (3 Oct 1940) 
Mr C RAttlee (Lab) (19 Feb 1942) 
Viscount Cranborne (24 Sept 1943) 
Marquess ofDufferin andAva (28 May 1937) 
Mr G H Hall (Lab) (15 May 1940) 
Mr H M Macmillan (4 Feb 1942) 
Duke ofDevonshire (1 Jan 1943) 
Sir Edward Bridges (1938-1947) 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson (1937-1940) 
Sir George Cater (Feb--May 1940) 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson (1940-1942) 
Sir George Cater (1942-1947) 
Sir John Shuckburgh (1931-1942) 
Sir William Battershill (1942-1945) 
Sir Arthur Dawe (1945-1947) 
Sir Henry Moore (1938-1939) 
Sir Alan Burns (1940) 
W D Battershill (1941) 
G E J Gent (1942-1946) 
G E J Gent (1939- 1941) 
KW Blaxter (1941, acting) 
J J Paskin (1942-1943) 
J B Sidebotham (1943-1948) 
CEYLON 
Sir Andrew Caldecott (16 Oct 1937-17 Oct 
1944) 
Sir Henry Monck-Mason Moore (3 Dec 
1944) 
G S Wodeman (3-6 Dec 1940) 
(Sir) Robert Drayton (Kt 1944) (4-7 Feb 
1943) 
Sir Robert Drayton (17 Oct-3 Dec 1944) 
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3. Board of Ministers 
Chairman 
Vice-chairman 
Minister of home affairs 
Minister of agriculture and lands 
Minister of local administration 
Minister of health 
Minister oflabour, industry 
and commerce 
Minister of education 
Minister of communication and works 
6. Officers of State 
(a) Chief secretary 
The chief secretary (ex-officio) 
Sir DB Jayatilaka (17 Mar 1936-30 Nov 
1942) 
acting D S Senanayake (11 Jan-27 Mar 
1936; 7 Dec 1936-12 Jan 1937; 14Apr-
4 July 1937; 14 Aug 1937-9 Oct 1942) 
D S Senanayake (2 Dec 1942) 
Sir DB Jayatilaka (17 Mar 1936-30 Nov 
1942) 
A Mahadeva (2 Dec 1942) 
D S Senanayake (17 Mar 1936) 
SW R D Bandaranaike (17 Mar 1936) 
WAde Silva (17 Mar 1936-18 Feb 1942) 
G E de Silva (25 Feb 1942) 
GC S Corea (17 Mar 1936) 
C W W Kannangara (17 Mar 1936) 
J L Kotelawala (17 Mar 1936) 
G S Wodeman (22 Oct 1938-23 Nov 1939, 
acting) 
M M Wedderburn (23 Nov 1939-3 Feb 
1940) 
G S Wodeman (3 Feb-4 Mar 1940, acting) 
M M Wedderburn (4 Mar- 8 Apr 1940) 
G S Wodeman (8 Apr-30 May 1940, acting) 
G S Wodeman (30 May-3 Dec 1940) 
W L Murphy (3-6 Dec 1940, acting) 
G S Wodeman (6 Dec 1940-7 Apr 1942) 
RH Drayton (7 Apr-6 July 1942, acting) 
RH Drayton (6-24 July 1942) 
CH Collins (24 July-2 Aug 1942, acting) 
(Sir) Robert Drayton (2 Aug 1942-17 Oct 
1944) 
CH Collins (17 Oct-3 Dec 1944, acting) 
Sir Robert Drayton (3 Dec 1944-13 May 
1945) 
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(b) Legal secretary 
(c) Financial secretary 
Governors-general and Viceroys 
J C Howard (1 Oct 1936-1 Dec 1939) 
J W R Illangakoon (1 Dec 1939-10 Feb 
1940, acting) 
RH Drayton (10 Feb 1940-9 Apr 1942) 
J M Fonseka (9 Apr- 23 June 1942, acting) 
J H B Nihill (24 June-7 July 1942, acting) 
J H B Nihil! (7 July 1942-1 Sept 1943) 
RH Drayton (1-22 Sept 1943) 
J H B Nihill (22 Sept 1943-5 Apr 1945) 
MW H de Silva (5 Apr-4 Oct 1945, acting) 
H J Huxham (2 Oct 1937-22 Apr 1940) 
CH Collins (22 Apr-6 Dec 1940, acting) 
H J Huxham (6 Dec 1940-17 Nov 1942) 
C E Jones (17 Nov 1942-23 Jan 1943, 
acting) 
CH Collins (24 Jan-13 July 1943, acting) 
H J Huxham (13 July 1943- 30 Jan 1945) 
C E Jones (30 Jan-1 May 1945, acting) 
INDIA 
Marquess of Linlithgow (18 Apr 1936) 
Field Marshal Viscount Wave!! (20 Oct 
1943) 
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Glossary: Parts 1-11 
conductor 
estate 
government agent 
Kachcheri 
Kandyan 
kanakapulle 
kangany 
Korale 
Perahera 
a minor supervisory officer on a plantation 
plantation 
administrative head of a province 
provincial or district secretariat 
pertaining to the old Kandyan kingdom which occupied 
the central highlands and much of the north central and 
south eastern plains; Sinhalese from the Kandyan region 
a minor official in a plantation, generally with some 
responsibility over maintenance of accounts, especially 
those relating to wages of workers 
organiser or head of a group or gang of workers on 
plantations; on the larger estates there were several 
kanganies of whom one or more would be given the title 
of head-kangany 
administrative unit within a district 
a famous ritual ceremony associated with the Temple of 
the Tooth in Kandy. Generally for ten days in July or 
August there is a magnificent procession of elephants 
and dancers which attracts thousands of people to the 
town. The head of state is traditionally the guest of 
honour on the last day - hence the presence in British 
times of the governor 
Pongal (also Thaipongal) Hindu harvest festival, observed early in January 
rupee 
sang am 
suriya mal 
visiting agent 
coin in use in Ceylon; worth about 1s 6d or 7l!2p (UK) or 
30 cts (US) in the 1940s. Ceylon had and has a decimal 
currency of 100 cents to a rupee 
a trade union on a plantation 
thespesa populnea; marxist groups in Ceylon began 
selling this flower on memorial day as an anti-imperialist 
gesture, and in opposition to the sale of poppies 
a senior planter, overseeing work of several plantations 
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Chronological Table of Principal Events: 
Parts 1-11 
3 Sept 
3 Oct 
10 Jan 
27 Feb 
6 Mar 
12 July 
4 Nov 
12 Nov 
11 Jan 
14 Mar 
4 Sept 
21 Sept 
28 Oct 
17 Nov 
8 Dec 
15 Feb 
25 Feb 
5 Mar 
9 Mar 
23 Mar 
24 Mar 
5 Apr 
1939 
War declared between Great Britain and Germany 
CO decides that constitutional reform in Ceylon should be postponed 
until after the war 
1940 
Police shooting of Indian plantation worker at Mool-oya, Hevaheta 
Resignation of Board of Ministers on constitutional issues arising from 
Mool-oya incident 
Ministers re-elected by executive committees 
Arrest and detention of Lanka Sama Samaja Party leaders 
Exploratory talks between delegations representing the governments of 
India and Ceylon in New Delhi 
GOI reports failure of Indo-Ceylon talks 
1941 
A contingent of the Ceylon Garrison Artillery, the first batch of Ceylon 
servicemen sent for overseas service in Second World War, leaves the 
island 
Major G SU Orde Browne, CO labour adviser, arrives in Colombo to 
report on labour conditions in Ceylon 
Indian delegates arrive in Colombo for Indo-Ceylon talks 
Delegates at Indo-Ceylon talks conclude their sittings on reaching 
'agreed conclusions' on all subjects 
Governor Caldecott submits reform proposals to CO 
Ceylon placed under the command of the c-in-c, India. Major General 
R D Inskip appointed general officer commanding troops in Ceylon 
Declaration of war between Great Britain and Japan 
1942 
Singapore surrenders 
Senanayake leaves for India to negotiate food supplies 
Vice Admiral Layton appointed c-in-c, Ceylon 
Dutch forces in Java surrender 
Japanese occupy Andaman islands 
War Council established in Ceylon 
75 sea-borne Japanese aircraft attack Colombo in morning raid 
xxviii 
8 Apr 
9 Apr 
6 May 
1 July 
8 Aug 
9 Aug 
2 Dec 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS: PARTS I-ll 
Escape of Lanka Sama Samaja Party leaders from jail 
American forces in Bataan, Philippines, surrender. Japanese raid on 
Trincomalee 
Surrender on Corrigedor ends American resistance in Philippines 
Establishment of University of Ceylon with Dr W Ivor Jennings as first 
vice chancellor 
Indian National Congress adopts 'Quit India' resolution 
Indian National Congress leaders arrested and interned 
Senanayake chosen as leader of house and vice-chairman of Board of 
Ministers. A Mahadeva elected minister for home affairs in place of Sir 
DB Jayatilaka 
18-20 Dec Ceylon National Congress, in annual session at Kelaniya, adopts resolu-
tion that its objective is 'the attainment of Freedom for Ceylon' 
26 May 
8 June 
6 July 
9 July 
25 Aug 
6 Nov 
21 Dec 
3 Feb 
15 Apr 
6 June 
15 June 
15 July 
25 Aug 
18 Sept 
17 Oct 
29 Oct 
19 Nov 
4 Dec 
22 Dec 
1943 
Official announcement from Whitehall on future constitution for Ceylon. 
Speaker reads message to State Council 
Senanayake makes statement in State Council on ministers' response to 
declaration of 26 May; announces ministers' resolve to draft a constitu-
tion 
M S Aney appointed agent for GOI in Ceylon 
Clarification of policy statement of 26 May 
Admiral Mountbatten appointed supreme allied commander, SEAC 
Publication of report of special committee on education 
Senanayake resigns from Ceylon National Congress 
1944 
Ministers' draft constitution despatched to London 
Mountbatten arrives in Ceylon; headquarters of SEAC transferred from 
New Delhi to Kandy 
Allied landings in Normandy (D-Day) 
Whitehall announces decision to appoint a commission to visit Ceylon 
and report on constitutional reform 
Appointment of commission to report on social services 
Paris liberated 
CO announces appointment of Sir Henry Moore as new governor of 
Ceylon 
Caldecott relinquishes office and leaves island 
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress established 
Official announcement of appointment of commission on constitutional 
reform in Ceylon chaired by Lord Soulbury 
Arrival of Sir Henry Moore in Colombo 
Arrival of Soulbury commission 
1945 
8 Jan Admiral Layton relinquishes post of c-in-c, Ceylon; succeeded by Lt-Gen 
E de R Wetherall 
22 Jan 
13 Mar 
10 Apr 
20 Apr 
23 Apr 
9 May 
17 May 
23 May 
11 July 
26 July 
14 Aug 
11 Sept 
12 Sept 
1 Oct 
9 Oct 
1 Nov 
8 Nov 
25 Jan 
23 Mar 
16 May 
17 May 
18 July 
6 Sept 
6 Jan 
27 Jan 
20 Feb 
12 June 
1 July 
15 Aug 
20 Sept 
24 Sept 
8 Oct 
14 Oct 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS: PARTS I-ll 
Soulbury Commission begins public sittings 
Soulbury Commission concludes public sittings 
Soulbury commissioners return to London 
xxix 
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, civil defence and food commissioner, appointed 
financial secretary 
Japanese evacuate Rangoon 
End of hostilities in Europe 
White paper on Burma published 
Coalition government dissolved in Britain 
Senanayake leaves for London for discussions at CO on constitutional 
reform 
Labour Party victory in British general election 
Japanese surrender 
British Cabinet decides to accept Soulbury Report as basis of Ceylon's 
future constitution 
Japanese forces in S E Asia surrender to Mountbatten in Singapore. 
Publication of Senanayake's note on Ceylon's claim for dominion status 
Free education introduced in Ceylon from primary school up to universi-
ty, with Sinhalese and Tamil as medium of instruction 
Soulbury Report published 
White paper on constitutional reform in Ceylon published 
State Council accepts motion introduced by Senanayake on white paper 
proposals by 51 votes to 3 
1946 
J H B Nihill, legal secretary, leaves for London for consultations on 
drafting of new constitution 
Cabinet Mission arrives in India 
Cabinet Mission plan for India announced 
Order-in-Council promulgating new Ceylon constitution published 
Senanayake introduces 16th and last budget under the 1931 constitution 
United National Party established 
1947 
R Aluvihare appointed first Ceylonese inspector-general of police 
Attlee-Aung San agreement on Burma 
British government announces intention to transfer power in India by a 
date not later than June 1948 
Official statement on dominion status for Ceylon 
Last meeting of State Council 
Polling commences for election to new parliament of Ceylon. Indian 
independence (14 Aug for Pakistan) 
Parliamentary elections concluded in Ceylon 
Senanayake becomes Ceylon's first prime minister 
First formal meeting of new Cabinet 
First meeting of House of Representatives 
XXX 
11 Nov 
12 Nov 
13 Nov 
25 Nov 
26 Nov 
1 Dec 
5 Dec 
10 Dec 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS: PARTS I-ll 
White paper on new constitutional status of Ceylon published. Agree-
ments on Ceylon independence signed in London and Colombo 
First meeting of Senate 
Ceylon Independence Bill introduced in House of Commons 
Ceremonial opening of parliament 
Senanayake moves independence motion in House of Representatives 
First national budget presented in House of Representatives by J R 
Jayewardene, minister of finance 
Independence motion passed in House of Representatives by 59 to 11 
Ceylon Independence Bill receives Royal Assent. Sir H Moore appointed 
first governor-general 
1948 
4 Jan Burma becomes independent republic 
4 Feb Ceylon Independence Day 
xxxi 
Introduction 
The issues and the nature of the official documentary record 
The outbreak of the Second World War forms the starting point in selecting 
documents for the Sri Lanka volume in this series. There are three reasons for this. 
From 1931 Ceylon (the country was officially renamed Sri Lanka* in 1972) had one 
of the most advanced constitutions of the colonial empire - the Donoughmore 
constitution. The principal features of that constitution are discussed later in this 
introductory chapter. Almost from the time of its introduction agitation had begun 
for changes in that constitutional framework. By the middle of 1939, a consensus 
had been negotiated, over a two-year period commencing with the appointment of 
Sir Andrew Caldecott as governor of Ceylon in 1937, on the principles of an even 
more advanced constitution. The outbreak of war inevitably led to a postponement of 
any serious consideration by Whitehall of the proposals that formed the essence of 
this consensus. Nevertheless these proposals had an important influence on 
constitutional reform once the process was started afresh in 1943. 
Secondly, the outbreak of the war also led the Colonial Office to encourage the 
conversion of the then Board of Ministers into a quasi-Cabinet. This decision was 
taken as early as October 1939 but there was no policy statement issued on it (2). 
Wartime conditions necessitated this change, and it was initiated informally and 
through usage and convention. The balance of power in the constitution shifted in 
favour of the ministers as against the executive committees which, as we shall see, 
formed the core of the novel system introduced in 1931, and the individual 
legislators. In initiating this change the CO was conceding one of the main demands 
in the 1930's agitation for constitutional reform. 
Thirdly, wartime conditions led to the emergence of a genuine political part-
nership between the Board of Ministers and the governor. This relationship was not 
without tensions and disagreements- anyone reading these documents will see that 
there were a great many of these, especially in 1940 and 1941 - but there was a 
qualitative difference in the relationship between the governor and the Board of 
Ministers prior to 1939 and thereafter. Ceylon's entry into the war had been decided 
upon and announced by the metropolitan power but this did not lead to any 
opposition from the bulk of the country's politicians. Unlike their Indian and 
Burmese counterparts, the political leadership of the day actively supported the war 
effort. This association in the war effort from 1939, and direct participation in it, 
gave the Board of Ministers a far greater influence on the making of policy and 
decisions in regard to areas of authority which, before the war, had been the 
• Although the volume carries the modern,day name of the island, the documents all refer to 'Ceylon', the 
name used by the island's Dutch rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and continued by the 
British. Accordingly, the references in this introduction are likewise to Ceylon. However, as a number of 
the documents illustrate, the name 'Lanka' was in use among the Sinhalese even in British times. In 
Sinhala or Sinhalese, Sri Lanka means 'resplendent isle' . 
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of Prime Minister Attlee, it was amalgamated with the India and Burma Committee 
under the title of the latter. 
The Cabinet papers from 1945 also include reports from the Chiefs of Staff on the 
strategic aspects of ending British rule in Ceylon. Coverage of defence issues has 
been supplemented by documents selected from three further sources: ADM 116 
(Admiralty and Security Cases) which provides key insights into Admiralty views on 
the defence aspects of constitutional reform in Ceylon; WO 32, the registered files 
(general series) of the War Office; and WO 203, the voluminous series containing 
nearly 6500 files which documents the activities and operations during the war of the 
South-East Asia Command. A little over seventy files from WO 203 deal with Ceylon. 
While the majority have not yielded material useful for inclusion in the volume, one 
of them- WO 203/5412- records the important role played by Admiral Mountbatten, 
supreme allied commander, SEAC, in the appointment of the Soulbury Commission 
in 1944. Other files in the series contain the minutes of meetings of the Ceylon War 
Council from September 1942 to December 1945. 
While it is gratifying to report that in selecting documents for inclusion in this 
volume the editor has not been faced with the problem of restrictions on access to 
the records, readers and future researchers should be aware that in two cases, both of 
which concern CO 537 for the year 1947, the documentary record for Ceylon is not 
complete. The main political file for 1947 - carrying the original CO reference 
55541/47- is not recorded in the PRO handlist for the CO 537 series. There is an 
entry for the file in the Ceylon register of correspondence in CO 337 which itemises 
the file's contents in the standard numerical sequence throughout the year. The 
register entry indicates that the file was removed in 1950 but does not make clear by 
whom or for what purpose. It was not returned and its absence was evidently not 
noted when the records relating to Ceylon for this period were transferred to the 
PRO. At the time of this volume going to press, a search for the file has not revealed 
its whereabouts or even if it still exists. Fortunately, however, and this applies for the 
entire period covered by this volume, duplicates of the correspondence on the main 
political and constitutional questions are to be found in the confidential print series 
for Ceylon in CO 882. Prints were made of the documents from file 5554114 7 before it 
went missing. Although the print does not contain the internal CO minuting on the 
correspondence, it has been possible, using selections from the print, together with 
other documents from Cabinet papers and an important file from the records of the 
Prime Minister's Office (PREM 8/726), to assemble a selection of material illustrating 
the key political issues and considerations which led to the British government's 
statement of policy in June 1947 to the effect that Ceylon would achieve fully 
responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The documents to 
which this applies are all in part two: they are numbers 381-385, 387, 391-394, 
398--403, 405-408, 417, 421-424. Also missing from CO 537 is file 55569/8/47 on the 
issue of nationality towards the end of 1947 and, in particular, on Ceylon's request 
that the British Nationality Bill be deferred to allow time for Ceylon to conduct 
negotiations over citizenship with India. This file has been destroyed under statute. 
Again, recourse has been made to the confidential print to cover the issue in question 
-see numbers 427, 429 and 434. 
The publication of this volume completes a trilogy of documentary histories based 
on the official British record for the end of empire in South Asia in 1947-1948. 
Readers familiar with the earlier series on India and Burma edited by Professors 
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Mansergh and Tinker respectively will detect a similarity between all three publica-
t ions in that most of the documents reproduced are in the form of exchanges of 
telegrams. In Ceylon's case, from the time the Donoughmore constitution was 
introduced in 1931, there had been more frequent resort than before to telegrams, to 
and from London, as a means of communication. Despatches and memoranda from 
the colony became less frequent. Again in Ceylon's case, and especially for the period 
covered by this volume, one consequence of this preponderance of telegrams is that 
many of the documents do not lend themselves to any great elegance of style. In 
selecting documents for inclusion, therefore, although readability and quotability 
were regarded as advantageous, they have not been the primary concerns; the 
emphasis throughout has been on the importance and significance of the issues 
under consideration. The Ceylon record differs, certainly from that relating to India, 
in that it does not include an equivalent of the regular and at times highly colourful 
personal correspondence which passed between the secretary of state for India and 
the viceroy. But for a limited period, there is a similarity with the weekly personal 
reports submitted by Mountbatten to the India Office when, as the last viceroy 
between March and August 1947, he presided over the dissolution of the raj. From 
September 1939 to August 1941 Governor Caldecott was in the habit of sending to 
the CO rather long personal commentaries on the affairs of the colony in which he 
indulged in some candid remarks on political issues and on the foibles of his 
ministers. These commentaries are eminently readable and quotable. Caldecott 
named them 'Things Ceylonese' and over the period in question he submitted fifteen 
such reports in total. All are reproduced in part one of this volume. Whether they had 
any great direct influence on policy making is difficult to judge but they are 
important nevertheless in filling in the background to decisions as they were made. 
The Ceylon papers provide little by way of dramas or crises. Indeed the processes of 
transfer of power were singularly free of dramas and crises; they were too smooth to 
be really credible to critics in Ceylon, especially the marxist left, who argued that 
Ceylon's independence was a sham, a piece of make-believe in which Whitehall had 
willing collaborators in the island's political establishment (437, 438) . The 'dramas 
and crises' came in tragic profusion after independence. But this said, it should not 
be assumed that the cognate processes were entirely free of anxieties, for some of the 
issues involved, especially those concerning the future and position of the Indian 
community in the island, were extraordinarily complex. Commenting in January 
1940 on what he had seen of Ceylon affairs over the last two and a half years, Sir 
Cosmo Parkinson, the permanent under-secretary of state at the CO, observed that 
he had formed the opinion that 'of all the Colonies, Ceylon was likely to present the 
most difficult problem with which the Colonial Office would be dealing' (9). Even 
allowing for the fact that Parkinson made this observation two years before the 
collapse of the empire in the Far East and South-East Asia at the beginning of 1942, 
the documents in this volume bear ample testimony to the validity of his assessment. 
This introduction now continues in three sections. The first surveys the back-
ground to the issues involved in the reform of the Ceylon constitution from the 
inauguration of the Donoughmore constitution in 1931 to the outbreak of war in 
1939. The second and third sections introduce the documents reproduced in the 
volume in parts one and two respectively. 
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The background 
The Donoughmore Report 
A reforms package based on the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission 
was introduced in Ceylon in 1931 with the avowed object of breaking the mould of 
Ceylonese politics. Together they marked a deliberate crossing of one of the last 
barriers between colonial status and responsible government, in much the same way 
as the Durham Report, that path-breaking nineteenth century document on the 
Canadas, had accelerated the evolution of responsible government in the white 
dominions in the mid-nineteenth century and after. In both cases the changes 
introduced were seen to be of decisive importance, and in both a considerable period 
of transition was envisaged in reaching the goal of self-government which was 
defined in terms of control over internal affairs and the civil administration while 
Whitehall continued to have control over defence and external affairs . Writing in 
1946 at a time when the Donoughmore constitution was on the verge of being 
superseded, Martin Wight described it as 'the most remarkable state paper of 
Colonial affairs of the twentieth century} an assessment that has stood the test of 
time. In the acuity of its analysis of the constitutional problems of the colony, and its 
singular readiness to depart from convention and tradition in the solutions 
recommended, it is very much like the Durham Report with the significant 
difference that while the latter 'found the solution of the problems of the Canadas in 
the model of the British Constitution, [the former] was remarking that western 
parliamentary systems are irrelevant to non-western communities'.3 
Like the Durham Report of its day, the Donoughmore Report found the basic issue 
to be the divorce of power from responsibility. While rejecting the demands of the 
principal political organisation, the Ceylon National Congress, for full responsible 
government, it nevertheless recommended a form of semi-responsible government 
and conceded a very substantial measure of responsibility to the colonial politicians 
with- and this is the significant point- commensurate power. The central feature 
of the constitutional structure recommended for the colony was the departure from 
what hitherto had been the mode of advance to semi-responsible government: 
instead of the conventional device of a Cabinet or quasi-Cabinet there was to be a 
system of executive committees modelled on those of the League of Nations and 
the London County Council. As a device in colonial constitutional practice, the 
executive committee system was at once novel and unusually complex. The 
members of the unicameral legislature, the State Council, were grouped into seven 
executive committees,4 with the aim, quite explicitly, of giving them administrative 
experience and political education apart from political responsibility. The members 
of these executive committees elected one of their number as its chairman, the 
latter then becoming the minister in charge of the area or areas of responsibility 
allotted to the committee, and a member of the Board of Ministers. 
This constitutional structure was fundamentally dyarchical as well . While it was 
intended that the elected members should have a large measure of responsibility for 
internal affairs, there were clearly marked limits to their power. Three of the most 
important executive departments were assigned to officers of state, senior British 
officials, with responsibility for these to the governor alone.5 The principal officer of 
state, the chief secretary, was also chairman of the Board of Ministers. The 
vice-chairman was an elected minister who became leader of the State Council, a 
dual position which endowed him with greater political influence than the chairman 
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of the board who did not play any overt political role. In the period covered by this 
volume the former position was held by two men, Sir D B Jayatilaka to the end of 
1942, and from then on by D S Senanayake, the principal Sinhalese politician in the 
negotiations over the transfer of power in the years 1943 to 1947. Apart from the 
executive powers assigned to the officers of state, the governor also had his reserve 
powers. These had been a feature of the constitutions devised in 1920-1924, but now 
they were more precisely defined and strengthened. The governor had at his disposal 
a greater variety of courses of action in matters of paramount importance and in 
emergency situations. 
The leadership of the Ceylon National Congress saw the Donoughmore scheme as 
an outsider's view of what was good for Ceylon and not as a natural stage in the 
political evolution of the country. They had envisaged the introduction of that salient 
feature of the government of colonies elevated to semi-responsible status, the 
orthodox Cabinet form of government, as the logical next step in the slow process of 
constitutional evolution that had begun in 1910, and they neither expected any 
deviation from the norm, nor showed any willingness to accept a new model which 
appeared, by reason of its very novelty, to be inferior in design and functionally 
inadequate for the purposes it was intended to serve. 
Some of the most radical features of the Donoughmore recommendations, those 
relating to the franchise and electoral systems, left their intended beneficiaries 
more bewildered than elated. To avoid what they perceived as the transfer of power 
to a small oligarchy at the expense of the poor, the Donoughmore commissioners 
were quite unwilling to consider the conferment of semi-responsible status on the 
island without introducing at the same time a phenomenal widening of the 
franchise (under the constitution of 1923-1924 only four per cent of the population 
had the vote) . None of the principal political organisations in the island and none 
of the important politicians envisaged any noteworthy widening of the franchise, 
much less advocated it in their evidence before the commission. They were taken 
aback when the Donoughmore commissioners recommended that all males over 
twenty-one and females over thirty should be eligible to vote. In implementing this 
recommendation in 1931, the CO went even further and brought the age limit for 
females down to twenty-one. The scale of the change assumes its true proportions 
when set against a regional and indeed an international perspective.6 Ceylon was 
thus the first British colony in Asia - and indeed the first Asian country - to enjoy 
the benefits and face the challenges of universal franchise. Ceylon's first general 
election under universal franchise was held in 1931, twenty-one years before India's 
first such election, and only two years after Britain's own first general election 
under universal suffrage. 
Just as radical in approach was the commissioners' attitude to the question of 
communal representation. Quite deliberately no provision was made for communal 
representation, although the minorities were almost unanimous in urging that it be 
retained. Unlike the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian constitutional reform, 
the Donoughmore Report took rejection of 'communalism' to its logical conclusion 
by devising an electoral system which made no concession to communal interests. 
Thus the minorities were bitterly hostile to the report because of its forthright 
condemnation of communal representation. 
The recommendation that the franchise be extended to the immigrant Indian 
minority resident in the island - in the main plantation workers- on the same terms 
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as the indigenous population, that is to say, after five years' residence in the country, 
to all British subjects aged twenty-one in the case of males and thirty in the case of 
females, led to a prolonged and acrimonious political dispute in which all the 
important Sinhalese politicians, the Ceylon National Congress leadership no less 
than the more conservative leadership of the Kandyan Sinhalese, 7 found themselves 
ranged against the Donoughmore proposals. The immigrant Indians were eleven per 
cent of the population and their enfranchisement on the liberal terms outlined in the 
Donoughmore Report was seen as a potent political threat to the interests of the 
Sinhalese population in the plantation districts. The Indians were present in some 
districts in such large numbers that the Sinhalese political leadership and especially 
its Kandyan segment was thoroughly disturbed at the possibility of an Indian 
domination of the central highlands of the island if permanent citizenship rights 
were conferred on them on these generous terms. The Donoughmore commissioners 
saw the problem thus: 
The problem of the Indian immigrant labourers is a serious and difficult one and arises 
here in connection with communal representation of the Indian community. There are at 
present about 700,000 of these people in the island, most of them employed on the tea 
and rubber estates at the higher levels where Sinhalese have hitherto been unwilling to 
work in large numbers. Indian Tamils are also engaged as labourers on Government, 
Municipal, or other work in the towns, and are also to be found as traders and 
shopkeepers. The coolie section of the people are not very happily placed in their own 
country of Southern India. Many of them are of the depressed and outcast [sic] class and 
have lived in great poverty, and in many ways their lot in Ceylon is an improvement on 
that of their fellows in South India. At the same time, the conditions of the Indian 
labourer in Ceylon are still capable of improvement, and must be bettered before they can 
be described as satisfactory. 8 
Apart from the sheer size of the numbers to be enfranchised, there were other 
reasons why the recommendations on the franchise for the Indians in the island 
roused the Sinhalese politicians to such intense opposition. First, there was the 
perception among the Sinhalese that the bulk of these people were only temporary 
residents in the island with no permanent interests in it. Almost all of them 
maintained close ties with the villages in southern India whence they or their parents 
came. The frequency with which they visited their villages in southern India, and the 
regular remittances of money they made to them, were seen as evidence of the 
transient nature of their connection with Ceylon where they earned a livelihood and, 
despite their poverty, enjoyed a standard of living well above that of their kinsfolk in 
southern India. Sinhalese politicians firmly believed that the loyalties of these people 
were with India and not with Ceylon. Secondly, there was the ease with which 
impoverished unskilled labour moved to Ceylon from southern India through the 
traditional emigration routes to the plantation districts and elsewhere in search of 
work. The number of Indians entitled to citizenship after five years' residence would 
keep increasing through this immigration process. 
In the Legislative Council, as the national legislature was called in pre-
Donoughmore days, the Donoughmore proposals were adopted by the slimmest of 
margins - 19 to 17 (the vote being restricted by the then governor, Sir Herbert 
Stanley, to the unofficial members) -after a long and acrimonious debate. They were 
adopted at all only because the CO, at the instance of the Ceylon government, 
imposed restrictions on the franchise for Indians resident in Ceylon in modification 
of the Donoughmore proposals, restrictions which were enforced in the face of 
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strong protests from the Indian government and representatives of Indian opinion in 
the island.9 
This compromise saved the Donoughmore Report from defeat in the Legislative 
Council but the problems that arose from the implementation of the formula 
adopted kept the governments of Ceylon and India at loggerheads for much of the 
period covered by this volume. It led to controversies within the island between the 
Sinhalese political leadership and the representatives of the Indians - quite apart 
from disputes between the governor and the Board of Ministers, and between Ceylon 
and India. The CO and the India Office acted as intermediaries between the 
contending parties, the India Office sometimes advocating a parochial point of view. 
All the minority representatives in the Legislative Council voted against the 
acceptance of the Donoughmore proposals, as did two Sinhalese but the reasons 
which caused the latter to vote against were totally different from those which guided 
the representatives of the minorities. The two Sinhalese dissidents voted against the 
Donoughmore proposals because they felt that these did not go far enough in the 
direction of self-government. 
Pressure for reform of the constitution, 1935-1937 
Although the leadership of the Ceylon National Congress and its allies had been 
apprehensive of the effect of universal suffrage on their political fortunes, they 
adjusted to the needs of the new situation with remarkable political skill and alacrity, 
and found to their pleasant surprise that the massive rural vote easily swamped the 
urban vote. Indeed the immediate effect of universal suffrage as demonstrated in the 
general election of 1931 was to help them consolidate their hold on power within the 
State Council, the new national legislature. 
A E Goonesinha, the Labour leader and advocate of universal suffrage, entered the 
State Council with great hopes of establishing himself and his fledgling Labour Party 
as a powerful influence within the legislature but his role turned out to be altogether 
less prominent than what he - and his British Labour Party mentors - had in mind. 
To a large extent this was a reflection of the demographic profile of the country, with 
its small indigenous working class vote overshadowed by the Indians in the 
plantations and to lesser extent in the urban areas, but it also reflected a steady 
erosion of his power in the trade union field in the wake of the extensive 
unemployment that followed the depression. Besides, younger rivals, more doctri-
naire in their radicalism, were in the process of replacing Goonesinha in the 
leadership of the trade union movement and the politics of the urban working class. 
These radical forces had as yet no base in the State Council. Moreover, because of the 
Jaffna boycott of elections, 10 the Tamils were under-represented in the State Council 
and until 1934, when G G Ponnambalam entered the legislature, they had no 
articulate spokesman. 
The Ceylon National Congress leadership and their associates entered the State 
Council and secured election to a majority of places on the Board of Ministers, 
despite their reservations about the new apparatus of government and despite 
fighting the election as individuals and not as members of a political party. They were 
not intent on deliberately wrecking the system. Their objective, on the contrary, was 
to make the system work as well as possible. In doing so they were intent on 
demonstrating their fitness for a more advanced form of self-government than the 
complex and cumbersome Donoughmore structure with its built-in deficiencies. In 
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their strong commitment to constitutional methods of agitation, these tactics and 
strategies had the same self-imposed restraints as those of their predecessors in the 
Legislative Council of the 1920's. Nevertheless they made no secret of their intention 
to agitate for the conventional form of government associated with semi-responsible 
government. Their agitation began from 1932. 
There were three main demands in the 1930's agitation for constitutional reform. 
Of these the most important was pressure for the establishment of a Cabinet form of 
government on the Westminster model in place of the central feature of the 
Donoughmore system, the novel experiment of executive committees. The others 
were the abolition of the dyarchical aspects of the Donoughmore scheme by the 
elimination of the posts of officers of state and the transfer of their powers to elected 
ministers, and a substantial reduction of the governor's powers. 
When these claims first emerged the CO took up the position that it was too early 
to consider changes of so far-reaching a character in a constitution that had taken 
nearly three years to devise. The Board of Ministers might have achieved greater 
success if they had won the support of the minorities for their proposals. This they 
did not have and it weakened their case substantially. The executive committee 
system had less support in the CO - and very soon in the colonial administration in 
the country - than other features of the new constitution, but any willingness there 
might have been to consider a change vanished in the face of persistent claims by the 
minorities that their position vis-a-vis the Sinhalese, weak as it was, could 
deteriorate still further should the executive committees be abolished. By now the 
minorities had the same strong faith in the executive committee system as a buttress 
of their inherently weak political position as they once had in communal (and 
weighted) representation. The executive committee system had enabled them to 
secure the election of two minority representatives as ministers. Hence the decision 
was taken in Whitehall to postpone any consideration of a reform of the constitution 
until after the general election of 1935-1936. 
By the mid-1930's the political situation in the country was changing rapidly, one 
feature of which was the emergence of a marxist challenge to the established 
politicians, and to the urban trade union movement dominated so far by Goonesinha. 
Two marxists, Philip Gunawardena and Dr N M Perera, secured election to the State 
Council at the general election of 1936 as members of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
(LSSP), 11 a significant if numerically meagre reward for an intelligent and vigorously 
conducted campaign in which they had come out strongly against the policies, 
methods and objectives of the Ceylon National Congress and the Labour Party. 
Apart from the marxist challenge to the political establishment in the State 
Council, there were two other noteworthy consequences of the impact of universal 
suffrage on the politics of the country. First, universal suffrage was among the main 
determining factors in the revival of a linkage between nationalism and a Buddhist 
resurgence and the cultural heritage associated with Buddhism. In the perspective of 
the island's long history, this was a more significant development than the entry of 
the marxists into national politics. The leadership in this was taken by S W R D 
Bandaranaike's Sinhala Maha Sabha, the progenitor of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) of today. This form of nationalism was inherently divisive in its impact on the 
politics of this period but no less democratic for that. It was kept in check by the 
duumvirate of Jayatilaka and Senanayake. Secondly, and on a different level, 
universal suffrage was largely responsible for a broad impulse towards social welfare 
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in the Donoughmore era, especially in the period of the second State Council 
(1936-1947) when the political leadership became more responsive to the social and 
economic facets of the resurgence of nationalism. 
When Congress politicians and their sympathisers retained control of the State 
Council at the January 1936 general election, they scarcely revealed any perception 
of a change in the political system. On the contrary their first act was significant in 
underlining their belief that nothing had changed. This was the election of a 
homogeneous Sinhalese Board of Ministers by the device of disposing their 
supporters in the various executive committees according to plan. 12 The 'Pan-
Sinhalese' ministry established through these manoeuvres secured a show of 
unanimity for the demands of the Board of Ministers, but the immediate effect of this 
not too subtle move was to aggravate communal feelings in the island without the 
compensation of impressing on the CO the urgency of the need for a reform of the 
constitution. Nor was the CO persuaded that the new unanimity of views in the board 
was genuine. 
The board treated its return to office as an endorsement of its demand for a further 
measure of constitutional reform, and soon set about the business of outlining its 
proposals . In a memorandum which it eventually submitted to the governor, Sir 
Edward Stubbs, in March 1937,13 the board outlined its priorities on constitutional 
reform: the curtailment of the governor's reserve powers, abolition of the posts of 
officers of state, and the replacement of the executive committees by 'the ordinary 
form' of Cabinet government with a chief minister either invited by the governor to 
form a government or elected by the State Council itself. This memorandum was . 
issued by the Board of Minsters without consulting the State Council. While there 
was general support for the proposals on the officers of state and the governor's 
powers, the minorities continued to express fears that the Cabinet system would 
make it more difficult for them to secure appointment as ministers except on terms 
laid down by the Sinhalese majority. 
Although Stubbs himself felt constrained to agree that the Donoughmore 
constitution was now 'a proved failure', he was far from certain about what should 
take its place; he would not support the demand for a reduction of the governor's 
powers, at any rate not for a long time to come; nor would he agree to abolish the 
posts of officers of state, since he believed that it was too soon to transfer their 
functions to elected ministers. He suggested that the only practicable course of 
action would be to appoint a commission to take a fresh look at the island's problems 
and determine whether a more satisfactory constitution could be devised. 14 
The tempo of these exchanges on constitutional reform quickened with remark-
able suddenness in the first quarter of 1937, the last months of Stubbs's governor-
ship. Through what came to be known as the Bracegirdle incident, the change was 
precipitated by the intrusion of marxist agitation on an issue relating to the balance 
of power in the constitution. Mark Antony Bracegirdle, a young communist from 
Australia (and a recent immigrant there from Britain), had arrived in Ceylon in 1936 
as an employee of a tea estate company. He outraged the planting community by 
taking an interest in trade union activity among the plantation workers, and even 
more by appearing on LSSP platforms in planting districts. He was dismissed from 
his post, and his deportation from Ceylon was arranged mainly between the 
inspector-general of police and the chief secretary on the basis of powers conferred 
on the government by an order-in-council of 1896.15 The deportation order was 
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served on Bracegirdle on 22 April 1937, but before it could be enforced he was 
successfully spirited away by the LSSP. In the meantime legal action was taken 
against the police through a writ of habeas corpus. The validity of the deportation 
order was challenged before the chief justice and the senior puisne justice, who held 
that Bracegirdle could not be deported for exercising his right of free speech, which 
in fact was all he had done.16 
The Bracegirdle incident provoked a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude. 
The basic issue, in brief, was that of relations between ministers and heads of 
government departments within their ministries. More specifically, from the point of 
view of members of the State Council, ever suspicious of the officers of state, one of 
the latter - the chief secretary -was seen to be encroaching on the functions of an 
elected minister, the minister of home affairs, vice-chairman of the board of 
ministers and leader of the State Council, Sir D B Jayatilaka, no less. The uproar that 
ensued surprised Stubbs, and he saw it, quite correctly, as the direct result of the 
intervention of the LSSP, which had ensured that tempers would remain at fever 
heat for as long as possible by taking the issue to the wider public beyond the walls of 
the State Council, within which debates on such issues had been confined in the 
past. By so doing and securing the support on this issue of the Board of Ministers, of 
Goonesinha and the majority of members of the State Council, the LSSP demons-
trated that constitutional negotiations conducted at the official level between 
Whitehall, the governor and the board were strangely remote from the new realities 
of the political situation in the island. Apart from bringing the LSSP into the 
limelight on a national scale and giving it substantial publicity and increased 
popularity, the Bracegirdle incident saw Stubbs receiving a decisive rebuff, and 
Jayatilaka's reputation considerably tarnished as a result of his maladroit handling of 
this issue. 
Caldecott and constitutional reform, 1937-1939 
The CO did not realise that the Board of Ministers was under attack in an altogether 
more systematic manner than before from a younger generation of radical politi-
cians, for otherwise it would hardly have gone ahead as it did, in the aftermath of the 
Bracegirdle incident, with a constitutional amendment strengthening the governor's 
reserve powers. On 10 November 1937 the British Cabinet approved an order-in-
council amending the Donoughmore constitution and bringing it, so far as the 
governor's reserve powers of legislation and control of the civil service were 
concerned, more in line with the Government of India Act of 1935. The order-in-
council was introduced in the island in January 1938. The governor was now 
authorised to legislate independently of the State Council on all matters that 
concerned 'public faith, public order, and the essentials of good government', in a 
manner vitally different from the practice of the past in regard to the exercise of his 
limited powers of 'certification'. He could proclaim his ordinances direct and needed 
only to communicate them to the clerk of the State Council; the council's right to 
discuss or delay such measures was thus removed. The order-in-council caused 
considerable public agitation, and coming as it did in the wake of the Bracegirdle 
crisis, it was assumed that there was a connection between the two. But there was no 
such connection. Indeed senior officials at the CO were very critical of Stubbs's 
actions on the Bracegirdle issue, arguing that he had precipitated the crisis by acting 
without due regard to constitutional practice and plain good sense. 
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A constitutional amendment on these lines had been thought of as early as 1932 
when there were fears (largely in the CO) of a potential breakdown of the 
constitution over a budgetary crisis. Such a breakdown had not occurred. Indeed by 
the end of 1933 the CO was satisfied that the constitution was working as smoothly 
as could have been expected in a period of acute economic crisis, and so the proposed 
amendment was shelved. By the middle of 1935, however, this proposal was revived. 
Not that there had been any constitutional crisis, much less a breakdown: there were 
a few occasions when it became necessary for the governor to use his reserve powers. 
Most, if not all, such instances related to salaries and leave privileges of members of 
the higher bureaucracy, about which Whitehall was especially sensitive. One of the 
disadvantages, as CO officials saw it, of the machinery devised under article 22 of the 
Donoughmore constitution for the use of the governor's reserve powers, was that it 
permitted a debate in the State Council on every occasion when these powers were 
used. As most such debates related to conditions of service of public officers, this 
procedure was regarded with increasing distaste for its presumed demoralising effect 
on the higher bureaucracy (especially the British element in it) . The decision to 
proceed with the amendment to article 22 was hastened by the delaying tactics 
adopted by the State Council, with the connivance of the deputy speaker, in 
1936-1937, over an increase in the salaries of police officers. 
The experience of the years 1936-1937 would seem to indicate that while the 
ministerial group in the island - especially the representatives of the Sinhalese -
believed in the inevitability of progress from semi-responsible status to self-
government on the model of the white dominions, the permanent officials in 
Whitehall held a diametrically opposed view. For them there was no such inevitabil-
ity in constitutional development. They could point to the example of Cyprus and, 
most recently and prominently, to that of Malta, where semi-responsible status had 
not led to responsible government but to political crisis, constitutional breakdown 
and a reversion, if only temporarily, to direct British ruleY The concurrent 
constitutional crisis in Malta must, no doubt, have weighed heavily with the 
permanent officials in the CO as they viewed the situation in Ceylon, and affected to 
notice signs of incipient crisis in the legislators' pique over the fringe benefits of the 
higher bureaucracy. 
But the starting point of a clear understanding of events in the final phase of the 
transfer of power in Ceylon is a realisation of the breakthrough that came in 
1937-1938 when two men of liberal instincts, Malcolm MacDonald as secretary of 
state and Caldecott as governor, brought fresh and unorthodox minds to bear on the 
problems of constitutional reform in the island. Within days of his arrival in the 
island, Caldecott had to cope with the political fall-out from the Bracegirdle incident, 
an unusually difficult if not inauspicious start. He found that the island's political 
establishment in the form of the Board of Ministers was intent on bringing the 
dispute to an end for two reasons. First, they realised that the only beneficiary of its 
prolongation would be the LSSP. But more important, there was the expectation that 
with the arrival of a new governor their campaign for constitutional reform could be 
resumed in more propitious circumstances than under his predecessor. The CO for 
its part was agreeable to this but the Board of Ministers was unaware of the price they 
were expected to pay for it - the amendment to article 22 of the Donoughmore 
constitution. Once the order-in-council embodying this amendment had been 
approved by the CO, a despatch was prepared informing the governor that the 
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constitution of the colony would be modified in certain directions more acceptable to 
ministers after examination by the governor and possibly by a further commission of 
inquiry. This, it was maintained, would help reduce the level and range of criticism 
of the amendment that was to be introduced. 
The despatch, dated 25 November 1937, made no reference to the appointment or 
sending of a commission, but asked Caldecott to review the constitutional problems 
of the island on his own by seeking the views of all sections of opinion in the island, 
and to make a report as soon as he had time to form his own conclusions. Caldecott 
himself was not in favour of a commission sent from Britain. He believed that the 
governor of the colony was in a much better position to conduct the preliminary 
negotiations on the reform of the constitution than a commission. The first six 
months of his stay in the island were spent in studying memoranda on reform of the 
constitution submitted in response to his request from the Board of Ministers, state 
councillors representing minority interests, and from numerous political and 
communal associations and interested individuals. 
The initial response to the publication of the order-in-council on the change in the 
machinery of the governor's reserve powers had ranged from pained surprise on the 
part of the Board of Ministers to vigorous protests from the LSSP, but once the 
former decided to treat it as a peripheral issue that could be conceded without too 
much objection in the greater interest of a comprehensive reform of the constitution 
on which Caldecott was intent, the original tempo of the discussions initiated by him 
was sustained without any serious interruption. This order-in-council was regarded 
as a minor inconvenience rather than a serious setback by all except the LSSP. 
The 'fifty-fifty' campaign 
Between January and May 1938 Caldecott received eleven formal deputations which 
placed before him a bewildering array of views ranging from demands for a limitation 
of the franchise, the establishment of a second chamber, to the 'fifty-fifty demand' 
then being advanced by Ponnambalam, the principal leader of the Tamils, which 
envisaged an equal apportionment of seats in the State Council between the 
Sinhalese majority and the minorities collectively. The climax of the 'fifty-fifty' 
campaign18 directed by Ponnambalam on behalf of the coalition of minorities he had 
organised came in later years. 
The term 'fifty-fifty' was, in fact, no more than a slogan, a simplification of a rather 
complex set of proposals first devised by Ponnambalam in 1937. His scheme involved 
a complicated system of multiple weightages in a combination of territorial and 
communal representation supposed to ensure the reinstatement of the constitution-
al concept of 'balanced representation' by which was meant that no single ethnic 
group would be able to out-vote a combination of the others. It was, in brief, a return 
to the electoral system of the 1920's- the so-called Manning constitutions19 - but 
modified to accommodate the principle of universal suffrage. 
That Jayatilaka and Senanayake opposed this scheme was not a matter for surprise. 
Ponnambalam found that Caldecott was not more favourably disposed towards these 
claims than the two Sinhalese leaders. Very soon the governor became inflexibly 
opposed to the scheme in all its permutations. In June 1938 in a despatch which 
came to be known as his reforms despatch he informed the CO: 
I have made known my opposition to what is called here the "fifty-fifty" demand. That is 
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that seats in the State Council should be apportioned half to 'the majority community' i.e. 
t~e Sinhalese, and half to the 'minority communities'. I am similarly opposed to the 
'sixty-forty demand' and to any other form of fractional representation on a race basis. 
The elected seats must in my opinion continue to be filled on a territorial franchise 
though (as will emerge later in this despatch) I would gladly see the electoral areas so 
constituted as to afford a chance of more seats for members of minority communities .... 
My reason for opposition to the 'fifty-fifty demand' or to any modification of it is that any 
concession to the principle of communal representation would perpetuate sectionalism 
(which I believe to be anathema to thinking people in Ceylon of all races) and preclude 
the emergence of the political issues. To ease the present position by affording a chance of 
more seats for minority candidates is one thing; to introduce the principle of representa-
tion of minorities on any mathematical formula is quite another. ... 
I am in favour of re-shaping, and adding to the number of electoral areas in order to 
afford more chances for minority candidates. Redelimitation is also necessary in the 
Kandyan areas in order that the Kandyan interest, which is that of an agricultural 
pea~gntry, may not be swamped by the Indian interest which is that of plantation labour. 
Caldecott stated that he had a number of specific proposals for these purposes, but 
that he was not prepared to sponsor any of them until they were examined by a 
delimitation committee. He recommended the following terms of reference for that 
committee: 
To consider the present electoral areas of the island and to advise what changes or 
additions could be reasonably made with a view to affording more chances for the return 
of candidates belonging to the minority communities and to securing adequate repre-
sentation of the Kandyan rural interests.21 
Caldecott's forthright rejection of what was popularly called the 'fifty-fifty' demand 
was an unexpected and insuperable setback to Ponnambalam and other advocates of 
it. 
The rhetorical excesses of this campaign, and the political posturing associated 
with it, alienated large sections of Sinhalese opinion. Apart from conferring a greater 
political acceptability on communal organisations such as the Sinhala Maha Sabha, 
which was as committed to emphasising ethnic identity as the central motivating 
force in political organisation and activity as Ponnambalam himself, it eventually lost 
the support of other minority groups, especially the Muslims, who came to view the 
'fifty-fifty' campaign as a self-destructive pursuit of excessive political demands. More 
important, memories of it lingered on long after the campaign itself had petered out 
in the mid-1940's. The result was to arouse Sinhalese suspicions about demands for a 
federal political structure which emerged in the late 1940's from Tamil politicians 
whose entry into national politics had been through the 'fifty-fifty' campaign. 
The distinguishing feature of Caldecott's reforms despatch of June 1938 was his 
forthright but carefully considered rejection of the executive committee system. He 
recommended that it be replaced by a Cabinet form of government in which a 
member of the legislature, most likely to command the support of a majority there, 
would be chosen as chief minister by the governor. The officers of state would not be 
members of such a ministry. Many of their functions and responsibilities would be 
transferred to the appropriate ministries. Indeed Caldecott came to attach as much 
importance to the introduction of a Cabinet form of government as the Board of 
Ministers itself. The success of democracy in Ceylon, he argued, would depend 
greatly on the discipline and drive which party loyalties alone could infuse into a 
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democratic political system. He seized upon one of the noticeable shortcomings of 
the country's evolving political structure, namely its underdeveloped if not inchoate 
party system, and argued that one of the great advantages of Cabinet government was 
that it would stimulate the development of a dynamic and competitive party system. 
One link in the reforms he advocated placed him at odds with most sections of 
opinion in the State Council. This was his insistence that the advance to responsible 
government would have to be accompanied, as a temporary measure, by an increase 
instead of a substantial reduction in the governor's reserve powers. 
On 10 November 1938 MacDonald sent Caldecott a short formal reply to his 
reforms despatch and expressed general agreement with the principal recommenda-
tion it embodied, namely the replacement of the executive committee system by a 
Cabinet form of government. Caldecott was instructed to publish his reforms 
proposals and to submit them for discussion in the State Council. This he proceeded 
to do. 
The debate which began on 9 May 1939 continued over the next two months and 
was concluded on 12 July 1939. With all restrictions on the length of speeches 
removed, the debate itself turned out to be the most exhaustive review of the 
constitutional structure of the country ever attempted up to that time by the 
national legislature. Caldecott's proposals were introduced in the form of a series of 
resolutions and these were dissected with a thoroughness that had seldom been seen 
before in discussions of constitutional reform. All the proposals were adopted after 
prolonged discussion and without substantial modification. These included a 
resolution supporting the appointment of a commission from Britain to review 
constitutional reform in Ceylon. The prime movers of this last recommendation were 
the minorities, including representatives of British commercial interests in the 
country. It was the only one on which Caldecott was lukewarm, not unsympathetic. 
Thus a consensus on constitutional reform had been successfully negotiated by 
Caldecott by mid-1939. A decisive breakthrough had been achieved and the stage was 
set for one more step in the country's constitutional evolution to responsible 
government. 
The formulation of a constitution on the basis of the consensus that had emerged 
in support of Caldecott's proposals was bound to be a time-consuming affair. The CO 
was nothing if not slow and deliberate in these matters at the best of times. The 
Office had hardly begun the process of examining Caldecott's long despatch, 
reviewing the debate of March-July 1939, when war broke out in Europe. This had an 
immediate dampening effect on the CO mandarinate which was now not inclined to 
expend time and energy on any serious consideration of constitutional reform in 
Ceylon. 
Part I: The Second World War and the Sou/bury Commission 
Although the island served as an important base of operations in the allied campaign 
against Japan and from which arms and equipment were dispatched to the allied 
forces in the Persian Gulf, the impact of the Second World War on Ceylon is one of 
the least researched aspects of its modern history. The neglect of this important 
theme can be explained by two factors. First, there was no invasion of the island and 
only the barest minimum of air attacks. Secondly, as a British colony, Ceylon's entry 
into the war was decided upon by the metropolitan power. The political leadership of 
the mainstream nationalist movement who shared power with the British colonial 
INTRODUCTION xlvii 
administration actively supported the war effort, unlike their Indian and Burmese 
counterparts. Thus association in the war effort, indeed active participation in it, did 
not lead to any notable political agitation and controversy and the war left few scars 
in the collective memory of the people of Ceylon. 
After the Japanese conquest of the British, French and Dutch possessions in 
South-East Asia, Ceylon became the principal if not the sole supplier of rubber to the 
allied powers. In order to meet an insatiable wartime demand for this vitally 
important commodity, Ceylon's rubber plantations were tapped far beyond the 
generally accepted production norms- 'slaughter-tapping', the technical term used 
for this process, conveys the meaning most appropriately. The island was not 
threatened by invasion until the first quarter of 1942, after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and the surrender of the British, French, Dutch and American colonies to the 
Japanese. In April1942 there were two Japanese air-raids on the island, on Colombo 
and its suburbs and on Trincomalee. The damage inflicted was not severe, except on 
the morale of the civilian population. There was no Japanese follow-up to these raids 
and the threat receded in time. By 1943 the tide had begun to turn in favour of the 
allies in the war against Japan, and the decision taken at the Quebec conference to 
establish the South-East Asia Command was an important landmark in this. In 
mid-April1944 the headquarters of SEAC were shifted to Ceylon and to the town of 
Kandy in particular (178). 
Michael Tomlinson's The Most Dangerous Moment22 deals in detail with the 
Japanese threat to Ceylon in early 1942. The author, an airman stationed in the 
island and personally involved in the events of that momentous year, regrets that 
historians have 'touched only briefly and generally obliquely on the Japanese Navy's 
only major offensive westwards'. History, according to Tomlinson, 'has almost 
forgotten' the April raids and the impact that they made. He points out that 
Churchill himself regarded 1942, when the Japanese fleet which had attacked Pearl 
Harbor was approaching Ceylon, 'as the most dangerous moment of the Second 
World War, and the moment which caused him the most alarm' . In assessing the 
significance of the events described in his book, Tomlinson asserts that the Japanese 
air-raids on Ceylon in April 1942 were 'the furthest incursions westwards that the 
Japanese were ever to make by land, sea or air, with all its trenchant and catastrophic 
possibilities'.23 He concedes that 'the operation ... neither much hastened defeat 
nor ultimate victory, nor led to irreparable losses or material gains to either side'. 
Nevertheless, 'it is only too easy to overlook the enormous importance which was 
attached to these events at the time or to underrate the consternation and gloom 
which prevailed in the British camp as the Japanese swept ever westwards and there 
seemed no holding them'.24 
The postponement of constitutional reform 
As early as the first week of October 1939 the CO had decided that constitutional 
reform in Ceylon should be postponed until after the war (2). The Office was 
strengthened in this decision by Ponnambalam's message sent on behalf of the 
minorities on 18 October 1939 that they had suspended all political activities on the 
reform of the constitution as it was felt that the country should not be distracted by 
any political controversy at this juncture (4). Minority representatives repeated this a 
month later in a statement which went on to say that they had suspended political 
agitation for the duration of the war (13). Thus the consensus reached though 
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prolonged debate in the State Council in March-July 1939 was being undermined by 
the minorities' decision to wait for more settled times. 
The first inkling of a change in the CO attitude, if not policy, on constitutional 
reform in Ceylon reached Caldecott by the beginning of 1940. In a despatch of 26 
January MacDonald, much to Caldecott's surprise, rejected the idea of a delimitation 
committee or commission which the latter had always treated as crucially important 
to his reforms proposals (9, 23) . Instead three options were proposed, the first of 
which was a governor's conference at which the Board of Ministers would meet other 
leaders - presumably the leaders of the minority groups - to negotiate a settlement 
of existing differences between the Sinhalese and the minorities. The second was a 
constitutional conference in London (MacDonald himself admitted that this would 
be difficult in wartime) and the third was a round table conference, after the war, of 
all important groups. Above all it was suggested that the general election, the third 
under universal suffrage and scheduled for 1941, should be postponed. Thus the only 
option really available to Caldecott was the first and with regard to that neither he 
nor the ministers were very enthusiastic especially after the time and energy spent 
debating and writing on constitutional reform over the two previous years. 
While MacDonald and his officials at the CO were reluctant to consider reform of 
the constitution because of the outbreak of war, they nevertheless encouraged a 
far-reaching change in the balance of power between the Board of Ministers and their 
executive committees. In a minute he wrote on 3 October 1939 MacDonald stated 
that he regretted that Ceylon did not have a Board of Ministers that really worked as a 
responsible Cabinet in all matters which came under its purview (2). His officials had 
come to the same conclusion. They encouraged the governor to permit the Board of 
Ministers to operate as a quasi-Cabinet. Thus while the executive committees 
continued to exist, they were reduced in all but name to the status of advisory 
standing committees, a trend which was strengthened by the operation of two other 
factors. First, wartime spending in Ceylon and a more buoyant economy placed 
greater resources than ever before at the disposal of the ministers and these they 
used to good effect in keeping members of executive committees busy and happy 
with projects in which they were interested. Later, in March 1942, a War Council was 
established and the Board of Ministers became members. All important decisions 
relating to the conduct of the war were taken in the War Council rather than by the 
board and the executive committees (124). 
The Board of Ministers was unaware, until late in 1941, that Whitehall had decided 
that reform of the constitution would not be taken up during wartime. The ministers 
believed that the CO - despite the outbreak of war in Europe - would have these 
matters under active consideration on the data already available (14). Caldecott 
himself was not unsympathetic to this view and persisted in his campaign for 
constitutional reform despite the war in Europe (36, 40, 42, 44, 47, 51) . 
In the early months of 1940 Caldecott was under increasing pressure from British 
planting and commercial interests in the island, especially the former, to take firm 
action against trade unionists in plantation areas (12, 26). The LSSP had created 
considerable apprehension among the planters by sponsoring a series of strikes 
(accompanied by sporadic acts of violence) in some of the plantation districts. This 
was part of an attempt by the LSSP to break into the trade union monopoly in the 
plantations held by the traditional Indian leadership. Although they made little 
headway against the latter, they nevertheless succeeded in disturbing the planters to 
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a greater degree than the Indian plantation trade union leadership because of the 
nature of their propaganda and techniques of agitation - their anti-British and 
anti-imperialist slogans, their advocacy of class conflict and violence and spectacular 
shows of strength. The planters and British officials - but not the governor -were 
perturbed and from the planters came insistent demands for pre-emptive punitive 
action against the LSSP before it could establish a bridgehead in the plantation 
districts. 
The planting community, rattled and frightened, were increasingly hostile to all 
political activity in the island. British mercantile and planting communities were not 
without influence within the island itself. With the active support of the British-
owned Times of Ceylon they sought to exploit the extraordinary situation caused by 
the outbreak of war to embarrass Caldecott by making out to Whitehall that he was 
not as vigilant as he ought to be about potential threats to civil order. Many of these 
were hysterical outbursts rather than sensible criticisms, but Caldecott would not be 
diverted from his own way of handling these matters and refused to take hasty action. 
The Times of Ceylon began a political campaign designed to exploit minority 
grievances and fears and to thwart the reformers among whom was placed Caldecott 
himself. In a leading article on 16 March 1940, it set out the case for a Royal 
Commission on constitutional reform and this was taken up by the minorities. The 
ministers - and the governor himself- were wary of any such commission and were 
much more favourable to Caldecott's proposal for a delimitation commission. Yet 
another point of divergence between them and the minorities had emerged, and one 
that was to cloud the whole issue of constitutional reform in Ceylon. It gave strength 
to the arguments of those in the CO who believed that agitation for constitutional 
reform would inevitably exacerbate communal rivalries to the detriment of the 
island's war effort. 
In the meantime an incident arising out of a strike on a plantation in Hevahata 
near Kandy - Mool-oya estate - in January 1940 triggered another political and 
constitutional crisis (21) . The Mool-oya crisis25 was the direct result of the LSSP's 
campaign of establishing itself as a plantation trade union. The LSSP moved in once 
more to seize the initiative in a bid to repeat its successful stage-managing of the 
Bracegirdle affair, but the Board of Ministers, with Senanayake assuming the 
leadership, handled the situation much more astutely than it had over the 
Bracegirdle affair. 
The State Council appointed a commission of inquiry to report on these incidents, 
and the inspector-general of police was directed by the minister of home affairs 
(Jayatilaka) to instruct police officers not to actively oppose any applications for the 
postponement of cases concerning the Mool-oya incident filed in the magistrate's 
court of Kandy, until the commission had completed its investigations and had 
reported to the council. The inspector-general of police refused to carry out these 
instructions on the grounds that the minister's decisions had neither been autho-
rised by the executive committee of home affairs nor ratified by the governor in 
accordance with article 45 of the order-in-council of 1931. When Caldecott upheld 
the action of the inspector-general of police, the Board of Ministers resigned on 27 
February 1940. It was their contention that article 45 had never before been strictly 
observed in practice. This well-publicised resignation focused attention on the 
constitutional issues involved. The flurry of telegrams between Colombo and 
London, of which a few are reproduced here, captures some of the drama and 
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excitement of this episode (27-32) . But behind it all there was a reluctance on both 
sides - the governor no less than the Board of Ministers - to permit a breakdown in 
the governmental machinery, in the certain knowledge that it would only strengthen 
the LSSP even further. The governor's interpretation of the rules regarding the 
working of the executive committee system, made in the wake of the Mool-oya affair, 
greatly strengthened the position of the minister as chairman of the committee as 
against the committee itself, particularly in the vitally important sphere of initiating 
action in directing administrative policy. The ministers were happy with this. 
Caldecott, for his part, was keeping within the framework of policy of the 
strengthening the powers of the ministers vis-a-vis the executive committees which 
the CO was intent on implementing. 
For the LSSP this episode made a big difference. Caldecott ordered their arrest and 
detention in July 1940, giving in at last to pressure from the planters and the CO (50, 
52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 63) . 
Indo-Ceylon negotiations 
Throughout the years 1939 to 1948 the voting rights of Indians resident in the island 
continued to be a highly sensitive political issue. This was - as we shall see - partly 
because the modifications of the Donoughmore proposals on the franchise of the 
Indians resident in the island did not prove to be as effective as Sinhalese politicians 
were assured, and believed, they would be. There was also, in 1937, a controversy 
over the franchise of Indian plantation workers in local government elections at the 
village level. 
Under the provisions of Ordinance 13 of 1889, Europeans, Burghers26 and Indian 
plantation workers had been excluded from the franchise in elections to village 
committees. The rationale for this denial of voting rights was that none of these 
groups paid taxes to such committees, or formed an integral part of the village 
community served by such committees and could not possibly benefit from the social 
objects these councils were designed to provide. When this ordinance was amended 
in 1924 the exclusion of these groups was retained. Representatives of Indian opinion 
in the island acquiesced in it on that occasion, and indeed raised no objections until 
1937. 
In 1937 a more comprehensive amendment of Ordinance 13 of 1889 was 
attempted and implemented on the initiative of Bandaranaike, the minister of local 
government. Plantations were included within the area of operations of such 
committees and, in addition to the existing commutation tax, provision was made for 
a land tax on an acreage basis as an alternative method of village taxation. But the 
more controversial amendment concerned the continued exclusion of Indian 
plantation workers from the franchise while Europeans and Burghers were now 
given the right to vote at village committee elections. Representatives of Indian 
opinion reversed their previous and long-established acceptance of the exclusion of 
Indian plantation workers from the franchise at village committee level, and 
protested against their exclusion under the terms of Bandaranaike's amending 
ordinance, charging that it was a clear case of ethnic discrimination. 
More important still, Ponnambalam made a significant entry into this debate as a 
champion of the rights of the Indians. In the early 1930's, when, in modification of 
the recommendations of the Donoughmore scheme, the Ceylon (State Council 
Elections) Order-in-Council of 1931 had imposed restrictions on the voting rights of 
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the Indians resident in Ceylon, Tamil politicians in Jaffna and elsewhere had paid 
little or no heed to the protests from the Indian Tamil leadership in the island. 
Ponnambalam, in a notable reversal of this attitude, came out in 1937 as a defender 
of the rights of the Indian Tamils. He was hoping thereby to enlarge the composition 
of the minorities coalition he led, and an advocacy of unrestricted voting rights for 
Indians in Ceylon became a staple element in his political campaigns in the late 
1930's and early 1940's. 
Ponnambalam's intervention strengthened the resolve of Sinhalese politicians to 
stand firm against the inclusion of plantation workers in yet another area of political 
activity. The numbers of such workers on the electoral roll in the country had 
increased far beyond the limits envisaged by the Sinhalese politicians when they had 
accepted the restrictions on the voting rights of Indians introduced through the 1931 
order-in-council. As a result of the controversy that ensued, the bill passed by the 
State Council was not approved, in its intended form, by the CO. Instead, at the 
suggestion of the then secretary of state, the amending bill was itself amended by the 
exclusion from the village committee franch ise of all plantation workers irrespective 
of ethnic identity. The vast majority of plantation workers were Indians, but by 
making the restriction general rather than specific, the amendment was made more 
acceptable to the colonial administration in the island if not to representatives of 
Indian opinion.27 r 
Much of the opposition to the extension of the franchise in village committee 
elections to Indian plantation workers stemmed from dissatisfaction among 
Sinhalese politicians with the working of articles 7 and 9 of the order-in-council. 
Article 9 had been devised to provide enfranchisement of Indians who had difficulty 
in proving domicile of choice under article 7 where the requirement was five years' 
residence. Applicants for certificates of permanent settlement under article 9 were 
required, not merely to make a declaration that they were permanently settled in the 
island but also to renounce claims to rights and privileges which, under the existing 
laws of the land, were not common to all British subjects. Also registration under 
article 7 was found to be much easier than anticipated, partly at least, because British 
officials in charge of enforcing the law were inclined to be less exacting and 
demanding than the spirit if not letter of the law warranted, to say nothing of the 
assurances given on these matters to Sinhalese politicians in 1931. Registration 
through article 7 proved to be so uncomplicated that not many Indians resorted to 
article 9. 
The number of Indians registered as voters stood at around 100,000 in 1931; it 
rose to 145,000 in 1936, at the time of the second general election to the State 
Council, and to 225,000 in 1939.28 This steep increase led to strong protests from 
Sinhalese politicians against what they described as laxity in registration procedure. 
With a general election scheduled for early 1941 this pressure increased. 
Caldecott responded by ordering a tightening of the rules and regulations on 
registration in 1940 (45, 49, 54). By 1943 the number of Indians on the electoral 
registers had dropped to 168,000. Even so only two per cent of Indian registrations 
were obtained through certificates of permanent settlement under article 9. Thus 
Sinhalese grievances against the registration procedure remained almost undimi-
nished from what they had been before 1940, while Indian opinion was invariably 
hostile to the insistence on a stricter adherence to the requirements of the law in 
regard to the registration of Indians as voters (58). 
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With the depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's, working class Indians in 
the urban areas, especially in and around Colombo, were resented as competitors in a 
tight labour market. The plantation workers were seen - to a greater extent than in 
the past - as a privileged group, and trade union leaders like Goonesinha, who had 
earlier worked with their Indian counterparts in the island and championed the 
cause of the underprivileged workers, indigenous and Indian alike, turned against 
the latter. 
Above all the depression focused jealous attention on a small but wealthy section 
of the Indian community in the island; on the Indian moneylenders foreclosing on 
mortgages on land and houses, and on Indian traders who controlled the wholesale 
distribution of textiles, rice and other food items and who held a commanding 
position in their retail distribution throughout the island. The prominence attained 
in their respective spheres by the moneylenders and traders attracted hostile 
criticism towards the Indian community as a whole. At a time of high unemploy-
ment, vocal sections of the Sinhalese, including influential politicians, feared that 
their economic and political interests were under threat from the Indian minority in 
the island. 
The Board of Ministers, with J L Kotelawela, the minister of transport and works, 
in the lead, responded by imposing restrictions, in 1939, on the employment of 
Indians in government service. These restrictions affected skilled as well as unskilled 
workers employed on the railways, in road construction and in sanitation services 
among others. The Government of India retaliated by placing an embargo on the 
emigration to Ceylon of unskilled labour from India, which in turn inevitably 
produced an outcry from the planters who feared that the supply of Indian labour on 
which they were so dependent would be reduced as a result (6, 7, 8, 10). A partial ban 
on the emigration of unskilled labour from India had first been imposed in 1937 as a 
retaliatory measure during the controversy over votes for Indian plantation workers 
in village council elections. Over and above all this the voting rights of Indians in 
Ceylon became a matter of acute controversy in early 1940. KW Blaxter, a principal 
in the CO Eastern Department, provided a succinct summary of the issues involved: 
On the existing register of voters a large number of Indians have been wrongly included 
owing to the lax interpretation of a memorandum by the Legal Secretary. The Board of 
Ministers are assuming that the election next January [ie January 1941] will duly take 
place and it is therefore necessary during the present year to carry out a further revision 
of the register. The Legal Secretary has recently issued a further memorandum 
impressing upon the registering authorities the procedure they must adopt for enrolling 
Indian voters. The strict observance of this memorandum will result in the removal of a 
large number of voters from the rolls. The Ministers have become thoroughly alarmed by 
the realization of what the position is and are not disposed to introduce in the State 
Council the necessary financial supplementary estimate for the money required to carry 
out the revision of the register until certain changes have been made in the Elections 
Order in Council relating to Indian voters. They wish the Order in Council to be amended 
so as to provide for the payment of a rupee fee and also to ensure that Indians who obtain 
the vote in Ceylon should renounce the special privileges which they had as Indians. They 
propose to move a resolution in the State Council on the 14 May to the effect that the 
serious condition of the Electoral Register demands that immediate steps be taken to give 
effect to paragraph 35 of Sir Herbert Stanley's despatch of the 2nd June 1929 and to 
paragraph 10 of Lord Passfield's despatch of the lOth October 1929.29 
These conflicts showed little signs of abating, wartime conditions notwithstand-
ing. Two integral units of the empire were bickering like two sovereign states over 
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the protection of their respective interests, almost oblivious to the larger interests of 
an empire whose very existence was under severe threat from its enemies. Caldecott 
himself was aware of the dangers of the continuation of this conflict and endeavoured 
to cool tempers among Ceylon's politicians. He realised that the planters were 
apprehensive about the threat posed to the efficient running of their plantations 
from potential labour shortages as a result of the Indian ban on the emigration of 
unskilled labour. In addition there were hints, from India, of trade sanctions. The CO 
was anxious that these controversies should be brought to an end through a process 
of negotiation (17,19). 
Attempts at resolving these issues had been made towards the end of 1939 but 
these failed almost at once. A terse communique issued by the Government of India 
on 5 January 1940 announced the failure of the talks (18). In the meantime the 
Government of Ceylon, under pressure from the Board of Ministers, proceeded with 
its plans to tighten the regulations on registering Indians resident in the island. The 
Indian government was perturbed and sought an opportunity to comment on the 
changes proposed. In early July 1940 moves were afoot to resume talks between the 
two governments (58, 59). The CO suggested on 15 July that the first discussions 
should be of an exploratory nature, a proposal that found acceptance both in 
Colombo and Delhi, the latter being chosen as the venue. 
From the time the resumption of the talks was announced on 14 August 1940 the 
two governments as well as the CO found themselves involved in an attempt to 
discourage politicians in the Ceylon delegation from meeting their Indian counter-
parts (62, 64, 70). This was more difficult than usual because at the same time a 
delegation from the Ceylon National Congress was attending the annual session of 
the Indian National Congress; the delegation included some members of the Board of 
Ministers. On 22 October 1940 Caldecott sought to reassure the viceroy by stating 
that any conversation between Ceylon ministers and Indian political leaders would be 
strictly unofficial and informal (73). 
Representatives of the two governments met to discuss outstanding issues at 
informal and preparatory talks in Delhi in November 1940. The four-member 
ministerial delegation from Ceylon was led by Senanayake and included G C S Corea, 
minister for labour, industry and commerce, Bandaranaike, and a British official, H J 
Huxham, the financial secretary. The talks soon produced a deadlock. In their official 
report the delegation from Colombo stated: 'As no agreement could be reached on 
the question of the status of Indian immigrants in Ceylon, the Indian delegation was 
unwilling to proceed to the consideration of other questions noted for discussion. 
The talks thus came to an end' (74, 75) . 
Struggling hard to control the damage to Indo-Ceylon relations that could have 
flowed from the abrupt failure of these preparatory talks, Caldecott successfully 
prevailed upon the Ceylon ministers in the official delegation not to publish, at once, 
their version of the breakdown. The governor feared that any hasty public official 
statement by the ministers could make things worse than they already were (76). He 
succeeded in this to the extent that no official statement was issued, but he could not 
prevent Senanayake from making a reference to the talks in the course of his address 
at the annual session of the Ceylon National Congress on 22 December 1940. 
Senanayake's strident explanation of why, in his opinion, the talks in Delhi had 
failed, was given wide coverage and great prominence to in the local newspapers (79; 
also 82, 83, 89). 
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Caldecott was now intent on patching up this quarrel between his ministers and 
the Indian government and decided to make a statement to the State Council on the 
undertakings which Ceylon had given to India on the treatment of Indians in Ceylon, 
and which were still valid obligations (84). He felt this course of action to be essential 
'as being the only way of reassuring India of the bona fides of the Ceylon government, 
and of inducing the Ceylon politicians to adopt a realistic approach to the Indian 
question in the island' .30 
The text of this statement was agreed upon between Colombo and the CO and was 
conveyed to the State Council on 5 February 1941. However, the governor's attempt 
at mediation succeeded only in aggravating the situation. The Board of Ministers 
strongly protested against the statement and proceeded with plans to introduce 
legislation to control immigration to the island, and for the registration of resident 
Indians (86, 88) . 
It was against this background that Caldecott persuaded the Board of Ministers to 
make another effort at reaching an agreement on outstanding issues with the 
Government of India. This second round of talks was held in Colombo in September 
1941 between a delegation led by Sir G S Bajpai and a delegation of Ceylon 
ministers and officials.31 Both sides were in a more conciliatory mood on this 
occasion, the Ceylonese more so than the Indians. The Ceylon delegation offered the 
status of permanent settlers- with the right to vote- to all Indians with a minimum 
of seven years residence in the island, with all those admitted to the country there-
after being treated as temporary residents. This was part of a six-point formula 
offered by the Ceylon delegation. An agreement was reached and initialled on this 
basis on this occasion, but significantly the Indian government, under pressure from 
the leadership of the Indians resident in Ceylon, failed to ratify it even though its 
terms were published. 
Wartime conditions and the revival of pressure for constitutional reform 
Britain's energies were now concentrated on the war in Europe and the constitution-
al problems of a small Asian colony took very low priority in this. With MacDonald's 
departure from the CO on 13 May 1940, there were three short tenures of the 
secretaryship of state for the colonies between that date and 24 November 1942 when 
Oliver Stanley took over and remained in office until August 1945. All the secretaries 
of state during this period - Lords Lloyd, Moyne and Cranborne - were coalition 
Conservatives, as was Stanley himself. 
It came as no great surprise to Caldecott when, on 18 December 1940, Lloyd sent 
him a telegram stating the impracticability of further examining the constitutional 
problems of the island before the end of the war (78). This was not immediately 
divulged to the ministers, much less published. Instead Caldecott played for time in 
the hope that Whitehall could be persuaded to make a more generous response (81, 
97) . Even at this stage the ministers and other Sinhalese spokesmen felt that the CO 
was unnecessarily delaying a decision on a matter on which it possessed all the 
relevant data. The governor realised that there was no support for a constitutional 
conference or a commission from these sources in the colony. Instead he reverted to 
the proposals put forward in his despatch of October 1939 (9), with minor 
modifications (100). The governor's arguments made little impression on the CO, 
although some officials were prepared to acknowledge that it would be difficult for 
Britain to impose a solution (101-103). Eventually, an official announcement -
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approved by the War Cabinet in August 1941, communicated to the Board of 
Ministers in September and placed before the State Council in late October - was 
made to the effect that constitutional reform was postponed until the war was over, 
and that the position would be examined afresh by a committee or conference 
thereafter (106). This declaration was tantamount to an indefinite postponement of 
constitutional reform. It was clearly a disappointment for the Board of Ministers but 
they reacted as was customary with a polite note of disagreement and continued to 
press for a more generous gesture from Britain (107, 109- 112). 
Caldecott now watched the consensus on constitutional reform which he had 
patiently put together in 1938-1939 dissolve in the face of world events and their 
impact on local politics. At the beginning of 1942 the moderate wing- by far the 
most influential - of the nationalist movement was no longer bound by the 
1938--1939 consensus and had set out dominion status as its objective. Within a year 
a group of young men, with J R Jayewardene and Dudley Senanayake (Senanayake's 
elder son) among the most prominent of them, persuaded the Ceylon National 
Congress to spurn dominion status for the more emotionally satisfying and 
politically attractive concept of independence. It needed all Senanayake's personal 
prestige and tenacity of purpose to stand up against this current of opinion, and to 
insist that the goal of Ceylon's constitutional evolution should be dominion status, to 
be attained in association with, rather than in opposition, to Britain. At this stage, 
Caldecott was not enthusiastic about dominion status for Ceylon, arguing that 'it is 
obvious that the implications and obligations of Dominion Status are either not 
understood or are being deliberately ignored by people who should know better' 
(113). 
Japan's entry into the war in 1941 and the string of spectacular successes she 
achieved initially had an immediate impact on the thinking both of Whitehall and the 
Board of Ministers. Caldecott reported, at the end of 1941, that these developments 
'thrust every other consideration out of mind, and everybody [has] plenty to do in 
organizing services and preventing panic' (113) . Ceylon was by now a frontline state 
in the war against Japan. Caldecott never had to worry about the political loyalties of 
the Board of Ministers. Whitehall, for its part, understood the new strategic 
significance of the island and the new secretary of state, Lord Cranborne, explained 
CO thinking on this to Caldecott in a telegram of 3 March 1942 (118). This was 
followed on 5 March by a directive from the Chiefs of Staff on the appointment of 
Vice Admiral Sir G Layton as commander-in-chief of the British forces in the island 
(119). 
Layton's appointment was important on its own because of its regional military 
significance, for earlier, on 17 November 1941, the island had been placed under the 
commander-in-chief, India, and Major General R D Inskip had been appointed 
general officer commanding the troops in the island. Locally, Layton's appointment 
had an even wider significance because his authority was not restricted to the armed 
forces but extended to the civil government as well - he was authorised to use the 
governor's reserve powers under the constitution to any extent he thought fit. Indeed 
Layton's powers were so extensive that clashes with the civil government - the 
governor and the Board of Ministers - seemed inevitable, and there were fears that 
such clashes could lead to a constitutional breakdown. For Senanayake, manifestly 
now the most dynamic figure in the Board of Ministers and the obvious successor to 
the ageing Jayatilaka, the powers conferred on Layton and the establishment of a War 
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Council in the island on Layton's initiative and under his control (124), were new 
and unpredictable complications that confronted him and his allies in their 
campaign for constitutional reform. The War Council was thus constituted: Layton 
(as chairman), the governor (as a member), the three officers of state, the seven 
Sinhalese ministers, the service chiefs and the civil defence commissioner as well 
(from the last quarter of 1942). It met for the first time on 24 March 1942. Its main 
objective was the co-ordination of the war effort, but a reading of its minutes shows 
that, from the outset, it's writ extended well beyond that. 
There were also fears that the island's strategic importance in the struggle against 
Japan would be a further constraint in pressing ahead for constitutional reform. 
What happened, however, was that Layton, by virtue of his regular meetings with the 
ministers, displayed a greater appreciation of the political problems they faced than 
might have been the case had he relied solely on the governor's views, or the views of 
the British officials, civil and military. More to the point, Senanayake soon 
established an amicable working relationship with Layton. He got on cordially 
enough with Caldecott, despite the latter's occasional fits of antipathy to him, of 
which we have evidence in the acerbic comments on Senanayake in some of the 
governor's 'Things Ceylonese' reports to the CO. But in the event they worked 
together with much less friction after Layton's arrival than before; a triangular 
relationship seemed more stable than the earlier one between the governor and 
Senanayake as aspirant to the de jure position of leader of the State Council, and vice 
chairman of the Board of Ministers. With this new situation and with the board 
continuing to give its unstinted support to the war effort, Senanayake found that the 
island's strategic importance actually strengthened his bargaining powers. 
The fear of a Japanese invasion was very real. When the first Japanese air-raid 
occurred on 2 April1942 with bombs being dropped on Colombo, to be followed soon 
after by another raid, this time on Trincomalee, there was panic. People fled the 
capital and the suburbs to towns and villages in the interior of the island; large 
numbers of Indian money-lenders, businessmen and traders fled to India. There were 
fears of a return of Indian workers to their villages in southern India but these proved 
to be exaggerated. Fortunately the threat from Japan receded quickly. The antici-
pated invasion never came, nor did the Japanese air raids continue. 
The dispatch of the Cripps Mission to India in March 1942 undermined the 
credibility of CO policy on constitutional reform in Ceylon. The Office, for its part, 
did not see it that way, even when there were requests from the Board of Ministers 
and the Ceylon National Congress that Cripps should visit Ceylon as well, or failing 
that receive a ministerial delegation from Ceylon in Delhi. On 1 April 1942 
Cranborne informed Caldecott that the Cripps Mission was restricted to India (125). 
The same telegram renewed the CO pledge that discussions on constitutional reform 
would be resumed once victory was won, not a very reassuring prospect at a time 
when that victory seemed so far away. The minorities now proposed that a national 
government be formed during this emergency period, a proposal which neither 
Caldecott nor the CO were willing to consider, much less to support (125). April1942 
was not a good month for the colonial administration in the island. On 8 April the 
LSSP detainees staged a daring jail-break, escaping from the detention barracks in 
Kandy (127) . 
As the threat from Japan receded, other changes occurred in the last quarter of 
1942, all of which strengthened the administration. In early September Caldecott 
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reported that Senanayake would have a larger role in the distribution of food (138), 
an important matter at a time of threatened food scarcities and the introduction of a 
rationing system. 0 E (later Sir Oliver) Goonetilleke now emerged in a role that was 
to give him great prominence, as civil defence commissioner, in charge of the 
distribution of food. In this capacity he was invited to attend meetings of the War 
Council (138), thus strengthening his long association with Senanayake and 
beginning an equally important one with Layton and Caldecott who recognised his 
talents as a gifted administrator and general establishment figure par excellence. 
By the end of September 1942, the old duumvirate of Jayatilaka and Senanayake 
was over with the former's retirement. On 2 December Senanayake was elected 
leader of the house, and took over as vice chairman of the Board of Ministers, a de 
jure recognition of what had been, for long, a de facto situation. Equally significant, 
he secured the election of a Tamil, A Mahadeva, as minister of home affairs, in place 
of Jayatilaka thus bringing to an end the experiment of an all-Sinhalese Board of 
Ministers. 
In the meantime Caldecott and Layton between them took the initiative in 
reopening the question of constitutional reform for Ceylon by urging the CO to 
respond to the spirit of co-operation demonstrated by the Board of Ministers with a 
new declaration of policy that would meet the desires and aspirations of the more 
moderate elements in Ceylon (140, 141). Caldecott drove home the point in his 
telegrams that a more convincing and forthright statement on constitutional reform 
than that issued in 1941 was called for to retain the goodwill and co-operation of the 
Board of Ministers and to secure the whole-hearted co-operation of the Ceylonese in 
the war effort. The pressure from Caldecott and the cogency of his arguments had 
their effect and the War Cabinet considered it politic to issue a fresh declaration of 
policy on constitutional reform in the island (142, 143). The central feature of this 
pronouncement made in December 1942 was its definition of the objectives of 
constitutional evolution. These were stated to be the 'fullest possible development of 
self-governing institutions in Ceylon within the Commonwealth partnership having 
regard both to the single interest of the island and the larger interests of the 
Commonwealth on which the island's security and prosperity ultimately depend' . 
But this declaration did not have the desired effect, and the Board of Ministers 
complained that it was couched in 'far too indefinite and conditional terms' (148). 
Senanayake, at an interview with Layton and Caldecott on 25 February 1943, 
emphasised the need for a very early response to the board's demand for dominion 
status (154). Caldecott would not support this claim, but he and Layton had already 
informed the CO that moderate opinion in the country demanded full responsible 
government and internal home rule (150). After some initial uncertainty (150, 152), 
Stanley and his officials appreciated the distinction made by Caldecott and Layton 
between dominion status on the one hand, and full responsible government and 
internal home rule on the other, and this helped to persuade them to look at the 
problem afresh. 
On 17-18 February 1943, Caldecott and Layton sent the CO the draft of a 
declaration of policy on constitutional reform as a substitute for that made in 
December 1942 (153). The draft spelt out the limits on responsible government, 
especially in the areas of defence and external relations. Amendments were made by 
the CO (155), the Board of Trade commented on safeguards for British commerce 
(158) and Leopold Amery, secretary of state for India and Burma, drew attention to 
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the analogy between Burma and Ceylon (159). The issue was placed before the War 
Cabinet in March 1943. Using arguments which were substantially those of Caldecott 
and Layton, Stanley produced four reasons in support of a new declaration. First, to 
prevent any serious deterioration in Ceylon's war effort. Secondly, to avoid giving the 
impression that more could be obtained from the British government by making 
trouble than by methods of co-operation; a contrast in this respect was drawn with 
the 'largely non-co-operative' attitude of the 'political element' in India. Thirdly, to 
persuade Sinhalese politicians to turn their minds to a settlement with the 
minorities and to a 'realistic appreciation' of their future relations with India. 
Finally, to retain the initiative and to avoid a situation in which, at the end of the 
war, the same offer would have to be made but in conditions where much goodwill 
would have been lost. Against these arguments the secretary of state accepted that 
the governor's proposals would involve 'very real difficulties'. The first was the 
crucial issue of minority rights, for which the only definite safeguard was the 
requirement that any new reform proposals would need the approval of three-
quarters of the members of the State Council. Stanley admitted that he had feared 
that discussion of constitutional reform would run the risk of losing minority 
co-operation in the war effort but he had been assured by the governor that the 
minorities were 'just as keen to be released from Whitehall apron strings as the 
majority' (153) . There were also concerns that a popular government would assume 
complete financial responsibility at precisely the time when the post-war financial 
and economic problems of Ceylon might be most acute, and that it would be difficult 
to devise adequate safeguards for British commercial interests. But weighing all the 
arguments, the secretary of state maintained that the balance of advantage lay in 
making an immediate declaration (161). 
The War Cabinet was not immediately persuaded by Stanley's arguments and a 
Cabinet committee was appointed to examine the proposals further (161). The 
committee emphasised in particular the importance of protection for minority rights 
and British commerce and clarification on these issues was sought from the 
governor (163-166, 168). Eventually, and with the approval of the War Cabinet 
(169), a revised declaration was made on 26 May 1943. 
A comparison of the two declarations - of December 1942 and May 1943 - is 
revealing. In both no hope is held out of any changes during the war. But the second 
definitely committed Britain to a far-reaching reform at the end of the war. Where 
the first declaration offered a vague promise of 'the fullest possible development of 
self-governing institutions within the Commonwealth partnership' (143), the second 
was more precise. It offered 'full responsibility for government under the Crown in 
all matters of civil administration'. The only matters to be reserved would be defence 
and external affairs. The 1943 proposals did not include the right of secession. But as 
Stanley had explained when he first took the issue to the War Cabinet in March 1943, 
constitutionally, while not attaining full dominion status, Ceylon would be 'very 
much in the position now occupied by Southern Rhodesia' (161). 
In February 1943, at the beginning of the consultation which led to the May 
declaration, Caldecott and Layton had cautioned that although in their judgement 
'all moderate political opinion' would be satisfied with the proposed declaration, this 
did not of course mean that there would not be 'such measure of expressed 
disappointment as is inseparable from any concessions less than what is asked for' 
(153). This assessment of the situation in the island was as sensible as it was 
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accurate. Although the proposals outlined in May 1943 fell short of dominion status 
(which Senanayake had set out as the objective he aimed at), and far short of the goal 
of independence (which the Ceylon National Congress advocated), the Board of 
Ministers under Senanayake's leadership preferred to accept the offer as one further 
stage in the constitutional advancement of the country and as the basis for further 
negotiations. 
The first task confronting Senanayake was to formulate a draft constitution on the 
basis of the conditions laid down in the May 1943 declaration and the clarification 
of this given on 9 July 1943 (170, 171, 173, 174). The requirement that such a draft 
constitution needed to obtain the approval of three-quarters of all members of the 
State Council practically ensured that it would have to be nothing less than a 
national consensus on constitutional reform, because a constitution so formulated 
and so approved would then face another and equally exacting test - rigorous 
examination by 'a suitable commission or conference' once victory over the axis 
powers had been achieved. 
Ceylon and wartime supplies: the case of rubber production 
Of the many arguments used in justification of the May 1943 declaration, perhaps the 
most significant was concern to avoid any disruption of Ceylon's war effort. Indeed 
Stanley had reminded the War Cabinet of Ceylon's 'vital importance' as a strategic 
base and source of essential raw materials, rubber in particular (161). However, as 
already observed at the beginning of this introduction, beneath Ceylon's co-
operation on the question of materials there existed an underlying tension between 
the island's interests as a producer and those of the Treasury and the supply 
departments in Britain as purchasers and distributors. In the process, and with the 
CO playing the role of an intermediary, the issue was one which reactivated the 
former controversy with India over immigration and also threatened to further 
complicate Anglo-American wartime relations. 
With the Japanese occupation of Burma in 1942, Ceylon became even more 
dependent on India for food supplies, especially of rice. By the end of 1942 Ceylon's 
rice stocks had fallen to dangerously low levels, not only from the standpoint of the 
island's defence but also from that of meeting Ceylon's production of rubber and 
other essential raw materials. There were already indications that the morale and 
efficiency of workers in the island were beginning to suffer from the food shortage 
(146). 
But it was over the question of rubber production that the main difficulties arose. 
At the beginning of 1943, in his capacity as minister of agriculture, Senanayake 
launched a drive to increase rubber production over the year from 100,000 to 
130,000 tons. His methods included extensive slaughter-tapping on plantations and 
the special, temporary recruitment from India of 20,000 workers who would be 
repatriated at the end of the war. The Indian government was prepared to release the 
labour but refused to accept the condition of compulsory repatriation; some officials 
in the CO believed that India was 'blackmailing Ceylon on a long-standing and 
deep-rooted political issue' (151). However, the CO also saw fit to remind Caldecott 
that an intransigent attitude on the part of Ceylon might influence the War Cabinet 
to consider less favourably the governor's proposals for a new reforms declaration. 
Caldecott responded angrily that neither the CO nor the Indian government 
appreciated the 'intensely bitter and suspicious feeling' that existed in Ceylon over 
lx INTRODUCTION 
immigration (156, 157). He reported in March 1943 that despite the evident 
difficulties, Senanayake was preparing to recruit the extra labour from local sources 
(160). 
Friction with India was only one part of a complicated equation. Slaughter-tapping 
on the scale now contemplated threatened the ultimate destruction of thousands of 
trees. Compensation to growers was first considered but it proved impossible to 
reach agreement over the terms because of the different applications of taxes on 
excess profits for London-based and local concerns. The view of the Ceylon 
government was that whereas London companies should be dealt with on a 
compensation basis, their own growers should receive a straight increase of price. 
Anxious to maintain Ceylon's rubber production and to avoid 'another political 
complication from the American side if Ceylon production in fact falls short', the CO 
and the Ministries of Production and Supply were prepared to concede Ceylon's 
demands. The Treasury, however, refused, on the grounds that there was no 
guarantee that higher prices would be matched by increased rubber production. 
Ceylon, according to the Treasury, was 'virtually blackmailing us' (162, 167, 180). 
In June 1943 Caldecott reported that rubber production was causing both himself 
and Layton 'grave anxiety'. The extra labour from local sources promised by 
Senanayake had so far failed to materialise and there was a real danger that Ceylon 
would not achieve it!' production targets . The governor's assessment now convinced 
the CO that the real issue at stake was not one of price but of labour (172) but 
negotiations over the recruitment of Indian workers were deadlocked and remained 
so until well into 1944. 
It was at this juncture, and as feared by the CO and Ministries of Production and 
Supply, that American officials became involved. Ceylon provided about sixty per 
cent of the allies' natural rubber. The maintenance of Ceylon rubber production was 
said by the American consul in Colombo to be an 'A-1 priority'; the dispute between 
India and Ceylon was jeopardising allied operations (189, 192). By the autumn of 
1944 the CO was considering asking Churchill to intervene personally in the labour 
dispute with India but no action was taken.32 Putting pressure on Ceylon would only 
undermine other aspects of the island's war contribution (229). 
Throughout this dispute the view from the economic departments in Whitehall 
was that while India had been at fault in stipulating conditions which were bound to 
revive old antagonisms over immigration, Ceylon itself had been unreasonably rigid 
and inflexible. On the price Issue, Ceylon's argument that higher prices were needed 
as an inducement to persuade growers to produce more rubber ultimately antago-
nised the Treasury and the Ministries of Production and Supply. At the end of 1943, P 
Saravanamuttu, the Ceylon rubber commissioner, visited London for discussions 
over rubber prices. C Y Carstairs, an assistant secretary and head of a newly formed 
Production Department in the CO, minuted after a discussion with DE H Pierson of 
the Ministry of Supply: 
Mr. Pierson gave me the interesting view that our path had been made very difficult by 
Mr. Saravanamuttu's presentation of the case. On enquiry, I elicited that this means that 
Mr. Saravanamuttu had been entirely too candid, not having attempted to represent that 
the pres~nt pric~ was an unr~munerative one for the great majority of the industry, but 
that a htgher pnce would stimulate the Ceylon producers (large and small) to greater 
efforts than hitherto . This idea offends against the principles current here that increases 
in price are only justifiable on account of increases in costs of production, and that the 
INTRODUCTION !xi 
profit motive is a bad one. All this is true enough, but of doubtful applicability to a 
territory such as Ceylon, and it ignores completely certain political and psychological 
factors, including the prices which Ceylon has to pay for imports from India, which we 
did our utmost to make clear to the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury.33 
Others in the CO, most notably Sydney Caine, the financial adviser, took a less 
favourable view of Ceylon's case and began arguing in a manner which suggested 
that Ceylon was ignoring the sacrifices being made in Britain and by producers 
elsewhere in the colonial empire.34 Such ideas resurfaced at the end of the war when 
Goonetilleke, in his new capacity as financial secretary, made an unsuccessful 
attempt to negotiate preferential trade agreements with Britain (368-372, 374). 
The ministers' draft constitution 
Following the clarification in July 1943 of the May declaration, the Board of 
Ministers set to work, almost immediately, on the process of drafting a new 
constitution. Much to Caldecott's annoyance and chagrin, Senanayake chose as his 
principal adviser on constitutional affairs Dr W Ivor Jennings, vice chancellor of the 
newly established University of Ceylon. Caldecott was upset that the principal legal 
advisors and officers of the government, the legal secretary and the attorney-general, 
were left out of the drafting process. For the outlines of the constitution Senanayake 
and his colleagues reverted to the policy framework that had emerged in the 
discussions that had taken place in the mid and late 1930's, and especially to the 
reforms debate of March to July 1939. 
The key feature was a return to the Westminster model in the structure of 
government, with suitable modifications to accommodate the needs of the minorities 
in regard to the protection of their rights. One of the first questions that arose was 
whether or not a bill of rights should be introduced into the constitution. 
Senanayake was not unsympathetic to the view that a bill of rights would be a useful 
means of allaying the fears of minorities as to their position in an independent 
Ceylon, but he was dissuaded from supporting it by the arguments of Jennings, for 
whom the applicability of the Westminster constitutional model to the Ceylonese 
situation was an unalterable article of faith. Jennings would not give any serious 
consideration to the incorporation of a bill of rights in the constitution. On his 
advice it was rejected by the Board of Ministers and replaced by a provision based on 
section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, prohibiting legislation infringing 
on religious freedom or discriminating against persons of any community or 
religion. The draft constitution prepared by the Board of Ministers in 1943-1944 
contained a clause (clause 8) prohibiting parliament from enacting laws which 
discriminated against ethnic or religious groups, restricted or prohibited the free 
exercise of any religion, or conferred on 'persons of any community or religion 
privileges or advantages which are not conferred on persons of other communities or 
religions'. This was transferred, with only minor additions, to the constitution on 
which the transfer of power was effected in 1947-1948, the Soulbury constitution, as 
section 29(2). In retrospect it would seem that this was no substitute for a bill of 
rights, and the protection afforded to the minorities proved to be far from adequate. 
But at the time of the transfer of power the constitutional guarantees against 
discriminatory legislation in the new constitution, in combination with other 
provisions which were made to accommodate minority interests, seemed sufficient 
for that purpose. 
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'The representation clauses', as Jennings remarked all too accurately, 'were 
undoubtedly the most contentious .. . [and the] task of the Ministers was exceeding-
ly difficult' .35 Addressing itself to the thorny question of representation, the 
ministers' draft constitution devised a structure that found wide acceptability. One of 
its distinctive features was the incorporation of the principle of weightage in 
representation to allay the fears of the minorities and to provide greater electoral 
influence to the backward areas of the country. The province - there were nine 
provinces in British Ceylon at the time of the transfer of power - was the unit 
adopted for demarcation of constituencies, with a parliamentary constituency for 
each 75,000 persons, ascertained to the nearest 75,000, in a province. While this 
naturally favoured the more densely populated parts of the country, the population 
formula was combined with a provision that there would be, in addition, a 
constituency for every 1,000 square miles of territory. This area weightage varied 
from a minimum of one in the Western province, to four each in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces (in the first of which Tamils formed a clear majority, while the 
Muslims were a substantial minority especially in the Eastern province) and the 
North Central province. The area weightage in this last province was designed to 
benefit the Kandyans. The other comparatively backward Kandyan provinces, Uva 
and the North Western province, gained three seats each on the area rule. 
The advantages of weightage in representation were several; its beneficiaries were 
also many. Sinhalese politicians welcomed it because of its avoidance of communal 
representation. By reducing the size of constituencies both in area and in population 
in those parts of the country where the minorities were the, or a, dominant element, 
comparatively homogeneous constituencies, which were not specifically communal, 
could be demarcated by a future delimitation commission. Equally, because the 
sparsely populated areas were also, coincidentally, the areas with larger concentra-
tions of minorities, these latter would increase their representation, and this 
appealed to the minority groups such as the Muslims who were growing increasingly 
disenchanted with Ponnambalam's own campaign for balanced representation. The 
Kandyans were among the principal beneficiaries of weightage in representation, a 
point on which both Caldecott and the Sinhalese political leadership of the day were 
agreed; and there was an element of equity in that the sparsely populated areas (some 
of which were Kandyan) would have greater representation, and thus greater 
influence politically, than they might have had if population figures were the sole 
criterion in demarcating constituencies. 
The draft constitution recognised that 'No system of representation would 
necessarily ensure that all sections of the community would be adequately repre-
sented'. Provision was therefore made for the nomination of up to six members by 
the head of state 'where he considers that any important interest was not adequately 
represented'. This was designed with the minorities, or rather the smaller minorities, 
in mind. 
The preparation of a draft constitution that would meet the requirements of the 
Whitehall declaration of 1943 was a challenge to the statesmanship and political 
acumen of Senanayake and the Board of Ministers. They - and their advisers -
worked with remarkable speed, and by the beginning of 1944 a draft- the minister's 
draft constitution as it came to be. called - was ready for submission to Whitehall 
(181). On the whole it bore the stamp of Senanayake's political vision, in which 
concern for the interests of the minorities went beyond the formal need to conform 
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to the letter and spirit of terms laid down by Whitehall. The speed with which they 
had completed their work was mainly because nobody outside the Board of Ministers, 
not even members of the State Council, had been invited to participate in the 
preparation of the draft constitution. While this was not contrary to the terms of the 
declaration of 1943, it was nevertheless one of the criticisms of the draft raised by the 
more vocal representatives of Tamil opinion and British business interests in the 
island (182, 188, 193, 194). 
The Soulbury Commission 
Under the terms of the declaration of May 1943, it was envisaged that the draft 
constitution would be examined by a 'suitable commission or conference' after 
victory over the axis powers had been achieved. Once the draft was ready - by 
February 1944 - Senanayake and the Board of Ministers pressed for an immediate 
consideration of their scheme. Senanayake argued that urgent local circumstances 
made an early decision on the constitution a matter of vital necessity (183). He had 
the backing in this of Caldecott and Layton, a pbwerful combination on their own. 
Both favoured the appointment of a commission. They emphasised that failure to 
meet Senanayake's wishes would deal a 'death blow' to the ideal of Ceylon becoming 
an internally self-governing unit of the Commonwealth and lead to 'a general 
demand for inclusion in a new federal India'. They also reminded the CO that the 
alternative to the appointment of a commission would be an election in Ceylon at the 
very time that SEAC was being established in the island (186, 190, 191, 196, 198). 
The governor and Layton strengthened their bargaining powers in Whitehall when 
they sought and received the active support of Admiral Mountbatten, supreme allied 
commander of SEAC, whose headquarters were transferred from New Delhi to Kandy 
in April 1944 (199).36 Having been consulted by the Chiefs of Staff in London, 
Mountbatten warned that SEAC operations might be disrupted if an election were 
held in Ceylon (200). His intervention helped greatly in overcoming the original 
reluctance of the CO and the War Cabinet to concede Senanayake's request (184, 
187, 195, 197, 202). The decision might have gone against Senanayake had 
Mountbatten not intervened. 
The official announcement on the appointment of a commission to visit the island 
was made on 5 July 1944, but far from being received with cordiality and a sense of 
satisfaction at the extraction of an important concession- for, after all, the war was 
not yet over - it was greeted in ministerial circles in Colombo with undisguised 
dismay (208). And not merely ministerial circles. The Ceylon National Congress, 
naturally enough, was even more forthright in criticism (207). The point at issue 
was what both ministers and Congress saw as a widening of the commission's terms 
of reference well beyond that set out in the declaration of May 1943, from merely an 
examination of the draft constitution prepared by the Board of Ministers, under the 
terms of that declaration, to include consultation with 'various interests, including 
the minority communities, concerned with the subject of constitutional reform in 
Ceylon'. Taking a rather narrow view, Senanayake and his colleagues in the Board of 
Ministers argued that this amounted to an abrogation of one of the terms of the 1943 
declaration. They urged that the work of the commission should be restricted to the 
scope set out in the declaration which meant in effect that it should be limited to an 
examination of the ministers' draft constitution. The requirement that the constitu-
tion should be approved by at least three-quarters of members of the State Council 
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was, according to the ministers, sufficient protection for minority interests. The 
ministers' protests were considered over a period of nearly two months but 
ultimately they were overruled and the terms of reference of the commission were 
left unchanged (209-221, 224-227). 
Over the personnel of the commission, Caldecott was clear as to what the situation 
called for: a three man commission, one member of which should have British 
political experience; one, experience in the lower house of a dominion parliament; 
and the third, British Treasury experience. Three names were mentioned as the sort 
of persons who would fit the bill. Among them was a former Conservative MP and 
minister, Lord Soulbury. Dons and constitutional theorists, he urged, should be 
studiously avoided (a reflection perhaps of his antipathy to Jennings who was both a 
don and a constitutional theorist) and none of them, he added, should have had any 
previous association with Ceylon or with other colonial administrations, or with 
India (186). 
Caldecott did not make any suggestions for the position of chairman of the 
commission, but the CO did not look beyond Soulbury -who was suggested by the 
governor only for nomination as a member - as chairman. His name was submitted 
on 8 August to the prime minister as the CO nominee for the chairmanship; the 
prime minister's approval was given on 21 August. Thereafter the search began, in 
consultation with Soulbury, for the two other members. 
One was a nominee of the Labour Party or, to be more exact, of Ernest Bevin in 
particular. Trafford Smith of the CO, who was appointed secretary to the commis-
sion, minuted on 12 October 1944: 'Mr Bevin does not wish to recommend anyone 
other than Mr F. J. Burrows, President of the N[ational] U[nion] [of] R[ailwaymen] as 
a possible member of the Ceylon commission.'37 When it became necessary to make 
the official announcement on the personnel of the Ceylon commission, the secretary 
noted somewhat testily that Burrows was not in Ulho :s- Ulho and 'that neither I nor 
anyone else here knows anything about him beyond the fact that he is the retiring 
President of the National Union of Railwaymen'.38 The nomination for the third 
position proved to be more difficult. On 25 October J B Sidebotham, assistant 
secretary and head of the Ceylon and Pacific Department, argued that Caldecott's 
views on keeping out dons and constitutional theorists should be disregarded. 'I have 
always felt myself, he stated 'that somebody with some knowledge of constitutional 
law problems would be of great assistance to this particular commission'.39 At this 
stage Sir James Colquhoun, principal and vice chancellor of St Andrews University, 
had been approached to serve on the commission. He declined and the CO turned 
instead to Professor J F Rees, vice-chancellor of the University of Wales and principal 
of the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Rees eventually 
accepted the invitation but in case he did not, the CO had prepared a short list of 
dons and constitutional theorists whom it wished to invite to serve.40 
On 19 November 1944 the names of the personnel of the commission were 
officially announced. Caldecott had already relinquished office on 17 October, the 
date on which he left the island. His successor, Sir Henry Moore, arrived in Colombo 
on 4 December.41 The commission travelled to Colombo by air and its first public 
sessions were on 22 January 1945. It was the last of three important commissions 
sent from Britain to report on the affairs of the island, the first being the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of 1828--1831, and the second, a century later, the 
Donoughmore Commission. The distinguishing feature of the Soulbury Commission 
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was that its terms of reference were the narrowest of the three. 
To demonstrate their disapproval at the widening of its terms of reference, 
Senanayake and the Board of Ministers resolved on an official boycott of the 
commission. The Ceylon National Congress acted likewise and at a special session 
came out in support of an all-party conference on constitutional reform. So far as the 
ministers were concerned the boycott meant, in practice, merely that they did not 
appear before the commission at its public sittings. Intermediaries, the most notable 
of whom was Goonetilleke, conveyed their views to the commissioners and 
Senanayake and the ministers met them informally, especially at receptions. Above 
all, although the ministers did not present their draft constitution before the 
commission, the latter regarded the examination of that document as its main task 
during its stay in the island. The Congress leadership, however, were more 
committed to the decision to boycott the commission. Senanayake, for his part, had 
already resigned from Congress, a move designed to emphasise that he had distanced 
himself from an organisation which had not succeeded in winning the confidence of 
the minorities. 
Up to the appointment of the Soulbury Commission, events had gone Sena-
nayake's way. He had succeeded in keeping the process of drafting the constitution 
under his control, and had also guided it so astutely that he had been able to win the 
backing of the Board of Ministers for the final document. Now, however, doubts were 
cast about his ability to produce results . Unhappy at being left out of the drafting 
process, and anxious to make their own views on the constitution known and their 
influence felt, Senanayake's critics- of whom there were more than a few within the 
State Council and Congress - sensed the possibility of exploiting the weakening of 
his position. Not that Senanayake entirely minded, for the situation had the 
advantage - such as it was - of giving Whitehall and the Soulbury commissioners a 
sobering comparative perspective in which Senanayake's moderation came through 
with greater clarity than it might have done through his own efforts. 
It was against this background that a resolution was moved in the State Council 
calling upon the Board of Ministers to draft another constitution of the 'recognized 
Dominion type' appropriate for a 'Free Lanka'. This initiative was immediately 
successful. An amendment pledging support to the Whitehall declaration of 1943 was 
beaten soundly by twenty-six votes to four. The board was bound by the provisions of 
the Donoughmore constitution to implement a resolution adopted by the State 
Council, and a bill making provision for such a constitution was introduced at the 
next session of council by Bandaranaike. 
A Free Lanka Bill was prepared between November 1944 and the beginning of 
February 1945. That a further draft constitution could be produced with such speed 
was made possible because it was based on the ministers' original draft. Apart from 
certain minor dissimilarities incidental to the variance in intentions of the two 
drafts, the Free Lanka Bill diverged from the ministers' scheme only in regard to the 
provisions dealing with the powers of the governor-general. These powers were, of 
necessity, much more limited in the former because it deliberately placed control 
over defence and external affairs with the Cabinet and not with the governor-general 
as envisaged in the Whitehall declaration of May 1943. The Soulbury Commission 
was in the island and engaged in its task of examining witnesses and documents 
when the State Council debated the Free Lanka Bill. British officials in the island and 
in Whitehall recognised this debate for what it was, a piece of political theatre, set in 
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an atmosphere of unreality and therefore not to be taken too seriously, an opinion 
Senanayake himself shared with them (236) . 
Part //: Towards independence 
Senanayake at the Colonial Office 
In the meantime Senanayake had decided on his own course of action. Once the 
Soulbury commissioners left the island he was anxious to be in London for the 
publication of their report. Before he departed he had to deal with two issues. First, 
he needed a statement on the CO's attitude to the Free Lanka Bill; secondly, he had 
to determine who would deputise for him as leader of the house and vice chairman of 
the Board of Ministers during his absence, a period which might extend over several 
weeks (247) . 
It was as clear to Senanayake as it was to the other members of the Board of 
Ministers that the Free Lanka Bill would not secure the royal assent. It was, however, 
important that the CO's refusal to approve it should be notified officially to the board 
before he left for London. The reason was clear. Nobody could then undermine his 
position on the board and in the country by accusing him of participating in 
discussions at the CO about the rejection of the bill. The CO readily responded; 
officials and the secretary of state were alert to the need to support Senanayake (256). 
On the grounds that it had neither secured a three-quarters majority in the State 
Council, nor adhered to the limits on external sovereignty imposed by the 1943 
declaration, the rejection of the bill was officially conveyed to Moore on 19 June. 
On the question of Senanayake's deputy, Moore seemed more concerned about 
this than Senanayake himself. But there too, by a combination of shrewd man-
oeuvering and luck, the matter was speedily resolved. The governor reported that 
Senanayake preferred Bandaranaike to J L Kotelawala for the acting position (253) . 
Given Bandaranaike's unconcealed desire to set himself up as Senanayake's succes-
sor, this seemed, at first sight, a strange decision. But it was a shrewd one. 
Bandaranaike was almost certain to cause difficulties for Kotelawala who also saw 
himself as a strong candidate in any struggle for the succession to Senanayake. 
Kotelawala, for his part, would tolerate Bandaranaike's temporary tenure of Sena-
nayake's position because he had no desire to embarrass Senanayake politically or 
upset his plans in London. Fortunately the manner of Bandaranaike's selection for 
the acting position worked very much to Senanayake's advantage, for he was not the 
unanimous choice of the Board of Ministers. Three members of the board were 
contenders - Bandaranaike, Kotelawala and G C S Corea - and since none of them 
had a clear majority, lots were drawn to settle the issue. Bandaranaike won, and 
apparently that too on the third draw. In these circumstances Bandaranaike's 
position for the eventual succession to Senanayake was not as secure as it might have 
been had he been unchallenged for the temporary vacancy during Senanayake's 
absence in London. At Bandaranaike's insistence, the refusal to grant the royal assent 
to the Free Lanka Bill came up for discussion in the Board of Ministers, but here 
Senanayake and his associates were strong enough to thwart Bandaranaike's 
attempts to exploit the situation to his political advantage. The latter, however, had a 
more amenable arena for publicity, the State Council, and there, at a hastily 
summoned meeting, a motion protesting against the rejection of the bill was easily 
carried (255). Bandaranaike himself was one of the principal speakers on the 
occasion. There was, nevertheless, for all his polished indignation, a perceptible note 
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of restraint in his speech as befitted a minister and a challenger to the leadership, 
which was absent from the contributions made by other speakers. Bandaranaike did 
not confine his criticisms to the State Council. He had access to the resources of the 
Sinhala Maha Sabha which he controlled, and he used these now to prolong the 
controversy. But once again there was an element of restraint if not caution in his 
use of that organisation's resources. A telegram of protest was sent on its behalf to 
the CO. The new leadership of the Ceylon National Congress was much more in 
earnest. They began a concerted protest campaign, in all parts of the country, in 
association with the communists - who had recently secured membership of that 
body - in support of independence and secession from the Commonwealth. The 
campaign was conducted over several months. 
Once the Soulbury commissioners left for London to prepare their report, Stanley 
extended an invitation to Senanayake to visit London for talks. Ponnambalam felt 
that he was entitled to equal treatment with Senanayake (249), and sought CO 
agreement for him to be present at any interview that Senanayake had with officials. 
This was firmly resisted by Moore and the CO, and Senanayake for his part rejected 
the suggestion out of hand (250, 252). Nevertheless Ponnambalam proceeded to 
London to lobby support for his views, and was soon joined in this enterprise by 
representatives of the Indian minority in the island, including Indians with some 
official standing in India. All of them secured interviews with ministers and officials 
at the CO. Senanayake had decided on his own line of action. If the Soulbury Report 
was favourable he would ask for more, for dominion status, but if it was 
unsatisfactory he would repudiate it and refuse any longer to be bound by the 
declaration of 1943 which, in his opinion, the British government had itself 
disregarded by widening the commission's terms of reference. He arrived in London 
in mid-July 1945 to find that events were moving with disconcerting rapidity. His 
first interview was with Stanley on 30 July but by this time the secretary of state was 
on the verge of vacating office as a result of the landslide victory secured by the 
Labour Party at the general election. 
This meant, inevitably, that no immediate response was likely from the new 
Labour government to the Soulbury proposals. By the time Senanayake first met 
George Hall the new secretary of state, on 9 August, he had already been given a copy 
of the Soulbury Report. To his great relief and satisfaction he found that the 
Soulbury commissioners had, in fact, endorsed the main principles of the ministers' 
draft constitution. There were adjustments, modifications and additions, but none of 
any real substance save the recommendation for the establishment of a second 
chamber. More important still, the minorities' political campaign orchestrated by 
Ponnambalam and his Tamil Congress had little impact on the commission's 
thinking and recommendations. 
Simultaneously, on the international scene, the war in the east was over with 
dramatic suddenness and the defeat of Japan now influenced Senanayake's attitude to 
the Soulbury proposals. Had circumstances been different- that is to say had the war 
with Japan not come to so sudden an end- he would have been elated to find that the 
Soulbury commissioners had endorsed the main principles of the ministers' draft 
constitution. But the war was over and there was no reason for accepting anything 
that fell short of the ultimate goal of dominion status. Moreover, account had now to 
be taken of the British government's intentions with regard to India and Burma. In 
September 1945 Lord Wavell, the viceroy, announced that after elections had been 
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held to the Indian central and provincial legislatures in the coming cold weather, it 
was the government's intention to hold discussions as a preliminary step to the 
convening of a constitution-making body and then to proceed with the institution of 
an Executive Council having the support of the main Indian political parties.42 With 
regard to Burma, the government's white paper of May 1945 envisaged a three-year 
period of direct British rule, followed by elections and an invitation to the new 
legislators to draw up a constitution for full self-government.43 
Apart from a small group of officials he took with him, Senanayake had the 
advantage of Jennings's presence in London. Jennings's hand was clearly seen in the 
long letter- it was more a memorandum than a letter- dated 16 August which 
Senanayake submitted to the CO as a prelude to his discussions (266, 268). The letter 
began by explaining why and how opinion in the island had shifted since the early 
months of 1944. It pointed out that Burma had been promised full self-government 
and stated that there was nothing in the social and economic conditions, or the 
recent history, of the two countries to justify the placing of Ceylon in an inferior 
position. Senanayake outlined his case for dominion status for Ceylon and main-
tained that the existence of communal divisions could not be regarded as an 
argument against, as such divisions had not prevented the offer of the same status to 
India where, in fact, they were more pronounced. 
To most of the recommendations of the Soulbury Report, Senanayake had no 
objections. The one proposal over which he had serious reservations was the 
establishment of a second chamber. He believed that a bicameral legislature would 
be controversial in the island. Above all, he concentrated on the procedures for 
defence and external affairs set out in the report; the mechanisms recommended 
would, in his view, be unworkable in practice because of their complexity. Both the 
Soulbury commissioners and the ministers themselves in their 1944 draft constitu-
tion had accepted the limits on Ceylon's external sovereignty laid down in the 1943 
declaration. In the report and the ministers' draft, bills relating to defence and 
external affairs fell into the category which the governor-general was empowered to 
'reserve' for approval by Whitehall, to ensure that 'only legislation conforming with 
the policy of the imperial Defence Authorities may be enacted by the Parliament of 
Ceylon'. The governor-general's powers in regard to defence were not limited to the 
control of legislation. Where legislation was required for the implementation of 
long-range imperial defence policy, or for other reasons, it was envisaged that the 
governor-general would explain what was required to the prime minister who would 
then obtain his Cabinet's consent to the introduction of such legislation. But if for 
political or other reasons the Cabinet declined, the governor-general was empowered 
to implement a governor-general's ordinance. 
The Soulbury commissioners endorsed this procedure, but went beyond it in 
situations 'which may not be capable of being dealt with by normal constitutional 
methods or by a Governor-General's ordinance'. They referred to 'the emergency of 
war or a grave national emergency in which the normal constitutional machinery 
has either broken down or become ineffective' . The Soulbury Report argued that in 
'order to deal with either of these emergencies it may be necessary for His Majesty in 
Council to legislate by order-in-council',44 and proceeded to recommend that an 
express provision to this effect be inserted in the constitution. The practical 
difficulties of implementing the defence proposals outlined in the Soulbury Report 
became one of the main arguments in Senanayake's case for the immediate grant of 
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dominion status, without the intermediate stage which the report envisaged. He 
suggested that this transition could be effected through an order-in-council, and 
offered to sign agreements with Britain on defence and external affairs for the mutual 
benefit of the two countries in the immediate post-war situation. 
On 29 August 1945, Arthur Greenwood, chairman of the Colonial Affairs 
Committee, placed before the Cabinet the committee's views on the Soulbury 
Report. The committee had considered at length the arguments for and against 
abandoning the stipulation in the 1943 declaration that the new constitution had to 
be approved by three-quarters of the State Council. It recommended on balance that 
Hall should be authorised to explain to Senanayake, if the latter raised the question, 
that the government would not necessarily insist on a three-quarters majority; 
instead the largest possible majority, preferably including a substantial element of 
minority support, would suffice (270). The Cabinet considered the committee's 
report on 30 August but wanted more time to consider (271). In the meantime, Hall 
informed Moore that in his discussions with Senanayake he would adhere to the 
conditions laid down in the 1943 declaration; there would be no consideration of 
Senanayake's claim for dominion status. Assessing the changing situation in Ceylon, 
the governor responded that Senanayake ought not to linger in London, 'unless he's 
going to bring back Dominion Status or something very like it' (272) . The Cabinet 
met again on 3 September. Hall was authorised to begin discussions with Sena-
nayake on the understanding that the government was not committed to the 
proposals in the Soulbury Report and that after the discussions the secretary of state 
would report back. The decision on waiving the three-quarters majority was 
confirmed. It was also decided that Wavell should be acquainted with the position 
and the action now contemplated by the government (273). 
Senanayake had four formal discussions at the CO between 4 and 17 September. At 
the first he reiterated the points made in his letter of 16 August and proceeded to 
argue his case for full dominion status (274) . Referring to the declaration of policy on 
Burma in the white paper of May 1945, he asserted that his country deserved equally 
generous treatment and that Britain should show to Ceylon the same consideration 
that she had shown to former enemies whose constitutional rehabilitation she was 
assisting. Much of the discussion was based on the second part of Senanayake's letter 
with its detailed responses to and criticisms of the Soulbury proposals. Again he 
expressed reservations on the second chamber but ultimately he accepted it. At 
meetings on 7 and 10 September the Soulbury recommendations were discussed in 
detail. Senanayake handed in drafts he had prepared (or rather had prepared for him 
by Jennings and others) of a proposed section of the new constitution dealing with 
the reservation of bills amending the constitution, and outlined a definition of 
external affairs. The position of public officers under the new dispensation was aired; 
Senanayake also spoke at some length on the Indian franchise in Ceylon and the 
difficulties involved in resolving the issue as well as its political implications (279, 
282). 
While Senanayake's discussions with Hall and his officials were proceeding apace, 
Ponnambalam was interviewed at the CO (284), and representatives of the Indian 
community in the island - working in tandem with Ponnambalam - renewed their 
demand for the enfranchisement of thousands of Indians, together with the granting 
of full civic rights to those regarded as entitled to citizenship. They received a polite 
hearing but not much more (288, 291, 299). 
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Prior to his final round of discussions with Senanayake, Hall submitted a 
memorandum to the Cabinet on 10 September explaining that Senanayake had made 
it plain that he had come to England to request the grant of dominion status and that 
he had offered to sign agreements on defence and external affairs (280). The secretary 
of state's view was that the time was not ripe for any constitutional advance beyond 
that adumbrated in the 1943 declaration, and he indicated that he would leave 
Senanayake in no doubt on this key point. At a meeting the following day, the 
Cabinet agreed and recommended that Hall should not make any statement on 
dominion status in the course of any further discussion with Senanayake. It was also 
agreed that there would be simultaneous publication of the Soulbury Report in 
Britain, Ceylon and India (283). 
Hall's last discussion with Senanayake, on 17 September, revolved round the final 
communique (292). Senanayake expressed regret that the government's policy was 
not to be announced simultaneously with publication of the Soulbury Report. Hall 
explained that this was the inevitable consequence of the change of government and 
the end of the Japanese war. Senanayake asserted that he now regarded himself as 
having complete freedom of action upon his return to Ceylon; the secretary of state 
responded that he hoped this did not mean that Senanayake had given up all 
intention of co-operating with Britain. 
Senanayake returned home in the last week of September, in a much better mood 
than Hall had reason to expect. Moore sensed this after a brief discussion with him, 
and on 25 September he informed the CO that Senanayake would accept a 
constitution on the lines of the Soulbury Report, plus agreements on defence and 
external affairs (295) . Moore added that there was, at this point and by the exercise of 
a little courage, a golden opportunity of making a generous and spontaneous offer to 
Ceylon, and one that in the long run would pay a handsome dividend. Lord Soulbury, 
with whom Senanayake had stayed for a weekend during his visit to London, was of 
the same opinion. He wrote to Hall on 5 October expressing general support for the 
views outlined in Senanayake's letter of 16 August. Soulbury stated his own view that 
the government should now go considerably further in the direction of self-
government than had been recommended by his commission (300). He added that so 
long as the commission's recommendations on safeguards for the minorities were 
embodied in any new constitution, nothing more was required from the government 
for that purpose. He regarded the three-quarters majority as indispensable for the 
protection of minorities. Soulbury was unaware that the Cabinet itself had decided to 
release Senanayake from this latter obligation. 
The negotiating team 
Very little has been written on the decisive phase of the transfer of power in Ceylon 
that was soon to begin. In 1949, Ivor Jennings published his book on The 
Constitution ofCeylon and promised, in his preface, that he would some day 'explain 
in print how much Ceylon owes to Mr. Senanayake and Sir Oliver Goonetilleke'. 'But 
for them', Jennings asserted, 'Ceylon would still be a colony'. From about the middle 
of 1943 Jennings had become the principal, though unofficial, adviser to Senanayake 
(and Goonetilleke) in the negotiations with the CO on the transfer of power, a 
position he retained until the process reached a successful completion in early 1948. 
He thus had unusual access to a great deal of confidential information and he used it 
to good purpose in drafting the book on the transfer of power that he had in mind. 
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The book was ready by the early 1950's. Entitled Donoughmore to independence, it 
carried the subtitle A contribution to the constitutional history of Ceylon, 1931 to 
1948, but he died prematurely before he could polish the draft to meet the exacting 
demands of his publishers, and before the thirty-year rule was introduced releasing a 
flood of CO documents for the last phase of British administration in Ceylon. 
This draft now forms part of the Jennings papers in the library of the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies in the University of London. Together with chapter xi of his 
unpublished autobiography and other documents in that collection, it is indispens-
able for any serious study of the transfer of power in Ceylon. Jennings was aware that 
the future historian would have to examine the CO records to gain an understanding 
of the negotiations about which he provided so much information and in such rich 
detail: 'We shall not know the whole truth until the official documents are made 
available'.45 But he added a caveat about a dimension missing from the official 
record. 'History drawn from documents', he asserted, 'is apt to mislead because the 
importance of personal influences is rarely placed on record and indeed such 
influences are difficult to assess'. 46 
In his unpublished autobiography Jennings described his own role as that of 'the 
draftsman'; 'the real work', he claimed, 'was done by Mr. Senanayake and Sir Oliver 
Goonetilleke'.47 In playing down his own role, Jennings was being uncharacteristi-
cally modest, for he knew more than anyone else that Senanayake and Goonetilleke 
could not have negotiated so successfully with the CO mandarinate and British 
politicians, to say nothing of the governor and the officers of state ·in Colombo, 
without the expertise on constitutional matters which only he could have provided. 
That rich expertise he placed at the disposal of Senanayake and Goonetilleke with a 
dedication and generosity unmatched by any expatriate adviser on constitutional 
affairs in any other colony seeking independence from Britain. It would also be true 
that few constitutional advisers, indigenous or expatriate, had as great an influence 
in determining the shape of the post-independence constitutional framework of a 
colony as Jennings had in the case of Ceylon. Governor Caldecott (and to a lesser 
extent his successor) and the officers of state were distinctly unhappy about the 
extent of Jennings's influence in the negotiations on the transfer of power. In giving 
guarded but occasionally pointed expression to their feelings in this regard they 
reveal a facet of the negotiations on the transfer of power not generally noticeable in 
the CO records published in this volume - the extraordinary role of Jennings as 
Senanayake's unofficial constitutional adviser. 
In his unpublished study of the transfer of power in Ceylon, Jennings sought to 
justify the role he played as Senanayake's adviser: 
I was ... in sympathy with Mr. Senanayake's aim to secure Dominion Status at the 
earliest possible moment, though my reasons differed from his. It had to be Dominion 
Status, for Ceylon was neither large enough nor rich enough to dispense with such help 
as the Commonwealth could give by agreement. Had I not been in sympathy, however, I 
should have given the assistance; and indeed I was not in agreement with every sentiment 
that I put into the documents over the next four and a half years. The University tradition 
in these matters is very clear. Universities are public corporations containing experts on 
most branches of knowledge who regard themselves as holding that knowledge in trust 
for the community. If, therefore, the government of the country, or indeed any country, 
requires assistance it is the duty of the university to provide it. My knowledge would have 
been at Mr. Senanayake's disposal even if I had not agreed with his objective, though no 
doubt the association was the more fruitful because I agreed. 
The association . . . continued throughout the four and a half years between the 
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declaration of May 1943 and the end of December 1947. It was modified when one of us 
was out of the country, and after the general election of August 1947 and the 
establishment of the Senanayake government with Sir Oliver Goonetilleke as Minister of 
Home Affairs I became a mere consultant, called in when questions of some difficulty 
arose. Until then the three of us could have been described as the nucleus of a Reforms 
Ministry, with Mr. Senanayake as Minister, Sir Oliver as Permanent Secretary, and myself 
as the Constitutional Adviser on tap.48 
Had Jennings's two books, presently in draft form, been published, a substantial 
amount of new information on the Ceylonese side of the story of the transfer of 
power would now be available, even if provided by an unusual Englishman. As it is 
considerably more information exists on British policies and initiatives - although 
the information is admittedly rather slight in comparison with that which is available 
for the cognate process in India and Burma - than material illustrating the 
independence movement in the island from the Ceylonese viewpoint. By far the most 
significant gap for the study of the transfer of power in Ceylon is the lack of a 
comprehensive biography of D S Senanayake.49 
One of the most striking features on the Ceylonese side of the transfer of power is 
the dominance of Senanayake in the negotiating process. In insisting that dominion 
status should be the primary objective, and that this could be attained in association 
with the Britain rather than in opposition, Senanayake stood against the prevailing 
current of opinion in the island. By 1942 even the moderate Ceylon National 
Congress had committed itself to independence in preference to dominion status in 
emulation of the Indian National Congress. Senanayake's model was not India but 
the old settlement colonies of the empire whose development to dominion status had 
been one of constitutional advance by measured stages. His tactics and strategy 
reflected his own political convictions, with their emphasis on moderation and 
pragmatism, as well as the political traditions of the mainstream of nationalist 
politics in Ceylon with its well-known proclivity for peaceful constitutional agitation. 
Above all he was a realist who saw nothing dishonorable in an acceptance of 
constitutional reform in instalments. Jennings explained that Senanayake 
had the good politician's unconcern with detail. In consultation with Sir Oliver- and the 
relationship was so close that it was rarely possible to say whether an idea came from the 
one or the other- he had worked out the grand strategy. The aim was Dominion Status. 
Any proposal which seemed to be a step in that direction should be accepted, though an 
effort should first be made to make it go a little further. In working out the details, the 
proposal should be pressed to its limits and just a little beyond. Having gone some way 
towards Dominion Status, a suitable opportunity should be sought for presenting a 
demand for the next step, and if it proved impossible then to secure Dominion Status, an~ 
offer which nevertheless went further should be accepted and pressed its utmost limits. 5 
One important theme which Jennings emphasised in Donoughmore to independ-
ence, as well as in his unpublished autobiography, was the 'personal influence which 
Mr. Senanayake gained in London' during his visits to the CO in July-August 1945.51 
Jennings described it as 'a triumph of personality rather than of organization'. 
Though he had no reason to believe that Senanayake was not adequately briefed, and 
was quite sure that the administrative arrangements for which Senanayake's aides 
were responsible were up to the CO standard, 'it was obvious that Mr. Senanayake 
himself created a great impression'. It was evident from the 'casual remarks' thrown 
out by senior officials that Senanayake had 'surprised them by the strength of his 
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character and the sincerity of his purpose'. 'It was perhaps an advantage', Jennings 
added, that Senanayake 
had not the facility of language of the English-trained Ceylonese graduate or slick 
self-assurance of the professional advocate. A Ceylonese prototype of the English official 
would not have made such an impression because the Colonial Office was familiar with it. 
It had never met Mr. Senanayake's type before . .. . Mr. Senanayake completely captured 
the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State. If he had been able to meet the Cabinet I 
am sure that he would have obtained independence in 1945.52 
'The result of all this', Jennings added in his unpublished autobiography 
was that an entirely different relationship was established between Mr. Senanayake and 
the Colonial Office, a relationship which made the last step towards Dominion Status 
supremely easy. The Colonial Office was on Mr. Senanayake's side from 1945 onwards, 
and the problem was only to choose a suitable moment for persuading the Cabinet.53 
In these assessments Jennings seems to have carried his assessments too far. While 
clearly Senanayake made a favourable impression on officials and had the CO on his 
side from 1945, there were still significant hurdles to overcome and the final 
persuasion of the Cabinet proved no easy matter. 
The Sou/bury Report, Tamil protests and the white paper 
Following the publication of the Soulbury Report on 9 October 1945, the CO was 
inundated with telegrams and letters of protest from the Tamil Congress and 
representatives of the Indian community in the island expressing their deep 
disappointment with its recommendations (309, 323, 327). They were joined in this 
by the European Association of Ceylon (314) . The CO also received a long and 
wide-ranging document from Ponnambalam, complaining that the proposals for 
representation of minorities fell far short of what had been hoped for, and arguing 
that the commission's recommendations would not give the minorities anything 
approaching an adequate share in the government of the country (322) . Nobody was 
more disappointed or more alarmed by the report than the representatives of the 
Indians. Wavell sent a message to the India Office protesting against the Soulbury 
Commission's recommendations on the Indian franchise (310) . 
By the middle of October the Cabinet in London was in the process of spelling out 
its policy on constitutional reform in Ceylon. Hall put before the Colonial Affairs 
Committee a recommendation that a constitution based on the Soulbury proposals 
should be reviewed after six years. Some of his colleagues on the committee 
expressed the view that it would be unwise to commit the government to a fixed 
period for review; others raised questions relating to the island 's minority problem 
(304) . When Moore was sent the draft of a pol icy statement on 16 October he 
responded immediately that while on the whole it would be acceptable to Sena-
nayake, any reference to a review after six years might jeopardise acceptance of the 
Soulbury Report and the statement itself. He suggested instead something on the 
lines of the statement of policy contained in the white paper on Burma (306, 308) . 
Simultaneously Lord Soulbury, in discussion with Trafford Smith, expressed 
concern over delays in the introduction of the new constitution (311). He explained 
that his two colleagues on the commission endorsed the views outl ined in 
Senanayake's letter of 16 August (266) . Soulbury, in fact, felt keenly about 
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Senanayake's difficulties and indicated that he might even publish his own letter of 5 
October to Hall (300); if the government's decisions were not to his satisfaction, he 
would speak out against them in the House of Lords. 
The impact of Soulbury's intervention remains unclear. On 26 October the 
Cabinet considered a report from the Colonial Affairs Committee which retained the 
provision for a constitutional review after six years (312) . Ministers raised objections 
and they were also uncertain about the wording of that part of the policy statement 
which dealt with the issue of the three-quarters majority (316). These questions were 
referred to a small group of ministers chaired by Clement Attlee, the prime minister, 
which revised the draft statement. At Attlee's suggestion a reference to the 
evolutionary character of constitutional development was substituted for a review 
after a six years (317). Soulbury was shown the text of the new statement at a 
meeting with Hall on 30 October (318) . His reaction was reported to have been 
generally good, and he fe lt that the statement would help Senanayake. The statement 
was announced on 31 October, followed by a white paper embodying the decisions of 
the British government. 54 Moore reported in early November that although the white 
paper did not meet all of Senanayake's desiderata, he was prepared to accept it and 
place it before the State Council for approval (320). 
The Indian problem, post-war reconstruction and the communist challenge 
On 23 October 1944, after the appointment of the Soulbury Commission was 
announced, the Indian government sought to reopen negotiations on the rights and 
status of Indians in the island. This was rebuffed by the Board of Ministers. The board 
did not think that any agreed basis existed for the resumption of negotiations, and 
pointed out that the general question of the rights and status of Indians in the island 
was, in substance, a different matter from the particular problems of constitutional 
reform which were the subject of inquiry by the commission. Above all ministers 
insisted that they did not want the case for the Indian community in Ceylon to be 
presented or openly sponsored before the commission by the Government of India 
(230; also 233, 234, 243, 251). 
The unresolved issues relating to the position of the Indians in the Ceylonese 
polity, and the conflicting grievances involved in these, were ventilated afresh when 
the Soulbury Commission began its sittings. Spokesmen for the Indian community 
argued that Indians resident in the island had been clearly discriminated against in 
regard to the franchise, and urged that this subject as well as immigration should be 
among those reserved under the terms of the 1943 declaration. 
The Soulbury Commission, which devoted two chapters of its report to the issues 
of the franchise and immigration, 55 came down on the side of the Board of Ministers 
in declaring that the policies pursued by the latter on the franchise 'did not seem to 
His Majesty's Government to involve any racial discrimination against Indians, 
whereas some of the Indians protests amounted in effect to a claim to a position of 
privilege rather than of equality'.56 Paragraph 242 of the report recommended that: 
(i) Any Bill relating solely to the prohibition or restriction of immigration into Ceylon 
shall not be regarded as coming within the category of Bills which the Governor General 
is instructed to reserve for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure ... ; 
(ii) Any Bill relating solely to the franchise shall not be regarded as coming within the 
category of Bills which the Governor-General is instructed to reserve for the signification 
of His Majesty's pleasure. 
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The Indian leadership in the island regarded these comments and recommendations 
as a grievous setback to their cause and, as we have been, began a campaign of 
opposition to the franchise recommendations embodied in the report, but to no 
avail. When the government's policy statement was under consideration in October 
1945, Moore was informed by the CO that no concession had been made to the 
Government of India's representations on any main issue (313) . 
The publication of the Soulbury Report and the white paper had one major 
political consequence: it guaranteed Senanayake's triumph over his critics in the 
Board of Ministers and the State Council. Senanayake's motion for the acceptance of 
the Soulbury proposals was seconded by none other than Bandaranaike himself. 
When George E de Silva gave the blessing of the Ceylon National Congress to the 
proposals in a long speech (prepared by J R Jayewardene),57 Senanayake's triumph 
was complete. Thanks to a concerted campaign of persuasion, all waverers in the 
ranks of the minorities were won over, and when the debate began on 8 November 
the tide turned so strongly in Senanayake's favour that only one vote - that of W 
Dahanayake, a Sinhalese radical who wanted nothing short of independence- eluded 
him. At the vote taken on 9 November two others joined Dahanayake in opposition to 
Senanayake's motion, which was approved by 51 members (326). Two Indian 
representatives voted against the resolution. They themselves had been inclined to 
vote in favour even though the quid pro quo they asked for was not forthcoming, but 
M S Aney, the agent for the Government of India, 58 seated in the gallery of the house, 
sent down a note asking them to vote against the motion. It was, as Moore observed, 
'a stupid and improper piece of interference' on the part of the representative of the 
Indian government (325) . 
Senanayake was elated at the majority he had won but Aney's indiscretion did not 
pass unnoticed. If nothing else it confirmed fears of undue Indian influence in the 
affairs of Ceylon through the Indian minority once both India and Ceylon had won 
their independence. Indeed relations between Senanayake and his associates on the 
one hand, and the leadership of the Indian community in the island on the other, 
remained strained throughout the year 1946--1947. 
In just over six months after the debate in the State Council on the white paper, 
the order-in-council embodying the new constitution was enacted.59 Almost all the 
work was undertaken in Colombo. Senanayake was anxious to hasten the process. As 
early as November 1945 he informed the CO that he would like to send J H B Nihill , 
the legal secretary, to London with a draft of the constitution. Although the CO 
urged that the drafting of the constitution be left to a legal draftsman sent from the 
Whitehall (330), Senanayake's views -which were supported by Moore - prevailed 
and the drafting was left in the hands mainly of Nihill, B P Pieris of the legal 
draftsman's office in Colombo and, of course, Jennings. 
The Tamil Congress persisted with its campaign against the Soulbury Report and 
the white paper (339, 347) but there was stronger pressure from other sources, and 
on other issues: the defence clauses and the question of the Indian franchise. 
In July 1945 Layton, now returned to Britain as commander-in-chief, Portsmouth, 
expressed concern to the Admiralty about the defence implications of the proposed 
reforms. Adumbrating a much wider interpretation of defence requirements than 
bases, ports and airports, he argued that some control over the island's internal 
communications, roads and railways was essential for defence purposes. He also 
revealed himself to be suspicious of CO motives over Ceylon (263, 315). When the 
lxxvi INTRODUCTION 
Admiralty sought to reassure him on this (335) , Layton responded by emphasising 
the need for unceasing vigilance in matters of the island's defence (337). Senanayake 
insisted that the definition of the term defence must be in the form adopted in the 
1943 declaration and on this he had the support of the CO. In March 1946 the CO 
persuaded the Chiefs of Staff Committee to accept Senanayake's position (348). 
The pressure for a revision of policy on the Indian franchise was stronger, more 
persistent, and came from powerful political sources as well: the viceroy's executive, 
the secretary of state for India and the British Cabinet Mission to India in 1946. 
While Indian leaders in the island sent telegrams of protest to the CO calling upon 
the latter to intervene directly in the matter of the Indian franchise (331), the most 
influential advocate of the Indian case was Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, member for 
supply on the viceroy's executive and formerly Indian representative on the War 
Cabinet in London. At an interview with Hall in December 1945, Mudaliar suggested 
that the Soulbury recommendations on the Indian franchise be modified if not 
changed (336). He repeated this request in February 1946 (342) and received the 
backing of the secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence (343). 
Senanayake had returned home from London with the belief that the obstacle to 
the immediate grant of dominion status was not the minority problems of Ceylon but 
the complex issues of the transfer of power in the Indian empire. This gave him an 
entirely new and much more satisfactory perspective to the problems with which he 
was now confronted. Dominion status, he bel ieved, was now in the offing. Also, his 
reading of the Soulbury Report - and no doubt the assessment of his advisors - had 
led him to conclude that questions relating to the franchise and citizenship would be 
treated as falling within the ambit of the powers of the Ceylon government under the 
new constitution. Thus, when requests came for a revival of talks with India, he 
adopted the position that questions relating to the Indian population in Ceylon 
should be left to the new parliament to decide (338) . He insisted that talks could take 
place only after the new constitution was in force (340). 
The policy of the CO on such matters was clear; it would support Senanayake. This 
was conveyed to Mudal iar in February 1946 (346) and to the India Office, reiterating 
the CO's commitment to the Soulbury recommendations on the franchise. Although 
occasionally the CO itself was not entirely happy with Senanayake's interpretations of 
the franchise clauses in the Soulbury Report (349), the Office supported him against 
the Indian protests, arguing that these had been made in good faith, based on the 
opinion of the legal secretary. Senanayake, for his part, responded to this pressure by 
asserting that he would not accept any changes in the franchise and immigration 
clauses at this late stage (352). 
On 11 April 1946 the Cabinet Colonial Affairs Committee met to discuss 
definitions of defence and external affairs and the conflicting interpretations of 
powers relating to the reservation of bills on franchise matters (357). In regard to 
both the committee felt it necessary to support Senanayake. These decisions were 
conveyed to Pethick-Lawrence who was now in India as a member of the Cabinet 
Mission. The secretary of state for India requested clarification of the safeguards for 
the Indian population which would be written into the constitution. He expressed 
himself satisfied with the answers he received (358-360). From the CO, Sir Charles 
Jeffries assured Moore that difficulties with India over the franchise and immigration 
had been satisfactorily overcome.60 Labour issues, however, were still in dispute 
(361, 362, 364, 366). 
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The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council was enacted on 15 May 1946. The 
subjects expressly reserved to the imperial government were defence and external 
affairs. Despite Pethick-Lawrence's acceptance of the minority safeguards, the 
Commonwealth Relations Department of the Indian government expressed regret 
that no opportunity had been given to comment on the draft order-in-council before 
it was published.61 
Once the constitution had been settled, Goonetilleke, in his capacity as financial 
secretary, turned his attention to the question of post -war reconstruction. In 
September 1946, he submitted to the CO a comprehensive report in which he 
proposed an extension of the wartime bulk purchasing agreements for Ceylon's 
principal commodities of tea, copra and rubber. Underpinning Goonetilleke's main 
economic argument that Ceylon was entitled to preferential treatment because of the 
island's co'ntribution to the war effort, lay a thinly-veiled political threat that if his 
proposals were not considered favourably, the consequence might be a break with 
the imperial connection and Ceylon's gravitation towards India (368). During his 
discussions in London he was said by the CO to have staked his personal reputation 
on a successful outcome. The CO Economic Department, however, together with the 
Ministries of Food and Supply, remained unimpressed. Arguing for the former, 
Sydney Caine challenged Goonetilleke's analysis of how Ceylon's contribution to the 
war had worked to the island's detriment and maintained that there were no 
grounds, commercial or political, upon which Ceylon could expect favourable 
treatment (371) . In the middle of his negotiations in London, Goonetilleke travelled 
with a British delegation to Washington to discuss the implications of a recent rapid 
increase of rubber production in Malaya for rubber prices generally. He received no 
more encouragement from American officials than he did from those in London 
(369, 370). The trade agreements which he was offered when he returned to Ceylon 
from Britain in October 1946 were much less than he had hoped for . CO officials 
described his attitude as 'repressed and gloomy' (372, 374). 
Over the last two years before independence, Senanayake and the Board of 
Ministers faced a serious political challenge from a revived left wing. Recruitment to 
the forces and to the civilian staff of the military bases of SEAC had provided a 
short-term solution to the unemployment problem in the island. With the closing 
down of these bases, and the demobilisation of Ceylonese from the British armed 
services, unemployment increased but not to the extent of causing severe problems 
for the government on its own. The social discontent that manifested itself stemmed 
from severe inflation arising mainly from the increase in the money supply from the 
massive defence expenditure of the years 1943 to 1945. The inevitable consequence 
of this inflationary pressure was discontent among the working class and white collar 
workers over the fall in value of their wages. The Defence Regulations and the 
Avoidance of Strikes and Lockout Act were designed to curb strike action by trade 
unions during wartime, but even so there were strikes in Colombo in 1944 and 1945. 
The communists had replaced the banned LSSP as the chief influence on the 
working class in Colombo and its suburbs, but although they helped organise trade 
unions they were not inclined to encourage or support strike act ion. The strikes 
broke out desp ite them. Now, with the ban on the LSSP lifted, strikes became more 
frequent and among the most militant of the trade unionists were those in the 
clerical grades of the public service. 
The LSSP turned, almost at once, to activity in the industrial sectors to regain the 
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primacy they had lost to the communists and organised a series of major strikes 
between 1945 and 1947, culminating in the general strike of 1947. These strikes were 
as much political demonstrations as they were trade disputes - one of the demands 
was the rejection of the new constitution- and the Board of Ministers was inclined to 
treat them, particularly the general strikes of 1946 and 1947, as a serious bid for 
political power by the marxists.62 
Senanayake was perturbed by the violence that often erupted during these strikes 
and the demonstrations that accompanied them. At a meeting of the Board of 
Ministers in October 1946 he stated that he had lost faith in the administrative 
services generally and in the ability of the police to provide protection to law-abiding 
citizens against acts of lawlessness (373). His lack of faith in the police (375) had 
reached the point where he recommended in November 1946 that a Battalion of 
Army Volunteers be established and kept permanently mobilised. Such a unit, he 
argued, could well be the nucleus of a Ceylonese army (376). There were sharp 
differences between him and some of the officers of state in their attitude to the 
police, and to trade unionism in the government services (378, 379). 
India, Burma and Ceylon 
While Senanayake was preparing for the forthcoming general election, scheduled for 
the middle of 1947, and had established his own political party- the United National 
Party (UNP) - to face the formidable challenge he anticipated from the marxist 
parties (in the form of the LSSP and the communists) and Ponnambalam's 
communalist Tamil Congress, events were moving with remarkable rapidity in India 
and Burma. Policy pronouncements made in Britain on the political future of the raj 
and of Burma, and the responses to these from Indian and Burmese political leaders, 
had an immediate impact on the affairs of Ceylon. 
The documents in the second part of this volume reveal an unusual sensitivity on 
the part of officials at the CO to Senanayake's predicament in the face of the rapidly 
changing situation in India and Burma. In a minute dated 16 December 1946, J B 
Sidebotham referred to the recent demand made by the Anti-Fascist People's 
Freedom League (AFPFL) in Burma for complete independence within a year. Any 
decision on Burma's independence, he warned, could undermine Senanayake's 
position in Ceylon. If the British government decided to concede Burma's demands 
before the new Ceylon constitution came into force, Sidebotham argued that it 
should be prepared to make a further declaration on the grant of dominion status to 
Ceylon and undertake to reopen discussions for that purpose, if necessary, as soon as 
the new constitution became fully operational. He returned to this theme two days 
later with the comment that it would be unfair, because of potentially 'disastrous 
political consequences', to allow a promise of independence for Burma to be sprung 
upon Senanayake at the outset of his election campaign, without due warning and 
without giving him firm assurances of progress, in the near future, beyond the new 
constitution. Jeffries agreed and stated that if it were decided to make any such 
promise to Burma, it would be essential, at the same time, or before, to make a 
further offer to Ceylon (377). 
On 27 January 1947, after a series of talks in London between a Burmese 
delegation and members of the Cabinet, Aung San (the leader of the AFPFL) and 
Attlee signed an agreement on the methods by which Burma would achieve its 
independence, either within or without the Commonwealth, 'as soon as possible'.63 
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Just under a month later, on 20 February, the government made its historic 
announcement that Britain intended to transfer power to responsible Indian hands 
by a date not later than June 1948.64 Senanayake responded on 28 February in a 
letter to Arthur Creech Jones, Hall's successor at the CO. In it he stated that Ceylon 
could not accept a lower political status than India or Burma (381). He had explained 
his position at considerable length and with great candour to Moore and had spoken 
of his fear and distrust of India, and his profound concern for Ceylon's regional 
security. The stark choice the country faced , he asserted, was survival as a small but 
independent partner of the Commonwealth or absorption by an independent India. 
Indeed Senanayake feared that Nehru's ambition was to make independent India the 
dominant power in this part of the world. Nehru's great interest in Ceylon, 
Senanayake believed, was solely because of its strategic importance through its naval 
base at Trincomalee and air bases in other parts of the island. 
Moo re sent to the CO his own appreciation of the political situation. Senanayake's 
current difficulties were said by the governor to be the result of hi~ acceptance of the 
Soulbury proposals. Many of Senanayake's supporters felt that if he had rejected the 
Soulbury constitution, Ceylon would have received the same offer now made to 
Burma. Political pledges to India and Burma were seen as evidence that the speed 
with which independence was attained was governed, not so much by the merits of 
the case as the nuisance value of the applicants. Moore himself felt that this 
conclusion was inescapable in the circumstances, and he went on to argue that if 
Ceylon was to be retained as a loyal and willing member of the Commonwealth, the 
most serious and urgent consideration should be given to Senanayake's arguments. 
Goonetilleke had been deputed by Senanayake to discuss matters further with the 
secretary of state (382). 
From the time Senanayake's and Moore's letters were received in the CO, Creech 
Jones took the initiative to seeking to persuade the Cabinet that the island's progress 
to dominion status should be accelerated. On 29 April 194 7 he submitted a 
memorandum to the Colonial Affairs Committee which explained that Goonetilleke, 
now in Britain, had emphasised the importance to Ceylon of Britain's decision to 
withdraw from India and the anxieties which this raised in relation to Ceylon's 
future. Particular concern had been expressed that the British government would 
not be willing to face a major clash with India in order to protect Ceylon's interests. 
If independence was granted to Ceylon, there would be no pressure brought on 
Senanayake to leave the Commonwealth. The latter had urged that full independence 
within the Commonwealth should be granted as soon as possible after the elections 
in Ceylon. Creech Jones added that Senanayake was willing, if the government so 
desired, to negotiate agreements in respect of imperial defence and external affairs . 
These could be drafted in consultation with the governor who would, in turn, consult 
h is ministers. Goonetilleke had pressed for the use of the word 'independence' rather 
than dominion status in any statement on Ceylon's constitutional advancement, 
since, up to this point, the latter had not been used in the case of India and Burma. 
The secretary of state emphasised the urgency of a decision . He appreciated that 
the government was facing accusations at home of 'scuttle' and of 'squandering the 
empire ' but felt that if the matter were handled correctly, Britain would have an 
excellent opportunity, not only of keeping Ceylon within the Commonwealth and 
securing vital defence interests in the Indian Ocean, but also of demonstrating to the 
world that Britain's policy towards colonial peoples was not an 'empty boast'. Subject 
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to the views of the Chiefs of Staff and the dominion governments, the Colonial Affairs 
Committee supported Creech Jones's recommendations (388). 
The chiefs of staff were more cautious than the CO. They expressed concern that 
an unconditional grant of independence to Ceylon was a gamble and that it should be 
accompanied by assurances that the defence requirements of the Commonwealth 
would not be jeopardised in any way (389, 396). 
Creech Jones found himself isolated when the Cabinet debated the issue on 6 May 
1947. Cabinet decided that it would be unwise to reach a hurried decision on a 
question of such major importance. Ministers asked whether it was not premature to 
agree to any further measure of constitutional reform in Ceylon. They were still not 
satisfied on the issue of safeguards for the minorities. They were also anxious to avoid 
giving an impression of weakness or of encouraging demands for similar concessions 
in Malaya and elsewhere. Ministers were equally emphatic that they could not 
subscribe to Senanayake's assumption that the British government would not be 
prepared to risk a clash with India over Ceylon. Creech Jones and his officials at the 
CO were left with the unenviable task of drafting a new policy statement in the light 
of the Cabinet's discussion (390). 
There followed a month of intense correspondence between Whitehall and 
Colombo over the wording of the statement (392-394) . On 1 June Creech Jones 
submitted a draft to Cabinet, together with a draft of an accompanying letter of 
explanation to Senanayake. Prompted by T L Rowan, his principal private secretary, 
Attlee dismissed the draft of the statement out of hand, describing it as one of the 
worst examples of 'turgid jargon' that he had ever seen and ordering that it should be 
rewritten. Cabinet was equally critical when it considered the drafts on 3 June (395). 
Revised drafts of a statement and letter to Senanayake were agreed on 6 June. The 
statement made no definite pledge of immediate dominion status; negotiations on 
this would would proceed once elections had been held in Ceylon and a new 
government was fully functioning (398, 399). Senanayake, however, refused to 
accept the text which he described as 'retrograde' (400). His view was influenced, not 
only by the strike situation in Ceylon and the imminence of the election, but also by 
the decision to grant dominion status to India and Pakistan almost immediately 
under the 3 June plan negotiated between Mountbatten and the Indian leaders. 
Further intense correspondence followed (401-403) before a new statement, pledg-
ing, for the first time, that 'immediate steps' would be taken to confer upon Ceylon 
'fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations', was made on 
12 June (405). Attlee was clearly dissatisfied with the manner in which the whole 
affair had been handled by the Colonial Affairs Committee. His concern prompted a 
review in the Cabinet Office of the Cabinet committee arrangements for dealing with 
constitutional and other problems arising in various parts of the Commonwealth, 
including the colonial territories (404). 
There was one final complication over the new statement and this arose out of the 
use of the term dominion status in the transfer of power arrangement in India. 
Having previously pressed for the use of the word 'independence', Senanayake was 
now unhappy with 'fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of 
Nations' in the Ceylon statement. Although rejected by the Burmese leaders, India's 
acceptance of dominion status had given the expression a new political credibility in 
South Asia and its absence in the statement on Ceylon appeared to raise doubts about 
the nature of the independence that was being offered. Senanayake therefore 
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suggested alternative expressions for use in the Ceylon statement, although Moore 
informed the CO that he would agree to accept the existing text if his suggestions 
were deemed inappropriate (406). Goonetilleke sent a message that it was too late to 
change the wording and Senanayake accepted Creech Jones's assurance that it meant 
the same as dominion status, no more and no less (407). The statement was 
announced by Creech Jones in the House of Commons on 18 June 1947, and by 
Senanayake in the State Council on the same date. 
The defence agreement, sterling balances and citizenship 
With agreement in principle on Ceylon's independence now reached, it remained to 
finalise the details . Goonetilleke was deputed by Senanayake to negotiate on his 
behalf in London where he was joined in July by Moo re. There were three agreements 
to be negotiated: on defence, external affairs and the rights of British civil servants. 
Of these the most politically sensitive related to defence. 
Senanayake had no objection to British insistence that Ceylon's independence 
should not impair the defence requirements of the Commonwealth. For him no less 
than for Whitehall, the defence agreement was part of a process of adjusting to the 
uncertainties of a new pattern of international politics in South Asia where India was 
an independent state. If defence was important to the Chiefs of Staff because of 
Britain's interest in the Indian Ocean, especially for securing links with Australia and 
New Zealand, for Senanayake it served a different but no less important purpose. The 
Ceylonese negotiators believed that a defence agreement offered them security 
against possible threats from India to Ceylon's independence. 
In the drafting of their defence requirements, the Chiefs of Staff considered a 
number of models. One was South Africa and the Simonstown base but they 
considered that the defence agreement negotiated by the United States with the 
Philippines prior to the grant of independence to that country in 1946 to be more 
appropriate for the Ceylon situation (396). The sensitivity surrounding the defence 
question covered such issues as whether the agreement should identify the base 
facil ities and military establishments which Britain would occupy, the extent to 
which Britain would retain responsibility after independence for the maintenance of 
internal security in Ceylon, the control of British forces in the island, and, as a 
matter of special concern, not only to the Chiefs of Staff in London but also to the 
government of Australia, whether the agreement should be subject to a time-limit 
(412, 415, 416, 418, 419, 420, 428). On all such matters the agreement eventually 
concluded was either silent or cast in very general terms (436). 
Throughout the discussions, Goonetilleke 's assignment was not confined to 
negotiations on the formal agreements: it ranged over the whole question of 
ensuring that Ceylon's independence conformed to the traditional pattern of 
dominion status (410). This included recognition of Ceylon's right to secede (411). 
There was also some discussion of whether it would be necessary or desirable to have 
agreements safeguarding the rights of minorities and covering the treatment of 
foreign nationals, companies and shipping. In all cases it was decided against, 
Senanayake being adamantly opposed to any attempt to reopen the minority 
question (409, 413, 415, 419). 
On other outstanding questions the CO and the War Office attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to obtain an increase in Ceylon's defence contribution (296, 445) . The CO and 
the Treasury also voiced anxiety over what both departments viewed as serious 
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depletion of Ceylon's sterling balances. With the Treasury arguing that Ceylon was 
'just about broke', an effort was made in November 1947 to impose a ceiling on 
Ceylon's sterling withdrawals. This was resisted (435, 442, 444). 
Dominion governments were kept informed of Ceylon's impending independence 
(416) . There were no comments, much less objections, from three of them. Only 
Australia had objections, of a sort, to make. Insisting that there should be no 
time-limit placed on the defence agreement, the Australian government suggested 
that a Commonwealth conference be held in London to discuss Ceylon's new status 
prior to the grant of dominion status (418). In the face of Australian persistence, 
Moore, on behalf of Senanayake, advised that the proposal for a Commonwealth 
conference should be politely but firmly rejected (422-424). 
The six months prior to independence were not without incident. The Ceylon 
government was anxious to introduce emergency legislation to cope with the threat 
to public order that had emerged from the militancy and politicisation of the trade 
union movement under the direction of the LSSP. This legislation was welcomed by 
the Colonial Office and a Public Security Act was approved by the State Council on 11 
June 1947 as one of its final acts before it was dissolved. The emergency powers 
order-in-council which had been prepared earlier was not proceeded with once this 
bill had been approved (397). 
The general election of August-September 1947, at which Senanayake's UNP did 
not fare as well as the Colonial Office had expected, caused some worries in the initial 
stages. But the UNP was easily the largest party in the new parliament and 
Senanayake was able to form a government with a comfortable majority (425). In the 
aftermath of the election, and indeed almost from the time nominations were called, 
it was rumoured that ministers and others elected to the House of Representatives, 
or elected or appointed to the Senate, might be disqualified on the grounds that at 
the time of their election or appointment they were, technically, public servants 
within the meaning of the law. Moo re informed the CO in October 194 7 that there 
were difficulties in filling the Senate because of this ambiguity in the law. The CO 
was not keen to amend the Ceylon (Constitution) Order-in-Council to meet this 
difficulty and indeed felt that such an amendment would be open to the objection 
that it had been introduced for the benefit of the goveming party. With Moore's 
clarification sent in November 1947 that further amendment was required merely to 
plug a loophole, the CO eventually agreed, much to the relief of Moore and the 
ministers.65 
On 29 October 1947 the Ceylon Cabinet approved the three agreements which had 
been negotiated in London (431) and decided further that the bill to give effect to 
independence be titled 'The Ceylon Independence Bill', following the Indian 
precedent. This was agreed, although at the outset the parliamentary timetable in 
London gave cause for concern (432, 433). The text of the white paper containing the 
proposals for conferring on Ceylon fully responsible status within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations was published simultaneously in London and Colombo on 
11 November 1947. The three agreements were signed on the same day in London 
and Colombo (436) . The second reading of the independence bill was debated in the 
House of Commons on 21 November 1947, and in the House of Lords on 4 December 
1947. There was unanimous support for the bill in both houses, but the debate in the 
Commons was notable for the anxieties expressed by some members of the 
Conservative opposition about imperial defence in the light of the political and 
INTRODUCTION l:xxxiii 
constitutional changes on South Asia then being introduced, and in particular the 
independence now envisaged for Ceylon.66 Senanayake, in the meantime, had fixed 4 
February 1948 as independence day (440). Moore, the last governor, of the colony 
was invited to accept appointment as the first governor-general of the new dominion 
to whose creation he had contributed a great deal on his own, and through the 
support he gave Senanayake. 
There remained questions relating to citizenship for the Indian minority in 
Ceylon, Senanayake's hand in this respect had been strengthened considerably in 
January 1947 when, overturning its own previous advice, the CO recommended that 
Ceylon should be included in the countries to be represented at the British 
Commonwealth Conference on Nationality and Citizenship which was held in 
London in February 1947. Participation in the conference carried with it an 
acknowledgement that henceforth Ceylon would be entitled to enact legislation to 
determine its own local citizenship. The decision to allow Ceylon to participate in the 
conference was not made without misgivings; officials at the CO recognised that the 
Ceylon government might use citizenship legislation to discriminate against Indians. 
However, in the political circumstances then prevailing, the CO felt that the risk was 
one that had to be taken (380). 
It was reported in October 1947 that Senanayake had arranged negotiations with 
India over citizenship (427, 429). As a consequence of the London conference, 
Senanayake was aware that a British Nationality Bill was under consideration. He 
was concerned that British legislation might affect his negotiations with Nehru and 
he suggested that the British bill should be deferred until his discussions with India 
were over. He clarified his views further in November 1947 explaining that a 
definition of Ceylon citizenship was being prepared but that he would not proceed 
with it until the conclusion of his talks with India which were scheduled for 
December 1947 (434). 
The substance of the offer Senanayake made to Nehru on this occasion was the 
grant of citizenship to all Indians who had lived in the island for a 'prescribed 
number of years'. He defined the prescribed period as seven years' continuous 
residence for married persons and ten for single persons, with 31 December 1945 as 
the operative date. This, in fact, was a much more generous offer than the one made 
in 1941, but it did not satisfy Nehru who held out for a qualification of eight years for 
all persons, married or single, with January 1948 as the qualifying date.67 Sena-
nayake, with memories of what had happened at the negotiations in 1941 very much 
in mind, refused to give in to Nehru's demands. The talks collapsed. Hugh Tinker, 
the historian of the Indian communities settled in British colonies, blames Nehru for 
the failure of these talks. He points out that, as a result of Nehru's rigidity and his 
refusal to bargain or compromise on what he thought were matters of principle, a 
unilateral settlement was imposed by Senanayake's independent government in 
1948-1949.68 
One of the first political initiatives of Senanayake's government after independ-
ence was the definition of Ceylonese citizenship. The Ceylon Citizenship Act, No 18 
of 1948, restricted the status of a national of Ceylon to those who could claim it by 
descent or registration. The application of these conditions to Indians in Ceylon was 
defined in the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No 3 of 1949. The 
requirements were much the same that Senanayake had offered Nehru in 1947. A 
third piece of legislation, the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act, No 
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48 of 1949, removed the voters of Indian origin from the electoral rolls. Under the 
second of these acts applicants were required to produce documentary evidence in 
support of their claims to Ceylonese citizenship. Such evidence was hard to come by, 
but the difficulties involved in this were compounded by the initial refusal of the 
Ceylon Indian Congress (later the Ceylon Workers Congress) to co-operate in the 
implementation of this legislation. By the time they changed their minds, it was too 
late for most potential applicants for Ceylonese citizenship to stake their claims. 
Epilogue 
Ceylon had few of the difficulties of transition that caused so much concern in regard 
to the process of ending empire in Africa and other parts of the colonial world. The 
island had a well-developed education system which was being purposefully expanded 
and improved in the 1940's. University College, Colombo, established in 1921, was 
converted to the University of Ceylon in 1942 with Jennings as vice chancellor. The 
colony had an excellent administrative system, a smaller version of the steel 
framework of the raj. Most of these officials in the higher bureaucracy were 
Ceylonese; the recruitment of civil service cadets from the UK and British colonies 
came to end in the late 1930's. The judiciary was largely if not entirely Ceylonese at 
all levels. The chief justice was an Englishman, as were one or two puisne justices, 
but the great majority of judges of the supreme court and the legal profession 
generally were Ceylonese. The same applied in the cases of the technical and medical 
services, especially the latter. 
There was no significant deviation from this pattern in regard to the police and the 
armed services. The top positions in the police were still held by British officers, and 
even lower down the scale officers from the Metropolitan Police Service had been 
recruited but, by and large, there was a strong and growing Ceylonese element in the 
higher echelons of the service. By 1945--1946 the pressure was on for the 
replacement of British officers by Ceylonese. The problem with the police, as the 
political leadership in Ceylon saw it, was that it seemed incapable of maintaining law 
and order in the city of Colombo and its suburbs during periods of labour unrest. 
Hence, as we have seen, Senanayake favoured the creation of a small detachment of 
soldiers to help the police maintain order in times of crisis (375, 376). The island had 
no standing army worth speaking of, no navy, and no air force. There were, of course, 
volunteer regiments, manned by young Ceylonese who had served in the British 
forces. Significantly enough, when a small army was built at independence or shortly 
thereafter, its nucleus consisted of demobilised officers and men, and with volunteer 
regiments in support. Its first commanding officer was seconded from the British 
army. 
The manner in which power was transferred to Ceylon proved to be controversial, 
and the agreements over defence and external affairs were at the heart of the problem 
(437, 438). They seemed to suggest a qualitative difference in the nature of the 
independence that was won by Ceylon through a process of orderly negotiation - in 
comparison with the cognate process in India, Pakistan and Burma. Once Sena-
nayake had set his sights on dominion status and membership of the Common-
wealth, the manner of its attainment seemed to him less important than the fact of 
its achievement. But his most vocal critics on the left of Ceylon's spectrum, who had 
no faith either in dominion status or in the Commonwealth, denied that the island 
was really independent, and pointed to the defence agreements as evidence of this . As 
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forWhitehall, it sought to justify Ceylon's passage to self-government in 1948 on the 
basis that it was not merely a special case but an unusual one as well because of the 
strength of its civil society, the political maturity and sophistication of its leaders 
and, above all, the fact that it had had adult suffrage for nearly two decades. 
The emphasis at that time - it must be noted - was also on the characteristic 
British belief that there was something unique in each of territory of the empire. The 
uniqueness of India, for instance, was regarded as so self-evident that it offered no 
precedent for the countries of the colonial empire, save possibly Ceylon. The 
constitutional future of the island could hardly be separated from the momentous 
decisions on India then being taken. 
The general significance of Ceylon's advance from colonial to dominion status was 
thought to be far-reaching. 'This is the first occasion in our history,' Lord Addison, 
the lord privy seal and former dominions secretary, said in introducing the second 
reading of the Ceylon Independence Bill in the House of Lords on 4 December 1947, 
'upon which a colony, developing this system of self-government of its own accord, 
had deliberately sought to become a Dominion state in our Commonwealth, but we 
hope and expect it will not be the last'.69 Much later, in 1960, Sir Charles Jeffries 
justified the decision to concede Ceylon's case for dominion status because 'of its 
size, its economic strength, its advanced state of social organization. Since 1931 it 
had in fact had a form of political constitution which placed the main responsibility 
for the conduct of its affairs on an elected State Council and on Ministers answerable 
to that [body]'. Ceylon in brief, was a special case. Jeffries added that 'no other colony 
seemed to be in sight of fulfilling these conditions. If Ceylon was the forerunner, it 
had a long start'. 70 
Nicholas Mansergh, the historian of the Commonwealth, viewed Ceylon's inde-
pendence in much the same terms: 
Ardent nationalists from other and less peaceful lands might allude in tones of 
condescension to Ceylon's fight for freedom but the gentlemanly pressure for independ-
ence exerted by its conservative nationalist leaders upon Whitehall made up in good sense 
what it lacked in political passion. As a result Ceylon acquired the status of a Dominion of 
the British Commonwealth without bitterness, by orderly constitutional advance which 
made the matter of its attainment a source of unfailing satisfaction to British constitu-
tional historians and its status in the academic world that of the model Dominion.71 
Ceylon, then, was at the head of the queue and it was not expected that others 
would follow too soon along the same path. But by the 1960's others had followed 
this path - in Africa and Asia, no less than in the Caribbean. And as colony after 
colony reached independence, men like Jeffries and the historian Duncan Hall saw 
the transfer of power in Ceylon as a historic event. Thus Hall argued: 
Historically, Ceylon had almost as much right as India to be regarded as an original 
member of the Commonwealth. It was not only the first of the 'colonies ' (the dependent 
areas administered by the Colonial Office) to achieve full membership of the Common-
wealth. It was also the first to envisage, to look forward to, and to prepare for that goal. 
And it pursued that goal steadily, without ambivalence, patiently and without violence.72 
Jeffries was just as enthusiastic about Ceylon's special claims: 
Ceylon provides the classic example of how with good sense and good will, two peoples 
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can carry through the extremely difficult and delicate transition from a ruler-subject 
relationship to an equal partnership. 
Ceylon has been the prototype and model for the new Commonwealth of the latter part 
of the twentieth century. In Ceylon the British learnt, by trial and error, the art of 
colonial administration; but they learnt, also, the wisdom of relinquishing control when 
it was no longer tolerable by a people willing and able to maintain itself as an independent 
state.73 
Jeffries, one feels, was claiming more than he was entitled to do in arguing that 
the rapid progress in ending empire in the 1960's was the result of the steady 
application of a policy initiated by those who participated in the late 1940's in the 
making of policy on Ceylon's future . A reading of the papers in this volume would not 
support such a claim; rather one sees a whole series of ad hoc decisions taken to deal 
with each problem as it arose. The most that could be claimed is that these ad hoc 
measures eventually provided a rough pattern of action for the future. On every 
occasion a pragmatic acceptance of political realities was more important than any 
careful application of principles. 
* * * * 
The work on this volume would have been more time consuming and much more 
difficult but for the facilities available to me at the International Centre for Ethnic 
Studies (ICES) by way of secretarial and other assistance. The introduction was word 
processed by Ms Sepali Liyanamana of the ICES. Several drafts were prepared by her 
with her usual cheerful efficiency. Mrs Kanthi Carnage, librarian/documentalist at 
the ICES, helped in the laborious process of proof reading and in the preparation of 
the index. This was work done more as a labour of love than as part of her duties at 
the ICES. Iranga Athukorale word processed the index. In addition Rajeewa S 
Jayasinghe (BA, Sri Lanka) served as a very efficient and conscientious research 
assistant to me on this project, helping to check references, to locate material at the 
Sri Lanka National Archives in Colombo and with data for the biographical entries 
and the chronology of principal events. I am very grateful to all of them for their 
assistance so generously given to me. 
KM de Silva 
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21 ibid. 
22 M Tomlinson, The most dangerous moment (London, 1976). 
23 ibid, pp 16--17. 
24 ibid. 
25 There is no study, as yet, of the Mool-oya incident, apart from occasional references to it in books 
relating to this period of Sri Lankan history. SP XV, 1940, contains much useful material. 
26 Burghers are descendants of the Dutch and Portuguese settlers and rulers of the country. They are 
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Summary of Documents: Part I 
Chapter 1 
The war and postponement of constitutional reform; 
Indo--Ceylon relations, Sept 1939-Apr 1941 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1939 
1 Sir A Caldecott 7 Sept 'Things Ceylonese', 1st periodical re- 1 
for CO port 
2 Mr MacDonald 3 Oct Minute on 1 4 
3 Sir A Caldecott 4 Oct 'Things Ceylonese', 2nd periodical re- 4 
for CO port, + Minutes by G E J Gent & Sir H 
Moo re 
4 G G Ponnambalam 18 Oct Letter explaining views of minorities 7 
to Sir A Caldecott on reforms 
5 Mr MacDonald 19 Oct Letter on labour relations between In- 8 
to Lord Zetland dia & Ceylon 
(India Office) 
6 Sir A Caldecott 21 Oct 'Things Ceylonese', 3rd periodical re- 9 
for CO port 
7 Sir A Caldecott 23 Oct Tel on forthcoming Indo-Ceylon con- 11 
to Mr MacDonald ference in Delhi on trade negotiations 
& labour relations 
8 Mr MacDonald 26 Oct Tel (reply to 7) on labour relations 12 
to Sir A Caldecott 
9 Sir A Caldecott 28 Oct Despatch on reforms debate in State 12 
to Mr MacDonald Council; minority representation & 
proposal to appoint a re-delimitation 
committee [Extract] 
+ Minutes by G E J Gent, Sir C Par-
kinson, Mr MacDonald & Lord Duffer-
in 
10 Sir A Caldecott 31 Oct Tel (reply to 8) 19 
to Mr MacDonald 
11 G G Ponnambalam 3 Nov Letter explaining views of minorities 20 
to Sir N Stewart on reforms 
Sandeman (Con MP) 
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to Sir A Caldecott 
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13 Nov Minute on European unofficials in 21 
Ceylon 
18 Nov Despatch forwarding a message from 22 
minority representatives 
27 Nov Despatch conveying views of Board of 23 
Ministers on reforms 
30 Nov Tel on deadlock between India & 24 
Ceylon over labour relations 
28 Dec 'Things Ceylonese', 4th periodical re- 24 
port 
29 Dec Despatch on implications for Ceylon of 28 
failure of labour negotiations with In-
dia 
1940 
5 Jan Letter conveying views of GOI on fail- 29 
ure of labour negotiations 
[Jan] Note on history of labour dispute be- 31 
tween India & Ceylon in preparation 
for meeting with deputation from 
Ceylon Association 
20 Jan Despatch on reforms, transmitting a 34 
resolution of the Ceylon National Con-
gress 
22 Jan 'Things Ceylonese', 5th periodical re- 34 
port 
23 Jan Letter (reply to 18) on proposals to 38 
resolve labour dispute & constitutional 
reform in Ceylon 
26 Jan Despatch on reforms, suggesting three 40 
possible courses of action 
18 Feb 'Things Ceylonese', 6th periodical re- 43 
port 
23 Feb Despatch on registration of Indian vo- 44 
ters, + Enclosures 1--4 
28 Feb Letter on the views of a constituent 51 
with a tea planting interest in Ceylon 
on the political situation 
4 Mar Tel requesting clarification of cir- 52 
cumstances leading to resignations of 
Ceylon ministers 
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to Sir A Caldecott 
Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr MacDonald 
Sir A Caldecott 
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Lord Zetland (India Office) 
to Mr MacDonald 
Mr MacDonald 
to Lord Zetland 
G E 1 Gent 
Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr MacDonald 
Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr MacDonald 
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1940 
5 Mar Tel transmitting a message from gov- 53 
ernor to State Council on ministerial 
resignations 
5 Mar Tel (reply to 27) 
6 Mar Tel on re-election of ministers 
54 
55 
13 Mar Tel on resolution of crisis over min- 56 
isterial resignations 
21 Mar Things Ceylonese': 7th periodical re- 58 
port 
21 Mar Letter on Mr Bandaranaike's anti- 62 
Indian speech 
11 Apr 'Things Ceylonese': 8th periodical re- 62 
port 
22 Apr Despatch on recent ministerial crisis, 67 
proposing amendments to Ceylon 
(State Council) Order-in-Council of 
1931, + Enclosure 
23 Apr Despatch (reply to 23) on refusal by 69 
Board of Ministers to participate in a 
governor's conference 
23 Apr Letter on reforms & Indo-Ceylon rela- 70 
tions 
30 Apr Letter (reply to 22) transmitting vicer- 71 
oy's response to a proposal for inter-
departmental discussions between CO 
& India Office 
6 May Letter (reply to 38) 72 
7 May Minute on situation on Ceylon & Mr 73 
MacDonald's view that governor 
should return to UK for consultation 
9 May Despatch on labour situation, + Encl- 73 
osure: report by Mr Corea (3-6 May) 
9 May Tel recommending appointment of 76 
constitutional commission & post-
ponement of election in Ceylon & ex-
plaining why it would be inadvisable 
for governor to return to UK, + Mi-
nutes by Sir G Cater & Mr MacDonald 
xciv SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [43-57) 
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43 Sir A Caldecott 10 May Tel (reply to 35) 78 
to Mr MacDonald 
44 Mr MacDonald 11 May Tel (reply to 42) 78 
to Sir A Caldecott 
45 Sir A Caldecott 17 May Despatch on election law & Indian 79 
to Mr MacDonald voters, + Enclosure: note of meeting 
between governor & ministers 
46 Sir A Caldecott 20 May 'Things Ceylonese': 9th periodical re- 82 
for CO port, + Minutes by G E J Gent & Lord 
Lloyd 
47 Sir A Caldecott 23 May Tel recommending appointment of a 87 
to Lord Lloyd one-man informal mission to Ceylon, 
+ Minute by Sir C Parkinson 
48 G E J Gent 25 May Letter on State Council Powers & Pri- 88 
to Sir A Caldecott vileges Bill 
49 Sir A Caldecott 27 May Letter on Indian labour in Ceylon, + 89 
to G E J Gent Minute by Gent 
50 G F Bolster (tea planter) 4 June Letter on labour unrest on tea planta- 92 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd tions 
(Ministry of Food) 
51 Lord Lloyd 5 June Tel (reply to 47) arguing against a 95 
to Sir A Caldecott mission & advocating postponement of 
an election until the end of the war 
52 G E J Gent 13 June Note for Lord Lloyd's meeting with 96 
representatives of plantations interests 
from the Ceylon Association 
53 KW Blaxter 14 June Minutes on Sama Samajists, on the 99 
& Sir G Bushe grounds upon which N M Perera & D P 
R Gunawardene might be arrested & 
detained 
54 Sir A Caldecott 14 June Despatch on registration of Indian vo- 100 
to Lord Lloyd ters, + Enclosure 2: extract from mi-
nutes of a meeting of Board of Minis-
ters 
55 Lord Lloyd 15 June Tel on Sama Samajists, on need for 104 
to Sir A Caldecott fi rm & effective action 
56 Sir A Caldecott 18 June Tel (reply to 55) 105 
to Lord Lloyd 
57 Sir A Caldecott 29 June 'Things Ceylonese', lOth periodical re- 106 
for CO port, + Minutes by Lord Lloyd & K W 
Blaxter 
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Sir A Caldecott 
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to Lord Lloyd 
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to Sir A Caldecott 
Sir A Caldecott 
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Sir A Caldecott 
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Lord Lloyd 
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to Lord Lloyd 
Lord Lloyd 
to Sir A Caldecott 
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(India Office) 
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KW Blaxter 
Sir A Caldecott 
for CO 
Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Lloyd 
T W Davies (New Delhi) 
to S Caine 
T W Davies (New Delhi) 
to S Caine 
SUBJECT PAGE 
1940 
3 July Tel conveying views of Lord Linlithgow 111 
on Indo-Ceylon relations 
5 July Tel (reply to 58) 112 
12 July Despatch on arrest & detention of 113 
Sama Samajist leaders 
19 July Despatch on conditions of employment 114 
for European officers 
23 July Tel on proposed mission to India by a 115 
deputation of Ceylon ministers 
16 Aug Minute on Lord Lloyd's concern over 116 
anti-British agitation in Ceylon 
20 Aug 'Things Ceylonese', 11th periodical re- 117 
port, + Minute by Lord Lloyd 
23 Aug Letter on Indian labour 120 
31 Aug Letter on circumstances under which 122 
an investigation should be conducted 
into shootings on Mool-oya estate 
3 Sept Despatch on resolution passed by 123 
Sinhala Maha Sabha demanding 
dominion status, + Minutes by KW 
Blaxter & G E J Gent 
17 Sept Tel on registration of Indian voters 125 
17 Sept Despatch (reply to 61) 125 
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13 Apr Letter, 'Reform of the Ceylon constitu- 296 
tion', supporting views of minorities 
13 Apr Letter on reforms 296 
13 Apr Tel (reply to 190 & 191), requesting 297 
amplification of governor's views be-
fore War Cabinet is consulted over 
appointment of commission 
20 Apr Tel (reply to 195) 298 
28 Apr Tel (reply to 196), requesting a further 300 
appreciation 
civ SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [198-212] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PACE 
1944 
198 Sir A Caldecott 5 May Tel (reply to 197) 301 
to Mr Stanley 
199 Advanced Headquarters, 18 May Minutes of meeting, 'Constitutional re- 303 
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[1] 1 
1 CO 54/971/11, no 1 7 Sept 1939 
'Things Ceylonese': first periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
[This informal review on the affairs of Ceylon was the first of fifteen such commentaries 
Caldecott sent to the CO between 7 Sept 1939 and 24 Aug 1941. All of them are 
reproduced here (see 1, 3, 6, 16, 21, 24, 32, 34, 46, 57, 64, 72, 89, 96 and 105). These 
commentaries varied in length and the quality of analysis and value of information 
provided, but all of them had insights on the changing political scene in the island and 
personal rivalries among its politicians which the official documents do not provide. 
Because they were not official despatches they were more relaxed in tone, and Caldecott 
often gave vent to his personal views, fears and expectations, not to mention prejudices, 
without the restraints that one saw in his official correspondence. The governor was not 
above retailing gossip about his ministers' personal affairs. But flaws and all, these 
commentaries are a unique source of information on the island's affairs at this time.] 
I. Intercommunal relations in Ceylon prior to outbreak of war 
1. It would be wrong to deny that the publication and debate of my Reform 
Proposals caused considerable interracial feeling between politicians. The only item 
of the proposals that aroused fierce interest was that dealing with more seats for the 
minorities. Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam put forward exorbitant demands on behalf of the 
Jaffna Tamils, and the Moors and Indians followed his lead in respect of their own 
people. At a speech at Nawalapitiya Ponnambalam resorted to aspersions on 
Sinhalese ancestry and his own was quickly associated with Timbuctoo and with a 
Simian prelude by Mr. Bandaranaike (Minister for Local Administration) and Mr. 
Goonesinha (Labour Party). 
2. This irrelevant mud-slinging weakened Ponnambalam's position in Jaffna and 
Goonesinha did little good for himself by too obviously endeavouring to stage a 
come-back for his party (i.e. himself) on a national Sinhalese slogan quite 
incompatible with his labour tenets. The result is that while he has been indulging in 
squibs and crackers his real (red) fire has been stolen by the Sama Samajists 
(Communists) and added to their own. 
3. It is generally recognised now by all parties that constitutional reforms are 
unlikely to mature during the war; Ponnambalam has therefore made an eloquent 
appeal for unity and Goonesinha has ceased organising anti-Jaffna boycotts which he 
started after Ponambalam's speech at Nawalapitiya. 
4. I consider it true therefore to state that the intercommunal bickering which 
arose in the political (it never extended to the social) sphere as a result of the 
Reforms Proposals has passed away, and that it will not re-emerge until constitution-
al reform is again on the tapis. 
5. The recent bitterness of feeling between Sinhalese and Indians was much more 
serious in as much as it percolated through the political and permeated the whole 
social sphere. It flared up immediately on the publication (unauthorized) in the Press 
of a Memorandum by Major Kotelawala (Minister of Communications and Works) in 
which he proposed the dismissal of all daily-paid Indian employees of Government 
and their replacement by Ceylonese. Although the Kotelawala mountain has brought 
forth only a mouse of notices given to Indians engaged since 1934 (when 
employment of Ceylonese was made obligatory) this mouse has borne in Indian eyes 
all the objectionable features of the mountain, and has thus caused India to make 
absolute its ban on the emigration of unskilled labour to this Island. On the Ceylon 
side the egregious Goonesinha published a lot of inflammatory articles in broad-
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sheets and mushroom newspapers and engineered boycotts of Indian boutiques. 
6. This was of course a game at which two could play; Indian labourers boycotted 
Sinhalese boutiques and Indian propagandists drew level with Goonesinha in the 
publication of lampoons and canards. 
7. A fortnight ago the position caused me some uneasiness: there were in fact two 
outbreaks of disturbance, with both of which the Police dealt promptly and 
summarily. Since then however prosecutions have put the brake on mischievous 
propaganda and Goonesinha nowadays ends all his speeches with a fervent doxology 
to law and order. His latest service to the Sinhalese masses is to encourage the 
opening of Sinhalese barber shops in competition with Indian by undergoing as an 
inaugural ceremony on such premises a public shave. So far, I understand, he has 
not lost much face. 
8. The situation therefore is satisfactory for the present and, if India will only 
accede to Ceylon's renewed request for a conference at which to discuss outstanding 
questions and differences between us, there would appear no impediment to its 
permanent liquidation. 
!1. Crisis psychology 
9. The populace, the politicians and the press all behaved with patience and 
philosophy during "the war of nerves". The huge crowds assembled for the Kandy 
Perahera were restrained and orderly to a degree of perfection, on which fact I duly 
felicitated the Kandyan Chiefs in the course of a short speech at the Government 
Agent's reception of them after the final Day Perahera. 
10. Defence measures were pressed to finality during the days of crisis, and all 
was ready when war was declared. 
11. There is no doubt whatever that the people of Ceylon of all races are behind 
us in this war. The local Astrologers, in unison with some European Theosophists, 
proclaimed that there would be no war; but the general verdict was that it was daily 
becoming inevitable and that peace could be no longer had with honour. 
Ill. Reactions to war 
12. The first general reaction to the declaration of war was a sense of relief from 
long suspense and of duty at last begun. This was manifested in the speed with which 
mobilization of local forces was effected and in the cooperation of the public in 
observing the coastal black-out etc. 
13. The second reaction was a wave of unfortunate memories of the riots of 
1915,1 resulting in suspicion and criticism of Defence measures already taken and of 
1 The riots of 1915 occurred during the cententary commemorations of the Kandyan Convention which 
marked the cession of the Kingdom of Kandy to British rule. National Day celebrations which were 
observed for the first time over the whole island in Apr 1915 were followed in May and June by the 
outbreak of communal disturbances. The riots were directed specifically against the Coast Moors, a section 
of the Muslim community who were mainly recent immigrants from the Malabar coast in south India. 
Active. in the retail trade, the Coast Moors were said to be more willing than their competitors to extend 
credit. They also sold at higher prices, thus incurring the hostility of the people at large and their 
competitors among the Sinhalese traders who were an influential group within the Buddhist movement. 
Having initially treated the riots as communal disturbances, the British came to regard them as part of an 
organised conspiracy by the Sinhalese against the imperial government. Retribution was severe and 
enacted by the military operating under the protection of an Act of Indemnity which placed them beyond 
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those thought likely to be taken. In view of the fact that four of my seven Ministers, 
the Deputy Speaker and the Proprietor of the Daily News group of newspapers were 
all arrested, imprisoned and in fear of having to face a firing squad in 1915 this 
second reaction, however regrettable, need cause neither surprise nor undue 
concern. 
14. At first I was both annoyed and disappointed that Mr. Senanayake should have 
vented his suspicions in open Council without ever having given me a hint or inkling 
of them. On second thoughts I now recognise that it was best that the balloon should 
have thus gone up, because it gave us the opportunity to puncture it publicly. This I 
did by addressing State Council on 5th September: A Press cutting of my speech is 
attached.2 From Editorial comment and from private information from Sinhalese, 
European, Tamil and Muslim sources I gather that for the time being at any rate 
confidence and cooperation is restored. 
15. The "1915 Complex" is nevertheless a hydra-headed bogy and may require 
periodical exorcism. 
16. My speech was followed (after my departure from the Council Chamber) by 
the passing of a resolution of loyalty to His Majesty and of cooperation in waging the 
war. This resolution was not 'suggested' by myself or other Britisher; it was 
spontaneously initiated by the Ministers. There were three abstentions from voting: 
that of the two Muscovy Ducks (Sama Samajists) was expected, but nobody expected 
Senanayake's son Dudley (Member for Dedigama) to make such a sorry exhibition of 
himself. These abstentions should not be taken seriously but given a Pickwickian 
interpretation. 
IV. The constitution in wartime 
17. It was the intention of my advisers and myself to use the ordinary machinery 
of Government so far as possible for war purposes. The first failure of this policy 
occurred yesterday when the State Council amended the Control of Exports Bill by 
providing for appeals to the Executive Committee and making other quite unaccept-
able amendments. I shall therefore refuse Assent to the Ordinance when it is 
submitted to me, and am having the necessary Regulations prepared under the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. 
18. The truth is that the Executive Committee just won't allow the Ministers to 
be Ministers, but want all the power in their own hands. Too many cooks cannot be 
allowed to spoil the war broth, and it will therefore be necessary to deal with nearly 
all Defence measures under the Emergency Powers Act, including legislation 
regarding Trading with the Enemy. I shall of course work in close liaison with the 
Ministers and the result will be a makeshift approximation to Cabinet Government. 
19. It is a real tragedy that Sir Baron Jayatilaka, the nearest approach to a 
Statesman among them all, has lost all leadership and nearly all influence since the 
Bracegirdle Affair.3 Senanayake is now often openly disloyal to him and at a 
conference of Ministers which I held on Saturday they squabbled and both made a 
the reach of the law. Sinhalese Buddhist leaders and trades union activists in the railway workshops in 
Colombo were amongst those arrested. A Riots Damage Ordinance imposed collective fines on all 
Sinhalese residents of specified districts, irrespective of whether or not they were implicated in the riots . 
2 Not printed. 
3 For the Bracegirdle incident, see the introduction to this volume, pp xli-xlii. 
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pretence of threatening to resign. Among the remainder there is no cohesion and Mr. 
Bandaranaike likes to pose as a sort of Opposition within the Ministry. 
20. In any other country such an Administration would be unpromising, but in 
Ceylon it not unfaithfully represents in miniature the psychology and sociality of the 
majority of its inhabitants. It may therefore prove to be the best, even in war. 
2 CO 54/971111, no 2 3 Oct 1939 
[Things Ceylonese]: minute by Mr MacDonald on Sir A Caldecott's 
first periodical report 
[Having read and commented on the governor's report (see 1), MacDonald minuted on 4 
Oct: 'I should rather like my remarks on this to go to the Governor. Perhaps a note from 
me to him saying that I welcome his intention to send this Report periodically, and saying 
that the following is a minute that I wrote on reading his first Report ... would be a good 
idea' (C0/54/971/11).] 
Yes, I would like to read these always. We must watch Things Ceylonese carefully; 
opinion in a colony like Ceylon may be profoundly changed during this war, and we 
must keep control of it. We can do this by constant contact with it, and by taking 
responsible Ceylonese as much as possible into our confidence, and by making them 
feel that they are real, active partners of ours in the war. But I do not regard all the 
members of all the Executive Committees as being "responsible Ceylonese"! The 
present constitution therefore does not fill the Bill in war-time. It is a pity that we 
have not got already in Ceylon a Board of Ministers which really is, in the matters 
which fall to it, a responsible Cabinet. Something on that line is wanted, and I 
therefore welcome the Governor's statement at 'A'1 that he will "work in close liaison 
with the Ministers and the result will be a makeshift approximation to Cabinet 
Government". He will have to be careful not to lose the confidence of the committee 
members, though. I agree that all question of constitutional reform should be 
shelved for the time being; the Governors' reasons against reviving controversy are 
sound in present circumstances. But it may be desirable later in the war to introduce 
progressive reforms which make a more efficient machine of government. At the 
same time we must keep something back to "give" to the Ceylonese in the way of a 
further extension of liberties or self-government after the war. 
I 'A' refers to the last sentence of para 18 of Caldecott's report. 
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'Things Ceylonese': second periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO. 
Minutes by G E J Gent and Sir H Moore 
I. Internal security schemes 
1. In my last Report! I stated that the "1915 Complex" was a hydra-headed bogey 
and that Sir Baron Jayatilaka had lost all leadership. The main event of the past three 
I See 1. 
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weeks, i.e. the Internal Security Scheme Controversy, had its roots in these two 
facts . 
2. In the early days of my Governorship I added the Vice-Chairman of the Board 
of Ministers (i.e. Sir Baron Jayatilaka, Home Minister) to the Local Defence 
Committee in order to get effective liaison between that Committee, the Board of 
Ministers and the Home Ministry. Unfortunately, owing to ill health and the strain 
which he underwent during the Bracegirdle inquiry, Sir Baron has for a considerable 
time past been resting on his oars. His Executive Committee have found him dilatory 
and somnolent, and as liaison member of the Defence Committee he has just failed to 
function. As a result he subscribed to an internal security chapter in the Defence 
Scheme without consulting either his ministerial colleagues or his Executive 
Committee. Nor was he awake to the fact that the chapter incorporated certain 
features that had been unfavourably criticized by a 1928 Committee whose members 
included Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, Sir Forrest Garvin and Mr. D.S. Senanayake. 
3. A Sinhalese proverb has it that an elephant never forgets and Mr. Senanayake 
shares with the elephant this formidable quality in addition to that of charging 
headlong through obstructions. He remembered both the events of 1915 and the 
advice tendered by his 1928 Committee for the alteration of certain police 
arrangements that dated from 1915. With trumpetings and bellowings in Council he 
demanded of the dazed Jayatilaka what was the internal security scheme to which he 
had subscribed. A demand was thereupon made for the chapter of the Defence 
Scheme to be 'tabled', which I promptly and persistently refused- not because there 
was anything particularly secret about the chapter, but because once a Secret 
document were released on popular demand Colonial Regulation 145(4) would cease 
to be our citadel of secrecy. 
4. The discomfited Sir Baron came to me at this stage, and at his request I 
granted his "Executive Committee an interview. While I would not give the 
Committee the relevant chapter of the Defence Scheme I gladly produced for them in 
proof form a draft Internal Security Scheme (recently compiled by the Police) about 
which there need be no secrecy and which in fact forms the basis of the Civil items in 
the Defence Scheme Chapter. The Committee has bitten onto this draft and will 
doubtless in due course produce what they consider a better one. 
5. Mr. Senanayake was however determined to get onto the table of Council not 
the mere draft of a Scheme but something to which his already launched epithet of 
"diabolical" could conceivably be applied. Notwithstanding the fact that the previous 
(1923) scheme, commonly known as "the red folder" , had long since been withdrawn 
Sir Baron allowed a copy of it to be dug out and 'tabled' for this sacrificial purpose. It 
was reprinted in the newspapers and duly anathematized all round; but, to quote the 
Hunting of the Snark,2 
"The sentence will not have the slightest effect 
as the pig has been dead for some years". 
6. What Mr. Senanayake really dislikes about our Internal Security Schemes, new 
as well as old, is that they leave local emergencies to be dealt with to too great an 
2 Lewis Carron, The hunting of the snark (1876). Lewis Carron was the pseudonym of Charles Lutwidge 
Dodgson (1832-1898), an English mathematician and logician, who became celebrated as the author of 
stories for children. His most famous works were A/ice's adventures in wonderland (1865) and Through 
the looking-glass (1871). 
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extent by European planters either as Unofficial Police Magistrates or as Special 
Police Officers. There is in my opinion a ponderable element of truth in this 
contention but it is a pity that it was not enunciated more sanely and less wildly. 
7. I am not yet clear in my mind as to whether Senanayake is deliberately trying 
to unseat Jayatilaka from the Council Leadership or not. The rift between them 
appears very wide at times and Sir Baron went so far as to threaten to resign on this 
matter at a Conference which I had with the Ministers. Senanayake thereupon 
promptly followed suit; but I pointed out to them that the Conference had more 
important matters to occupy it than unnecessary talk about resignations. 
//. Relations with India 
8. India is being very dilatory about answering our request for a round-table 
Conference on trade, immigration and other outstanding matters. She has not 
however banged the door this time so far. In the mean time Sinhalese-Indian feeling 
has so improved throughout the Island that the Police are no longer sending special 
reports on it. Things are normal again. 
Ill. Volunteer pay on mobilisation 
9. There has been a big muddle over Volunteer pay on active service, concerning 
which there is bound to be a lot more talk in Council. In 1935 the Treasury approved 
certain rates without reference to the Board of Ministers or the Governor, who is the 
statutory authority. The rates included Colonial Allowances for European Volunteers 
(not paid during the last war) and Separation Allowances on different scales for 
Ceylonese and Europeans. The scale for the latter was unduly generous. Although 
these rates were never properly authorized they were published in regimental orders 
more than once, and I therefore gave orders (with which the Ministers agree) that 
Government must keep faith and pay them for September. Most of the European 
Volunteers were demobilized on the 30th September, so that they will not be affected 
by the new rates which will come into force as from the 1st October. 
10. The new rates, though prescribed by the Governor, will in reality be 
determined by the law which provides that the Governor may apply (or not apply) 
regular army rates but does not give him power to vary them. The 1935 rates were 
not merely unauthorized but illegal! 
Iv. State Council 
11. The Council, having after all its alarums and excursions passed the Budget, is 
in recess until the 17th October so that Ministers and Officers of State have time now 
to get on with their jobs. The Agenda of Executive Committees however seem to me 
to be getting more and more overloaded. 
12. Mr. Dean, recently General Manager Designate of the Ceylon Railway, has 
telegraphed an eleventh hour refusal of the appointment. His recorded reasons are 
his failure to get satisfactory pension and leave terms out of India or an extension of 
his offered agreement (from 4 to 5 years) from us. He may quite likely also have read 
the State Council debate on the March resolution authorizing his appointment, and 
have reached the conclusion that his position here might prove precarious. If that be 
so one cannot blame him. 
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Minutes on 3 
Para 5. Mr. Senanayake, the Minister for Agriculture & Lands, is a genuine 
representative of the political Sinhalese in being a 100% racialist.3 
That, after all & amidst the other & lesser political issues in Ceylon, is the 
fundamental rallying ground of the various elements in the Island, & not excluding 
the European. 
Sir A. Caldecott has in the past been criticised for an alleged excessive faith in Mr. 
Senanayake's advice and abilities. Sir Andrew himself is free of racial prejudice, and 
has gone out of his way in local social life to make this clear. If he loses faith in Mr. 
Senanayake, by far the biggest political force in the Ministry & the Council, on this 
score, the trouble will be that there is no other Sinhalese leader whom he can 
usefully take to his bosom instead. 
In those circumstances it is essential that, for the time being & until the situation 
in the matter of a reformed constitution can be effectively re-surveyed, he shd. have 
continued and clear assurance of H.M.G's support in his personal discretion- equally 
in his firmness towards Executive Committees and their several Chairmen, the 
"Ministers", as in his concessions to them. 
C.E.J.G. 
18.10.39 
I am afraid Sir A. Caldecott is in for a difficult time. The war, while it lasts, may 
temporarily lessen communal frictions, but if at the end of it India gets Dominion 
Status we may expect a revival of Sinhalese nationalist sentiment in Ceylon. 
H.M. 
18.10.39 
3 Gent added in the margin against the first para of his minute: 'Sir B. Jayatilaka is equally a racialist but 
in the main anti-Indian. Mr. Senanayake is in the main anti-European. I think that this is a fair 
representation.' 
4 CO 54/964/3, no 36 18 Oct 1939 
[Reforms]: letter from G G Ponnambalam to Sir A Caldecott on the 
views of the minorities 
I have the honour to inquire, in view of the conditions created by the outbreak of 
war, what action Your Excellency proposes to take in the matter of the Reform of the 
Ceylon Constitution. All agitation by the minority communities has been suspended 
as it is rightly felt that the country should not be distracted by any political 
controversy at this juncture. 
As there is no consensus of opinion among the representatives of the various 
communities in the Island and as there are strong differences of opinion between the 
majority community and the minority communities with regard to further constitu-
tional changes, we feel that a Parliamentary Commission should investigate the 
whole question before any action is taken. 
In the event of Your Excellency proposing to recommend changes in these 
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circumstances, any action on the part of the Secretary of State conceding the 
substance of the demands of the Sinhalese Ministers is bound to be viewed with 
extreme disfavour by the Tamils and other minorities and give rise to acute 
dissatisfaction at a time when we feel that all communities should stand united 
behind Britain for the successful prosecution and speedy termination of the war. 
As I am writing this letter at the instance of a number of representatives of the 
minority communities, I shall be obliged if Your Excellency will be pleased to 
communicate its contents to the Secretary of State at as early a date as possible. 1 
1 Caldecott forwarded Ponnambalam's letter to MacDonald in despatch no 699 (19 Oct) which explained 
that, owing to the pressure of war work, his despatch on constitutional reform was not ready for 
transmission to the eo. 
5 CO 54/966/112, no 98 19 Oct 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from Mr MacDonald to Lord Zetland on 
labour relations between India and Ceylon 
You will remember our correspondence regarding current difficulties in the relations 
between the Governments of India and Ceylon, in the course of which the 
Government of India have placed an embargo on the movement of Indian labourers 
from India to Ceylon. We had hoped that a settlement of the difficulties could be 
reached by an early arrangement between the two Governments for discussion of the 
outstanding points at issue, but my most recent information is that the Government 
of India have so far made no response to the approach which, partly on my pressure 
exercised through the Governor, the Ceylon Board of Ministers made a month ago to 
Delhi. I think you will agree that this is disappointing. I don't know whether you can 
see your way to suggest to the Viceroy the harmfulness of delay in present 
circumstances, but the particular matter which I want to bring to your notice is set 
out in the enclosed letter1 received in the Colonial Office from the Ceylon 
Association in London in the matter of the rigid ban on the return of Indians to 
Ceylon who have had occasion to go to India on a visit and are now unable to get back 
to their work. Apart from the difficulties which such action causes to the estate 
managements in Ceylon and the discontent it creates amongst the estate population 
it does seem to me extremely unfair on individuals that the Government of Madras 
should persecute them in this way. If you can take any steps to induce the 
Department concerned in the Madras Government to take a more reasonable 
attitude, I am sure it would be greatly appreciated by those affected. 
Please let me have back Mr. Baynham's letter and enclosure. 
1 Not printed. 
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'Things Ceylonese': third periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
Myself 
1. This first paragraph will be in explanation of my present temporary address; 
which is Government House, Madras. As long back as March last my recently 
de-tonsilled throat showed signs of further streptococcal infection. The trouble 
spread forward at the side of the tongue, and until last week I had not had an 
undisturbed night or been without pain since April. My wife was taken ill with a 
severe neurosis in August, when my son arrived from Eton for the holidays and was 
marooned here by the cancellation of return sailings. There also arrived the 
Admiral's wife and daughter, only to find the Admiral "somewhere at sea" and their 
houses at Trincomalee and Diyatalawa commandeered for barracks and offices. In 
spite of my wife's condition they had therefore to be quartered at Queen's House. In 
these conditions and under stress of war work my throat deteriorated rapidly so that 
(by the time my wife was removed to a Nursing Home and beginning to convalesce, 
the Admiral back in Colombo and provided with a house, and my son booked back to 
England by the "Viceroy of India") the doctors pronounced deep-ray therapy the only 
cure. There being no apparatus for it yet at Colombo I left for Madras on the 28th 
October, since when I have enjoyed the hospitality of Lord and Lady Marjorie 
Erskine1 and the professional attention of Dr. Rama Rao. 
2. The treatment has been in all respects satisfactory and I return to Colombo 
tomorrow night. I have already received the good news of my wife's recovery. 
Import and export control 
3. The Secretary of State's reply to my telegraphed request for permission to 
show Secret documents concerning economic warfare to the Executive Committee 
for Labour, Industry and Commerce being in the expected negative I at once so 
informed the Board of Ministers. Thereupon Mr. Senanayake and Mr. Corea (an 
unusual combination) asked what would be the position if the Executive Committee 
delegated all its powers and functions in regard to this subject to the Minister 
(Corea). I replied that the position in that case would be perfectly simple and that it 
was precisely because the Ministers had assured me that the Executive Committee 
would do no such thing that I had, at their request, sent my telegram to the 
Secretary of State. A few days later the Executive Committee actually passed a 
motion of unlimited delegation, and the position is now regarded as 'constitutional'. 
Corea is always tactful but I attribute the Committee's unusual exercise of common 
sense to pressure brought to bear by Senanayake through his son, who is on the 
Committee. It is unfortunate that Senanayake's influence is not always so commend-
ably directed. 
Administrative difficulties 
4. The position of the Governor under the Committee system becomes in-
creasingly difficult in times of stress or crisis. During the first weeks of the war (with 
which the budget debated coincided) meetings of the Executive and Standing 
1 Lord Erskine, governor of Madras, 1934-1940. 
10 WAR AND POSTPONEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM [6] 
Committees, of Council, of the Board of Ministers and of Sub-Committees were so 
numerous and continuous that I found it almost impossible to maintain liaison with 
any Minister or Officer of State. They were always and at all hours engaged. My 
meetings with them were nearly all arranged at their telephonic request when points 
of difficulty had arisen. While it is perhaps gratifying that they should wish to bring 
their difficulties to me, it would be far more satisfactory if they were to discuss with 
me their plans and policies before difficulties arise. That however is unfortunately 
not the Ministerial conception of constitutional procedure. 
Indo-Ceylon relations 
5. The Ministers came to see me on this subject because I had refused to approve 
the draft of a telegram that would have wrecked the chances of the desired 
conference. I had prepared another draft which agreed to hold in abeyance the 
retirement-cum-bonus scheme and to postpone for a month any question of further 
retrenchments of Indian personnel. This met with immediate opposition from 
Senanayake, who said over 3,000 Sinhalese labourers were under notice in the 
Survey Department alone (see, however, paragraph 7 infra) and in these circum-
stances to give even temporary immunity from retrenchment to Indians would be to 
provoke the certainty of riots . At this stage Bandaranaike said that if a telegram was 
to be sent in the sense I desired he proposed to regularize it by introducing a 
confirmatory resolution in State Council next day. Such a motion would of course 
have aroused bitter communal altercation and was certain of defeat. I therefore 
drafted a far more conciliatory telegram than that which I had refused to approve, 
which left it to India to press their demands further. A few days later in an interview 
with the Indian Agent I agreed to a compromise put forward by him in regard to the 
retirement-cum-bonus scheme; i.e. that applicants to retire under it should be 
allowed to take the bonus now and go if they wanted to, but should be told that the 
scheme was under discussion with India and that, if they preferred their applications 
under it could be held in temporary abeyance. I heard from Mr. Wedderburn last 
week that there had been a subsequent interchange of telegrams; that the 
Conference was unlikely to materialize this month, but that he did not apprehend 
anything more serious than a postponement. 
6. Through friends here in Madras my fears have been confirmed that the 
anti-Indian speeches of irresponsible Sinhalese politicians have aroused real irrita-
tion and annoyance. The prevailing opinion is that hard cases under the Indian 
emigration ban (of separated families) are unlikely to receive humane consideration 
so long as feeling runs as high as it does now. The inoffensive cooly too often pays the 
price of political blunders. 
Financial position and salary level proposal 
7. At another meeting with the Ministers I refused to support their proposal for a 
salary levy. It had been mooted at a previous meeting, but on that occasion I stated 
my inability even to consider such a proposition until I had before me the Ministers' 
general financial policy. At this second meeting the view was expressed by Mr. 
Senanayake that one could not in justice dismiss thousands of labourers without 
demanding some sacrifice from permanent employees. Otherwise the full brunt of 
war-time economy would fall exclusively upon the poorest. I thereupon asked who 
were these thousands of labourers doomed to dismissal and learned to my surprise 
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that (following apparently a precedent set in 1915--18) it was proposed to stop all 
survey and settlement of lands during the war and so to retrench all survey coolies. 
Ceylon already suffers acutely from arrears in land settlement, and I requested the 
Ministers carefully to reconsider what appeared to me a proposal of very false 
economy. Moreover it would form an extremely bad example for Government, which 
should be a model employer, to dismiss the labour force engaged on a perennial 
service; unless indeed conditions of bankruptcy necessitated it. At this stage in our 
discussion it transpired that the Ministers had not understood the Financial 
Secretary's exposition of the financial situation, and the question was reserved for 
their further consultation with him. 
8. The proposal for a salary levy is the second barrel fired by the Ministers at the 
public service, the first being the request (already communicated to the Colonial 
Office) for a Commission to consider the question of reducing the salaries paid to 
"non-new entrants", to use the local Treasury jargon. The following appear to me the 
reasons for Ministerial objection to the present scales of remuneration:-
(a) the Donoughmore Commission's remarks about salaries. There is a good deal, 
I think, in Sir Drummond Shiel's contention that failure to send out a Salary 
Commission as recommended by them was an omission which will long affect the 
attitude of Ministers and State Council towards the Service; 
(b) the fact that in Ceylon, owing to the overcrowded condition of the legal and 
medical services and the small salaries given on Coconut estates, Government 
service affords the most lucrative career for the young man; indeed the superiority 
of his prospects is notoriously reflected in the size of the dowry which he can 
expect with his bride; 
(c) an inferiority complex which excites unintelligent Councillors when they find 
a high average of intelligence in the public service; 
(d) the control of personnel by the Secretary of State and Governor and not by the 
Ministers or Council; and 
(e) the fact that a Civil Service rooted in the bureaucratic tradition is not 
uncritical of the imperfections of infantile democracy. 
9. I cull the following from a personal letter from Senanayake, just received:-
"Nothing useful is likely to come out of these talks with India,; it is best for 
both Ceylon and India to decide to look after their own affairs independently 
of each other". 
Senanayake's scope of vision is no less limited than his power of expression. If 
Jayatilaka fails, negatively, to lead Senanayake would, positively, mislead. 
7 CO 54/966/112, no 99 23 Oct 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 293 from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr MacDonald on the forthcoming conference in Delhi on trade 
negotiations and labour relations 
Your telegram, No. 165, Confidential. Ceylon has now accepted invitation from the 
Government of India to Conference in Delhi about the third week in November for 
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the purpose of trade negotiations contemplated in Article XIII of Indo-British Trade 
Agreement and for discussion on the question of emigration and immigration and 
other outstanding questions of common interest. Ministers would not agree to 
Indian proposal to hold in abeyance scheme for voluntary retirements of non-
Ceylonese on the ground that those who have applied for them and wish to go would 
consider it a breach of faith on our part, which is of course true. They have also 
refused to extend undertaking to treat non-Ceylonese with 10 years' service or over 
on the same footing as Ceylonese for the purpose of retrenchment to cover persons 
with less than 10 years' service. In view of the fact that owing to the curtailment of 
services due to the war thousands of Ceylonese labourers are being retrenched any 
extension of undertaking given to non-Ceylonese would certainly cause dangerous 
recrudescence of anti-Indian feeling both in the State Council and outside. I much 
hope, therefore, that the Government of India will appreciate the realities of the 
situation and that the Conference will take place without further impediment. 
8 CO 54/966/112, no lOO 26 Oct 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward telegram (reply) no 265 from Mr 
MacDonald to Sir A Caldecott on labour relations 
Your telegram No. 293. 1 I do not understand why, if necessary, suspension of scheme 
of voluntary inducement to non-Ceylonese to anticipate risk of retrenchment should 
not be conceded in respect of those who have not yet taken advantage of it. No breach 
of faith could reasonably be said to be involved. 
Should be glad to know briefly what are the existing services which have been 
curtailed owing to the war with consequent retrenchment of thousands of Ceylonese 
labourers. 
Advantage of successful negotiations with India are of such importance as to 
warrant substantial effort on part of Ceylon even at risk of criticism in State Council 
to reach mutually acceptable basis. 
1 See 7. 
9 CO 54/96412, nos 22 & 24A 28 Oct 1939 
[Reforms] : despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald on the 
reforms debate in the State Council, the question of minority 
representation and a proposal to appoint a re-delimitation committee 
[Extract] 
Minutes by G E J Gent, Sir C Parkinson, Mr MacDonald and Lord 
Dufferin 
I have the honour to report to you on the recent Reforms Debate in the State Council 
of Ceylon, six encased copies of the Hansard of which are being despatched to you by 
Ocean Mail. 1 
1 Enclosures not printed. 
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2. With this despatch itself I enclose 
(1) A report by the Legal Secretary, who moved the resolutions, in two volumes; 
(2) a note on the proposed Reforms handed to me at Kandy by the Agent of the 
Government of India on the 23rd June; and 
(3) a Memorandum submitted by the Ceylon National Congress dated the 28th 
July. 
3. I have already forwarded, as they came to hand from week to week, a number 
of representations addressed to you from vah ous quarters; a large number of 
additional letters and memoranda have been addressed to, and carefully perused by, 
myself. 
4. The form which the Debate took (of one general and thirty-one particular 
motions) has already been accounted for in my despatch No. 322 of the 5th May. It 
was not of my own choosing. 
5. In this despatch I propose (rather than to heap Pelion on Ossa by meeting 
argument with counter-argument) to summarize seriatim my own reactions to each 
item of the Debate. Under certain heads it will be found that I have revised a previous 
opinion, although my general view remains much the same as before. 
6. Before proceeding to consider its parts it is necessary to face the fact that the 
Debate as a whole reflects cleavage rather than concord and that my proposals have 
not received (to quote Mr. Ormsby Gore's2 (now Lord Harlech) despatch No. 
763/1937) "the general consent of all important interests in Ceylon". I am convinced 
that nearly all our political fissures radiate from the vexed question of minority 
representation, and it has been a great disappointment to me that various efforts that 
were being made some months ago by representatives of different communities to 
get together on a basis of some agreed variation of paragraph 6 of my Reforms 
despatch3 should have proved entirely infructuous. I realize however that in a 
country where there are no parties or political loyalties and indeed nothing to bind 
anybody to anybody else's word, agreement to-day might well have spelt disagree-
ment tomorrow .... 
34. The preceding paragraphs of this despatch cover all the resolutions moved by 
the Legal Secretary on the basis of my Reforms Despatch; but the curtain was rung 
down on the Debate by the Member for Point Pedro's motion for the immediate 
appointment of a Royal Commission. Later, in his letter of the 18th October 
forwarded with my despatch No. 699 of the 19th October,4 Mr. Ponnambalam has 
spoken of a Parliamentary Commission as eventually necessary, but has deprecated 
any further distraction of the Island by political controversy at this juncture of war. 
The position however is that if the whole question of constitutional Reform is 
shelved for the duration of the war, political agitation in the ranks of the majority 
community will be just as inevitable as agitation by minority spokesmen if the 
question is not shelved. This is a dilemma from which there is no escape. 
35. The Legal Secretary has on pages 64 and 65 of his Report, Volume 11, put 
forward three possible courses. The first (preparation of a new Order in Council 
forthwith) I am unable to regard as compatible with the position as I have 
summarized it in paragraph 6 of this despatch, quite apart from the difficulties and 
dangers foreseen by the Legal Secretary. The second (appointment of a Royal 
2 S of S for the colonies, 1936-1938. 3 SP XXVIII, 1938. 4 See 4. 
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Commission) is not in my view advisable at any rate for the present. If one arrived in 
the immediate future the result would inevitably be that expressed in Carroll's lines:-
"And when he asked them to explain 
They simply said it all again."5 
The third course considered possible by the Legal Secretary is the making of a 
further effort to settle the question of the representation. The proper method of 
doing this would, it seems to me, be to appoint the [Re-delimitation] Committee 
envisaged in paragraph 6 of my Reforms Despatch and in No. 11 of the State Council 
Resolutions . ... The personnel of the Committee might be five gentlemen selected 
respectively from among the Lowland Sinhalese, Kandyan, Jaffna-Tamil, Moorish 
and Indian communities under the presidency of the Legal Secretary. 
36. If the appointment of such a Committee commends itself to you there is one 
contingency that must be carefully guarded against. This is that some members of 
the Minority Communities might represent it as an opportunity for increasing their 
representation under the present Constitution. It should be made quite clear that 
there can be no piece-work tinkering of this kind; the Committee's recommenda-
tions will be relevant only to an overhaul of the whole Constitution. 
37. Owing to the medical necessity of my proceeding to Madras this week I find 
myself constrained to send this despatch with very little alteration of my original 
skeleton draft, which I had intended considerably to amplify and supplement. On 
reading it through, however, I am satisfied that it contains all that I feel it essential 
to report at this stage; nor do I wish to delay my report in view of a practical 
consideration that has just arisen. Some Rs.SO,OOO is spent annually on revision of 
the Register of Voters. The Board of Ministers would like to cut out the work in 1940 
and save this sum if there is not to be a General Election in 1941. If indeed there is to 
be constitutional reform in the near future it would be reasonable to provide by an 
Order in Council for an extension of the life of the present Council until an election 
can be held under the amended Constitution. The Ministers would be prepared to 
support such an extension provided only that you were prepared to pursue the 
question of reforms and that their consideration were not deferred for an indefinite 
period such as the duration of the War. 
38. My opinion of the present system of administration being what it is I find it 
impossible to look forward to another general election under it with any degree of 
satisfaction or complacence. I should nevertheless unhesitatingly press for a 
postponement of the constitutional issue if I thought that its abeyance would have 
any chance of achieving even temporary political tranquillity; but, as I have already 
indicated, I entertain no such illusion. The Sinhalese will not let matters rest. 
39. In all the circumstances I feel that appointment of the proposed Re-
delimitation Committee should be the next step. Believing as I do in the sincerity of 
the numerous assurances, which still reach me daily from every quarter of the 
Island, of Ceylon's determination to help win the war I am bold to hope that the work 
of the Committee may be facilitated by a realization on the part of all communities 
that one of the most effectual ways of assisting His Majesty's Government in the 
months immediately ahead will be for Ceylonese to bring to their own constitutional 
problem a maximum of compromise and conciliation and a minimum of sectional 
animus and obduracy. 
5 Quotation from Lewis Carroll , see 3, note 2. 
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Minutes on 9 
In paragraph 12 of his memorandum to the Cabinet in November, 1938, (No.7 on 
55541/5/38 secret below) the Secretary of State summarised as follows the procedure 
which he recommended in pursuance of the Governor's proposals for constitutional 
reform, set out in his despatch at No.18 on 55541/38:-
"I propose now to authorise the Governor to publish his proposals, and to 
arrange that they shall be debated in the State Council. On the result of that 
debate will depend the nature of our further action. If it should show, as I 
hope it will, a general opinion in favour of the principles of the Governor's 
recommendations, I should proceed without further delay to the drafting of 
the necessary amending Order in Council; and in this task I should hope to 
avail myself of the experience of the India Office in the working of the Indian 
constitution. If, on the other hand, the Governor's proposals should be 
inadequately supported, or should be received with irreconcilable hostility by 
any important section of the population, I should have to consider whether 
any amendment of the constitution could be effected without a further full 
enquiry by a Parliamentary Commission". 
The Cabinet agreed "that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should have 
authority to instruct the Governor to publish the proposals ... for the reform of the 
constitution of Ceylon, and that, if general opinion was in favour of the principles of 
the Governor's recommendations, he should proceed without delay to draft the 
necessary amending Order in Council". 
The Governor, in his despatch at No.22 herein, sends his conclusions and 
recommendations on the result of the State Council debate, the proceedings of 
which are recorded in the Hansards which are available with me. The Governor 
admits, in paragraph 6 of his despatch, that "the debate as a whole reflects cleavage 
rather than concord and that my proposals have not received the general consent of 
all important interests in Ceylon". A perusal of the Legal Secretary's report on the 
debate, which forms enclosure 1 to No.22, shows that this is indeed the case. Motions 
10, 11 and 12, relating to the numerical representation to be granted to minority 
communities and the method of effecting it, gave rise to a number of amendments, 
and voting followed communal lines. Furthermore, the very important motions 
15-18, relating to the abolition of Executive Committees and Officers of State and 
the substitution of a Cabinet system of government, were strongly opposed by the 
Tamil, Moslem and Indian representatives, and motion 25 concerning the appoint-
ment of Deputy Ministers, which the Governor considers to be an essential part of his 
scheme, was rejected by the Council altogether. 
At pages 64-65 of his Report (enclosure 1 to No.22) the Legal Secretary suggests 
that three alternative courses of action are now open to us. These are as follows:-
(1) That the Secretary of State should now proceed on the basis of the State 
Council debate and the Governor's recommendations, to frame an Order in Council 
revising the Constitution. 
As stated above, the Cabinet agreed that the Secretary of State should proceed to 
draft an amending Order in Council if general opinion was in favour of the proposals. 
As the debate has revealed no such general agreement, it seems that course (1) must 
be definitely ruled out. 
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(2) That a Royal Commission should be sent to Ceylon immediately to examine 
afresh the question of reforms. 
The Governor points out (paragraph 34 of No. 22) that the only effect of a Royal 
Commission appointed to visit Ceylon at this juncture would be a repetition of all the 
arguments recently aired at such length in the State Council debate. Moreover, the 
State Council rejected, by 29 votes to 12, Mr. Ponnambalam's motion that a Royal 
Commission should be sent out to examine the Donoughmore constitution - (see 
page 61 of the Legal Secretary's report). It is therefore apparent that the Sinhalese 
majority would be strongly opposed to the appointment of a Royal Commission at 
this juncture, and communal differences would be accentuated at a time when a 
welcome truce between rival political factions has been brought about by the 
outbreak of war. Course (2) therefore seems to be out of the question. 
(3) That a Committee should be appointed now to consider the re-delimitation of 
electoral areas- [see motion 11, pages 6-8 of the Legal Secretary's report)- in the 
hope that such a Committee will be able to find a solution of the representation 
problem which will be acceptable to all parties and thus remove the principal 
obstacle to the introduction of a new constitution without the preliminary of a Royal 
Commission. 
This is the course favoured by the Governor- see paragraphs 35, 36 and 39 of No. 
22. But there appears to be this fundamental objection. Although the appointment of 
a local Re-Delimitation Committee is intended as a step towards securing more 
satisfactory representation for the minority communities, the voting on motion 11 
shows that the representatives of those communities voted against it- (Hansard Vol. 
49, page 2339). The minorities wanted the terms of reference to be more favourably 
defined and they wanted a Commission appointed by His Majesty's Government 
instead of a local Committee. It therefore seems improbable that a local committee, 
constituted as suggested by the Governor in paragraph 35 of No. 22, would be 
successful or that it could carry out its task without arousing communal ill-feeling 
afresh. The Legal Secretary admits that, unless the Committee were completely 
successful, it would probably have to be followed by a Royal Commission, and this 
would be most undesirable, particularly in war time, for the reasons stated above. 
Taking these factors into consideration, course (3) seems to be no less open to 
objection than courses (1) and (2). 
It therefore seems necessary to search for any other courses of procedure which 
will:-
(1) not give the impression that the question of reforms is abandoned sine die; 
(2) not revive active communal feeling at this juncture; 
(3) not encourage the leading interests to stump the island canvassing support. 
I have come to the conclusion that the best hope may lie in asking the Governor to 
consider the plan of an announcement by the Secretary of State to the following 
effect: that he considers that the debate has shown that there is not a sufficient basis 
of agreement in Ceylon to justify proceeding with the reform of the Constitution on 
the lines proposed without further exploration of the interests of all concerned; that 
in the present war all our efforts must be directed towards the immediate object of 
achieving victory and that no distraction must be allowed to interfere with that 
supreme aim. A full further exploration of the constitutional problem would 
therefore be taken up on the successful conclusion of the war, when a Round Table 
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Conference in London will be called with the object of arriving at a solution of the 
problem in consultation with the leaders of the political and other interests affected. 
The considerations which prompt me to recommend this course of action are as 
follows: the Governor's despatch at No. 24 and paragraph 34 of h is despatch at No. 22 
make it clear that the Ministers and the Sinhalese majority would not rest content 
with a mere neglect to formulate any new proposal for the constitutional issue until 
the war is over, and it is for this reason that the Governor has not recommended 
such a course. But I cannot help feeling that the promise of a Round Table 
Conference in London would make an appeal to the Sinhalese and the rest for the 
reasons - (1) of the adoption of that procedure formerly with India and Burma, (2) 
that it will avoid the hazard of such another report as the Donoughmore Report, (3) 
that it will avoid the need for actively resuscitating communal issues by political 
agitation in the Island at the present juncture. I feel not only that the immediate 
essential is to avoid the exhibition of communal feeling in Ceylon during the war, 
and that the knowledge that the problem would be threshed out in London, between 
representatives of all parties, would remove any incentive on the part of the rival 
factions to continue their communal crusades in Ceylon in the meantime, but also 
that a Conference in London will encourage leaders in Ceylon to explain their 
essential interests in conference in the least extravagant fashion and will enable 
those politically concerned in this country to obtain a better idea of the points and 
personalities at issue. 
If this course of action is considered worth pursuing it should in the first place be 
confidentially proposed to the Governor for his consideration and advice. And it will 
involve the consideration of certain questions of intermediate procedure. A new 
general election to the State Council will be necessary in the normal course (under 
the provisions of the Order in Council) in January 1941. The Governor and the 
Ministers feel , and I think it would be generally agreed here, that it would not be 
desirable to extend the life of the present Council indefinitely until the war is over. 
The Ministers have said that they would be prepared to support an extension of the 
life of the present Council for one year, but only on the understanding that the 
question of reforms would be pursued and would not be deferred for an indefinite 
period (paragraph 37 of No. 22 and No. 24). The Governor has said that he finds it 
impossible to look forward to another general election under the present Constitu-
tion with any degree of satisfaction or complacency (paragraph 38 of No.22). If the 
war were to last 3 years and a Conference in London met in the fourth year, it would 
be the fifth year at least before a new Constitution could be put into operation. This 
would be too long an extension of the life of the present Council. I doubt whether the 
risk of local disturbances in Ceylon in the course of a wartime general election need 
be apprehended if it were realised locally that the members were being elected for a 
sort of "Rump" Parliament which would be replaced by a Council elected under such 
new Constitution as might follow the holding of a Round Table Conference. Whether 
the elections, if held, should take place in 1941 or should be postponed for one year 
seems to me fo be a question on which we should take the Governor's advice. 
I should make it clear that my proposal is that we should defer during the war all 
questions connected with the proposed reform of the constitution, including any 
possible amendment of Article 386 on the lines which were suggested in paragraph 
6 Which dealt with premature retirement of government officers on proportionate pension. 
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31 of the Governor's first Reforms despatch at No.18 on 55541/38. We have had 
representations on this and kindred subjects from the Ceylon Public Service 
Association - (see No.34 on 55531/1/39). My idea is that, when the Round Table 
Conference takes place, our sole concern should be to safeguard (1) the necessary 
powers of the Governor, (2) the essential rights of the minorities (including 
European capital interests), (3) the essential rights of the Public Service. It would be 
for the Ceylonese themselves to agree upon a satisfactory solution for the remainder 
of the problem. 
Secretary of State 
G.E.J.G. 
20.12.39 
Judging from what I have seen of Ceylon affairs during the last two and a half years, I 
had formed the opinion that, of all the Colonies, Ceylon was likely to present the 
most difficult problem with which the Colonial Office .would be dealing. That opinion 
is certainly not weakened by the developments set out in the Governor's despatch 
(No.22) . 
I agree with Mr. Gent's criticisms of the three possible courses of action discussed 
in the first part of his memorandum: none of those would be satisfactory. And I think 
that Mr. Gent has made an admirable suggestion, i.e. that on the successful 
conclusion of the war the Ceylon constitutional problem will be further explored by 
means of a round-table conference in London at which leaders of the political and 
other interests affected would be brought into consultation. I believe that a 
conference of that kind held in London would be more effective and certainly safer 
than anything in the nature of a commission sent to Ceylon. And in view of the India 
and Burma precedent it should appeal strongly to the Ceylonese. 
? Consult the Governor by confidential despatch as proposed in Mr. Gent's 
memorandum. 
A.C.C.P. 
1.1.40 
There are strong points to be made in favour of a Round Table Conference 
immediately after the war. But there are also arguments for making progress during 
the war, if that is feasible. The main one is that the various communities may be 
more willing to compromise during the war than in the safe days of peace; so 
agreement between them may be easier now than it will be after the Empire has 
emerged victorious. I wonder whether a Governor's Conference a little later on 
might not work. If the Singhalese [sic] majority want to make progress with a new 
constitution, they may be ready to make bigger concessions to the minorities than 
has yet been indicated. Let us discuss in the first instance; then despatch putting 
alternatives to Gov. 
(I would not even rule out a Parliamentary Commission later on - as an alternative 
to a Governor's Conference - though the opposition of the Singhalese majority is a 
formidable obstacle to that.) 
M.M. 
3.1.40 
? Discuss. My first inclination wld. be to have a small R.T.C. over here fairly soon. 
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There are obvious objections, though I think they cl d. be overcome. The promise of a 
R.T.C. after war is over seems to me too vague to help us very much if the position is 
going to be difficult to hold, and unnecessary if it is not. 
D &A. 
8.1.40 
I agree with X7 and this prompted me to suggest a Governor's Conference in Ceylon 
at an early date. I think it would be difficult to have a R.T.C. here during the war, and 
embarrassing. But perhaps the difficulties could be overcome. However, the 
Governor's knowledge of these people and problems is so good that it would be a pity 
to leave him out of it, as would be the case if the conference were over here. But 
discuss tomorrow. 
M.M. 
10.1.40 
This was discussed last week by the S of S, & I have drafted a despatch putting to the 
Gov for his consideration & comment the various suggestions which the S of S wd 
like him to think over.8 
7 X refers to the last sentence of Dufferin 's minute of 8 Jan. 
8 See 23 for the despatch which was sent. 
C.E.J.G. 
16.1.40 
10 CO 54/966/1/2, no 103 31 Oct 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram (reply) no 323 from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr MacDonald on labour relations 
Your telegram No. 265, Confidential. 1 On 31st of May notice was issued to every 
non-Ceylonese daily paid employee of the Government with over five years' service 
offering bonus calculated on length of service and free transport if he chose to return 
to his home abroad in preference to risking retrenchment in 1940. Offer was stated 
to remain open until 31st of December only. During the past six weeks forms have 
been sent to several thousand employees reminding them of the offer stating the 
amount of the bonus and requesting decision. Replies accepting or rejecting being 
received daily. About 250 acceptances to date . Considered impossible to break faith 
with employees of this Government by withdrawing the offer, but have instructed 
Department(s) concerned to stop the issuing of further forms containing renewed 
offer pending reply from India to my telegram accepting the invitation to the 
Conference. 
Budget 1939- 1940 recently passed does not curtail social services but provides 
greatly reduced works programme. Further cuts necessary if expenditure to be kept 
within revenue even with additional taxation. Consequent reduction in wages 
payable at least 1lf2 million rupees representing wages of about 4,000 workmen. 
1 See 8. 
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11 CO 54/96413, no 40 3 Nov 1939 
[Reforms]: letter from G G Ponnambalam to Sir N Stew art Sandeman 
explaining the views of the minorities 
[Sandeman, a Conservative MP representing the Middleton and Prestwich Division of 
Lancashire from 1923, forwarded Ponnabalam's letter to MacDonald. The secretary of 
state acknowledged it and returned it to Sandeman who then wrote a further letter to the 
CO as follows: 'As you know, I am taking almost as much interest in Ceylon as I did on the 
question of the India Bill. My sole aim in doing so is my feeling that the minorities have to 
be protected, and very actively protected, more in the East even than in Europe. I also 
have the feeling that a western form of government is not the most suitable for Eastern 
mentalities, who for centuries have had something else engrained in them. I am perfectly 
certain that you are taking every measure which is possible to see that so far as it can be 
done under the proposed constitution, the rights of the minorities will be guarded. I 
should very much like to know whether you are going to issue a White Paper on the 
Governor's Report. I have the feeling that the Sinhalese may try to exploit the fact that 
there is a war on, in the same way as [the Indian National] Congress is undoubtedly 
doing, in order to gain their own ends' (CO 54/964/3, no 42, Sandeman to MacDonald, 14 
Dec 1939).] 
I do hope you won't mind my writing to you at a time like this. In reply to your last 
letter I wrote to you in Kenlygreen, St. Andrews, Scotland. I do hope you received 
that letter. Since then I did not wish to worry you as Parliament had adjourned and 
as I realised only too well how tremendously worried you must have been with the 
serious developments on [?in] the International situation. I would not worry you 
even now with a letter as I realise only too well that things are no better and, if any-
thing, worse for those like yoo who have to shoulder the Nation's and the Empire's 
burden, but I am forced to write to you as I find that there are certain sinister moves 
being made by our Sinhalese friends just now. The position is this. On the declaration 
of war the representatives of the minority communities ceased all political agitation 
and publicly called a truce in order that the country might unitedly co-operate 
towards the successful prosecution and speedy termination of the war. In the 
meantime we find that the Governor has forwarded his despatch on the Reforms 
debate in council with his recommendations thereon. 1 As there was no measure of 
agreement at all between the majority community and the minority communities on 
the Reform proposals we demanded a Royal Commission. Now there seems to be a 
move afoot on the part of the Pan Sinhalese Board of Ministers to wrest all the 
Reforms they possibly could have when we have ceased agitation here and England is 
engaged in war, without a comprehensive examination of the constitutional position 
by a Royal Commission. This attempt of theirs must be strongly resisted. 
The actual position is that, if anything, the minorities are anxious for an 
amendment on the constitution in order that the balance might be restored, but we, 
not wanting to embarass England at this stage, are content to leave everything in 
abeyance till the termination of the war. The Sinhalese on the other hand having all 
the power they have under the constitution want a further accession of power and 
hope to obtain it by joining forces with the extremists of India and Burma. This in 
short is the situation here, and I do sincerely hope that in the midst of all your cares 
and worries you and your party will be able to afford a little time to prevent the 
1 See 9. 
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Secretary of State from being stampeded into taking hasty action along the path of 
least resistance. 
We in our little way have placed unreservedly our persons and resources in the 
cause of England and the Empire, and in this moment of stress we whole-heartedly 
join with you in striving for the final triumph of freedom and justice. 
Kindest regards to Lady Sandeman and your good self. 
12 CO 54/973/14 13 Nov 1939 
[European unofficials in Ceylon]: minute by Sir C Parkinson to Mr 
MacDonald 
[Parkinson's minute was prompted by a private letter written by Ralph Skrine to Sir H 
Moore at the CO. Skrine, of Bosanquet & Skrine Ltd which was based in Colombo, 
described himself as a businessman with thirty-nine years' experience in Ceylon. He 
began by asserting that events in Ceylon were 'drifting badly' and that the Donoughmore 
constitution, the root he suggested of the island's problems, had been framed by 
individuals with no 'first-hand knowledge of the people whose evidence they were taking'. 
Assessing the subsequent working of the ·constitution, Skrine was especially critical of 
Caldecott: 'I have no personal animus against Caldecott whatever as an individual. I have 
had glowing accounts of him from a man I know at Home who knew him well in the 
Straits, and at the start I was disinclined to believe that he was weak. He works like a 
black, and its not ability he lacks but a certain firmness which must go hand in hand with 
conciliation, if justice is to be done to all parties. His reputation as a good mixer is true 
enough so far as the Native population goes, but I think he has overdone it most unwisely 
in attending endless Dinners and functions which for health reasons he would have been 
wise to curtail after the first few weeks. I believe him to be a very "shuck" man and much 
worried, and Lady Caldecott is in the same condition. He no doubt is doing what he 
believes to be right, but he does not appear to have grasped the fact that "familiarity 
breeds contempt", and that the people he is trying to conciliate will give him no help 
whatever if his actions do not accord with their wishes. From all accounts I receive he is 
very much under the thumb of Senanayake, who knows just exactly what he wants and 
will stick at nothing to get it, viz: Complete Self-Government in the hands of his own 
Party.' Skrine also suggested that the CO was at fault in that it had failed to give clear 
guidance or instructions to the governor: 'If you discuss this point with any British 
Official here or men of my own business Community, you will invariably get the answer: 
"Well, of course, the Governor's hands are tied and the Colonial Office are far too busy 
with Palestine and the other Colonial responsibilities to worry about a little Island like 
Ceylon" ... I imagine that the position with Caldecott at any rate is that he has been told, 
"We have got enough trouble on our hands already, so for God's sake keep the place 
quiet!!".' He concluded that the 'Senanayake crowd' were 'much like children, and 
"human nature is human nature" all the world over. You cannot run a School, a 
Regiment, a Business Concern or anything else without a firm hand to direct it, and that 
is what is so badly lacking here' (CO 54/973/14, no 2, Skrine to Moore, 29 Oct 1939).] 
Secretary of State 
You will be interested to see this letter from a Ceylon unofficial. I do not know the 
writer myself, but it is always interesting and often useful to get views of this kind 
from unofficials in a Colony. But I think that when you have read Mr. Skrine's letter 
you will feel able to discount what he says about Sir Andrew Caldecott. Mr. Skrine 
does not, I suspect, realise that things cannot remain static: it would indeed be a 
dreadful thing if they were to. And yet it is quite understandable that he and many 
other people should prefer efficient government to government which, for the time 
being at any rate, sacrifices a certain amount of efficiency to what we should regard 
as progress. Very few people, I imagine, would maintain now that the Donoughmore 
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Commission produced an entirely satisfactory constitution for Ceylon. But we have 
got to work towards self-government in the Colonies and we have got to face up to 
many difficulties in the process. Dr. (now Sir) Drummond Shiels1 used to say to me 
when he was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State that the way of democracy is not 
easy, but the goal is worth while. The days when the Governor of Ceylon can 
administer the Island as a benevolent autocrat are gone. It does not follow from this 
that there is not room for revision of constitutional arrangements in Ceylon, and I 
hope we may be able to effect something useful. 
It is not necessary to comment at length upon Mr. Skrine's letter, but you will 
notice on page 7 two passages which show how utterly people who are not in the 
Service can, and often do, misconceive things. Of course, nobody has said to Sir 
Andrew Caldecott anything to the effect that he must keep Ceylon quiet because the 
Colonial Office has other worries: nor, of course, is it true that because you have 
been overburdened with Palestinian affairs, no time has been given to Ceylon or 
other Colonies-in any case the Eastern Department does not cease to function in 
the Colonial Office because the Middle East Department is working at high pressure 
on its own subject. 
1 Parliamentary under secretary of state for the colonies, 1929-1931, who was a member of the 
Donoughmore Commission. 
13 CO 54/964/3, no 37 18 Nov 1939 
[Reforms]: despatch from M M Wedderburn to Mr MacDonald for-
warding a message addressed to the secretary of state on behalf of 
representatives of the minority communities 
With reference to Sir Andrew Caldecott's Confidential despatch of the 28th of 
October on the subject of the Reform of the Ceylon Constitution, 1 I have the honour 
to forward at the request of Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam, Member of the State Council, a 
copy of a message addressed to you on behalf of Representatives of Minority 
Communities whose names appear at the end of the message. 
The message was submitted for transmission to you by telegraph, but in view of 
the expense Mr. Ponnambalam subsequently requested that it be sent by Air Mail. 
Message with 13 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, London. 
Minorities have suspended political agitation during pendency of war. Owing to lack 
of agreement with majority community, minorities are anxious that further 
opportunity be given for discussion of your proposals before decisions are reached. 
S. Dharmaratnam 
T.B. Jayah 
S. Kanagasabai 
1 See 9. 
M.S.C. 
11 
11 
C.G.C. Kerr 
S. Natesan 
R. Sri Pathmanathan 
M.S.C. 
11 
11 
[14] 
LX. Pereira 
G.G. Ponnambalan 
A.R.A. Razik 
M.S.C. 
11 
11 
NOV 1939 
S. Vytilingam 
G.A. Wille 
23 
M.S.C. 
11 
14 CO 54/964/2, no 24 27 Nov 1939 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald conveying 
the views of the Board of Ministers 
At the request of the Board of Ministers I have the honour to address you on the 
position created by the War in relation to the question of the Constitutional Reforms 
which have during the past year been the subject of debate in the State Council. By 
virtue of Article 19 of the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, as amended 
by the Amendment Order in Council, 1935, it is incumbent on me as Governor to 
dissolve the present State Council upon a date that shall enable the polling of votes at 
the ensuing General Election to take place in or about the month of January, 1941. 
The Board is of opinion that the indefinite continuation of the present Constitution 
is undesirable and harmful to the best interests of the country and therefore feels 
that the next General Election should be held under the reformed Constitution. The 
Board, however, realises the fact that it may not be possible for the question of 
Reforms to be settled so as to allow of a General Election by this date. The Ministers, 
therefore, request that steps may be taken without delay with the object of 
introducing a reformed Constitution. In this event, they are prepared to recommend 
to the State Council an extension of the life of the present Council for such 
reasonable period as may be necessary for this purpose. This may be effected by an 
Order in Council extending the life of the present State Council for one year. 
2. In ~onnection with the holding of the next General Election there is one other 
matter that has received the attention of Ministers. Under Part IV of the Ceylon 
(State Council Elections) Order in Council, 1931, it is provided that the registers of 
voters should be revised annually. The Board of Ministers consider that such annual 
revision is unnecessary and the expense thereby involved amounting as it does to 
approximately Rs.SO,OOO should not be incurred in the present state of the Island's 
finances. If, therefore, the Order in Council is amended to extend the duration of the 
life of the present Council, such amendment shall be accompanied by a modification 
of the provisions of the State Council Elections Order in Council so as to obviate the 
necessity for the revision of the registers of voters in the year 1940. 
3. You will doubtless consider the Ministers' request when you review the recent 
debate of the State Council on Reforms: in connection with which I have already 
addressed you (vide my Confidential despatch of the 28th October 1939).1 
1 See 9. 
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15 CO 54/966/112, no 114 30 Nov 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr 
MacDonald to Sir A Caldecott on the deadlock over labour relations 
Your confidential telegram, No. 418. I much regret to learn of deadlock with 
Government of India, and I am sure you will continue to use all your influence to 
resolve it. 
I note that Government of India contemplate public statement. Both Secretary of 
State for India and I are anxious that anything in the nature of public recrimination 
should be avoided, especially at a time when it is most important not to publish 
matter which will be useful for enemy propaganda. It may be taken as certain that 
anything suggesting dissension within the Empire will be seized upon by the enemy 
and made the most of. 
Secretary of State for India is also telegraphing privately to Viceroy to whom it is 
being suggested that it would be very desirable if he were to find it possible to consult 
with you as to terms of any public statement proposed by Government of India. 
Similarly, if Government of Ceylon intend to make public statement, great care 
should be taken as to its terms about which I should like you to consult Viceroy 
personally, if that should be possible, and I should also wish to be consulted. 
16 CO 54/971111, no 7 28 Dec 1939 
'Things Ceylonese': fourth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
1939-1940 
1. The passing of an old year and the beginning of a new is the time-honoured 
occasion for a review of the past and a forecast of the future. None of our important 
Ceylon happenings in 1939 can however be written off as belonging to the past; there 
is a carry-over into 1940 under each head, and in every case it is a carry-over of worry 
and anxiety. 
Startup affair 
2. The "Startup Affair"1 is likely to fizzle out as soon as the debate on the subject 
has been concluded next month. It has however wrecked whatever faith I had left in 
the present Ministry. The Ministers were perfectly well aware that, failing other 
attempts to instal Startup in his professorate, I should enact a Governor's Ordinance. 
They made no remonstrance to me and based their inability to introduce a 
ministerial measure to the same purpose not on any disagreement as to the necessity 
of placing Startup in his job without further delay, but on the consideration that 
Council, in view of its previous resolution condemning the appointment, would 
throw their bill out. I felt certain that opposition to my Governor's Ordinance would 
come from any other quarter but the ministerial bench. Until 2 p.m. on the day of 
the debate the Ministers felt themselves, I understand, similarly certain. At that hour 
1 On 12 Dec 1939 Caldecott used his reserve powers to appoint Or C W Startup as professor of physiology 
at University College, Colombo and registrar of the Ceylon Medical College despite the general disapproval 
of the appointment both in academic circles and among politicians. 
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however they learned that the protest motion of which notice had been already given 
by Mr. Samarakoddl was going to be made the vehicle of some anti-ministerial 
criticism and that the Governor was not to be the sole butt of the debate. Thereupon 
they hurriedly drafted their ministerial resolution of protest and had not even the 
decency to let me know about it until it came to my notice in supplementary agenda 
of Council two hours after its introduction. I have not hesitated to tell the two 
Ministers whom I have happened to meet on other business since the introduction of 
the motion exactly what I think. I do not however flatter myself that what I think, or 
what any responsible person thinks, will weigh in the least with Ministers and 
Councillors whose attentions are even at this early date exclusively focussed on the 
polling booths of 1941. 
Salary levy 
3. I understand that Mr. Senanayake has expressed indignation at my refusal to 
support any proposal for a salary levy, the idea of which I characterized as a recourse 
to bankruptcy. I am informed that he has since given utterance to the remark that 
ministerial policy must now therefore aim at producing a degree of bankruptcy 
sufficient to justify a levy on salaries of Government servants. In my last Notes3 I 
tried to analyse this hatred of the public services. I omitted however from that 
analysis the consideration that to many modern Ceylonese minds the system of 
Government through administrative heads of provinces and districts is unpalatable 
as being undemocratic and anomalous under the new Constitution. If in future the 
only public servants required for district administration were to be clerks of 
Provincial or District Councils then of course men with lesser qualifications could be 
had for smaller remuneration. The country is however far from ripe for such 
accelerated democratisation, and the replacement that is being gradually effected of 
Headmen by (horrible title) Extra Assistant Divisional Revenue Officers does not in 
fact represent an abolition of the traditional Headman system but a reform and 
modernization of it. 
Salary revision 
4. I have written at length in a Confidential despatch regarding the Select 
Committee recently appointed by State Council to report on public salaries, present 
and future. Although the appointment of this Committee was against ministerial 
wishes there is no doubt in my mind that any objectionable features in its report will 
nevertheless fail to receive ministerial denunciation, and that it will be left to the 
Governor as usual to hold the fort for the public service. 
Volunteers' family relief 
5. I am meeting the Ministers on the 7th January to discuss a point of 
disagreement between us that may eventually lead to my having to provide for local 
Defence expenditure by Governor's Ordinance. New rates of pay and allowances for 
mobilized Volunteers have been duly agreed with the Ministers and promulgated, as 
foreshadowed in paragraph 10 of the second issue of these Secret Notes of mine.4 
These rates are, as I there explained, really determined by law and so outside the 
2 The reference is to Siripala Samarakkody, member of the State Council. 
3 See 6. 4 See 3. 
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bounds of disputation: although within the (unmobilized) Ceylon Planters' Rifle 
Corps there has, I believe, been some disgruntlement concerning them. The present 
controversy concerns the relief for his family that a mobilized volunteer is entitled to 
claim under Cap.258 Section 15. The law makes the Governor the arbitrator and in 
order to systematize awards I have ordered that the amount paid in relief must not 
(a) exceed Rs 5 for a wife or Rs 4 for a child (with a maximum of three) per diem; 
(b) bring the applicant's post-mobilization income to more than his pre-
mobilization income; or to more than 
(c) Rs 1,000 a month for an officer or Rs 800 a month for other ranks. 
6. The Ministers, I understand, want a maximum of Rs 300 a month to cover pay, 
allowances and family relief. I shall point out to them that the law will not admit of 
such an arbitrary maximum, even if it could be justified by any argument outside the 
law; which of course it cannot. Mobilized volunteers are inevitably more expensive 
than regular troops; the economics of the Volunteer system accrue in peace time 
when the Force is unmobilized, and this the Ministers appear to forget. 
7. Although the Ceylon Planters' Rifle Corps was demobilized at the end of 
September and there is no apparent likelihood of its remobilization I believe the 
Ministers' attitude in this matter to be due to Mr. Senanayake's dislike of this strictly 
European regiment. If he openly took the line that the money spent on it should be 
devoted to a new regular Ceylon Regiment; that in modern warfare the young 
European's place was either on his job, or in a mixed Volunteer Force, or in the 
British Army; one could appreciate a measure of reason in his argument and respect 
his attitude. But indirect hitting at it is not straight politics and I sincerely hope that 
I shall be able to guide the Ministers to this conclusion. 
Reactions to the war 
8. The preceding paragraphs bring me to a consideration of Ceylon's reaction to 
the War. I have heard people say that the State Council's resolution of loyalty and 
cooperation (followed by similar motions by other public bodies) was nothing but 
eyewash and that the local politicians are out to embarrass us as much as they can 
while we are pre-occupied with war. It is not to be disputed that Ceylon politicians 
like fishing in troubled waters; that is nothing new. They make the most of our own 
disavowals of imperialism and of the attitude of the Indian Congress. I do not think 
that any of them are out to be helpful, but that is partly because they don't think us 
in need of their help. Ceylon is out of the zone of hostilities and in a life that goes on 
much as usual they are behaving no better and perhaps a little worse than usual. 
They do not question the certainty of our victory and the big future event for them is 
the next general election for the State Council. Outside the ranks of politicians a 
considerable general interest in the war is evidenced by an enormous increase in the 
circulation of vernacular newspapers. The great majority of these emanate from Lake 
House (the home of the Ceylon Daily News) and are sane, sound and loyal. If anybody 
ever anticipated that with the outbreak of war all hatchets would be buried, all 
agitations smothered, and all nationalistic aspirations abated he is already proved 
wrong - but it would have been a most unintelligent anticipation. If Ceylon's 
reaction to the war is nothing to enthuse about it is in my opinion nothing unduly to 
groan about. It may be summed up in the phrase "Pinpricks as usual". They should 
not be taken too seriously. 
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Labour unrest 
9. Last week I received a deputation of representative Planters and Visiting 
Agents and heard their views on labour unrest. There have been some twenty five 
strikes on estates during the past six weeks of which some five are still unsettled. 
Immediately after my return from India I had discussed the position with the 
Controller of Labour and had also impressed on the Minister of Labour (Mr. Corea) 
the day after his return from Burma the seriousness of labour unrest. An additional 
officer of the Labour Department has already been stationed at Hatton. The causes of 
unrest are agreed on all sides; it has nothing to do with conditions of employment 
but is fermented by persons whom the planters call 'agitators' and whom the Labour 
Department more correctly term 'politicians'. As the period of the present State 
Council approaches expiry the vote-catching propaganda of its members increases. 
The subtle and clever Brahmin, Natesa Aiyer, Member for Hatton, creator of the 
Ceylon Federation of Workers, finds it necessary not merely to stir up his supporters 
but to detach them from any tendency to exchange his .Federation for the newly 
formed Ceylon Indian National Congress which, since Nehru's visit, has been started 
as an offshoot of Congress in India. The latter body is trying to form branch 
associations among labourers on each estate, and Natesa Aiyer is similarly forming 
cells of his Federation. There may be serious clashes in some places as a result; but 
the probability in my opinion is that some compromise will soon or later be reached 
between the contestant parties. In the mean time there is a spate of oratory and an 
avalanche of pamphlets; all very carefully kept within the law. What the planters 
want me to do is to use the Governor's powers "to arrest and repatriate the agitators". 
I told their representatives straight that I would do nothing so silly or so fatal to their 
own and everybody's interests. The labourers, or most of them, now have the vote 
and any attempt to prevent Council Members or candidates from addressing their 
constituents would raise a whirlwind not only here but in India. Political awakening 
was inevitable under the present Constitution and things would never again be so 
easy for the employer as they were "in the good old days". The deputation then 
suggested that the Ceylon Government should indent on the Colonial Office for a 
"Trades Union expert" to come out and organize "proper and satisfactory" unions on 
the estates instead of the present "Kuttus" or "Sangams" organized by the Federation 
of Workers or Ceylon Indian Congress. I pointed out to them that the only result 
would be that those two organizations (possessing one thing in common - Indian 
Nationalism) would jointly and successfully promote a boycott of the expert. The 
representatives of the Planting Industry who saw me were all elderly, and obviously 
"had the wind up". The view of Sir Thomas Villiers5 and of a young planter with 
whom I have discussed the situation is that the present phase will pass without any 
Island-wide downing of tools. The position is however serious and requires the 
constant and careful watching which the Labour Department is giving it. 
Looking ahead 
10. It will be gathered from the preceding paragraphs that the political weather 
forecast for 1940 is definitely "stormy". Mr. Corea's election to the presidency of the 
Ceylon National Congress is unlikely in my opinion to convert that amorphous body 
5 Planter and merchant in Ceylon; member of Legislative Council, 1924-1931, and of State Council, 
1931-1932. 
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into any resemblance of a responsible political party: which is a pity as Corea (a 
Christian and the husband of a Tamil lady) might if he could only develop the 
personality and the leadership have a very salutary influence on Ceylon politics. He is 
not however the stuff that leaders are made of, and I cannot among our present 
politicians detect anyone approaching that category. Jayatilaka is played out, and 
Senanayake is too often off side to captain any team. The longer one serves in this 
beautiful Island the more one appreciates the political insight of Bishop Heber.6 
6 Reginald Heber (1783-1826), bishop of Calcutta and author of Journey through India from Calcutta to 
Bombay, with notes upon Ceylon, and a Journey to Madras and the Southern Provinces (1828). 
17 CO 54/966/112, no 129 29 Dec 1939 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: despatch from Mr MacDonald to Sir A 
Caldecott on the implications for Ceylon of the failure of labour 
negotiations 
I have the honour to refer to your confidential despatch of the 23rd of October, and 
to subsequent telegrams which have reported the failure of the Governments of 
Ceylon and India to arrive at a satisfactory basis for the opening of negotiations on 
outstanding trade and other matters in need of settlement. I regret that the promise 
of negotiations has not been followed by the opportunity for personal discussion 
between representatives of the two Governments which would have been afforded 
and which might have led to mutual understanding and accommodation; in these 
circumstances there appears unhappily to be no immediate prospect of that detente 
which must be maintained as the chief aim of all concerned. In the present situation 
therefore my attention is particularly directed to the effect in Ceylon of the 
prohibition by the Government of India against the emigration from India to Ceylon 
of unskilled labourers, and I have been considering again the memorandum by the 
Controller of Labour, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 565 of the 
18th of August. 
2. You have reported to me, and I have received representations from other 
sources also, to the effect that the embargo has been strictly applied by the 
authorities in Madras, and evidence is forthcoming to show that the restriction is 
having an unsettling effect on the minds of Indian labourers employed on up-country 
estates in the Island. I understand from Mr. Gimson's memorandum that in 
particular the effect was expected to be felt on such estates and in certain important 
industries in Colombo itself. 
3. At this juncture of war, it would be a matter of serious concern if the situation 
were to deteriorate in a manner subversive to the economic well-being of Ceylon and 
her plantation and other industries and to the maintenance of public order. It 
appears to me that in present circumstances it is necessary to consider what steps, if 
any, can usefully be taken to protect the vital interests of the Island, so long as the 
Government of India's attitude remains unchanged. I have, of course, no intention of 
suggesting that it would be right or wise to contemplate any policy of reprisals or 
counter action in any way damaging to the interests either of the Government of 
India or of Indians in Ceylon. 
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4. I request, therefore, that you will consider what steps are open to you with a 
view to achieving a modification of the prohibition imposed by the Government of 
India (e.g., its mitigation in respect of Indians and their families who are already in 
employment in the Island) or if that is not considered practicable, what steps can be 
taken by the Government of Ceylon to meet in the Island the difficulties which may 
result from its maintenance. 
5. I shall be grateful if you will report to me as soon as possible upon the situation 
in these respects and furnish me with any recommendations which you may have to 
make. 
18 CO 54/974/6, no 2 5 Jan 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from Lord Zetland to Mr MacDonald 
conveying the views of the Government of India on the failure of the 
labour negotiations. Enclosure 
I have now received the Viceroy's observations regarding the hardship caused in 
individual cases by the rigid enforcement of the Government of India's ban on 
emigration to Ceylon to which you drew my attention in the latter part of your letter 
of the 19th October. 1 
The Viceroy prefaces his remarks by saying that the policy of the Government of 
India appears to be both logical and inescapable until the Government of Ceylon 
modify their attitude, for not only has the Ceylon Government's policy of discrimina-
tory retrenchment created a state of uncertainty as to the future employment of 
Indians in the Colony, but there is a large section of public opinion in India, 
especially in Madras, that lends support to the view that Ceylon should not be 
allowed the benefits of estate labour from India while the Ceylon Government persist 
in the replacement by Ceylonese of Indians engaged in other forms of labour. As you 
are aware, the Government of India have since issued their proposed public 
statement announcing the breakdown of negotiations, and I enclose herewith for 
your information the text of their communique which was issued on the 13th 
December. I can only add a word of regret that our joint efforts have failed to bring 
the two parties together. 
I fear that cases of individual hardship are an inevitable consequence of the ban on 
emigration, but Linlithgow assures me that exemptions are being granted when 
special circumstances justify them. Dependants in India are freely granted permits to 
rejoin labourers in Ceylon, and the Madras Government have been authorised to use 
their discretion in exempting persons in permanent employment of the Ceylon 
Government who have a guarantee of employment on their return to that country. 
Incidentally, the Viceroy draws attention to the fact that in this matter of emigration 
restriction, the Madras Government merely act as agents of the Government of India 
who are ultimately responsible for the policy pursued, and he adds that in carrying 
out this policy the Madras Government have not gone beyond the general instruc-
tions issued to them. 
Linlithgow has also referred to another Ceylon question, namely, the proposals for 
1 See 5. 
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the amendment of the Constitution which were contained in the White Paper 
(Command 5910) published towards the close of last year. Since then the proposals 
have been debated in the Ceylon State Council and it is understood that Caldecott is 
likely to send his comments shortly if he has not already done so. 
You will recall that the Government of India asked for an opportunity of 
considering any part of the proposed scheme that might affect Indian interests. This 
request was conveyed to the Colonial Office in an official letter of the 8th October, 
1938, No. P. & J. 4624/38, to which Parkinson replied in a personal letter to Stewart 
to the effect that there would be ample time for the Government of India to express 
their views. The Government of India are naturally anxious that their views should be 
given due weight and consideration before any decision is reached. May I assure the 
Viceroy that this will be done when their views are received? (He says that they have 
delayed sending them owing to the uncertain position created by the war.) I am not 
sure what the position may be in regard to the constitutional changes, and whether 
there is a possibility of the whole question being postponed until after the war. I shall 
be very grateful to hear from you what the probabilities are. 
Enclosure to 128: communique issued by the Government of India on the 13th 
December, 1939 
In September last, the Ceylon Government suggested to the Government of India 
that a conference should be held to discuss the former's proposal to restrict 
immigration into Ceylon and that the opportunity should be taken to enter into trade 
negotiations and to discuss other outstanding matters of common interest. The 
Government of India saw no objection and expressed their readiness to receive a 
delegation from Ceylon in India, provided the Ceylon Government's scheme for 
retrenchment of non-Ceylonese daily-paid employees, which had proved the stumb-
ling block to an earlier inception of trade negotiations, could be discussed at the 
conference and its operation held in abeyance. 
It will be recalled that the Government of India had based their objections to the 
scheme on two main grounds. First, the scheme as originally announced gave 
preference so far as retrenchment was concerned to all Ceylonese, however short 
their service, over all Indians. Second, it placed indirect pressure upon Indian 
labourers by requiring all those with less than 10 years' service to decide before 31st 
December, 1939, whether they would give up their employment in consideration of 
receiving a bonus and free ticket to their home, the alternative being to continue in 
employment at the risk of retrenchment in 1940, without any bonus or other 
consideration. 
The negotiations between the two Governments on this question have, it is 
regretted, not been successful. The Government of Ceylon have found themselves 
unable either to hold the scheme in abeyance or to modify it, except to the extent 
already announced in the Assembly on 12th September, that Indians with more than 
10 years' service would be treated in respect of retrenchment on the same footing as 
Ceylonese. The Government of India have come to the conclusion that this does not 
offer a sufficient basis for entering the conference proposed by the Government of 
Ceylon and have informed the Government accordingly. 
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19 CO 54/97 4/8, no 3A [Jan 1940] 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: CO note on the history of the labour dispute 
in preparation for a meeting with a deputation from the Ceylon 
Association 
A deputation from the Ceylon Association in London will wait on the Secretary of 
State at 4 p.m. on Thursday, 18th January, to make representations regarding the 
ban on emigration of Indian labour to Ceylon, its bearing on the prevailing labour 
unrest on the tea and rubber estates, and its probable adverse effect at a later stage on 
the supply of labour for the estates. The nature of the representations which the 
deputation will make may be seen from the letter enclosed with No. 2 on this file. 
It may be worth while recapitulating the history of the events leading up to the 
Govt. of India's ban on emigration of labour. In April 1939 it became known that the 
Ceylon Ministers had under consideration a scheme, put forward by the Minister of 
Communications and Works, for replacing non-Ceylonese employees of the Govern-
ment by Ceylonese. The scheme found its way to the press and the Government of 
India sent a protest. After the Ministers had considered the scheme, they decided 
upon a course of action far less severe than that recommended by the Minister of 
Communications and Works. Their scheme amounted to:-
(1) The immediate discontinuance of non-Ceylonese daily paid Government 
employees who had been engaged since 1934 in defiance of a resolution adopted at 
that date to the effect that no non-Ceylonese should be engaged where suitable 
Ceylonese were available; 
(2) An offer of special repatriation terms to other non-Ceylonese daily paid 
employees who wished to retire in anticipation of extensive retrenchment 
measures which the Government proposed to put into effect later in the year: it 
was made clear that in such retrenchment preference would be given to Ceylonese 
over non-Ceylonese, and it was pointed out that it would, therefore, be to the 
advantage of non-Ceylonese employees who were in danger of retrenchment to opt 
for voluntary retirement under the special repatriation terms: the offer was to be 
open until 31st December, 1939. 
At this time proposals were already on foot for a trade conference between India 
and Ceylon, but no time or date had been fixed. As Ceylon refused to abandon its 
scheme regarding non-Ceylonese employees in deference to the Government of 
India's protest, the Government of India threatened to cut off the supply of Indian 
labour to Ceylon and hinted that the projected trade negotiations might have to be 
cancelled. Ceylon made no definite move, and Pandit Nehru visited Ceylon and 
discussed the question with the Ministers. Partly as the result of these discussions, 
the Ministers gave way so far as to modify their scheme to the following extent: 
notices of dismissal were withdrawn in the cases of employees who were:-
(a) registered as married to a Ceylonese wife, 
(b) registered as the father of children by a Ceylonese mother, 
(c) married to a non-Ceylonese spouse who was being continued in Government 
employment. 
The Ministers also undertook to give due consideration to cases of hardship and 
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conceded that, when retrenchment took place, the preference accorded to Ceylonese 
over non-Ceylonese would be confined to the case of employees of not more than 10 
years' standing, and that in other cases equal treatment would be given. The 
Government of India, however, was not satisfied with these concessions, and 
imposed a ban on the emigration of Indian labour to Ceylon on 1st August. 
Telegrams continued to be exchanged between the two Governments, and every 
effort was made by the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, and the Governor to bring the 
parties to terms. Ceylon eventually suggested that the shortest way out of the 
impasse was to call a conference at which the two Governments could discuss their 
differences over emigrant labour as well as other outstanding questions, including 
trade relations. The Government of India accepted this suggestion on the condition 
that the scheme offering voluntary retirement terms to non-Ceylonese employed 
before 1934 was held in abeyance pending the discussions. The Government of India 
actually went so far as to suggest a place and date for the conference-(Delhi, third 
week in November). Ceylon replied, welcoming the suggestion as to the time and 
place for the conference, but saying that they would not be able to hold the voluntary 
retirement scheme in abeyance as it would constitute a breach of faith to those who 
had already opted for it. The position then deteriorated again, the Government of 
India holding out for suspension of the voluntary retirement scheme, and the 
treatment of all employees on an equal basis, when retrenchment began, and Ceylon 
offering only an extension of the time limit for voluntary retirement, and refusing 
the suggestion of equal treatment in retrenchment, which was already imminent. 
The Government of India finally issued a communication to the press on December 
13th/ explaining the nature of the differences between the two Governments, and 
their reasons for deciding that the proposed negotiations could not now take place. 
The ban on emigration of labour from India remained, and still remains, in force. 
Turning to the question of labour unrest on the Ceylon plantations, the decision 
taken in April to dismiss non-Ceylonese employees seems to have given rise to an 
accentuation of inter-communal feeling between the Sinhalese and Indian elements 
in Ceylon. It gave Mr. Ponnambulam [sic] an opening for some more than usually 
abusive remarks on the subject of discriminatory action by the Ministers. Mr. 
Goonesina [sic] (Labour Party) took up the cudgels on the other side, and feeling got 
fiercer throughout the summer. The vernacular press on both sides conducted a 
fierce campaign by means of pamphlets and lampoons which had a wide circulation 
among estate labourers. Boycotts were organized, and rival politicians seized the 
occasion to advertise their claims to public favour by thumping the tub more loudly 
than usual. The situation deteriorated after the introduction of the ban on the 
emigration of Indian labour on 1st August, and towards the end of August there were 
two affrays between Tamil and Sinhalese elements in one of the tea areas. 
In September the Governor reported (paragraph 1 in 8 in enclosure to 1 on 
56104/39) that the outbreak of war had brought about an improvement in the 
situation. Inter-communal feeling had eased and the rival politicians had, tempor-
arily at any rate, buried the hatchet. The Governor felt that, if only the projected 
conference with India could be brought about, local differences might be permanent-
ly liquidated. As stated above, however, the arrangements for the conference broke 
down, and there has been intermittent trouble on the estates ever since. Some 
1 See 18, enclosure. 
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account of these troubles up to the end of September is given in the police report 
enclosed in No. 5 on 55569/1139, and the Ceylon Association have from time to time 
sent us letters from planters describing local disturbances. Sir Cosmo Parkinson 
recently received from Mr. Bowman a copy of a letter from "an English lady resident 
in Ceylon" (enclosure to 13 on 55569/1139) giving a vivid account of the situation as 
it appeared to her; and a most gloomy forecast of the future . The most recent official 
report is contained in paragraph 9 of the enclosure to 7 on 56104/39, the Governor's 
fourth report on "Things Ceylonese".2 It will be seen that in that report the Governor 
attributes the troubles to the efforts of two rival trades union organisations which are 
competing to gain the favour of Tamil labour, particularly in the Hatton District.* 
The Governor has also stated, in his despatch in 1 on 55569/40, that the ban on 
emigration of labour from India has contributed to the unrest. 
More recent information still comes from the Chairman of the Mooloya estates (1 
on 55569/1140) . A strike began on the estate on the 5th January, and on the lOth 
January it developed into an attack by Indian strikers on Sinhalese labour. The police 
had to fire to restore order. 
As to what is being done to improve matters, on the planters side we know that an 
admirable circular has been sent to all estate managers stating the attitude which 
they should adopt when strike action is taken or threatened by their labourers 
(enclosure to 12 on 55569/1139). On the official side, we know that the Labour 
Department is doing its best to prevent the trouble from becoming widespread 
(enclosure 2 to No. 5 on 55569/1139). But their task is made more difficult by the fact 
that labourers apparently have no real grievance against the estates to put forward. It 
seems to be generally accepted that if free migration of labour could be restored 
between India and Ceylon, the principal source of irritation would be removed. We 
have no evidence, however, that the Ceylon Government is taking any steps to this 
end, and indeed responsible Ministers seem to hold the view that Ceylon can get on 
very well without help from India (see paragraph 9 of No. 6 on 56104/39) . The only 
thing we can boast of is a letter just received from the Secretary of State for India 
(No. 2 on 55569/40)3 stating that, although individual cases of hardship are 
inevitable while the ban on emigration lasts, exemptions are being granted when 
special circumstances justify them. Dependants in India are now permitted to rejoin 
labourers in Ceylon, and the Madras Government have been authorised to exempt 
from the ban, at their discretion, persons in the permanent employment of the 
Ceylon Government who have a guarantee of employment on their return to Ceylon. 
On the 29th of December the Secretary of State wrote a despatch to- the Governor 
(No. 129 on 55569/39)4 expressing his serious concern over the prospect as affecting 
vital economic interests in the Island, and asking for his early recommendations as 
to the steps which were open to him to take in mitigation of the effects in Ceylon of a 
continued interruption of the free movement of labour between India and the Island. 
• Hatton District. One of the most important high-country tea areas in Ceylon. Represented in the State 
Council by Natesa Ayer, the Indian leader in the Council, who depends for his seat on the suffrage of the 
Indian labourers on the estates in the constituency. His position is being compromised by a new Indian 
labour organisation formed as a result of the visit to Ceylon last summer of Nehru, the Congress leader in 
India, which under the name of the Ceylon Indian Congress, is in active opposition both to the Ceylon 
Labour Party and the Ceylon Communist Party (Sama Samaj) and is instigating an extreme anti-Sinhalese 
feeling amongst Indian estate labourers. Mr. Natesa Ayer's policy is less extreme. 
2 See 16. 3 See 18. 4 See 17. 
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20 CO 54/973/14, no 5 20 Jan 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald transmit-
ting a resolution of the Ceylon National Congress 
With reference to my Confidential despatch of the 28th October 1939/ on the subject 
of the Reform of the Constitution, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a letter 
dated the 15th January 1940, from a Joint Honorary Secretary2 of the Ceylon 
National Congress embodying a Resolution which the Congress requests may be 
forwarded to you. 
2. The demands for constitutional reform made by the Congress at its Session on 
the 4th March 1939 are contained in the memorandum which formed Enclosure 3 to 
my Confidential despatch of the 28th October 1939. 
Letter with 20 
I am directed by the Ceylon National Congress to request Your Excellency to be good 
enough to forward to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies the 
following resolution unanimously adopted at the 20th Annual Sessions of the Ceylon 
National Congress held at Dharmarajah College, Kandy, on the 27th of December 
1939. 
Resolution referred to:-
1 See 9. 
"That the Ceylon National Congress asks that the Minimum demands for 
constitutional reform by the Congress made at its Special Session held on the 
4th March 1939, should be granted before the next General Election of the 
State Council, and such election should not be postponed beyond the period 
now provided for by the Constitution, unless it be necessary for the purpose of 
inaugurating a Constitution which satisfies our demands." 
2 J R Jayewardene. 
21 CO 54/977/7, no 1 22 Jan 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': fifth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO. 
Minute by G E J Gent 
Labour unrest 
1. Since my last instalment of these Notes1 the Police have had to fire on strikers 
on Mooloya Estate and one striker has died from loss of blood caused by gun-shot. 
The shooting was justified, the Sergeant having been forced to give the order by the 
strikers' assault on a police convoy of non-strikers. The latter were mostly Sinhalese 
engaged to replace striking Tamils and the "Times of Ceylon", with its lamentable 
bent for mischief and misrepresentation at once plastered Colombo with posters 
announcing a "communal clash". The Manager of the estate has since written to the 
1 See 16. 
[21) JAN 1940 35 
Ceylon Daily News pointing out that there was nothing communal about the clash at 
all; it was just a normal one of strikers v. non-strikers. What has been disclosed by 
the strike however is something almost as ominous: while it had nothing to do with 
communalism it did have something to do with communism. Mr. Gunawardena, 
Sama-Samajist member for Avissawella, and other members of the Sama-Samajist 
party were found by the Police on their way to the estate, which is in the Nuwara 
Eliya constituency whose member promptly telegraphed for measures to be taken 
against the Sama Samajist movement. In my last Notes I mentioned as the sources of 
unrest rival estate trade unions or "Sangams" promoted by (a) the newly formed 
"Ceylon Indian National Congress" and (b) Natesa Aiyer's "Federation of Workers". 
To these must now be added (c), the Sama-Samajist "All-Ceylon Estate Workers' 
Union", which I understand to have enrolled some eight thousand members. 
2. At my meeting with Ministers at Nuwara Eliya on January 7th we had 
discussed Labour Unrest at length. The Home Minister was in full touch with the 
Police and they on their part were ready for any emergency. The Mooloya incident on 
the lOth therefore caught nobody unawares. The Home Minister was away in 
Batticaloa when it occurred but immediately returned to Colombo, and on the 12th I 
had a conference with the Legal Secretary, the Ministers for Home Affairs and 
Labour, and the Inspector General of Police at which certain small amendments of 
the Defence Regulations were agreed to which will facilitate prosecution of 
pamphleteers. Certain inflammatory pamphlets have, I understand, been definitely 
traced down to the Sama-Samajist Press in Colombo. On January 15th the Indian 
Agent came to discuss the situation with me and later I saw the Controller of Labour. 
I wish that the former would co-operate rather than try to compete with the latter 
but my past experience in Malaya prevents my expecting any fulfilment of the wish. 
Mr. Vittal Pai represented that planters would not avail themselves of his services as 
an arbitrator in labour disputes and that they were often rude to his Assistant. As far 
as my information goes his attempts at arbitration (which of course are outside his 
Agency functions) have invariably failed; and if I were a planter myself I should not 
call him in because, although a nice fellow, he has neither the necessary authority 
nor the personality for successful mediation. 
3. On Elgin Estate a big strike still continues and I understand the Manager to 
have refused a chance of settlement recommended by the Minister for Labour and 
the Labour Department. This is a pity as it is bound to weaken Governmental 
authority. 
4. After writing the preceding paragraphs I had to lay these Notes by in the press 
of other business. I am glad that I did so as the Controller of Labour was able to 
report to me yesterday evening that to the best of his knowledge not a single labourer 
in the Island would be out on strike this morning. This marks a great improvement 
in the situation, and means that the Elgin Estate Manager has at the eleventh hour 
shown a more conciliatory attitude. Mr. Vittal Pai has also seen me again; his main 
concern now seems to be for his own reputation as Indian Agent. Labourers who 
have joined one or other of the three bodies mentioned in paragraph 1 look to their 
Union for leadership and advice, and Mr. Vittal Pai feels himself left out in the cold 
when for all other parties things are uncomfortably warm. The inconsiderate manner 
in which the Government of India has operated their emigration ban, leading to 
separation of families etc., has also naturally diminished their Agent's reputation 
among the coolies as a 'protector'. 
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5. A recent report from the Ceylon Emigration Commissioner in India justifies 
the hope that hard cases under the ban may at last be going to receive more 
consideration from the Indian authorities than hitherto. Apart from these hard cases 
and from its interference with the voluntary efflux and influx of labourers on holiday 
or on private business the ban is doing Ceylon no harm. One cause of labour unrest is 
undoubtedly the fact that the Island at the moment has more estate labour than it 
requires, with the result that one hears of employment for four days only in the week 
being provided by a number of estates. 
6. On the advice of the Minister for Home Affairs I have ordered a Commission of 
Inquiry into the Mooloya shooting (although the Coroner's finding leaves us in no 
doubt that it was justified) because the Garvin-Dowbiggin-Senanayake Committee 
on Police Questions, which reported some years ago, recommended that this should 
always be done. If it were not done the State Council would inevitably appoint a 
Committee of its own, and the wisdom of the recommendation is therefore beyond 
question. I understand that two Minority Members (Messrs Ponnambalam and JaY.ah) 
have already visited Mooloya Estate and interrogated the dead man's relations. 
Ceylon and India 
7. Although Messrs Corea and Senanayake during their recent absences in India 
posed as doves of peace they neither bore with them nor brought back tangible 
sprigs of olive. They told me however at Nuwara Eliya that they hoped to evolve some 
compromise on the so-called bonus repatriation scheme, and I still await further 
news. In the meantime I was lucky to notice in a number of documents appended to 
the Agenda of a Board of Ministers meeting another memorandum on the subject of 
non-Ceylonese labour by Major Kotalawala in which he said that the Government of 
India was using the discharge of non-Ceylonese as a pretext for avoiding trade 
negotiations. I at once issued orders for the Memorandum to be made Confidential; 
otherwise it might have got into the Press like the former one and have still 
worsened our relations with India. Apparently the gallant Major is incapable of 
learning a lesson. 
8. In a few days' time the Ministers are coming to see me concerning the addition 
to the election registers during the past year of some eighty thousand Indian voters. 
As far as I understand the position instructions given by the Legal Secretary have 
been ignored through lack of supervision and Ceylon domicile taken for granted. The 
worst feature of the case, as I so far understand it, is that the Legal Secretary 
approved with Treasury concurrence the payment of a clerical fee to estate clerks of 
three cents per cooly registered. This has induced the estate clerks to register as 
many names as possible. It is almost unbelievable that such a situation should have 
arisen in the department of an Officer of State, and I fear that the Sinhalese Ministers 
will make much political capital out of it. 
Volunteers' family relief 
9. I am glad to report that at my Nuwara Eliya meeting with Ministers they 
accepted the position explained in paragraph 5 of my last Notes. The European 
Association may however possibly address you on the subject, as apparently a 
number of its members object to the principle of claims under Cap. 258, Section 15, 
as "savouring of the dole". I fancy however that when the Committee which the 
Association has appointed to look into the matter finds that the law is being faithfully 
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followed in regard both to pay and allowances and to claims for relief the projected 
Memorial to you may not eventuate. What has really riled a large number of 
Europeans are irresponsible and opprobrious remarks in State Council about the 
Ceylon Planters' Rifle Corps. As I pointed out in my last Notes no part of this Corps is 
now mobilized or likely to be mobilized, and this question of Family Relief is a live 
one only for members, mostly Ceylonese, of other units of the Ceylon Defence Force. 
Startup affair 
10. It is hardly credible that the Ministers, the debate on whose protest motion 
will be resumed in State Council tomorrow, should have chosen this of all junctures 
to introduce a Bill to deprive the Medical College Council of its powers of 
appointment; it is however a fact, and is being widely criticized! Their motion is now 
of course out of time as any protest under Article 23(2) has to be made within seven 
days of the Governor's Message enacting an Ordinance. I suppose, however, that it 
will be passed with some saving amendment or other. The danger of legal 
proceedings to test the validity of the Ordinance seems to be finally dissipated by the 
redoubtable Mr. R.L. Pereira,2 K.C's Chairmanship of a Protest Meeting of Citizens 
on Saturday; all that seems contemplated is yet another protest to the Secretary of 
State. I expect that Mr. Pereira must have drawn quite a fat fee for his presidency 
over what was largely a gathering of Medical Students; in return for it he dealt out 
liberal doses of his usual Buzfuzz stuff. I, for instance, in the newspaper account of it, 
was headlined as having (in my first speech here 21/2 years ago!) indulged in 
"psychological claptrap". Parturiunt mantes. 
Minute on 21 
This memorandum of the Governor's is more than usually interesting on the labour 
problem. We have heard from another source that at long last the Government of 
India is contemplating a relaxation of the Emigration Ban to the extent of allowing 
those labourers, who happened to be in India at the time the ban was introduced 
(August 1st), to go back to Ceylon in cases where there is personal or family hardship 
involved. This is, of course, an elementary point which ought to have been conceded 
by the Government of India from the very first. There is no other indication yet of 
any concession to the labourers themselves but we understand that the dependants 
of labourers in Ceylon, in cases of proved hardship, are to be allowed to return there 
from India. 
It is interesting to read the Governor's remark that one cause of the present labour 
unrest is genuine unemployment on estates at present, but I do not think that it 
would be right to suppose that there is a surplus of Indian labour on Ceylon estates at 
present, having regard to the sustained high output of rubber and tea and the 
likelihood of a drift back to India if the Emigration Ban is maintained, and 
particularly a drift back in the near future, in accordance with the customary 
seasonal movement of labourers to their motherland in March and April. 
The Governor is, no doubt, wise to order a Commission of Inquiry into the fracas 
on the Mooloya Estate. 
2 R L Pereira was the country's leading lawyer. 
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The information in paragraph 7 that the two chief Ceylonese Ministers concerned 
(apart from the Minister of Communications and Works-Major Kotalawala, whose 
recurring stupidities make him a factor to be reckoned with in this problem) are 
giving their minds to evolving some compromise on the Ceylon policy which has 
irritated the Government of India. One interesting and important aspect of the 
problem, which may have an increasing influence on the situation, is that the 
Congress Party and ex-Ministers in India have a stake in the game not only on the 
Indian side but also vis a vis the Ceylon Ministers. The ban in India which was 
imposed before the Congress Party deserted office is being maintained by a stop-gap 
authority in India which may feel a particular difficulty in compromising with the 
Government of Ceylon over a decision imposed while Congress was still in power & 
in a matter which is one particularly of political prestige in the Indian mind. The 
Ceylon Ministers themselves may be feeling (following upon Mr. Nehru's visit to 
them in July last year) that they too would see political advantages in forcing the 
hands of the present Government of India by means of reaching an agreement direct 
with the Congress Ex-Ministers. There was evidence last summer that Nehru's 
personal visit to Ceylon was a matter of suspicion to the Government of India, who 
regarded, with some apprehension, any appearance of the dispute at that time being 
settled down between the Ceylonese ministers and Congress leaders behind the back, 
so to speak, of the Government of India; i.e. there was a little jealousy in India itself 
which was suspected of accounting for the over-quick and drastic action which the 
Government of India took against Ceylon. The new Ceylon Congress Labour Union 
which was established amongst the labourers on the estates following upon Nehru's 
visit, appears to be making good headway as would only be natural, in competition 
with the various estates and other union organisations of local origin, some of which 
are reputable and others less so. It may well, therefore, appear both to the Planters' 
Association, to the labourers themselves, and to the Ceylonese Ministers, that the 
most promising line of effective relief is to come to terms with Congress and to rely 
on the latter's influence in India to have the ban removed by the Government of 
India. 
The Governor's comments on Mr. Vittal Pai, the Agent of the Government of India 
and Ceylon, are interesting. I sought him out a year ago in Ceylon to have a long 
conversation; and though a pleasant and agreeable person, he did not strike me as a 
very impressive figure. (I should be glad to have this file back after it has been seen). 
G.E.J.G. 
7.2.40 
22 CO 54/97 4/6, no 4 23 Jan 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter (reply) from Mr MacDonald to Lord 
Zetland on proposals to resolve the labour dispute and constitutional 
reform in Ceylon 
I have delayed answering your letter of the 5th January1 about the Government of 
India's ban on the emigration of unskilled labour to Ceylon until I had received a 
1 See 18. 
[22) JAN 1940 39 
deputation from the Ceylon Association in London which came to see me on the 18th 
of January to represent to me, on behalf of tea and rubber estates in the Island, the 
difficulties which were being already experienced, and were to a greater degree to be 
apprehended, as a result of the labour unrest for which the Government of India's 
action has been mainly responsible. 
The disturbance of the rubber and tea industries at the present juncture is, of 
course, extremely undesirable, and no less so is any avoidable stimulation of racial 
feeling in Ceylon. I think you will agree that the Ministers in Ceylon, heavy-footed 
and tactless as they were in the early stages of this controversy, have gone some way, 
although not far enough for the Government of India, in modifying their original 
scheme in the matter of retrenchment of daily-paid non-Ceylonese labour in public 
employment. On the other side of the picture it seems to me that it might not 
unfairly be said that the Government of India were unduly hasty and drastic in 
imposing the ban on the 1st August, and though I do indeed welcome the assurance 
in your letter that permits are now being freely granted in India to dependents to 
rejoin labourers in Ceylon, there remains for the tea and rubber producing interests 
which employ Indian labour in the Island the principal difficulty that the ban is still 
kept against the free movement of labourers themselves. 
I feel that the time has come when we must take the view that both Governments 
have got into a position in which it is difficult for them to initiate further steps likely 
to lead to a solution of the present difficulty, and that it would be as well if a joint 
discussion could be arranged between representatives of the India Office and the 
Colonial Office who are immediately concerned with the problem in order to explore 
the lines of any suggestion which could be made here for a settlement which the two 
Governments might be persuaded to accept. At the end of December I sent a 
despatch2 to the Governor reiterating the serious view which I took of the matter 
both from the Ceylon and a wider point of view, and I urged him to make a fresh 
effort to think out steps which might be contemplated with a view to a solution of the 
present impasse. I shall presumably have the Governor's reply towards the end of this 
month, but I don't think that the Departmental discussions which I propose need be 
delayed for it. If you are inclined to agree perhaps a message from your Private 
Secretary would be sufficient to get an inter-Departmental discussion started. 
You refer also in your letter to the matter of constitutional reforms in Ceylon. It 
has always been my intention that the Government of India should have the fullest 
opportunity to express their views before any decisions were taken as to either the 
manner or substance of Constitutional changes in Ceylon. The Governor's proposals 
in the White Paper (Command 5910), to which you refer, were debated in the 
summer in the Ceylon State Council with a result which I can only regard as 
insufficient to justify any immediate action on the lines of those proposals, and in 
consultation with the Governor I have latterly been considering how best to proceed. 
On the outbreak of war a political truce set in, but I am advised that it might not be 
acceptable to the Board of Ministers if all further consideration of the problem were 
deferred until the end of the war, even though any actual amendment of the 
constitution might be so deferred if it were made plain that prompt action would 
then be taken and that in the meantime a satisfactory measure of agreement on the 
lines of procedure had been thought out. I am accordingly now contemplating the 
2 See 17. 
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advisability of sending a despatch to the Governor to ask for his views on possible 
courses of action for obtaining such agreement; for instance, by means of a 
Governors' Conference locally to which it might be thought desirable to attach one 
or two constitutional experts from here, or some form of Conference in London, 
either during or after the war. But I attach importance to securing, if possible, the 
consent and co-operation not only of the Board of Ministers but of other representa-
tive political leaders in Ceylon on any procedure which we may settle upon. It is my 
full intention that the Government of India should have their opportunity to let their 
views be known in any such discussions, and any contribution which they may be 
able to make will I feel sure be more effective if an early detente can be reached in the 
present difficulties over the labour and emigration question. 
23 CO 54-/964/2, no 25 26 Jan 194-0 
[Reforms]: despatch (reply) from Mr MacDonald to Sir A Caldecott 
suggesting three possible courses of action 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch of the 
28th October, 1939,1 in which you reported upon the recent Reforms Debate in the 
State Council and enclosed a report by the Legal Secretary, a note by the Agent in 
Ceylon of the Government of India, and a memorandum submitted by the Ceylon 
National Congress. 
2. As you are aware, I had hoped that the course of the Debate might have 
disclosed a general opinion in the State Council in favour of the recommendations 
which you have yourself formulated in your confidential despatch of the 13th June, 
1938, and that it would then have been possible to proceed without further delay 
with the drafting of the necessary amending Order in Council. 
3. An examination of the report of the Debate, facilitated as it has been by Mr. 
Howard's detailed appreciation of the sense of the speeches and the significance of 
the voting on the several resolutions, forces me to the conclusion that important 
sections of the State Council were not able to give their support to many of the 
substantial motions which were debated and passed. I much regret, therefore, that I 
am not able to conclude that the way is now clear for me to advise the issue of an 
Order by His Majesty in Council to amend the present constitution on the lines 
contemplated, and it becomes necessary to consider what policy should be adopted 
with a view to obtaining a satisfactory measure of agreement on the future 
constitution of Ceylon. 
4. The problem has been materially affected by the outbreak of war since the 
Debate took place, and the magnitude of the effort which must be contributed in 
every part of the Empire to ensure the prosecution of the war to a successful 
conclusion may be such that any further steps towards the revision of the 
constitution of Ceylon likely to have the effect of disturbing the unity of effort in the 
Island should be deferred until peace is attained. His Majesty's Government are aware 
of the determination of the Board of Ministers and other political leaders in Ceylon 
that the Island should make its maximum contribution to the war effort, and they 
1 See 9. 
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fully appreciate this attitude. It has, however, been shown that the present 
constitution has defects which must to some extent cause continuing difficulty and 
doubt in the political life of the Island and I should be disappointed if further 
consideration of the problem were deferred for the duration of the war. I should 
prefer that a suitable procedure for examining further the possibility of reaching 
agreement on the constitutional question should be devised and put in motion at an 
early date, even though the actual steps for introducing reforms may have to be 
deferred at this juncture in face of the critical struggle in which all democratic 
principles and free institutions are now involved. 
5. In Mr. Howard's report, three possible courses are suggested. As to the first, I 
have already set out my agreement with your view that it is not practicable to 
proceed with the preparation of an amending Order in Council in view of the present 
failure to secure any substantial agreement in Ceylon. The objection to the second 
course suggested, viz. the appointment now of a Royal Commission to visit Ceylon to 
examine the question afresh, presents difficulties as well as objections, and I am not 
satisfied that at this juncture it would lead to the achievement of satisfactory results. 
The third course suggested by Mr. Howard is that a further effort should be made to 
settle certain questions of representation in the State Council. I recognize it to be 
possible that useful, although limited, results of a kind generally acceptable in the 
Island might be achieved by this means, but I cannot see that it could serve as a 
substitute in any measurable degree for a plan to make headway with the general 
problem of constitutional reform. 
6. I therefore find myself considering whether any other courses remain to be 
explored, and I base myself on the expectation to which you yourself refer in the final 
paragraph of your despatch, with particular reference to the work of a Redelimitation 
Commission, namely, that there is a realization on the part of all communities in 
Ceylon that one of the most effectual ways of assisting His Majesty's Government in 
the months immediately ahead will be for Ceylonese to bring to their own 
constitutional problem a maximum of compromise and conciliation and a minimum 
of sectional animus and obduracy. The Debate in the State Council, which was held 
before the outbreak of war, appears to me to have had the effect of giving special 
prominence to sectional differences of view; and it may be that in the emergency of 
war the more fundamental claims of the points of unity and mutual interest shared 
by all communities in Ceylon, in association with the other parts of the British 
Empire, will secure special observance and induce a beneficial compromise on 
outstanding differences of view. This spirit of compromise may be dissipated if all 
further discussion and progress is postponed until after the war. 
7. It seems to me desirable therefore to search the possibilities of fresh lines of 
early progress. First, I shall be glad if you will carefully consider the advantage of 
convening a Governor's Conference of the Board of Ministers and other leaders 
representative of the chief interests in the Island with a view to discussing the best 
means of achieving agreement. These discussions, under your guidance, might take 
place formally in regular gatherings of those whom you chose to call into counsel, or 
informally by your conducting, in the first place, a series of conversations with 
individuals or groups. If this procedure seemed hopeful, it might be possible to lead 
the Conference on to an investigation by committee or otherwise of the main heads 
of reforms to be agreed upon. I should be ready, if you so advised, to invite one or two 
constitutional experts to proceed to Ceylon to assist you in such a Conference, as it is 
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my experience that consultants closely acquainted with such work are able to 
contribute substantially towards the removal of difficulties and disagreements which 
arise in the course of settlement of constitutional problems. It may be that you will 
see in this proposal the risk of reviving in Ceylon a sectional agitation of a character 
harmful to the unity of front which the prosecution of the war demands. If so, that 
consideration must be weighed against the risk that important groups in the political 
life of Ceylon may not be willing to have all further investigation of constitutional 
reform deferred for an indefinite period. 
8. Secondly, it has been suggested to me that a conference might be convened in 
London forthwith which would be equally representative of the various interests in 
the Island. But, in present circumstances, I see great difficulties in this course. Apart 
from the risks of enemy action on the voyage, it would appear to me undesirable to 
ask that the principal political personages should at this juncture all absent 
themselves from Ceylon. Moreover, the effects of a failure to reach agreement would 
be exaggerated to an undesirable extent in the stress of war-time. 
9. Thirdly, it might be contemplated that a decision should be reached now, if it 
were acceptable in Ceylon, that a Ceylon Round Table Conference should be 
convened in London on the successful conclusion of the war. Such a Conference 
would comprise representatives of all important groups in the Island which are 
interested in the problem of Constitutional Reform; the representatives would be 
nominated by the Governor, as in the case of the Burma and India Conferences, upon 
such advice as he deemed it appropriate to seek, and, as in the case of the Burma 
Conference, it would be desirable that the Government of India should have the 
opportunity to nominate a representative to attend the meetings. 
To this course the objection can be raised that it means that not only actual 
reforms, but even the intensive consideration of proposals for reform, will be 
deferred until after the conclusion of the war. This may be too disappointing to 
important political opinion in Ceylon. It also has the disadvantage that, as I have 
suggested already, the present disposition towards compromise between the various 
sections may disappear when the stress of war has been removed. Nevertheless, the 
proposal has certain advantages, and you may think that it is not an unattractive 
course, that it may equally appeal to opinion in Ceylon, and that if there is a need for 
some special measures of administrative association of political leaders in the Island 
with the wartime problems of government, it may be met by some extra-
constitutional arrangement for the purpose. 
10. I shall be grateful if you will give your careful consideration to these 
suggestions and communicate to me your views on them and on any other lines of 
action which may occur or be suggested to you. There remain the matters of the 
General Election which the Order in Council requires to be held not later than next 
year, and the revision of the Voters' Register, which are the subject of your 
confidential despatch of the 27th November 1939. There appear to me to be 
advantages in deferring a General Election in wartime, if you are satisfied that such a 
decision would be generally acceptable in Ceylon; but it would seem to be a matter 
largely affected by any agreement on the procedure for further action in the problem 
of constitutional reform, and if time permits, I hope that decisions can first be 
reached on the latter. 
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24 CO 54/977/7, no 3 18 Feb 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': sixth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
Storms and rocks ahead 
1. I am afraid that my Notes this month will consist of a number of typhoon 
warnings, though whether the ship of state will suffer any very great blowing and 
tossing cannot at present be predicted with any certainty. 
Jayatilaka versus Banks: 2nd round 
2. The most serious development has been a row between Jayatilaka and Banks in 
which the former has been wrong and the latter rude. It has culminated in a minute 
addressed to me by Sir Baron on the 13th February accusing the Inspector-General 
of insubordination and indiscipline. A copy of this minute and of my reply thereto are 
annexed [as Enclosures 'A' and 'B') 1 to these Notes; I feel that these two documents 
not only explain the circumstances and the manner of their arising but also illustrate 
the extraordinarily invidious position in which the Governor too often finds himself 
placed by Ministers and high officials. Neither refer to him until, between them, they 
have made a nasty mess of things and then he is expected to clear the mess up. The 
likelihood of the present mess developing into a political crisis is caused by the 
Communist Dr. Perera's having filed in State Council a motion of censure on the 
Home Minister for having failed to implement the Council's Resolution quoted in 
paragraph 6 of 'B'. Council refused at its last session to suspend standing orders and 
give the motion priority but Jayatilaka in the short statement to which he alludes in 
paragraph 9 of 'A' has promised a full statement later on, and everything depends on 
what that statement will be. Left to himself the old man might perhaps manage to 
parry Dr. Perera's thrust without involving himself and others in a general 
melee. On the other hand if he should listen to Senanayake-well, I fancy, that 
nothing would give Senanayake greater satisfaction than to help push Jayatilaka off 
the ministerial raft with one hand and to throw dung at Banks with the other. And 
in case I may be thought to be doing Senanayake an injustice by this fancy I am 
bound to say that I agree with his view that Sir Baron is now too senile, too casual, 
too lazy and too flabby to lead the Council or even his Executive Committee. He 
allows himself to drift into crises because he no longer has steerage way to keep a 
straight course and so avoid them. And yet (this is the tragedy) he is the nearest, if 
rather remote, approximation to a statesman that Ceylon has yet produced. 
Senanayake tonans 
3. I very nearly allowed myself to be stampeded into hasty and foolish action by 
Senanayake last month. The third annex [Enclosure 'C']2 to these Notes is an unsent 
despatch, the enclosure to which will show what it was that so rattled me. It's fifth 
paragraph is indeed abominable, coming from a Minister who has sworn to be 
faithful and to bear true allegiance to the King, and my first reaction was to draft a 
forwarding despatch in order that the Secretary of State might gauge for himself the 
1 The three enclosures with this report are not printed. Enclosures 'A' and 'B' dealt with the conflict 
between Jayatilaka and P N Banks (inspector-general of police) over the issue of prosecutions qrising from 
the shooting incident on the Mool-oya estate. 
2 For Caldecott's difficulties with Senanayake which he reported in Enclosure 'C', see 32, paras 1-4. 
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measure of that fidelity and allegiance. Before the despatch came up for signature 
however I had thought again and more wisely. The letter had of course no 
constitutional significance, since it had not been shown to or approved by the 
Executive Committee, and it was after all an effusion thoroughly typical of a 
Sinhalese village bully, whose characteristics (like the spots on a black panther) 
occasionally show through the ministerial veneer of"Jungle John". I therefore asked 
him to come round and told him that, if I had sent his letter to the Secretary of State, 
I considered that he would have had in decency to resign his Ministry. To this he did 
not demur. I then went on to say that I should in common courtesy forward no 
representation to the Secretary of State until we had received his promised despatch, 
and that I presumed that he (the Minister) would address me when the despatch had 
been duly considered. The despatch has since arrived and was sent to the Minister on 
the 9th February; I await his comments with interest. I trust that the tone of them 
will be less objectionable than the first ebullition of his wrath though I expect 
something pretty loud and harsh. As the Customary Law of Negri Sembilan3 has it (I 
still find the Custom a great aid to ethical philosophy) "it is the language of the 
mud-buffalo to snort and to bellow". 
Welcome reinforcement 
4. I am too busy to add much to these Notes before the next mail goes, but I feel 
that I must append a brief expression of my great pleasure at meeting our new Legal 
Secretary.4 He has been staying with us at Queen's House since his arrival, and will 
continue to do so for another three days; after which he takes up residence at the 
Galle Face Hotel. He gives me great confidence and I feel his arrival at this juncture 
of possible political tempest as a most welcome reinforcement. To-morrow I meet 
the Board of Ministers again on the subject of the improper registration of Indian 
voters (Things Ceylonese No.5 paragraph 8)5 and they may incidentally ask me about 
reforms. Whether I consult them then about the chances, if any, of round-table 
agreement will depend upon the atmosphere prevailing. 
C.P.R.C. grievances 
5. With reference to paragraph 9 of my last Notes I had a talk with the chief 
Volunteer Officers on February 3rd and visited the headquarters and mess on the 
15th. Unless the European Association or the "Times of Ceylon" decide to go on 
dragging this puddle for political live-bait I don't think that we shall hear much more 
of this matter. 
3 One of four Federated Mal ay States. 4 R H Drayton. 5 See 21. 
25 CO 54/978/7, no 1 23 Feb 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald on the 
registration of Indian voters. Enclosures 1-4 
I feel it my regrettable duty to report, without waiting for the Hansard report of the 
State Council debate of the 21st February, a position serious in itself but still more 
serious in regard to speeches which it has evoked, that has arisen in connection with 
the registration of Indians as voters. 
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2. You will remember that in paragraph 3 of my Reforms despatch, dated the 
13th June, 1938, I expressed myself as against any proposal to alter the regulations 
governing the Indian franchise. I added however that the question of tightening up 
procedure would receive my careful attention. I accordingly asked the Legal 
Secretary to look into the matter and on the 24th June, 1938, the position was 
discussed by the Board of Ministers. On the 9th August, 1938, the Legal Secretary 
issued his Circular No. 56 of which a copy is the first enclosure to this despatch. 
3. In paragraph 7 of my Confidential despatch dated the 28th October, 1939. I 
adhered to my recommendation that no alteration of the regulations should be made 
and described the present position as follows:-
"Under the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order in Council, 1931, an 
Indian can be enfranchised by 
Article 7 (a) proving Ceylonese domicile of origin, 
(b) proving, if he has been resident for five years or more, 
Ceylonese domicile of choice; 
Article 8 (c) proving that he possesses the prescribed literacy and property 
qualifications, or 
Article 9 (d) proving that he has been continuously resident in Ceylon for 
five years and declaring that he intends to settle here permanently. 
Proof of domicile of choice (b) is notoriously difficult and (d) was provided to 
make enfranchisement easier for the intending settler. What actually hap-
pened was that registering officers allowed people to be registered under 
Article 7 without proof of domicile of choice, and therefore without even the 
declaration required by Article 9. This loose procedure is now being tightened 
up and in my opinion nothing further is necessary." 
When I wrote that last sentence I had in mind the Circular issued by the Legal 
Secretary and had no reason to apprehend that Registering Officers would have failed 
to implement it. 
4. On the 17th January, 1940, however I received from the Acting Legal Secretary 
a request that I should grant the Board of Ministers an interview at which to discuss a 
position that had arisen out of a contravention of Mr. Howard's Circular in the 
important planting districts of the Central, Sabaragamuwa and Uva Provinces. The 
extent and gravity of the contravention may be gauged by the second enclosure to 
this despatch which is a copy of a Circular issued by the Government Agent of the 
Central Province, the penultimate sentence of paragraph 4 of which completely 
negatived Mr. Howard's instructions. In Uva, I understand the Government Agent 
substituted on his own initiative ten years' residence in the Island for any domiciliary 
qualification. The result of the failure to carry out instructions has been the addition 
last year of perhaps 100,000 Indian voters to the electoral rolls of ten constituencies 
for which figures are already available. 
5. I met the Board of Ministers on the 24th January and the question of 
invalidating the 1939 registers by an Order-in-Council was raised by certain 
Ministers. I expressed the view that the first thing to do was to ascertain whether the 
Elections Order-in-Council did not provide for rectification in a normal way by 
revision. It was agreed that the Acting Legal Secretary should give a written opinion. 
His opinion (Enclosure 3) was considered at a further interview which I gave the 
Board on the 7th February. As doubts as to its correctness were expressed I suggested 
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that the new Legal Secretary's arrival should be awaited and a second opinion be 
obtained from him. This was agreed to. 
6. Mr. Drayton's opinion is contained in my fourth enclosure and was accepted at 
a third Conference with the Board of Ministers on the 19th February. It was then 
decided that the Legal Secretary should prepare (a) the draft of a new Circular to 
Registering Officers for the avoidance of future error and (b) an estimate of the staff 
required for the coming revision of registers which must be put in train by the 1st 
April. 
7. On the 21st February the State Council continued its debate on Sessional 
Paper XIV, 1938, a copy of which is my fifth enclosure. 1 I enclose a report of this 
debate taken from the Ceylon Daily News of the 22nd February. The speech of the 
Minister for Local Administration, if it has been correctly reported, contains a 
passage (which I have underlined in red) calculated to cause a further deterioration 
in Indo-Ceylonese relations. My sixth enclosure, a cutting from this morning's paper, 
purports to reproduce a declaration by the Hon. Mr. D.S. Senanayake at a public 
meeting which, if the reported words were actually spoken, would be difficult to 
associate with the utterance of a responsible Minister. 
Enclosure 1 to 25: letter from J C Howard to J RV Ferdinand,2 9 Aug 1938 
I have the honour to inform you that at a meeting of the Board of Ministers held on 
the 24th June, 1938, the present method of registering immigrant labourers was 
discussed and it was agreed that I should send out a circular to all Registering 
Officers pointing out what other qualifications are required of those voters who claim 
to be registered on the ground of domicile other than domicile of origin under 
Article 7 of the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order-in-Council. 
2. Article 7 of the Order in Council contemplates 
(a) a domicile of origin which is determined at the time of birth: and 
(b) a domicile of choice which is a domicile a person can acquire. 
In the case of Ceylonese there is a presumption in favour of a Ceylon domicile but in 
the case of non-Ceylonese domicile shall not be deemed to have been acquired for the 
purpose of registration as a voter unless he has also resided in Ceylon for a total 
period of or exceeding five years. 
3. The definition or "domicile" involves legal questions of much difficulty and 
complexity but it is quite clear that a total period of or exceeding five years' residence 
in Ceylon cannot in itself give an immigrant labourer a domiciliary qualification 
under Article 7. "Domicile" is not synonymous with "residence" and mere "resi-
dence" by itself cannot constitute "domicile." The law allows a person not under 
disability to acquire for himself a domicile of choice by the fact of residing in a 
country other than his domicile of origin with the intention of continuing to reside 
there indefinitely; in other words the physical fact of residence must be accompanied 
by the required state of mind to make the country in which the person resides his 
sole and permanent home. 
1 Enclosures five and six not printed. 
2 Principal assistant, Registrar-General's Dept. 
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It follows therefore that Registering Officers are not justified in permitting the 
registration of "immigrant labourers" under Article 7 unless they are reasonably 
satisfied that such labourers 
(i) have resided in Ceylon for a total period of or exceeding five years; and 
(ii) have determined to make Ceylon their sole and permanent home. 
4. I appreciate the difficulties that confront Registering Officers but I trust that 
they will make every endeavour to see that the requirements of the law are satisfied 
before they permit the registration of immigrant labourers under Article 7 of the 
Order-in-Council. 
Enclosure 2 to 25: letter from E T Dyson3 to estate owners on the revision of 
registers of voters, 1939, Kandy district, 20-30 July 1939 
I have the honour to request that you will be so good as to assist me again this year in 
the preparation of the lists of labourers on your Estate who are qualified for inclusion 
in the register of voters on the ground that they possess Ceylon domicile. 
2. I enclose, for your information, a list of persons whose names appear under the 
address of your Estate as revised in 1938, and would request you to be good enough 
to return this list to me before the 31st August, 1939, after striking off those who 
have died or who are no longer under you, making the necessary comments against 
the names. In the case of those who have left the Estate, I would be glad if you would 
state wherever possible the address to which they have gone. In cases in which the 
exact address to which they have gone is not known, any information as to their 
present whereabouts would be most useful, i.e., India, Uva, Gampola, et cetera. 
3. Please furnish a separate list of persons who do not appear in the list now sent 
by me but who are qualified for registration on the grounds set out in paragraph 4 
below and who are not disqualified for any of the following reasons:-
(1) No person shall be qualified to have his name entered in any register of voters 
for this year if such person-
(a) Is not a British subject; 
(b) is less than 21 years of age on the 1st day of August, 1939; 
(c) has not for a continuous period of six months in the eighteen months 
immediately prior to the 1st day of August, 1939, resided in the Electoral 
District to which the Register relates; 
(d) is serving a sentence of penal servitude or imprisonment imposed by any 
Court in any part of His Majesty's dominions or in any country under His 
Majesty's protection or in respect of which a mandate is being exercised by His 
Majesty or by Government of any part of His Majesty's dominions, for an offence 
punishable with hard labour or rigorous imprisonment for a term exceeding 
twelve months or is under sentence of death imposed by any such court or is 
serving any term of imprisonment awarded in lieu of execution of such sentence; 
(e) has been adjuged by a competent Court to be of unsound mind; or 
(f) is incapable of being registered as a voter by reason of his conviction of a 
3 Government agent, Central Province. 
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corrupt or illegal practice, or by reason of a report of an Election Judge, in 
accordance with the Order-in-Council. 
4. Any person not otherwise disqualified is qualified to have his name entered in 
the register if he is domiciled in Ceylon; but except in the case of persons possessing 
Ceylon domicile of origin, domicile shall not be deemed to have been acquired by any 
person who has not resided in Ceylon for a total period of or exceeding 5 years. 
Domicile further implies the intention of making Ceylon a permanent place of 
residence but since it would be unduly laborious to prove such intention in the case 
of every individual, I think it would suffice if you omit the names of any who clearly 
have no such intention. I should further be grateful if separate lists could be prepared 
for males and females . 
5. I am authorised to pay at the rate of cents -/03 per name as remuneration to 
your staff for this information. 
6. I regret having to trouble you in this manner, but I can see no other means of 
maintaining the accuracy of my Electoral Registers. 
7. A franked addressed envelope is enclosed for the return of the list of voters. 
Enclosure 3 to 25: memorandum by J W R Ilangakoon4 
At the interview Your Excellency granted to the Board of Ministers on the 24th 
January Your Excellency requested me to consider further and advise Your 
Excellency on the question whether a Registering Officer in revising a register of 
voters for any electoral district in any year can expunge from the register the name of 
any person who, in his opinion, is not at the time of such revision qualified in 
accordance with the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order-in-Council, 1931, to 
have his name entered in the revised register of voters. 
2. The qualifications of a voter are prescribed in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9. Every voter 
must possess all the qualifications mentioned in Article 6, which are put in a negative 
form, and, in addition, the domicile qualification under Article 7, or the literacy and 
property qualification under Article 8, or the certificate of permanent settlement 
qualification under Article 9. 
Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 15 confer on the Registering Officer a general power 
to revise the register of voters. Clause (2) of Article 15 provides that in revising the 
register the Registering Officer-
(1) shall expunge the name of any person who is dead or has become disqualified 
or no longer resides in the electoral district to which the register relates; 
(2) shall insert therein the name of every person who not being already registered 
nor otherwise disqualified has a literacy and property qualification under Article 8 
or a certificate of permanent settlement qualification under Article 9 and has made 
application to have his name entered in the register on such qualification; 
(3) to correct any mistake in the register; 
(4) to supply any omission which has been made in the register. 
3. It appears to me that the particular powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 15 
4 Acting legal secretary. 
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are not exhaustive but merely explanatory of the general powers of the Registering 
Officer in his task of revision. I am, therefore, of opinion that it is competent for a 
Registering Officer in revising a register of voters in any year to expunge from the 
register the name of any voter who, in his opinion, is not qualified in accordance 
with the provisions of the Order-in-Council to have his name in the register at the 
time of such revision. 
Enclosure 4 to 25: minute by R H Drayton to Sir A Caldecott, 16 Feb 1940 
I confirm the views expressed by the Acting Legal Secretary in paragraph 3 of his 
confidential memorandum dated 31st January, 1940. It will perhaps be convenient if 
I give further reasons in amplification of those already given. 
2. It seems to me that, in order to determine the powers of the Registering 
Officer to review the register of voters, it is, in the first place, necessary to form an 
opinion as to the exact force and effect of the register. 
Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order-in-Council set out 
the qualifications entitling a person to be entered upon the register. A person 
possessing any of those qualifications is not entitled to exercise his right to vote 
unless he is on the register which is in force at the time at which the right to vote 
arises. Article 35 states that "the register of voters in operation ... at the time of any 
election ... shall be conclusive evidence for the purpose of determining whether a 
person is or is not entitled to vote at such election." 
The two characteristics of the register which I think are important are-
( a) that it has an evidential value only, and 
(b) that it is in operation for a period of one year only. 
In my view therefore the right to exercise the franchise must at all times depend 
primarily on the voter being qualified to vote. The register is conclusive evidence at a 
particular election that a particular person is entitled to exercise the franchise even 
though his name may have been wrongly inserted in the register, but it seems to me 
to be a wholly fallacious argument that, when once a person has had his name 
wrongly entered for the first time in any register, he thereby becomes qualified to 
have his name retained on the register until he dies or becomes disqualified under 
Article 6. Such an argument involves the assumption that the register is something 
more than evidence of the right to exercise the franchise at a particular election and 
ignores the limitation of the period during which a particular register remains in 
operation. 
3. The opinion expressed in the preceding paragraph strengthens the view of the 
Acting Legal Secretary as stated in paragraph 3 of his memorandum of the 31st 
January. A close examination of Article 15 of the Order-in-Council further streng-
thens this view. 
Clause (1) of that Article imposes in each registering officer an obligation to revise 
the register. The clause is quite general in its terms and it seems to me to be clear 
that the obligation is an obligation to ensure that every person entitled is registered 
and that no person is registered who is disentitled or, if entitled, is registered 
incorrectly. 
Clause (2) imposes on the Registering Officer an obligation to expunge from the 
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register certain entries therein if the circumstances set out in the first four lines are 
proved to exist. This is an obligation-not merely a power. Line 18 of Clause (2) 
contains a power as distinct from an obligation to "correct any mistake or supply any 
omission which appears to have been made in the register." This power is subject to 
the limitation expressed in the clause but that limitation does not relate to the point 
that is being dealt with in this memorandum. It seems that this power to correct a 
mistake is not limited to the correction of clerical errors, but comprises also the 
power to expunge from the register the name of a person who is not qualified at the 
time of the revision to have his name entered on the register. Unless the Registering 
Officer has this power it seems to me that the whole purpose of the register and the 
revision thereof will be defeated: for example, a person who is 18 years of age on the 
first day of August in 1939 may have been wrongly entered in the register; at the time 
of the revision in 1940 it is not correct to say that this person "has become 
disqualified" (see lines 2 and 3 of clause (2): he has at no time been qualified: 
therefore he cannot "have become disq'ualified." Is his name to remain on the 
register because it was inserted in error in the year 1939? If the argument that the 
power to expunge arises only from the express duty to expunge which is contained in 
clause (2) is correct, then the answer is, yes. If, on the other hand, the argument that 
the power to correCt mistakes enables the Registering Officer to expunge the name is 
correct, then the answer is, no. I have no doubt that the whole purpose of the 
Order-in-Council would be defeated unless the second argument prevails. 
4. If a Registering Officer acts in accordance with the view expressed in this 
memorandum, it seems to me that he must give notice to the person whose name he 
has expunged from the register notwithstanding that his is not specifically required 
to do so by any provision in the Order-in-Council. 
5. If the person to whom such notice is given claims to have his name re-inserted 
in the register he becomes, in my view, a claimant within the meaning of Article 17 
and therefore has the right of appeal referred to in Article 18 if the Registering 
Officer refuses to re-insert his name. It seems that the Revising Officer will be 
entitled to decide whether the action of the Registering Officer was correct. By 
Article 18 his decision is made final and conclusive. In these circumstances I doubt 
whether the person whose name was expunged would have any remedy by way of 
prerogative writ. 
6. I understand that names have been inserted on the register of persons who 
have resided in Ceylon for a period exceeding 5 years with little proof of such 
residence and with no proof that such persons have acquired a domicile of choice in 
Ceylon. 
Registering Officers will have a task of considerable magnitude and difficulty if 
they are to revise the register so as to correct errors falling within this category. 
Their task will include-
(a) an interpretation of the expression "resided in Ceylon for a total period of, or 
exceeding, 5 years"; and 
(b) a decision as to the proof required in order to establish a domicile of choice. 
The expression "total period of or exceeding 5 years" is one which unfortunately is 
not as clear as it might be. To establish a domicile of choice, residence as well as 
intention to remain are necessary. The object of the proviso to Article 7 of the 
Order-in-Council is solely to prevent any person being allowed to claim a domicile of 
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choice for the purposes of the Order-in-Council unless he has resided in Ceylon for a 
total period of or exceeding 5 years. Does "total period" mean a continuous period or 
the aggregate of a number of interrupted periods? And must residence with intention 
to remain still be continuing when an entry is made in the register or the register is 
revised? It may be that a number of cases will be disposed of because it will not be 
possible to establish an intention to remain but, if an intention to remain can be 
established, Registering Officers will have to decide the questions in regard to the 
meaning of the phrase "total period" which are raised in this paragraph. 
I should like to consider further the question of the interpretation of the 
expression "total period." I have said nothing in this memorandum in regard to the 
proof necessary to establish a domicile of choice and I am sure that there is no need 
for me to emphasise the difficulty of deciding whether a domicile of choice has been 
established in a particular case. I however mention both these points now because I 
feel that the interpretation which I have placed on the Order-in-Council in this 
memorandum imposes on Registering and Revising Officers a task of considerable 
magnitude and difficulty. 
26 CO 54/973/14, no 9 28 Feb 1940 
[Situation in Ceylon]: letter from Sir A Knox, MP, 1 to Mr MacDonald 
on the views of a constituent with an interest in tea planting in Ceylon 
I have received a sheaf of papers about Ceylon from a Constituent, who is interested 
in tea planting in the Island. 
The position he paints is very pessimistic. 
My Constituent's informant, in a covering letter agrees that the present Constitu-
tion cannot be allowed to go on in its present form-as to any advance towards 
self-government, he feels that it would be disastrous. He thinks the Governor is to 
blame as he has disregarded warnings from the Police and the European Commun-
ity. He imagines that, owing to instructions from the Colonial Office, his hands are 
tied, and that he feels he must delegate responsibility to his Cinghalese [sic] 
Ministers. The latter squabble over every petty detail, oppose expenditure on the 
defence of the Island, and squander money on anything that concerns themselves. 
They have no loyalty to the Empire, and would regard further concessions as 
weakness. If we surrender further power all big contracts will go to the Germans or 
the Japanese, and trade with Ceylon will be lost, as that with China has already gone, 
and the vast British capital invested by the British, who have given the Island any 
prosperity it possesses, would be wiped out. 
The writer encloses a Memorandum on Labour unrest prepared by three 
well-known planters. This complains of the increasing frequency of strikes, not one 
of which has been initiated by demands of higher wages or better conditions, but 
which have been worked up over trivial grievances by Political Agitators, and are 
partly caused by discontent due to the cruel discriminatory legislation against Indian 
workers by the Cinghalese majority in the State Council. 
It is complained that while the Governor has reserve powers to safeguard the 
1 Conservative MP for the Wycombe division of Buckinghamshire, 1924--1945. 
52 WAR AND POSTPONEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM [27] 
internal security of the Colony and its people, and to deal with all matters which tend 
to cause strife and unrest, the recent arbitrary retrenchment of Indians in 
Government Service at the behest of Cinghalese politicians, shows that he is not 
prepared to use such powers till such time as may be too late to be of any use to the 
tea and rubber industries. 
My Constituent's informant says that the Governor is entirely under the thumb of 
Senanayake. The majority of the Tamils, all the Burghers, Malays, Moors and the 
bulk of the Cinghalese know that the only chance of a fair deal for every Community 
lies in the British Rule, backed by adequate safeguards in the hands of the Governor. 
The present Constitution can only be continued if the powers of the Governor are 
amplified and a first class man of the MacCallum or Ridgway2 type, with a good staff, 
be appointed. 
Just before dictating this letter I note in the press that the Governor has at last 
used his reserve powers, and in consequence the Cinghalese Ministers have resigned. 
I do hope the Governor will be backed up and some attempt made to stem the rot 
that has set in since the unfortunate Donoughmore Commission, and so save some 
of our trade with the Island. 
2 Sir H E McCallum, governor of Ceylon, 1907-1913; Sir J West Ridgway, governor of Ceylon, 1896-1903. 
27 CO 54/978/3, no 13 4 Mar 1940 
[Ministerial resignations]: outward telegram no 150 from Mr Mac-
Donald to Sir A Caldecott requesting clarification of the circumstances 
which led to the resignations 
Your memorandum, No. 6/ "Things Ceylonese," just received and has given me 
essential elements of background of Ministers resignation. Am I right in deducing 
that if request of Minister for Home Affairs to I.G.P. regarding postponement of 
Court proceedings had been submitted for your ratification as a direction to Head of 
Police Department from Executive Committee you would have declined to ratify this 
or any other instructions which went beyond what you agreed to on 1st February. I 
shall be grateful if you will inform me by telegram what were your reasons for this 
conclusion. Were there particular reasons for resignation of Minister of Agriculture 
preceding remainder? 
I shall also be grateful for very early summary by telegraph of developments 
between 16th February date of your minute to Minister for Home Affairs and 27th 
February date of resignation of Minister with special reference to any action taken by 
yourself. 
1 See 24. 
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28 CO 54/978/3, no 15 5 Mar 1940 
[Ministerial resignations]: inward telegram no 230 from Sir A Calde-
cott to Mr MacDonald transmitting a message from the governor to the 
State Council 
Regret to learn that my despatch, No. 94, of 24th February, forwarding copies of all 
correspondence laid by the Minister for Home Affairs on the Council Table and 
newspaper accounts of debate on 22nd February, may have been lost in the wreck of 
the mail plane Hannibal. Following message which after full consideration with the 
Legal Secretary I have sent to-day to the State Council shows clearly the points on 
which Ministerial resignations have risen. Message from the Governor to the State 
Council of Ceylon. 
1. It has caused me great distress that my Ministers should have tendered their 
recent resignations without affording me an opportunity of examining with them the 
reasons for, or likely consequences of, such a course. 
2. At the meeting which I had with them on 26th February, called at the shortest 
notice, my decision on a particular reference to me was discussed. The paper laid on 
the Table of the State Council at its last session by the Minister for Home Affairs 
contains both reference and decision. 
3. My refusal to take disciplinary action against Mr. P. N. Banks was in the 
exercise of the responsibility vested in me by Article 86 of Ceylon (State Council) 
Order in Council, 1931. I informed the Ministers of my inability to vary this decision 
but offered to transmit to the Secretary of State any representation that they might 
wish to make thereon. 
4. I confirmed that my decision based on three grounds: (1) that the Home 
Minister's communication to Mr. Banks was a request and not an instruction; (2) 
that if it had been an instruction it would have been unconstitutional in the minor 
sense that the Home Minister had not placed it before his Executive Committee and 
in the major that it concerned the conduct of proceedings before a Court of Law; and 
(3) that there had been no failure on the part of Mr. Banks to give effect to the 
formula which was reached at the conference between the Home Minister, the Acting 
Legal Secretary himself, and myself on 1st February. 
5. The conversation then veered to paragraph 7 of my minute to the Minister for 
Home Affairs, dated 16th February. In that paragraph I set out my views of what 
would have been the correct constitutional procedure if Minister had (though he 
actually had not) referred any proposed instructions in this matter to his Executive 
Committee. I stated that the Committee could not justifiably have treated the matter 
either as so unimportant or as so urgent as not to require reference to me of any 
instruction to be issued. 
6. At this point I understand one Minister to represent that Article 45 (2) left the 
criterion of importance or urgency entirely to the opinion of the Executive 
Committee, so that whatever they opined would be justifiable . 
7. To this I replied that if, on a proper construction of Article 45 (2) Executive 
Committee were to decide that an instruction affecting the proceedings before a 
Court of Law should not require prior reference to me I should feel it my duty to see 
that such a decision was made impossible in the future ; and to secure that any 
instructions affecting the administration of justice, or carrying out by public officers 
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of duties and responsibilities imposed upon them by the law of the land, must be 
referred to the Governor before any instruction was issued. 
8. Article 45 (3) of Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council provides the 
machinery for defining what instructions should and what should not require the 
approval of the Governor as explicitly contemplated by Donoughmore Commission 
on page 48 of its report. 
9. In view of the present unhappy situation that has arisen I now feel that we 
should consider forthwith what class of decision by an Executive Committee should 
always require prior reference to the Governor before effect can be given to them. In 
drafting such a schedule I should, of course, take my Ministers into full consultation 
and endeavour to correlate any schedule made by me with any schedule made by the 
State Council under the same article. I have already asked the Secretary of State for 
information as to any limitation observed in the issue of Ministerial instructions to 
the police in England, and would similarly refer to him any other proposed items in 
the schedule. 
10. I have not contemplated, and do not contemplate, any other action in regard 
to the powers of Executive Committees under Article 45. 
11. I do not desire or counsel any interference with the practice whereby a 
Minister directly communicates to a Head of Department his wishes in any matter. If 
the Head should consider that compliance with any request so communicated would 
not be in the public interest it is his loyal duty to his Minister to point out any 
objections or impediments. If a Minister has occasion to substitute an order for a 
request his procedure must necessarily conform with the provisions of Article 45 
which it is in nobody's power to abrogate. If paragraph 41 (b) of my reform despatch 
is represented as such abrogation, my reply is that the phrase "Minister's directions" 
in that paragraph must, so long as we have our present constitution, connote 
directions issued conformable with the constitution and general law of the land. 
12. The reason for this message is that I understand that notices have been given 
of a resolution for non-co-operation by the Council in working the constitution, on 
the grounds that I have gravely infringed constitutional rights. I trust that I have 
made it clear in the preceding paragraphs that my steadfast purpose has been, and is, 
carefully to guard and conserve those rights for all concerned, to the best of my 
ability and understanding. Before committing themselves and thereby our whole 
island to a course of action which can be contemplated with satisfaction or even 
equanimity only by enemies of our commonwealth and of democracy I earnestly 
appeal to the State Councillors that they will subject the situation to calm, wise and 
dispassionate review in order that nothing inimical to the country's interests may be 
done as a result of misapprehension or precipitancy. 
29 CO 54/978/3, no 16 5 Mar 1940 
[Ministerial resignations]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from 
Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald 
Your telegram No. 1501 your deduction is correct, and reason for my conclusion was 
given in a subsequent minute to Minister for Home Affairs as follows:- "I cannot 
1 See 27. 
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agree that formula approved by me on 1st February constituted an approval of the 
action already taken by the Ministry. The formula carefully guarded essential points 
in the administration of Justice that action of the Ministry appeared to me to have 
left unguarded or insufficiently guarded, i.e. (a) the principle that the Police must 
press criminal proceedings to finality as expeditiously as possible; and (b) The right 
Court to hear conscientious and independent opinion of a Police Officer who has laid 
an information before it." 
Please see also paragraph 7 of my minute, dated 16th February. Legal Secretary 
informs me that my conclusion was legally and constitutionally correct in every way 
and I am certain that if the principle at stake were not jealousy [sic] guarded interfer-
ence with the prosecutions by Ministers, Committees and Council would in our local 
condition and absence of tradition become frequent. Home Committee has control 
of the Police only in respect of their executive duties and in the opinion of the Legal 
Secretary with which I agree though we have not advanced it such control as can be 
exercised over the Police in the administration of Criminal Justice vests in him. 
Resignation of Minister of Agriculture was undoubtedly due to loss of temper 
because I had resisted strong(ly) argument and statement put forward by him at my 
meeting with Ministers on 26th February. Summary of developments from 16th 
February to 27th February as far as I am aware of them is as follows:- 21st 
February, Minister for Home Affairs sent me further minute in reply to mine of 16th 
February which ended by saying he considered it his duty to table all papers relating 
to incident before a State Council. 22nd February .-After consulting Legal Secretary 
I sent reply dealing with specific points and maintaining my previous attitude. In the 
afternoon Minister laid all papers on Council, and on Motion of Minister of 
Agriculture. Council adjourned without doing further business till 5th March in 
order to consider the statement of the Minister and papers laid. 26th February, 
Ministers met me at their request in the afternoon and I with Legal Secretary present 
stood by my position as already explained in my minute. Meeting ended after spirited 
discussion in agreement that Ministers should confer with Legal Secretary next 
morning. At 9.30 p.m. I received first intimation by private letter from ?Sen(glu)yak 
to send (?group omitted, ?notice) of his resignation. 
27th February, remaining Ministers met the Legal Secretary in the morning and 
in the afternoon sent me an omnibus resignation signed by them all.2 
2 Acknowledging receipt of Caldecott's two tels of 5 Mar (see 28 and 29), MacDonald replied on 6 Mar: 'In 
absence of definite request from you no action has been taken so far in respect of Amending Order in 
Council, but draft is ready in case you need it. I should be glad to be kept informed daily of developments 
particularly as to likelihood of policy on non-co-operation' (CO 54/978/3, no 17). 
30 CO 54/978/3, no 18 6 Mar 1940 
[Ministerial resignations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr MacDonald on the re-election of the ministers 
Ex-Ministers were all re-elected by Executive Committees this morning and through 
medium of Speaker have asked for informal meeting with me before they decide to 
refuse or accept ministerial office. I have replied suggesting tomorrow morning. 
Lake House newspaper while laying all blame for crisis on me and Times of Ceylon 
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while laying all blame on ex-Ministers are alike in strongly opposing non-co-
operation and general opinion of all classes throughout the Island except Commun-
ists seems thoroughly against it. I am credibly informed that ex-Ministers have for 
the past four days been anxious for conciliation but were awaiting re-election. My 
message to the Council yesterday appears to have had pacific effect and return of 
normality now seems probable. If so crisis should have had useful effect of preventing 
precipitate resignations in future . 
31 CO 54/978/3, no 28 13 Mar 1940 
[Ministerial resignations]: inward telegram no 265 from Sir A Calde-
cott to Mr MacDonald on the resolution of the crisis 
With reference to my telegram No. 230 of 5th March1 following will be laid on the 
table of State Council by Legal Secretary this afternoon. Begins:-
Memorandum by the Governor on the point discussed with ex-Ministers at their 
recent meetings with His Excellency. 
1. (i) The ex-Ministers represented to me that paragraphs 10 and 11 of my 
message to the State Council dated 5th March might be interpreted as a desire or 
intention on my part to terminate, or in future to prevent any reasonable 
"adjustment of relations between an Executive Committee, the Ministers and heads 
of a department" along the lines of paragraph 43 of Sir Herbert Stanley's despatch of 
2nd June, 1929, reprinted in sessional papers No. 34-1929. I informed the ex-
Ministers that I had never had, and had not now, any such desire or intention. 
(ii) The following is relevant passage from Sir Herbert Stanley's2 despatch:-
"The adjustment of relations between the Committee, the Ministers and Heads of 
Departments respectively need not in practice present a problem much greater than 
the complexity thus far presented in the affairs of a public company by adjustment of 
relations between the Directors, the Chairman and General Manager. I do not 
conceive that a Committee would expect-at any rate for long to be consulted by the 
Minister on every point and at every stage of every matter with which he had 
occasion to deal, before he took any action. That would involve almost daily meetings 
of the Committee throughout the year, an obvious impossibility as a permanent 
arrangement. The Minister, having been selected by the Committee as its Chairman 
and exercising ministerial functions in virtue of that chairmanship, would be entitled 
to presume that members of the Committee, or at least the majority of them, would 
repose some confidence in his judgment and discretion, and he would soon acquire 
the kind of instinct which would enable him to foresee what matters the Committee 
would wish to discuss orally, what matters it would desire to have submitted by 
circulation of papers, and what matters it would be prepared to leave to him for 
disposal with the Heads of Departments in reliance upon its subsequent confirmation 
of his action if such confirmation should be necessary. Some Committees, no doubt, 
would be more exacting than others, but I postulate for all of thel!l an allowance of 
reasonableness not less than would be requisite for the working of any system 
dependent on mutual accommodation." 
1 See 28. 2 Governor of Ceylon, 1927-1931. 
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(iii) In answering despatch of lOth October, 1929, Lord Passfield3 stated that the 
devolution of duties between Ministers, executive committees and Heads of Depart-
ments was one of the questions which the special commission recommended should 
be worked out and embodied in General Orders. In the actual event the matter seems 
neither to have been worked out nor embodied in General Orders. The statement of 
administrative procedure prescribed by the Gazette Notification 7,858 of 5th June, 
1931, did no more than to repeat the provisions as to general control over 
departments contained in Article 39. Unless therefore there can be reasonable 
adjustment envisaged by Sir Herbert Stanley almost daily meetings of the Commit-
tee, which he described as "an obvious impossibility as a permanent arrangement," 
become unavoidable. 
2. (i) As regards paragraphs 8 and 9 of my message to the Council I suggested to 
ex-Ministers that the State Council might appoint a select committee to advise what 
class of decision should (a) be made the subject of requirement by the Governor or 
the Council under Article 45 (3) or (b) be made the subject of authorisation under 
Article 45 (4). 
(ii) I feel certain that the recommendations of the Committee, if appointed, will 
include the necessity for reference to the State Council and the Governor in respect 
of all decisions or instructions of an executive committee (a) which, if carried out, 
might affect the administration of criminal justice; or (b) which purports to relieve a 
public officer from executing any duty or obligation specifically imposed upon him 
by any Ordinance or Rule or Regulation thereunder. 
(iii) It may prove possible for select committee to define in greater detail decisions 
and instructions or classes of decisions and instructions which fall within sub-clause 
(ii), but that needs more care and time than present circumstances permit. For 
example, so far as instructions to the Police are concerned information regarding 
English practice with which I have already requested the Secretary of State to furnish 
me may help to more precise definition. 
(iv) The recommendations of the Select Committee and of the State Council 
thereon would be considered by me in consultation with my Ministers and referred to 
the Secretary of State with any addition or amendment that I might, after such 
consultation, consider necessary. 
3. In the meantime I do not desire to interfere with the status quo ante but I 
should rely on the Ministers concerned to consult me regarding any decisions or 
instructions of an executive committee which in his opinion might fall within the 
category mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of preceding paragraph before it is carried into 
effect. 
4. It is not of course, and never has been, my intention to detract from the 
powers of general control over their respective departments vested in executive 
committees by Article 39 or to interfere with practices that fall within the principle 
set out in the passage of Sir Herbert Stanley's despatch quoted in paragraph 1 (ii) of 
this memorandum. 
5. I informed ex-Ministers that my decision not to take disciplinary action against 
Mr. Banks had been in the exercise of my responsibility under Article86 and that I 
was not prepared to alter it. I confirmed the view which I expressed in paragraph 4 (i) 
and (ii) of my message to the State Council in regard to the Home Minister's 
3 Secretary of state for the colonies, 1929-1931. 
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communication to Mr. Banks. I repeated my willingness to consider and to forward 
to the Secretary of State for his orders any statement of protest or of appeal or of 
disagreement with my views that might be tendered. Ends. 
32 CO 54/977/7, no 4 21 Mar 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': seventh periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
The ministerial crisis 
1. It is over a month since last I wrote an instalment of these Notes.1 The 'crisis' 
has in fact kept me too busy to do more than get through my papers and keep 
pre-arranged engagements. My telegrams have provided a day to day commentary on 
the crisis but I will try to add something to them now in the nature of calm 
retrospect. 
2. The "Times of Ceylon" of March 18th quotes Mr. Corea as having stated at a 
public meeting as follows:-
"Explaining why Mr. Senanayake had resigned before the others Mr. Corea 
said that there had been a heated discussion between the Governor and Mr. 
Senanayake when the Board of Ministers met the Governor at Queen's House. 
During the discussion the Governor, Mr. Corea alleged, had told Mr. 
Senanayake that he was lying and asked him to prove what he was saying. It 
was that incident that had led Mr. Senanayake to resign earlier without 
informing his colleagues." 
Knowing the mischievous inaccuracy of the "Times of Ceylon" reporters I do not 
suppose that Mr. Corea ever employed these words. If however for the [italised] 
words were substituted 
"protested that Mr. Senanayake was misrepresenting what he (the Governor) 
had written, and that he (the Governor) considered the words that he had 
employed plain enough proof of what he had meant." 
I think that the genesis of the crisis would have been described with substantial 
correctness, though I cannot of course remember at this distance of time the exact 
words of the conversation. Mr. Senanayake was arguing that paragraph 7 of my 
minute of the 16th February2 was aimed at depriving Ministers and Executive 
Committees of all discretion and so at knocking the basis out of Ceylonese 
democracy. Quod erat absurdum. 
3. Although Senanayake was in his most argumentative mood there was no 
indication at the meeting of his being about to run seriously amok; in fact when we 
shook hands at its conclusion the agreed programme was that the Ministers should 
confer with the Legal Secretary next morning and see me again later when the legal 
and constitutional points had been fully explained to them. At 9.30 the same evening 
I received Senanayake's private and personal notice of resignation. It ran as 
follows:-
1 See 24. 2 See 28, para 5. 
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"Your Excellency 
The attitude adopted by Your Excellency at today's Conference makes it 
difficult for me to continue as a Minister. I shall thank you to accept my 
resignation. 
Yours sincerely, 
D.S. Senanayake" 
To this I replied next morning:-
"Dear Senanayake, 
I received your letter last night with much regret. That the attitude adopted 
by me at yesterday's Conference (i.e. my usual attitude of frank speech and 
straight discussion at all consultations with Ministers) should afford you 
ground for resignation has caused me not only sorrow but surprise. As I 
cannot reconcile it with my duty to depart from, or to modify, that attitude 
(which, your letter says, makes it difficult for you to continue as a Minister) I 
should feel that there was no alternative course to my acceptance of your 
resignation, with most real and personal regret, if it were formally tendered 
by you in an official communication. 
Yours sincerely, 
A. Caldecott" 
4. I have no doubt whatever that the 'attitude' on my part on which Senanayake 
based his resignation in his personal letter was (as Corea and others have since 
stated) my refusal to listen to arguments based on misrepresentation of my words 
and intentions. In his official notice of resignation, however, Senanayake shifted his 
grounds and gave the resignation a wider political basis:-
"The attitude of Your Excellency as disclosed in the correspondence tabled by 
the Minister for Home Affairs and confirmed by Your Excellency at the 
interview granted to the Ministers yesterday is, in my opinion, a complete 
negation of the democratic basis of the constitution accepted by this 
country." 
If on receipt of Senanayake's private letter I had begged him not to resign I think that 
I might have avoided, or at any rate shelved for the time being, a crisis; but recent 
developments (e.g. those adumbrated in paragraph 3 of my Things Ceylonese No.6, 
paragraph 3 of No.4, paragraph 9 of No.3 and paragraph 3 of No.2)3 made it plain to 
me that the time had come for Mr. Senanayake to be allowed the discipline of the 
consequences of his hectoring and precipitancy. 
5. However worrying the crisis has been for me it has been an even more anxious 
time for the Ministers. Some were even degraded to the depth of seeking a place on 
Sama-Samajist platforms in order to make sure of their reelection as Chairmen of 
Committee. One, I believe, was shame-facedly present when the Sama-Samajists 
burnt an effigy of me (unfortunately not Mudaliyar Amarasekera's portrait of me in 
oils recently exhibited at the Royal Empire Society) on Galle Face Green. Once 
re-elected they of course turned round and repudiated their recent strange 
bedfellows. In Council and in the Press they have had an awkward time, and I am 
3 See 24, 16, 6 and 3. 
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informed that the mass meetings organized by them failed to hold the crowds, which 
kept moving on and treated the platform as a mere side-show. Bandaranaike has 
added to his notoriety as a slinger of dirt and abuse but his, I believe, is the only 
Ministerial reputation to be enhanced, and that in wrong direction. 
6. Out of all the turmoil emerges the strange fact, for which I have not yet had 
time sufficiently to account even to myself, that I have felt really glad to welcome 
Senanayake back. In spite of his lack of education, hedgelawry, and tiresome 
blustering he is big and vital and a man. Of the rest it may be said (except of 
Jayatilaka whose increasing senility is a public danger) that they are as good a team 
as the State Council with its present personnel can put up. 
Reforms 
7. On the 19th February I confidentially conveyed to Ministers the sense of the 
Secretary of State's despatch (Confidential No. (2)) of the 26th January4 with a view 
to ascertaining whether the Board would take part in a "Governor's Conference" as 
suggested in paragraph 7 of that despatch. Mr. Senanayake replied that this would 
depend on what reforms I myself was prepared to support in the light of the State 
Council's criticisms of my original proposals. I said that I would confer with the 
Ministers later on this basis; that I had indeed no desire to keep my views from them, 
but that my recommendations on any point must in no way be regarded as indicative 
of what may be finally approved or as in any degree prejudicing a full and proper 
consideration by the Secretary of State of quite opposite views. The Ministerial crisis 
has of course prevented the further conference taking place. At the moment the 
Ministers are busy overtaking arrears of work and that they are not at unity among 
themselves is disclosed by the newspaper report that Sir Baron Jayatilaka has not yet 
been re-elected by them as Leader of Council but has been asked by four of them 
(Bandaranaike, Kannangara, Corea and Kotelawala) to stand down, a request to 
which he will give his answer on 1st April. In such circumstances, and until the full 
political consequences of the recent crisis become apparent, it is clearly impossible 
for me to proceed further in the matter. 
8. The "Times of Ceylon" has meanwhile been busy with mischievous machina-
tions. On the 20th February their Political Correspondent 'understood' that I had 
received a despatch and went on to invent its contents, the main feature in which was 
represented as mistrust in the Secretary of State's mind of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, 
Mr. Bandaranaike's party. On the 21st February this was followed by a second article 
purporting to be derived "from unassailable political sources in England." On March 
16th this paper's leading article (of which a copy is annexed)5 announced that "the 
Secretary of State had also noticed that the significance of the Sinhala Maha Sabha 
movement had not apparently received a satisfactory explanation from the Governor" 
and ended by declaring that "despite the other anxieties of the War the Secretary of 
State should regard Ceylon as a War problem and send a Royal Commission before it 
is too late." 
9. With Mr. Bandaranaike's irresponsible anti-Indian and anti-Banks utterances 
on the one side, and the "Times of Ceylon's" unscrupulous intrigues on the other, 
the chance of evolving any measure of agreement on the question of reforms seems 
slender indeed. Nor has the lightning Strike of Ministers helped matters. It would 
4 See 23. 5 Enclosures not printed. 
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however be a mistake in Ceylon to take sayings or events at their face value, and for 
the present I propose just to sit on the bank of the political pond and watch where the 
rises come. 
10. I am glad to say that Mr. Ponnambalam, in the course of an interview which 
he sought from me on the non-cooperation issue, apologised for (and tried to 
explain) certain misrepresentations in his speech on the Reforms debate. The chief of 
these was his "solemn statement" that I had promised a deputation led by him "that 
40% of the elected seats should go to the Minorities." I accepted his apology. He is 
the best speaker in the Council and the cleverest in debate, but he requires most 
careful watching. 
Labour unrest 
11. On the 15th March I had to make my annual address to the Planters 
Association at their General Meeting. This takes place at 3 p.m. in the afternoon, is 
attended not only by planters but by their wives, and is followed by a Garden Party. 
The atmosphere always reminds me of the Primrose League meetings to which I was 
dragged willy-nilly in extreme youth at Eridge Green in Sussex. Although I was 'born 
a little conservative ' I leave the Planters' meetings, as I did the Primrose ones, 
suffering from Pink-Eye. I annex a newspaper cutting (Ceylon Observer of 16th 
March) of my remarks, because my allusion to "outside forces" was greeted by a 
"thunderous applause" which considerably disconcerted me. It showed that most of 
those present (and this was confirmed in the Chairman's vote of thanks) look to some 
marvellous "round up of the reds" as the way out of their difficulties. My warning was 
of course meant for the Sama Samajists whose "Estate Workers' Union of Ceylon" has 
been sailing perilously near to sedition, and on which the eyes of the Police are being 
sedulously kept. The more important part of my message was that concerning the 
"new consciousness of the employer", which has pervaded by no means all of our 
Ceylon estate managers. It is indeed instructive to find that most of the present 
unrest is centred in a District where planters are notoriously "die-hard". 
12. That the "new consciousness of the employer" is nevertheless beginning to 
leaven the whole lump is indicated by today's good news of the decision of the 
Planters' Association to grant a Cash Bonus to Estate Labourers to help meet the 
increased cost of living. My third annex to these Notes is the "Ceylon Daily News" 
leader on the subject, which strikes me as containing sound sense. 
Postscript 
13. With reference to paragraph 2 of these Notes I am glad to add that Mr. Corea 
has by letter to the "Times of Ceylon" point-blank denied the words ascribed to him 
in that newspaper's report. He goes on to say that "there was no doubt whatsoever 
that the real reason for Mr. Senanayake's resignation was the opinion he held, which 
was shared by his colleagues, that the Governor's interpretation of Article 45 made it 
impossible to work the Constitution and that the rights hitherto enjoyed by the 
Ministers and the Executive Committees were seriously infringed." I do not however 
feel it in the interest of accuracy to modify what I have written on this subject in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 supra. 
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33 CO 54/987/7, no 1 21 Mar 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from Sir G S Bajpae to India Office 
commenting on Mr Bandaranaike's anti-Indian speech 
I am directed to enclose2 a summary of the speech delivered in the Ceylon State 
Council by Mr S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, ex-Minister for Local Administration, on 
Election Law and Procedure, in which he is reported to have said that nothing would 
please him more than to see the last Indian leave the shores of Ceylon and that "then 
he would die a happy man". The Secretary of State will appreciate that statements of 
this nature made in public by Ceylonese Ministers cause both resentment and alarm 
amongst Indians in Ceylon as well as in India and do not facilitate the Government of 
India's task in seeking a friendly solution of the differences between the two 
countries. I am to request that, if the Secretary of State sees no objection their 
difficulty in this respect may be brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. 
1 Secretary to the Government .of India, Dept of Education, Health and Lands. 
2 Not printed. Bandaranaike's speech in the State Council was reported in the Ceylon Daily News, 22 Feb 
1940. 
34 CO 54/977/3, no 5 11 Apr 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': eighth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
Crisis aftermath 
1. Paragraph 7 of my last Notes1 reported a split in the "Homogeneous" Ministry 
in regard to the election of a Vice-President of the Board of Ministers and, as the 
result, a leaderless State Council. Bandaranaike, Kannangara, Corea and Kotelawala 
had asked Jayatilaka to stand down or (later) to give an undertaking to resign within 
a year if he were reelected to the leadership. Sir Baron had refused both requests and 
they had given him till April 1st to reconsider his refusal. 
2. Subsequently the State Council Agenda displayed a Motion to be moved by the 
well-intentioned but bumble-brained, Gandi-capped [sic], Member for Matale (Mr. 
Bernard Aluwihare) in the following words:-
"That this House considers that Sir Baron Jayatilaka having jeopardised the 
safety of the people of this country by proposing the Internal Security Scheme 
whilst withholding the fact that the Police repudiated his authority; having 
with the Inspector General of Police consented to a formula which defeated 
the resolution of the House that the Mooloya prosecutions be postponed 
pending the inquiry by the Governor's Commission; and having asked the 
Governor for rulings which diminished the authority of the Ministers, has 
lost the confidence of the State Council and is unfit to be the Chairman of the 
Committee for Home Affairs or the Vice-Chairman of a Board of Ministers." 
3. On March 27th Mr. Senanayake asked to see me about Reforms (of which later) 
1 See 32. 
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but I very soon realized that the main purpose of his visit was to find out whether I 
thought that Sir Baron should resign. He told me of Aluwihare's motion and said 
that he and others had done their best to get Aluwihare to withdraw it. It would 
certainly be passed and Sir Baron had told the other Ministers that, if it was, he 
would expect them to resign with him. He considered that that would not be in the 
country's interest. He still felt a debt of loyalty to his old Chief, but considered that 
his powers were failing and that he was no longer capable of leadership. I replied that 
in my opinion Aluwihare's motion was a mischievous one and likely to cause further 
waste of the Council's time on subjects exhaustively discussed during the Crisis 
Debate; further that it made retirement with honour impossible for Sir Baron; and 
lastly that, whatever the Council's voting on a division might be, the Country would 
certainly not approve a forced and opprobrious end to his distinguished political 
career. 
4. On March 29th Senanayake, by arrangement, again saw me on Reforms and 
this time brought with him Bandaranaike who had also asked to see me on that 
subject. Once again the conversation turned onto Aluwihare's motion and I received 
the impression that the two of them had come to some agreement as regards the 
leadership in the event of Sir Baron being unseated. I fancy that the agreement must 
have been for Senanayake to succeed but with a promise of non-opposition to the 
Sinhala Maha Sabha. They both expressed certainty that Aluwihare's motion would 
be passed but uneasiness as to whether Jayatilaka would resign on it. I told them that 
my view remained as expressed in the last sentence of paragraph 27 of my Reforms 
Despatch and that to expect a Minister to resign on an issue arising out of 
gubernatorial action or which he disapproved was most illogical. 
5. On April 1st the Ministers once more failed to elect a Vice-President and on 
April 2nd the Council again met without a Leader. Standing Orders were suspended 
for Aluwihare to introduce his motion which (after speeches by himself, Mr. George 
de Silva, Dr A.P. de Zoysa and a fighting reply from Sir Baron) was negatived by 24 
votes to 8 with 16 abstentions. The same evening the Ministers unanimously 
reelected Sir Baron and so events have revolved full circle to where they stood before 
the 'crisis'! 
6. The "Times of Ceylon" cartoon yesterday pictured Singho (representing the 
average Ceylonese) standing on the Ship of State and shouting "Come aboard, Sir" to 
Sir Baron, who is hailing the ship from the pilot's launch. The cartoon is entitled 
"Picking up the Pilot", and I devoutly wish that it really were so. If however we are to 
indulge in maritime metaphors I attach greater verisimilitude to that which I 
employed in "Things Ceylonese No.6",2 where I wrote of Sir Baron that "he allows 
himself to drift into crises because he no longer has steerage way to keep a straight 
course and so avoid them." Of his crew it is now certain that among his colleagues 
only old de Silva (Minister for Health) is loyal to him and among the State 
Councillors only twenty-four. The "Ceylon Daily News" moreover raises the storm 
against him whenever possible, and I fear that I cannot in these circumstances 
pretend to any degree of confidence in his future pilotage. 
Reforms 
7. I stated in my last Notes that I was sitting on the banks of the political pond 
2 See 24. 
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waiting for rises. The ministerial fish have since risen, and the Board of Ministers will 
confer with me here at Nuwara Eliya on the 18th April to consider the suggestion of a 
Round Table Conference under my presidency. That was the earliest date to which 
they would agree, for they appear to think that their recent strike has earned them a 
holiday. They probably do require a rest, for they have had a hard time reaping what 
they sowed. 
Indophobia 
8. Both Senanayake and Bandaranaike, when I saw them on March 29th, were 
suffering violently from Indophobia. They assured me that at the next election, 
unless the electoral rolls were purged of a large number of Indian voters as a result of 
the coming revision (reported and explained by me in a recent despatch)3 Indian 
representatives would be returned not only for Hatton and Talawakele (which are 
already so represented) but for Kandy, Dumbara, Galagedera, Gampola, Matale, 
Bandarawela, Badulla, Balangoda and Ratnapura. I thereupon asked for figures of 
voters in each area by race, but they could not produce them. It is so much easier for 
politicians to deal in assertions than in ascertained facts; I am trying however to get 
the figures for myself. I reminded them of my anticipation that the majority of Indian 
voters disqualified under Article 7 of the electoral Order in Council would qualify 
themselves under Article 9, and I added that the revision of the registers would make 
all Indian labourers vote-conscious and probably result in many others qualifying 
themselves under Article 9. The Indian ban on Emigration would also have a marked 
effect on any election held during its continuance, because it has resulted in 
anchoring in this Island perhaps as many as a lakh of labourers who would otherwise 
be paying their periodical visits to India but dare not now do so with the impossibility 
of return. 
9. It is important in relation to reforms, to the present problem of labour unrest, 
and indeed to nearly all current problems to realize the extent to which Indophobia 
has gripped the Islanders. I say "the Islanders" and not only "the Sinhalese" because 
Jaffna Tamils have complained to me before now that only one Jaffnese business 
house remains in Jaffna town; all the rest having been bought up by Indians. It is a 
matter of history that when the British first took over the maritime provinces of 
Ceylon from the Dutch a number of minor officials were introduced from Madras 
whose rapacity and unpopularity later necessitated their recall. Dislike and fear of the 
Indian however has its roots deeper in the past even than that, and the collapse of the 
ancient Sinhalese civilization is associated in the modern Sinhalese mind (more than 
is probably historically justifiable) with the periodic Indian invastions and incur-
sions. During the past century the Sinhalese trader has been largely squeezed out of 
urban trade by the shrewder, harder-working Indian with his lower standard of 
living; the Ceylonese peasant has fallen into the clutches of the South Indian chetti 
and in many cases dispossessed of his land while the Ceylonese petty official finds 
himself similarly in the grasp of the 'Afghan' money-lender; the highlands of the 
Island are now in many districts almost exclusively populated by the immigrant 
labourers of the tea estates, and sufficient land has not been conserved for the 
expansion of Kandyan villages. 
10. This is the picture, the outlines of which are mainly true, which the Sinhalese 
3 See 25. 
[34) APR 1940 65 
patriot paints of the past. In the present he sees a huge number of immigrants 
breeding in the Island, whose children must be considered Ceylonese though they 
speak a different language, practise a different religion and exhibit a different culture 
(or lack of it) from the language, religion and culture of the people in whose midst 
they are living. To this must be added that (as a result of centuries of pressure of 
population in India) they accept and may be said to flourish under a lower standard of 
living than the Sinhalese. To these immigrants, if they decide to settle after five years 
experience of this (to them) Eldorado, has been given complete political equality 
with the people of the Island. Moreover they have recently been roused to a sense of 
their political power by no less a person than Nehru, who preaches an early end of 
the British Empire and the inclusion of Ceylon in an independent Greater India. The 
fecundity of the immigrants has been illustrated in Fiji where they now outnumber 
the Fijians. For these reasons says the Sinhalese politician (and he finds a ready and 
sympathetic audience) bitter fear of India is come on Ceylon. 
11. This sort of representation is of course by no means new to me, being very 
reminiscent of past conversations with the Rulers of Malaya on the subject of Chinese 
and Indian infiltration of their States. In Ceylon however there has been no brake on 
the process such as that imposed by the Malay Reservations legislation in most of the 
Malay States and by the Customary Land Tenure of Negri Sembilan and Malacca. 
While the Sinhalese are prone to exaggeration and overstatement there is neverthe-
less room, and need, for a sympathetic understanding of their point of view. 
Labour unrest 
12. The position still affords ground for anxiety and need for constant attention. 
A strike broke out at Rangbodde Estate (on the Kandy-Nuwara Eliya Pass) last week 
in which the labourers, although they did not proceed to violence, carried staves and 
truncheons of heavy Kitul wood. This is the first instance of such 'arms' being found. 
Thirteen labourers so armed are, I understand, being charged with unlawful 
assembly. The strikers, some 600 strong, are members of the Estate Workers Union 
of Ceylon (the Sama-Samajist trade union) and are demanding the dismissal of the 
Head Kangani who is supported by some 200 labourers who belong to the Ceylon 
Indian National Congress party. The latter are still at work and so also are some 50 
Sinhalese. 
13. The item in the news of this strike that worries me most is the allegation (so 
far uncontroverted) that the labour force is in debt to the Head Kangany to an 
aggregate amount of Rs 16,000. I am told that the majority of estates in Ceylon still 
work on the antediluvian system wherunder the Head Kangany is paid by the Estate 
'pence-money' for every cooly who turns out to work per diem, and is also allowed 
(and indeed expected) to finance the labourers' weddings, funerals etc. which he does 
by lending them money at interest. The Sama-Samajist Union is concentrating its 
attention on this weak spot in Ceylon estate administration and so, I believe, is Mr. 
Natesa Iyer's Federation of Workers. The demand put forward is that the labourers 
should be "put on estate account", i.e. that "pence-money" should no longer be paid 
to anybody in respect of a labourer's work, but that the amount should be paid to him 
as a bonus for good attendance. Where, as at Rangbodde, labourers have got seriously 
into debt to a Head Kangany, the desire to be rid of a perpetually dunning creditor 
who is also taskmaster is inevitably a potent stimulus to discontent and unrest. The 
Hea~ Kangani System is in my opinion doomed and without any present or future 
66 WAR AND POSTPONEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM [34) 
justification. Those Managers who have already abolished it on their estates 
(unfortunately a smallish minority) are being proved to have been prudent and wise. 
14. Another matter that causes me the gravest concern is the neurotic condition 
of many planters and their panicky reaction to the present troubles. Three things 
must be remembered in this connection:-
(a) that there has never before been in Ceylon serious trouble among Indian 
estate labourers; the planters have been taken aback by it. 
(b) When the Donoughmore Constitution was introduced the planters anticipated 
that their labourers would vote for some popular estate Manager. The negation of 
this forecast induced in most of them resentment and a contemptuous blind eye 
towards local politics; only a few recognized the necessity of accommodating 
themselves to a new order under which their employees would be citizen-voters 
instead of, as heretofore, immigrant proteges. 
(c) The altitude of many tea estates affects the nerves of employer and employee 
alike. One has only to stay some time in Nuwara Eliya to find this out for oneself. 
15. Although I have no comfortable words for the planters in the sense that they 
desire, I am particular to give them a sympathetic hearing whenever they wish to see 
me. On the 27th March I gave an interview to the Chairman of the Dimbula Planters' 
Association (Mr. K. Morford) and Mr. J. Forbes (Manager of Thornfield, Chairman of 
the Tea Research Institute and, incidentally, brother of the Commander-in-Chief, 
Home Fleet) at which Mr. Gimson, Controller of Labour, was present. This was, I 
think, a useful conference although many of their suggestions were impracticable. 
An interview with a Deputation from the European Association on the 2nd April, 
1940, was on the other hand entirely infructuous except that it gave the members of 
the delegation an opportunity to blow off steam. Their "Practical" proposals were (a) 
Suppression of the Sama-Samajist Party by Governor's Ordinance; (b) abrogation of 
the present constitution; (c) proclamation of Martial Law; and (d) summoning of a 
British Regiment from India. My Secretary who was taking notes, has reported my 
reply to these proposals as follows:-
"His Excellency pointed out that all these suggestions were completely 
impracticable and would not receive support. They would cause most serious 
and widespread unrest, martyrize the agitators and be exploited by the enemy 
in this time of war. The Defence of the Realm Regulations had in fact been 
modified in the United Kingdom and any action to be taken here must be in 
accordance with Democratic traditions. His Excellency suggested that the 
European Association might put their views in the form of a Memorandum 
that could be forwarded to the Secretary of State in order that he might be au 
fait with their outlook." 
I doubt the eventuation of such a Memorandum. 
16. On the 9th April I conferred at length with the Minister (Mr. Corea) and the 
Controller (Mr. Gimson) on the whole problem. It was agreed:-
(a) to introduce as a measure of urgency legislation on the Mauritian model for 
conciliation in disputes with compulsory arbitration as the 'sanction' if concilia-
tion fails or is not agreed to. 
(b) that the Minister should invite deputations from the Planters' Association and 
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Estates Proprietary Association to meet and discuss the position with him, and 
extend a similar invitation (for another day) to the leaders of the Labour Unions. 
It is hoped that the way may thus be paved for regular conciliatory procedure. At 
present it is largely irregular and hampered by refusals of the parties to meet each 
other and also by repudiation of settlements agreed to. 
Senanayake tonans 
17. With reference to paragraph 3 of No.6 of these Notes Senanayake, just before 
the 'crisis', sent me a memorandum on the Debt Conciliation Bill which contained 
all the passages to which I had objected in his original memorandum. The new 
Memorandum has not yet been returned to me by the Legal Secretary, to whom I 
referred it: but somehow or other (probably through the agency of a member of 
Senanayake's Executive Committee) it has appeared in both the leading newspapers. 
The amusing thing is that publication has evoked from the "Ceylon Daily News" 
another leading article against the Bill! Cuttings are annexed.4 
18. Senanayake has also sent me a letter in which (in effect) he seems to state 
that the Board of Ministers will not cooperate with me in a Round-Table Reforms 
Conference unless I consent to recommend a limitation of the Indian Franchise. I am 
not prepared to depart from my former recommendation for a continuation of the 
present regulations and it therefore remains to be seen what happens at my 
Conference with the Ministers on the 18th April. I gathered however from Corea that 
Senanayake did not consult the other Ministers about this letter. I am afraid that, 
having seen the other Ministers resign merely because they funked carrying on 
without him, he may feel himself safe in arrogating to himself the position of de facto 
Leader.5 
4 Not printed. 
5 KW Blaxter minuted (1 May 1940) on this report: 'This is again an interesting, but, at the same time, I 
must confess, disquieting report. The Governor gives a valuable historical analysis of the antipathy 
between the Sinhalese and the Indians, & at the present there seems to be no doubt that this antipathy is 
growing, & it is growing at a time when, in the midst of war, we can ill-afford to have serious friction in 
Ceylon & between Ceylon and India. The decision whether an election is to be held in Ceylon before long 
depends upon the Governor's reply on the subject of reforms. On present showing, there might well be 
serious clashes between Ceylonese & Indians if an election is held & (as wd. almost certainly be the case) 
passions became inflamed. 
Sir A. Caldecott's analysis of the Ceylonese-Indian position almost reminds one of the Palestine 
question. I remember that, about a year ago, either in the State Council or in a letter, Mr. Ponnambalam 
observed that, if H.M.G. were not careful, Ceylon wd. become a second Palestine. This was no doubt said 
for debating purposes, & at the time not much attention was paid to it, but Sir A. Caldecott's paragraph 10 
might, in parts, have been written about the Palestine problem' (CO 54/97717). 
35 CO 54/978/4, no 8 22 Apr 1940 
[Ministerial crisis]: despatch from Mr MacDonald to Sir A Caldecott 
proposing amendments to the Ceylon (State Council) Order-in-
Council of 1931. Enclosure 
I have the honour to refer to your secret telegram No. 209, of the 29th of February 
regarding the recent ministerial crisis, and to transmit to you for your information a 
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draft Order in Council which has been prepared for the purpose of combining the two 
draft Orders enclosed with my secret despatch of the 30th of July, 1938. It is not, of 
course, intended that the Order should be submitted to His Majesty in Council unless 
and until a further emergency may so require. 
2. Attention has been drawn to the fact that events necessitating the passing of 
any of these Orders in Council might also create difficulties under Articles 56 to 70 of 
the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931. A note dealing with this question 
is enclosed, and I should be obliged if you would furnish me with your observations 
thereon. 
Enclosure to 35 
Secret. If non-co-operation were to last very long difficulties might arise under the 
financial clauses, i.e., Articles 56 to 70. Their terms are quite unworkable if there are 
no Ministers or the State Council is not meeting. There should not be any immediate 
difficulties because the Governor would have almost unrestricted legislative power, 
and under Article 61 the Financial Secretary is authorised to make payments 
authorised by law other than the annual appropriation law so that if necessary the 
Governor could apparently enact an Ordinance even to cover expenditure which 
would normally require a requisition from a Minister under Article 64. (But of the 
wording of Articles 62 and 64). 
It would not be difficult to adapt the articles in question to such a situation by 
transferring powers as to the preparation of estimates and appropriation bills, the 
sanctioning of expenditure, etc., from the State Council and the Ministers to the 
Governor and Heads of Department. In some cases it would suffice to provide that an 
article shall have effect as if, say, reference to the Governor were substituted for a 
reference to the Board of Ministers. Some articles, however, would probably need 
some recasting while others could be left alone. 
For this purpose something on the following lines could be added to the new 
Article 49A:-
"and may, in like manner, make provision for the performance by himself or 
by any other person or body of persons of any functions of the Board of 
Ministers or of any Minister or of any Executive Committee or of the State 
Council, other than the power to make laws under this Order." 
Note that this would cover not only the financial clauses but the whole Order. 
There is a somewhat similar provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 (26 
George V., Cap. 2, Sections 45 and 93) part of which might be adapted. 
An alternative would be to add an entirely new provision to the effect that in the 
event of failure of the State Council, etc., to perform their functions, Articles 56 to 70 
(or perhaps some of them) should cease to have effect, and make some short general 
provision in lieu. 
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36 CO 54/973/13, no 6 23 Apr 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch (reply) from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald 
reporting the refusal by the Board of Ministers to take part in a 
governor 's conference 
With reference to your Confidential No. (2) despatch of the 26th January, 1940,1 I 
have the honour to inform you that I asked the Board of Ministers at a special 
conference convened on the 18th April whether they would be prepared to take part 
in a Governor's Conference of themselves and other leaders representative of the 
chief interests in the Island as adumbrated in paragraph 7 of your despatch. I regret 
to say that the answer of the Ministers has been in the negative. 
2. This negative answer was reached by them after long, careful and friendly 
discussion, and appeared to me based on the following main considerations. The 
Ministers had read paragraph 6 of my Reforms Despatch (in which I wrote that I 
anticipated that a Redelimitation Committee would, with the limitation of purpose 
inherent in my proposed terms of reference, find itself in a position to recommend 
not more than ten additional seat(s) as imposing a maximum limit of ten on any 
additional seats. In paragraph 9 of my Confidential Despatch dated the 28th October, 
1939,2 I have pointed out that such had not been my intention, but I have no 
hesitation in accepting the Ministers' word that they voted for Motion No. 11 (which 
reproduced paragraph 6 of my Reforms Despatch) on the definite understanding that 
not more than ten extra seats would be permitted under my scheme. They had, they 
informed me, incurred a great deal of criticism in Sinhalese quarters for assenting to 
ten extra seats; and such criticism would be magnified into non-confidence and 
revolt against their leadership if they now took part in a Conference which, they 
thought I would agree, would stand no chance whatever of achieving consensus of 
opinion on any important point unless potential new seats in excess of ten were used 
as bargaining counters. The Jaffna Tamils and Muslims at their political meetings 
were still sticking to claims which they (the Ministers) considered ridiculous and so 
long as that spirit was abroad they certainly could not, as representatives of the 
Sinhalese, go any distance beyond their recent more generous than reasonable 
acquiescence in the future creation of as many as ten extra seats. 
3. The Ministers went on to say that even if a more reasonable and compromising 
spirit were to pervade the minority communities, of which there was at present no 
sign, they would nevertheless not feel themselves in a position even to consider 
further sacrifices of political principle beyond their already given assent to a proposal 
for ten extra seats unless they knew precisely what any such sacrifice would achieve. 
At present all that they were really cognisant of were my recommendations as to 
reform and their own demands; these failed to coincide on important points and no 
idea had been given them of what the Imperial Government was prepared to concede 
if intercommunal agreement here could be arrived at. They had already gone as far 
towards compromise as ordinary reason and political principle would allow, and if 
they were to proceed any further it must not be blindfold but with definite and 
assured consequences in view. 
4. As regards the immediate future the Ministers could see no alternative, in view 
1 See 23. 2 See 9. 
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of your inability to approve any revision of the Constitution on the representations at 
present before you to a general election next spring. They did not expect any unusual 
disorder or other disadvantageous result from the election. 
5. Although it is impossible for me to conceal my personal feelings of disappoint-
ment and frustration in this matter of reform (for I am convinced that truly 
responsible government can never be evolved out of the Executive Committee 
System and that its ill effects on administration will become progressively pro-
nounced) I realize that the attitude of the European Community, in particular the 
demand of its leading Associations for a Royal Commission which was stated by them 
in the enclosure to my Confidential despatch dated the 12th February, and the stand 
taken up by those among the minorities who are championed by the redoubtable and 
intransigent Mr. Ponnambalam render it impossible to make any progress towards 
constitutional revision at this juncture. If delay should afford the opportunity for the 
formation and development of a sound moderate opinion (I hear that a number of 
Sinhalese moderates are now exploring the idea of an unpaid Second Chamber of 
leading citizens and elder statesmen) it will not perhaps have been without its 
compensations. 
37 CO 54/973/13, no 7 23 Apr 1940 
[Reforms and Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to 
Mr MacDonald 
I am afraid that you must have thought me very remiss and ungrateful for not having 
replied before to your kind letter of the 21st March. You will however see from the 
enclosed envelope that it was posted by ocean mail (instead of coming by Air Mail in 
the C.O. Bag) and it reached me only this morning. Thank you so much for your 
encouragement and appreciation which I find most heartening in these most difficult 
days . 
I find it hard to assess the results of the "crisis". It has certainly not weakened my 
position, rather the reverse: but it has terribly weakened the Ministers' position, and 
poor old Jayatilaka (in spite of his quite fine fighting speech on the recent censure 
motion against him) has emerged completely discredited. He hasn't even yet 
compiled his memorandum of appeal to you, of which he has talked so much . I doubt 
indeed whether it will ever eventuate. All this I find most dispiriting, because the 
Island is becoming more leaderless than ever and its politics more irresponsible. 
During the crisis and after I have been conscious of having a large measure of 
moderate opinion behind me, but that opinion is seldom vocal and the part which it 
plays in present-day Ceylon politics is inactive and therefore negligible. 
As regards reforms I am sending you a despatch this week to report the Ministers ' 
refusal to join in a Governor's Round Table Conference. I feel that I could have got 
agreement but for young Bandaranaike. Senanayake however, though he did not 
oppose a conference, said bluntly "whether there is a conference or not there will 
never be real or even more than momentarily apparent agreement: the Secretary of 
State will find that there is only one way to deal with reforms in Ceylon, i.e. he must 
say I am prepared to give you this and this but not that or that: take it or leave it." I 
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feel that there is a good deal in this remark of his and am thinking things over 
carefully in the light of it. 
The Indian ban on emigration is a serious and worrying business but its effects are 
being grossly exaggerated. I have insisted on getting exact figures which are now to 
hand. It is persistently represented that families are being separated by the refusal of 
the Indian authorities to permit the return of wife, husband, child etc. The figures 
show that 2091 applications for permits to return were made; 1876 permits have 
been issued, 184 are awaited and 31 only have been refused. Similarly I was recently 
told that 100,000 or more of Indian labourers were unable to take leave in India 
because of the ban preventing their return. The figures show that the number of 
estate labourers going back to India from 1st August 1939 to 14th March 1940 was 
15,000 less than in the previous corresponding period; a considerable figure but a 
very different matter from 100,000. I have suggested to Corea a possible line of 
re-approach to India, which he is considering: but it is important meanwhile to clear 
the ground of exaggerations and inaccuracies, and this I am trying to do. 
Drayton was staying up here with us last week for my conference with the 
Ministers, and I hope he will shortly be with us again as he has got a return of the 
phlebitis which he contracted in Tanganyika, and this garden is a better place for him 
to sit in the cool and rest his leg than is his Hotel in Colombo. He is a tower of 
strength to me. 
38 CO 54/97 4/6, no 13 30 Apr 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter (reply) from Lord Zetland to Mr 
MacDonald transmitting the viceroy's response to a proposal for 
inter-departmental discussions between the CO and the India Office 
You wrote to me on the 23rd January1 suggesting that a joint discussion might be 
arranged between representatives of the India Office and the Colonial Office who are 
immediately concerned with the problem in order to explore the lines of any 
sugestion which could be made here for a settlement which the Governments of 
India and Ceylon might be persuaded to accept. As I told you at the time, I referred 
your letter to Linlithgow. I asked him whether he would like us here to discuss 
matters with the Colonial Office as you suggested (without commitment), or 
whether as an alternative we should have here a purely preliminary discussion with 
you to explore any suggestions for ending the immediate deadlock and making a 
conference in India possible. 
The Viceroy's reply has been somewhat delayed by the resignation of the Ceylon 
Ministers, but that difficulty being out of the way he has now sent me an answer in 
the following terms:-
1 See 22. 
"I am glad to say that we now find ourselves able to agree with MacDonald's 
suggestion that interdepartmental discussions should take place between the 
India Office and the Colonial Office for the purpose of discovering some basis 
for negotiations between India and Ceylon. We should, however, make one 
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point clear, namely, that in any negotiations between the two Governments 
which might ensue, we should probably raise the question of finding 
employment in Ceylon for those Indian labourers who left it, voluntarily or 
otherwise, under that Government's scheme, but have not returned to India. 
We should find it difficult, after all that has happened, to enter into 
negotiations on any other basis. I should be grateful if you would let me know 
how discussions proceed. I know that, at this end, we . would welcome a 
rapprochement between ourselves and Ceylon, but you will agree that this 
must be on terms which will not expose us to legitimate public criticism in 
India." 
Will you let me know if you think this message offers a basis upon which 
negotiations between the two Governments can be re-opened? 
39 CO 54/974/6, no 14 6 May 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter (reply) from Mr MacDonald to Lord 
Zetland 
I am much obliged to you for your letter of 30th April1 about the possibility of 
discussions between our two Departments to see whether any useful suggestions 
could be made to the Governments of India and Ceylon for a settlement of their 
present difficulties. 
I note what the Viceroy says about a condition which the Government of India 
would probably see fit to insist upon in any inter-governmental negotiations; I don't 
know whether he means to refer both (1) to daily paid Government employees in 
Ceylon who were discharged as having been engaged by Ceylon Departments in 
disregard of the policy which the State Council approved in 1934, and also (2) to 
those others who accepted before the end of 1939 the inducement of free repatriation 
and a bonus in anticipation of possible retrenchment. The latter have presumably left 
Ceylon in order to obtain the financial benefit of their decision. As regards the former 
I should expect the Ceylon Government (who are, of course, like the Government of 
India, exposed to legitimate local public criticism) to find great difficulty, at a time of 
retrenchment and unemployment amongst Ceylonese, in reabsorbing under press-
ure from India those who were discharged from daily paid Government employment 
last year. But I am telegraphing personally to the Governor for his views and for 
information of the approximate number involved. When I get his answer possibly a 
preliminary talk could be arranged to see what the prospects are. 
1 See 38. 
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40 CO 54/973/13 7 May 1940 
[General situation in Ceylon]: minute by G E J Gent on the main 
issues and Mr MacDonald's view that the governor should return to the 
UK for consultation 
The Secretary of State discussed the present general situation in Ceylon yesterday 
evening with special reference to the following matters. 
1. The Ministers rejection of the Governor's invitation to take part in a Round 
Table Conference with him in Ceylon for the purpose of further discussion of the 
Reforms problem. 
2. The deterioration in the labour situation amongst the Indian workers on the 
tea estates. 
3. The impasse existing in the relations between the Government of India and the 
Government of Ceylon. 
4. The question of an amendment of the State Council Order-in-Council for the 
purpose of deferring the General Election to the State Council which would 
otherwise have to take place by the beginning of 1941. 
The Secretary of State had formed the impression that the labour situation might 
sooner rather than later have serious developments unless the various political 
questions, which were the main root of the unrest according to our available 
information, were decisively tackled without delay. He came to the conclusion that 
Sir Andrew Caldecott should be asked to come home for early consultation. It was 
possible that Sir Andrew's state of health would justify his taking short leave to 
England for medical consultation, but in the personal telegram which he directed 
should be sent to inform Sir Andrew Caldecott of the Secretary of State's desire that 
he should come home preferably by air for consultation as soon as possible, the 
Governor's advice should be asked for as to what reason should be published for his 
journey to London. I submit a draft personal telegram for consideration and 
approval. 
41 CO 54/975/1, no 29 9 May 1940 
[Labour situation]: despatch no 206 from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
MacDonald. Enclosure: report by Mr Corea, 3-6 May 1940 
With reference to paragraph 2 of my despatch No.197 of the 4th May current I have 
the honour to enclose for your information a report by the Minister for Labour, 
Industry and Commerce, of his conferences with representatives of the Planting 
Industry and of the Labour Organizations. As soon as I receive a report of the further 
joint conference mentioned in his tenth paragraph I will transmit a copy to you. 
Enclosure to 41 
Your Excellency 
I conferred with representatives of the Workers' Federation, the Estate Workers' 
74 WAR AND POSTPONEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM [41) 
Union and the Indian Congress on the 22nd April 1940, and with the Emergency 
Committee of the Ceylon Planters' Association, representing the Planters' Associa-
tion of Ceylon, the Ceylon Estates Proprietary Association, and the Ceylon Associa-
tion in London on the 23rd April 1940, on the present state of labour unrest in 
estates. 
2. The Workers' Federation and the Workers' Union stated that the main causes 
for the unrest were:-
(i) the inadequacy of wages; 
(ii) the opposition by Superintendents of Estates to the formation of Labour 
Unions, and their refusal to treat with such Unions; 
(iii) the existence of the kangany system. 
In their view much of the present unrest would disappear if the labourers were 
permitted to form their own unions and if they are recognised by Superintendents of 
estates. The Ceylon Indian Congress supported this view. They were, however, 
opposed to the abolition of the kangany system. They also urged the immediate 
consideration of the question of wages. 
3. The Emergency Committee of the Planters' Association agreed that labourers 
should be permitted to form their own unions, and that estate Superintendents 
should deal with such bodies if they were Trade Unions duly registered. They, 
however, expressed the view that they should be permitted to decide whether they 
would deal with all such registered Trade Unions. They had in mind the Sama 
Samajist's Trade Union called the Estate Workers' Union which they were unwilling 
to recognise. They urged as a serious difficulty the existence of several unions within 
one estate owing allegiance to different organisations, and suggested that Govern-
ment should take steps to form an amalgamation of all these bodies. 
I discussed the question of amalgamation with the Ceylon Indian Congress and the 
other two bodies. There seems very little hope of securing such an amalgamation as 
both the Workers' Federation and the Indian Congress are determined to oppose 
each other. 
4. There is considerable force in the argument of the Planters' Association but I 
do not see any possibility of compelling by law either the amalgamation of these 
groups, or compelling labourers to join a specified organisation, but the difficulty 
could to some extent be solved by the suggestion discussed later with regard to the 
establishment of Conciliation Authorities. I am, however, considering further 
whether steps could not be taken to recognise only one labour organisation within 
each estate. I am also definitely of opinion that in spite of the difficulty referred to 
above, much of the prevailing unrest and tension will disappear if labourers are 
permitted to join any registered Trade Union, and if such Trade Union is recognised 
by Estate Superintendents as a body authorised to negotiate on behalf of the 
labourers in the event of any disputes. It gave me, therefore, great satisfaction to find 
that the Planters' Association was prepared to accept that view. I only regretted that 
they should have qualified it by refusing to recognise every Trade Union duly 
registered. Difficulties are sure to arise if a duly registered Trade Union is to be 
refused recognition merely by reason of the fact that members of the Sama Samajist 
party happen to be members of such Trade Union also. 
5. The Planters' Association are opposed to an immediate consideration of the 
question of wages on the ground that they had granted, voluntarily, a war bonus, and 
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that the material which the Labour Department was collecting on the question of 
wages is not yet ready. I myself do not accept this view as I am satisfied that the cost 
of living has definitely increased. Whether it has increased above the figure that 
prevailed at the time of the Renganathan Budget is, I think, immaterial. The industry 
can very well stand a rise in the wages, and it would be far more desirable and 
conducive to settlement if instead of the voluntary war bonus a suitable wage 
increase could be given effect to. 
6. The Planters' Association has not definitely made up its mind on the question 
of the abolition of the kangany system. They are inclined to favour its gradual 
disappearance, but they informed me that that matter was down for discussion at the 
next meeting of the Planters' Association towards the end of this month, after which 
their definite views would be communicated to me. While there are, no doubt, 
practical difficulties in the way of the immediate abolition of the system, I feel that as 
the definite advantage that will accrue from such action more than counter-balances 
any immediate difficulties that may exist, such as the question of settlement of debts, 
etc., steps should be taken to abolish the system. 
There is ample evidence which, in my opinion, discloses the existence of great 
dissatisfaction on the part of the labourers with regard to the kangany system. Apart 
from its intrinsic defects, as a system, there appears to be no doubt that in practice 
the kangany is now looked upon as an exploiter of labour and is viewed almost with 
enmity by many labourers. 
6. [sic] The question of surplus labour was also fully discussed. The Planters' 
Association represented that they were collecting figures and would be in a position 
to state definitely whether there was such surplus or not. They do not agree that 
there is any surplus. It was the opinion of the other three bodies that there was a 
definite surplus. The view of the Labour Department and of myself is definitely that 
there is a surplus. The question is whether the existence of this surplus leads to 
unrest: I am of the opinion that it does, because in most estates it is difficult to 
obtain a full week's work nor is it possible for labourers to move from one estate to 
another. I feel, therefore, that it is necessary to )llake an offer of voluntary 
repatriation. In view of the prevailing ban on immigration I am satisfied that there 
will not be a large exodus. 
7. I then discussed the proposal for the establishment of Conciliation and 
Arbitration Boards. None of the bodies I conferred with on the 22nd and the 23rd 
April, 1940, are in favour of the establishment of Arbitration Boards. 
8. The Planters' Association requested that lightning strikes should be prevented. 
I am in accord with this proposal and propose to provide in the new Industrial 
Disputes Bill that before labourers strike disputes should be referred to a Concilia-
tion Board. 
Although I am aware of the difficulties in the way of Arbitration Boards, and also of 
the fact that they have after trial not been favoured in other parts of the world, I feel 
very strongly that in the present state of Trade Union development in this country, 
properly established Arbitration Boards which really is the sanction behind attempts 
at conciliation, are essential. It apparently is the same view which was taken in 
Mauritius after the recent labour troubles there. I therefore propose to place this 
point of view before my Executive Committee. 
9. The Planters' Association requested that steps should be taken to declare tea 
and rubber as essential commodities. I declined to do so and explained my reasons. 
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10. As there appeared to me the possibility of a general agreement between these 
various groups on measures necessary for putting an end to the present unrest, I 
propose to summon a Conference on May 9th, at which representatives of all the 
bodies with whom I have already conferred would be present. I shall submit a further 
report to Your Excellency after that Conference has taken place, and I would 
therefore desire that Your Excellency agree to discuss the matter with me. 
11 . I omitted to mention that Mr. Parfitt pressed on my attention the urgent need 
for the early introduction of the new Sedition Bill. I explained that the law as it stood 
at present was perhaps better than the proposed draft of the new Sedition Bill, but 
agreed that I would support the introduction of a Bill which would definitely prevent 
incitement to violence. 
12. Finally, I feel that a good deal of the present unrest could be satisfactorily 
removed if Trade Unions are formed and are accepted by Superintendents of estates 
as the media for the settlement of labour disputes. 
42 CO 54/973/13, no 9 9 May 1940 
[Constitutional reform]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr MacDonald recommending the appointment of a 
constitutional commission and the postponement of the general 
election and explaining why it would be inadvisable for him to return 
home. Minutes by Sir G Gater and Mr MacDonald 
Your Secret and personal telegram of 7th of May has arrived just as I was about to 
draft a despatch to convey distasteful but (?group omitted) conclusion that I have 
reached in view of the attitude and psychology displayed by Minister(s) on the 18th 
April and 4th May that sending out by you of a commission to investigate and report 
on political and general situation under the present consitution has become 
imperative and that general election should be postponed by Orders in Council until 
you have had time to consider its report. If I come home by air to see you I shall 
certainly find it necessary to make this recommendation which however I strongly 
urge should be acted upon now forthwith in order to allay growing unrest and 
uncertainty, all round. This being so I am most doubtful as to wisdom of my leaving 
the Island at present juncture for following main reasons first I am informed that 
SENANNAYAKE [sic] has spoken of non-cooperation in connexion with forthcoming 
resolution in Council reported by my telegram No.438. Although I doubt whether 
such a development is immediately probable I cannot in view of the precipitancy of 
the recent crisis ignore the warning. Secondly Commissioner of Enquiry - on 
MOOLOYA shooting whose report I alone have so far seen has reported that the 
shooting was not justified in law. Although this finding is vitiated in my opinion by 
bad law and bad logic (with which no doubt the law officers are likely to agree) 
publication of the report which cannot I think be avoided will inevitably cause 
situation that will need firm but delicate handling. Thirdly I feel that any action or 
policy on which you might decide after conference with me in gratitude would be 
criticized here as having been due to pressure by me. My views on reforms have met 
with general acceptance in no quarters and I feel all parties desire some sort of court 
appeal. There is absolutely no chance that I can see of constitutional reform or of 
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amelioration of SINHALESE attitude towards Indian question by agreement or on 
my advice. Fourthly I am nervous that my absence from Island in present conditions 
might be taken advantage of by forcing issues which an officer administering the 
Government would not be in a position to deal with as in the case of STARTUP affair 
while I was in Madras and the Brace Girdle [sic] business during INTERREGNUM 
after sanctioned departure. My health is better now than since 1933 and if I fly home 
I consider the true reason should not be concealed i.e. that you wish to confer with 
me. I am however apprehensive as to what might be inferred or result from such 
announcement and before making arrangements regarding passages I should be 
grateful for your definite instructions in the light of this telegram. In any case I hope 
that announcement of a Commission and of a postponement of general elections may 
receive your immediate consideration. I am very conscious that this course must be 
one of great difficulty in war time and I would not propose it unless I was convinced 
that it is the only method of coping with a situation which will otherwise deteriorate. 
Minutes on 42 
Four main points arise on the Governor's telegram and Mr. Gent's draft reply:-
1. The question whether the Governor should leave Ceylon to come here for 
consultation. I agree with Mr. Gent that it would be wiser for him not to leave 
Ceylon in present circumstances . 
2. The postponement of the general election. On this we must reach a final 
decision in the light of the Governor's views, but my first reaction is that the 
election should be postponed, if possible, for the period of the war. 
3. The appointment of a Commission. The difficulties of sending a Commission to 
Ceylon at the present time are obvious and I don 't think that a decision in favour of 
the proposal can be reached without very careful consideration. I should 
personally like to reflect further on it before reaching a conclusion. 
4. The desirability of making certain that the Governor is equipped with sufficient 
powers (a) to meet the challenge of non-co-operation; (b) to maintain law and 
order, to carry out any measures necessary for the effective prosecution of the war 
and to secure a satisfactory settlement with the Government of India . .. . 
G.H.G. 
10.5.40 
This matter is so important that I do not think it should be dealt with by me in view 
of the possibility that there will be a new Secretary of State in the course of a day or 
two. He should be free to reach his own decisions. In the meantime the telegram 
which I suggested on my copy of the Governor's most recent telegram should go off 
for immediate answer by him. 1 
1 cf 40. 
M.M. 
10.5.40 
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43 CO 54/978/4, no 9 10 May 1940 
[State Council Order-in-Council]: inward telegram (reply) no 445 
from Sir A Caldecott to Mr MacDonald 
Your secret despatch of the 22nd April. 1 Draft Order in Council. After consultation 
with the Financial Secretary, Legal Secretary recommends that Article 49A should be 
amended by the insertion after the words "this Order"-in the second and ninth 
lines--of the words "or in any other written law" and "or by any other written law" 
respectively, and by the addition of the following words at the end of the Article: "and 
may, by Order, make provision for the performance by himself or by any other person 
or body of persons of any functions vested by this Order or by any other Law in the 
Board of Ministers or any Minister of the Executive Committee or the State Council, 
other than the power to make laws under this Order." 
Objects and reasons for these amendments are:-
(a) To provide for possible non-co-operation in respect of powers and duties 
created by Statute and not by the State Council Order in Council. 
(b) To make it clear that, although the original suspension of the Constitution 
requires your approval and is effected by Proclamation, the Administrative 
arrangements do not require your approval but can be made by the Governor by 
Order. A large number of Administrative arrangements will have to be made 
quickly and the requirement of your prior approval in each case would be 
embarrassing; 
(c) To make clear that the functions of Ministers, Executive Committees, etc., 
created by written laws other than State Council Order in Council, of which there 
are many under recent legislation, can be transferred by order of the Governor. 
I agree with the above proposed amendments and in view of possible early need of 
power of suspension of the Constitution I shall be grateful for early consideration and 
telegraphic reply. 
1 See 35. 
44 CO 54/973/13, no 10 11 May 1940 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Mac-
Donald to Sir A Caldecott 
Your telegram 9th May .1 I agree that in the circumstances which you report it would 
be better that you should not leave island for the present. Your recommendations 
regarding appointment of commission and postponement of General Election are 
receiving active consideration, but please telegraph your advice on following 
points:-
(1) is it likely that latest war news from Europe will have any moderating 
influence on Ministers and their attitude and on tension which you report in 
Ceylon political and labour problems. 
1 See 42. 
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(2) Are your views as expressed in telegram under reference modified in any way 
by intensification of war situation. 
(3) If it turned out to be impracticable or undesirable for a Royal Commission to 
visit Ceylon at an early date or at any time during war, would you still advocate 
postponement of General Election, and if so should it be postponed indefinitely 
until end of war? 
45 CO 54/978/7, no 10 17 May 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the 
election law and Indian voters. Enclosure: note of a meeting between 
the governor and ministers 
With reference to correspondence on the subject of Ceylon Election Law and Indian 
Voters, which rests at present with my Confidential telegram, No. 438, dated the 8th 
May. I have the honour to enclose copy of a Note of the meeting which I had with the 
Ministers on the 4th May. Although the substance of the greater part of this Note was 
in a condensed form contained in my telegram the important bearing of paragraphs I 
and Ill on the general question of Constitutional reform was not touched upon 
therein. 
2. It will be seen from Mr. Bandaranaike's statement, recorded at the end of 
paragraph Ill, that his speeches and votings in the State Council debate on reforms 
are no longer regarded by him as binding; and I have little doubt that the same holds 
of the opinions of some other Ministers. 
3. The position that I took up in my Reform Proposals is explained in paragraph I, 
and I have no doubt whatever that it was thoroughly understood by everybody at the 
time. The debate which is at the moment still proceeding in the State Council (and 
which looks like causing a definite split in the Sinhalese ranks) will be fully reported 
upon by me in a subsequent despatch. The object of this present communication is to 
bring it to your attention that views previously expressed on questions of reform are 
essentially affected by present developments and that any measure of agreement that 
may have been apparent hitherto should not be counted upon. 
Enclosure to 45: note of a meeting at Queen's Cottage, Nuwara Eliya, 4 May 19401 
I. His Excellency stated that he first wished to make clear that when he 
recommended in his Reforms despatch that there should be no change in the 
franchise he referred solely and entirely to the franchise as defined in the existing 
Order in Council. At the time of that recommendation he had not read the 1928 and 
1929 papers and debates, nor had he seen the Secretary of State's telegram of lOth 
June, 1930 (S.P. :XVI-1930). As there was no reference in the existing law to the 
1 Present: Caldecott, RH Drayton (legal secretary), Sir DB Jayatilaka (home affairs), C W W Kannangara 
(education), Senanayake (agriculture and lands), Bandaranaike (local administration), Corea (labour, 
industry and commerce), E R Sudbury (secretary to Caldecott) . W A de Silva (health) and Major J L 
Kotalwala (communications and works) were unable to attend. 
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imposition of a Rupee fee for Certificates of Permanent Settlement, the consideration 
of that point had not risen, though if in fact such a fee was being imposed His 
Excellency would not have objected to its continuance in a reformed Constitution. 
The Hon. Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and a delegation of the Sinhala Maha Sabha 
had indeed, prior to the Reforms despatch, suggested the imposition of a substantial 
fee on the analogy of Naturalisation fees, but His Excellency had informed them that 
he could not support such a proposition. 
When His Excellency had expressed his proposal to "tighten up the electoral 
procedure" he had in mind the prevention of registration under Article 7 of persons 
who were entitled only under the procedure laid down in Article 9. Under the past 
improper procedure applications on the ground of domicile of choice had been 
automatically accepted by Registering Officers, but in the future it was intended that 
proof of such domicile should be insisted upon. 
11. The History of the present franchise was then discussed at length. The 
Donoughmore Commission had recommended five years' residence as the basis for a 
universal adult suffrage, but the Sinhalese had insisted on a more restrictive 
franchise for Indians. The result was the formula which was drawn up at Mr. D. S. 
Senanayake's house by the then Governor and incorporated in paragraph 35 of Sir 
Herbert Stanley's despatch of 2nd June, 1929. According to the understanding of the 
Legislative Council of the time the proposals contained in that formula were 
approved in toto by paragraph 10 of Lord Passfield's despatch of lOth October, 1929, 
and it was on that understanding that the Sinhalese had accepted the present 
Constitution. The Ministers considered the imposition of a Rupee fee for Certificates 
of Permanent Settlement and the renunciation of rights as essential elements in the 
restriction of the Indians' franchise, and they could not agree to any interpretation of 
Lord Passfield's despatch which modified this restriction. 
His Excellency referred to the explanation of the limited effect of any "renuncia-
tion of rights" given by the Colonial Secretary in his speech of 11th December, 1929, 
following that of Mr. T. L. Villiers (Hansard 1929-p. 1777); and to the view 
expressed by the Hon. Mr. C. W. W. Kannangara in the Reforms Debate on 11th May, 
1939, that the Rupee fee was immaterial (Hansard, 1939-p. 1486). His Excellency 
also pointed out that Sir Herbert Stanley's proposal in regard to the fee was that it 
should be "nominal" and not exceed Rs. 11-. His Excellency could not agree that a 
"nominal" fee was intended to be "restrictive." In reply to a question by His 
Excellency as to why the imposition of the Rs. 1/- fee was not raised in the Select 
Committee's Report on Election Law and Procedure in 1938 (S.P. XIV-1938), the 
Hon. Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (the Chairman of that Committee) stated that the 
Committee felt that the "renunciation of rights" was sufficient to impose the 
required restriction. 
As to the "renunciation" of rights His Excellency read out a list of such rights 
prepared by the present Legal Secretary, and pointed out that, while the holder of a 
Certificate of Permanent Settlement could not himself claim such rights, in 
practically all cases there were corresponding obligations which were enforceable by 
the Controller of Labour under criminal law. The Legal Secretary went further and 
stated that it was arguable that inasmuch as any citizen had the right to lay 
information on a criminal charge, the holder of a Certificate of Permanent 
Settlement could not be regarded as having lost the right to bring an action in such 
cases. 
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In this connection His Excellency requested the Legal Secretary to review his list 
of "rights peculiar to Indians" in conjunction with the list detailed by the Hon. Mr. 
C. W. W. Kannangara in the Legislative Council on 9th November, 1928 (Hansard, 
1928--p. 1813). 
The Ministers then referred (1) to the Colonial Office letter (of which they had only 
just became [sic] aware), dated 18th June, 1930 to Mr. I. X. Pereira, the then Indian 
Member of the Legislative Council, in which it was stated that the proposal to levy a 
fee on Certificates of Permanent Settlement had been dropped, and (2) to the 
Secretary of State's telegram of lOth June, 1930 (S.P. :XVI-1930), in which he had 
stated that His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in agreeing to any 
substantial modification of the essential proposals for Constitutional Reforms which 
had been accepted by the Legislative Council. The result which had in fact emerged 
was that after the Council had accepted the Constitution two vital restrictions on the 
Indians' franchise had been removed without the cognizance or consent of the 
Sinhalese: viz. (1) the Rupee fee was not imposed, and (2) by the interpretation 
placed upon paragraph 3 of the Secretary of State's telegram of lOth June, 1930, the 
renunciation of rights by the holders of Certificates of Permanent Settlement had 
become purely illusory and unreal. 
His Excellency pointed out that the implementation of the recent Labour 
Conventions, to which Ceylon had acceded, would remove all racial discrimination 
between manual workers, so that special Indian rights would in any case disappear. 
Ill . The Ministers said that the Sinhalese had accepted the Constitution on the 
basis of certain real restrictions of the Indian franchise, and they considered that the 
agreements made with the Indian Government in regard to the franchise of Indians 
after their acceptance of the Constitution were a breach of faith. When the new 
Labour legislation is passed the position will have reverted in effect to the 
Donoughmore Commission's recommendation of a five years' residence qualifica-
tion, which had been rejected by the country. The Ministers asserted therefore that 
they could not support any Reforms unless they included a satisfactory solution of 
the Indian question and they claimed that legislative provision should be made 
forthwith for (1) the imposition of the Rs. 1/- fee on Certificates of Permanent 
Settlement, and (2) the real renunciation of special rights by Indians. The Hon. Mr. 
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike further stated that until this was done he must withdraw 
his agreement with other proposals in His Excellency's Reforms despatch for which 
he had voted in the State Council. The other Ministers said that they would also wish 
to consider whether they should adopt the same attitude as Mr. Bandaranaike. 
His Excellency said that he could support neither the imposition in the Order in 
Council of a Rupee fee (as being a retrograde and undemocratic step) nor the denial 
to Indians of rights which he considered should be enjoyed by all labourers. He 
would, however, as requested by the Ministers, telegraph their demands to the 
Secretary of State for his consideration, and a draft would be placed before the Board 
of Ministers at its next meeting on 7th May. 
IV. The Legal Secretary asked the Ministers to consider the question of the 1940 
Revision of the Electoral Registers before the next meeting of the Board of Ministers. 
The Ministers, however, proposed to await the Secretary of State's reply before 
making any decision regarding the proposed revision. 
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46 CO 54/977/7, no 6 20 May 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': ninth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO. 
Minutes by G E J Gent and Lord Lloyd 
The ministry and current politics 
1. Over a month has passed since my last instalment of these Notes.1 I have been 
waiting for the position to show signs of stabilisation, but I have now reached the 
conclusion that there is going to be no stabilisation so long as the shadow of a 
coming general election falls across the political stage. One might have hoped that 
the world events of the past fortnight would give our politicians some sense of 
perspective and responsibility. Save for Jayatilaka (who, I hear and believe, contem-
plates retirement from ministerial if not from political life when the present State 
Council is dissolved) and Corea the Ministers do not however appear in the least 
worried about the Empire's ordeal. I have noticed no worthy response from them to 
any appeal for War Charities, they have left it to a private member (George de Silve) 
[sic] to give notice of a private motion for a vote of money towards the war (when 
they will put it down for debate I have no idea), and their present political philosophy 
seems to be founded on three considerations:-
(!) The British Navy and Mercantile Marine are invincible, and Ceylon has 
therefore no need to envisage any change of her world-status arising out of the 
war; 
(2) This being so her politicians can go on with, nay intensify, their usual game of 
pinpricks (see "Things Ceylonese" No.42 paragraph 8) and with impunity blame 
Britain for everything that Ceylon has got and for everything she hasn't; 
(3) The great goal, that looms dominatingly across the whole political horizon 
and blots out all other vision, is re-election to State Council and thereby a further 
provision of livelihood from State Funds. As there is no opposition party (and 
because an election cannot be staged in Ceylon without slogans of abuse against 
somebody) Whitehall, Queen's House, the fictitious "Governor's Government" of 
the three Officers of State, the domination of the Capitalist Planter and the Indian 
invasion of estate labourers are all being paraded with the usual turgid oratory and 
no less usual disregard for accuracy and truth in order that Councillors may be 
floated back to Council and Ministers back to office on a muddy flood of Sinhalese 
nationalism. 
2. The preceding paragraph does not mean that anybody wants an election. Far 
from it. The present State Councillors would, I have no doubt, welcome a respite 
from the necessity of having to incur election expenditure; and no thinking person 
contemplates with complacency another election under the present Constitution. All 
communities have however manoeuvred themselves into positions from which there 
can be no give and take in the matter of reforms, and so (unless action is taken over 
their heads) they must drift willy nilly into an extension of the existing system of 
Government and a general election. Wijewardene3 (proprietor of the Ceylon Daily 
News, Observer and the Vernacular Press) told me two days ago in conversation that 
1 See 34. 2 See 16. 
3 Mr D R Wijewardene, who owned the influential Lake House group of newspapers. 
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a further five-year dose of administration by Executive Committees would in his 
opinion spell the impossibility of any development during our lifetime of responsibil-
ity, cohesion or consistency among Ceylonese politicians. 
3. That the position is deteriorating is patent to everybody. When I arrived here 2lf2 
years ago the seven Ministers (self-styled a homogeneous Ministry) did in fact stick 
together. Jayatilaka's failure to resign after the Bracegirdle report started the rot. 
The three members of the Sinhala Maha Sabha (Bandaranaike, Kotelawala and 
Kannangara) wanted him to go and said so: Senanayake wanted to take his place as 
Leader but daren't say so; Corea and de Silva stood by him as a moderating influence. 
The recent row between Jayatilaka and Banks, which was followed by the Ministerial 
crisis, was considered by all Jayatilaka's colleagues except de Silva (who doesn't 
count) a piece of bad blundering on his part. At my recent conference with Ministers 
on 16th May it was uncomfortably clear that all his colleagues (including now Corea) 
were in rebellion against his leadership. The Conference was immediately followed by 
a particularly dirty attempt (even for Ceylon) to unseat the old man. The attempt is 
worth describing and explaining, as it may be followed by others:-
(a) At the beginning of the war, when Defence Regulations were being considered 
by the Board of Ministers and Executive Committees, it was decided not to enact 
regulations on matters already provided for by local law; 
(b) One of these matters was the prohibition of public meetings, which has 
hitherto been satisfactorily dealt with under sections 114 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code and 185 of the Penal Code; 
(c) On 12th May an order under the former not to hold a meeting was disobeyed 
by Dr. Perera, the Sama Samajist leader; but case law in India has established that 
if no disorder or injury results from such breach no prosecution lies. Dr. Perera 
undoubtedly found this out before his disobedience; 
(d) On my return to Colombo from up-country on 14th May I saw Jayatilaka and 
discussed this defect in the law, which his Executive Committee desired to be 
amended by Statute. I thereupon invited the Board of Ministers to meet me on 
16th May to consider whether a Defence Regulation should not be passed in 
anticipation of amendment of the law, because the mills of State Council grind 
even more slowly than those under Divine management; 
(e) At this Conference there was some reasonable argument (especially by Corea) 
and there are certainly cons as well as pros, e.g. we do not want to jeopardize at 
this juncture the success of Corea's scheme of conciliation in labour disputes.4 
The question is still under my consideration. But the attitude of the majority of his 
colleagues towards Jayatilaka was one of abuse rather than argument, and I had to 
call them to order on his behalf; 
(f) My meetings with Ministers are always by my invitation or at their request and 
are entirely confidential and informal. No communique or proceedings is ever 
issued; 
(g) Next morning however I was amazed to see in the usually circumspect "Daily 
News" what purported to be an account of the meeting under the headline "Home 
Minister asks Governor to use Emergency Powers". As Jayatilaka has of course 
been a protagonist for the curtailment of gubernatorial powers, and as the use of 
4 cf 41. 
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them in this case was entirely my own and not Sir Baron's idea, I at once scented 
intrigue; 
(h) Soon after breakfast Jayatilaka was in my office asking me to publish a 
dementi. I never issue dementis; if I did, lies would be published merely for the 
nailing. I gave him a minute however, which he was quick to publish. Nor too 
soon: he was questioned in Council that very afternoon. Newspaper cuttings of the 
original article and of my Minute are attached.5 Wijewardene, the proprietor of the 
newspaper and no friend of Jayatilaka, was (I believe) quite innocent in this 
instance. Senanayake has this paper's support and Bandaranaike the reverse. 
Therefore I have concluded, with regret, that the dirty work has been Sena-
nayake's, probably through his son Dudley. 
4. The State Council has transacted no real business for over three months. In 
February-March the 'crisis' monopolized its attention; then came the Easter recess, 
and on reassembly last week it set aside standing orders and proceeded to the debate 
of Bandaranaike's motion on the Indian Franchise. This motion has not fared as its 
mover or seconder (Senanayake) intended. The Legal Secretary tells me that if a 
division has [sic] been taken on Thursday it might even have been defeated. The 
Sinhalese have disclosed a serious split in their ranks and the motion's failure to 
arouse deep nationalist feeling was evidenced by lack of a quorum at two points in 
the debate. On Friday, in the middle of the mover's reply and with P/z hours of 
normal sitting-time still to go, the debate was adjourned till May 28th. The object of 
the adjournment was probably twofold:-
(a) to whip up Kandyan feeling at a public meeting at Kandy, whose member 
( George de Silva) had spoken against the motion; 
(b) to delay the question of revising the registers until it is impossible to revise 
them for a general election next year and thereby to provide a basis on which to 
request a postponement of the general election. 
5. Whatever the eventual voting on the motion may be I do not now anticipate 
that Bandranaike [sic] or Senanayake (even if both or either ever really had the 
intention) will be able to make it a platform for non-cooperation. I think that they 
realize that a country asking for a further measure of democratic self-Government 
hardly improves its case by demanding that Indian labourers to which it grants the 
franchise should be ipso facto deprived of the rights which labourers enjoy 
throughout the world by virtue of international conventions to which Ceylon is a 
party. But then the charge of deception against Whitehall (a 'deception' which has 
been plain to everybody ever since the new constitution came in) was too good a 
piece of nationalist propaganda for either of the two demagogues to let the other get 
away with. So we have their duet, with the other Ministers in a faint unenthusiastic 
chorus. 
Senanayake tonans 
6. With reference to paragraph 17 of No.8 of these Notes Senanayake has sent in 
yet another Memorandum on Debt Conciliation, challenging certain opinions of the 
Legal Secretary to whom reference has therefore again had to be made. That 
5 Enclosures not printed. 
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Senanayake's interest in this subject is not solely ministerial is indicated by the 
second annex to these notes. 
Labour unrest 
7. I have sent several despatches on this subject. Corea has worked hard and well 
on his conciliation programme. At the moment (so far as information goes; flood 
damage has cut Colombo off from many districts by mail, telegraph and telephone 
and from nearly all by road and rail) labourers are 'out' on only one estate. But the 
unrest is still there and if (on the one hand) the Sama Samajist Estate Workers' 
Union should fail within the next fortnight to confirm their undertakings given at 
Corea's Conference or (on the other hand) the Planters' Association should go back 
on the recognition of trade unions promised by its representatives at that Conference 
then, in either of these eventualities, there will be renewed and worse trouble. 
Communists 
8. The Sama Samajists are by their political antagonists, most newspapers and 
all Planters called Communists. They include one man who was in Moscow for 
several years, Comrade Gunawardene, and he is probably pukka scarlet. He is also, I 
understand, a nasty piece of work of the village bully type. The Samaj Samajist 
Members of Council boycott Queen's House so that I shall never have any personal 
knowledge of them. Dr. N.M. Perera, M.S.C, and Dr. Colvin de Silva (who largely 
finances the party) are, I understand, conscientious and intellectual socialists of a 
pronounced shade of red. In the middle and lower ranks of the party there is more 
opportunism than principle and vote-catching than policy. What the "Times of 
Ceylon" is agitating for is the proscription of the party, the prohibition of its 
meetings and the detention of its leaders. The Editor frequently cites anti-
Communist measures taken in India and the Straits Settlements. Action could not be 
taken to suppress the Samaj Samajist party here without a breakdown of the 
Constitution and immediate non-cooperation, because the Ministers and State 
Council certainly will not take it; it could only be done under the special powers of 
the Governor. None of the Ministers like the Samaj Samajists, but their view is (1) 
that the party's principles although equalitarian are not communistic; (2) that, 
although they talk occasionally of revolution, anti-Imperialism and anti-Capitalism, 
they have in fact fastened their practical politics on to abuses and imperfections that 
have to be admitted; and (3) that the movement, if driven underground, will be far 
more dangerous and gain force more rapidly. My present personal opinion of the 
Samaj Samajists may be set out as follows:-
(a) There is no proof or even indication of current support from Moscow in the 
way of funds or tracts. That Comrade Gunawardene has correspondence with 
Russia I do not doubt. The "Pravda", I believe, made much in its columns of our 
"Ministerial Crisis"; 
(b) The Brigadier Commanding the Troops is satisfied that the Party is making no 
attempt to tamper with the loyalty of the Local Forces or to unpopularize 
recruitment for them; 
(c) The Party is a growing political force which in my opinion the Ministers 
underrate. I think that in the next elections they will win many more than the two 
seats they now hold; 
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(d) the Party at present embraces within its fold all shades of red from pink to 
scarlet; suppression would suit the extreme leftists, and I agree with the Ministers 
that it would be a mistake to drive the movement underground even if suppression 
could be accomplished without non-cooperation and suspension of the Constitu-
tion; 
(e) The Party needs most careful watching. It will derive advantage both from the 
anti-Trade-Union attitude of die-hard planters and from the anti-Indian spoutings 
of the Sinhalese nationalists. The leaders of the Party are arch-intriguers and their 
tactics are to set everybody else against each other; 
(f) Their two papers (of which the Sinhalese edition has a circulation of 7500 and 
the Tamil edition one of 8000) frequently contain attacks on, and defamations of, 
the Police Department. So far these have been cleverly half-footed in fact and 
prosecution would have been a mistake. As soon however as the Editors provide an 
occasion legal proceedings should be taken. Their columns are being assiduously 
watched. 
Minutes on 46 
As the Secretary of State has at the moment under his consideration a draft personal 
telegram to the Governor of Ceylon in response to the latter's recommendation that 
a General Election should be postponed for the limited period of one year, it would be 
very desirable that he should see now this latest memorandum in the Governor's 
most secret and personal series on "Things Ceylonese." The memorandum, which I 
received this morning and which is dated the 20th May, reflects the Governor's 
deepening impression that political affairs in the island are deteriorating and that the 
Ministry (save perhaps Mr. Corea, the Minister of Labour) have no interest or 
inclination to ti,lke a grip of things. 
I draw particular attention to the following statements in this memorandum:-
Page 1 "There is going to be no stabilisation so long as the shadow of a coming 
general election falls across the political stage." 
Page 2 "No thinking person contemplates with complacency another election 
under the present Constitution. All communities have, however, man-
oeuvred themselves into positions from which there can be no give and 
take in the matter of reforms." 
[In para 8] the Governor gives us a useful analysis of the Sama Samaj Party (or 
"Communists") which is the chief bugbear of the European plantation industry and 
of the Ceylon Association whose deputation, if the Secretary of State consents to 
receive it, will certainly refer to the desirability of strong action against this Party's 
leaders. Its activities amongst the Indian workers on the tea estates may be assumed 
to be wholly mischievous. But the Governor has stood his ground against the local 
demand of the planters' organisations for the suppression of the Sama Samajists as a 
seditious organisation, and he explains here that action could not be taken for the 
purpose without a breakdown of the Constitution and immediate non-co-operation 
because the Ministers and the State Council certainly would not take it themselves, 
and it could only be done under the special powers possessed by the Governor. The 
Governor himself believes that the Party is a growing political force which the 
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Sinhalese Ministers underrate. But there is no evidence to show that it is financed or 
instructed by Moscow or that its agents attempt to tamper with the efficiency of the 
local forces. He intends that legal proceedings should be taken against the two Sama 
Samaj newspapers, as soon as they provide an opportunity for their defamatory 
articles about the Police. 
G.E.J.G. 
28.5.40 
I am not much impressed by the Governor's Memo. It reads like a District Magis-
trate's report during Satyagraha in India and he appears completely immersed in a 
mass of detail. All this is only [symptomatic] of radical trouble in the Constitution. 
L. 
3.6.40 
47 CO 54/973/13, no 13 22 May 1940 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Lloyd recommending the appointment of a one-man informal mission. 
Minute by Sir C Parkinson 
In continuation of my secret and personal telegram dated 12th May. Debate of Indian 
franchise, having wasted time of State Council for the whole of the session last week, 
has been adjourned until its reassembly on 28th May. Debate has disclosed some 
cleavage of opinion among Singalese and I do not anticipate non-co-operation on 
this issue. Legal Secretary suspects that adjournment, which was made quite 
unnecessarily during reply of mover and two hours before ordinary closing time, was 
intended to make sure that revision of registers cannot be completed this year and 
thereby to provide basis of which necessity for postponement of general election can 
later be argued. Yesterday Ponnambalam sought interview with me at which he 
made the following representations:-
"If there is no possibility of general question of constitutional reform being 
decided upon in the immediate future then purely domestic question of 
re-delimitation of electoral boundaries with a view to giving enhanced 
representation to Minorities should be put in hand at once in order that at the 
next general election minorities shall be assured of greater representation." 
My fully considered views are as follows:-(1) Any long continuation of the 
constitution in its present form is inconceivable. (2) A general election under it 
cannot therefore be justified. (3) Re-delimitation to enhance the representation of 
minorities cannot be entertained separately from other measures of reform. (4) Local 
politics are bound to deteriorate as the election approaches. (5) Upsetting of a 
general election during critical period of the war should be avoided. (6) Nevertheless 
postponement should be for a fixed and not indefinite period such as the duration of 
the war, though further extensions might later become necessary. I suggest the 
advisability of early announcement to the effect that you must have time yourself 
personally to examine the important question of constitutional reform in the light of 
very many representations that have been put forward from all quarters; that this 
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examination cannot possibly be hurried and that it is therefore proposed to take steps 
to enable postponement of general election for a year. In view of recent events and 
present political atmosphere I consider it most desirable that independent examina-
tion of position on your behalf should be conducted on the spot. If this were 
entrusted to a commission, personnel would, of course, need to be most carefully 
selected and suitable persons might not be found available in wartime. I therefore 
suggest the possibility of a one-man informal mission such as that of Wilson to 
Malaya in 1932. There is no need to give opportunity for further representations as 
arguments of every community are on record and have already been repeated ad 
nauseam. I feel therefore that special one-man mission might be more suited to the 
circumstances of the case than fully fledged commission. 
Minute on 47 
Secretary of State 
(through Mr. Hall) 
It is difficult to see any satisfactory solution to the constitutional and political 
troubles in Ceylon. I entirely agree with Mr. Gent that there is no point in sending 
out a "missioner" as suggested by the Governor. There are, as I see it, only two 
practical courses:-
1. A strong Royal Commission in which presumably all parties in the House of 
Commons would be represented. 
2. A round table conference in London. 
Neither of these is practicable in the present circumstances, and for my part I should 
definitely advocate the second, i.e. the round table conference in London after the 
war. I need not elaborate the arguments, as no doubt you would like to discuss this 
matter with Mr. Hall and the Department. I agree with Mr. Gent's draft telegram 
which, as you will see, revives the suggestion for a round table conference after the 
war, together with postponement of the general election which is due next year. 
A.C.C.P. 
29.5.40 
48 CO 54/975/90, no 5 25 May 1940 
[State Council Powers and Privileges Bill]: letter from G E J Gent to 
Sir A Caldecott 
[The State Council Powers and Privileges Bill had caused some controversy within the 
national legislature. A few members had expressed doubts about the need for immunities 
granted to members for speeches within the precincts of the legislature whether for 
legislative sessions of the whole house or meetings of executive committees. Some of the 
officers of state were also hostile to sections of the bill. The governor had been advised to 
use his powers of reservation until CO advice and His Majesty's approval were obtained. 
Gent's letter to Caldecott was in favour of granting approval provisionally. The memo by 
Campion (clerk to the House of Commons, 1937-1948) and the note by the assistant 
clerk, both of which supported that decision, are not printed here.] 
It is a considerable time since you submitted to us in your confidential despatch of 
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the 3rd October, 1939, copies of the State Council Powers and Privileges Bill for the 
signification of His Majesty's pleasures. 
The Bill was passed to the Clerk to the House of Commons for his consideration 
and advice, and, owing to pressure of work there, it is only recently that we have 
received his observations on the subject. 
I now enclose a copy of Sir Gilbert Campion's memorandum, and also a copy of a 
note prepared by the Assistant Clerk to the House of Commons regarding the 
Standing Orders of the State Council. 
Our provisional view is that assent should be given to the Bill as passed by the 
State Council. Having regard to what is said in the memorandum, we doubt whether 
exception can be taken to the privileges being applicable to Executive Committees; 
and, since the Board of Ministers meet in secret, we are doubtful whether any 
attempt should be made to exclude them from the privileges conferred by the Bill. At 
the same time, however, we have certainly not overlooked the point that you made in 
paragraph 5 of your despatch where you observed that it was almost a certainty that 
State Council Committees would be appointed to enquire into matters of discipline 
within the public service, and that you thought that the present Ordinance should 
implement the Ceylon (State Council) Order-in-Council by expressly excluding from 
its scope the subjects vested in the Governor by Article 86 of that Order-in-Council. 
Before reaching a final conclusion, we should be glad to know what further views 
you form in the light of Sir Gilbert Campion's memorandum, and also in the light of 
any further advice which Drayton may be able to give you both upon the Bill and 
upon the memorandum. 
As regards the note by the Assistant Clerk, we send it to you for your information 
and consideration at leisure. 
49 CO 54/977/7, no 7 27 May 1940 
[Indian labour]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent. Minute by 
Gent 
I have before now remarked on the great difficulty one experiences here in getting 
reliable figures for anything. In a personal letter which I wrote to MacDonald on the 
23rd Apri11 I gave figures for the separation of Indian families under the Indian 
Emigration Ban which had been supplied by our Emigration Commissioner in India. 
These were:-
Number of applications made for permits to return 2091 
Permits issued 1876 
Permits refused 31 
Permits awaited 184 
It now transpires that these figures were in respect of the following cases of separa-
tion only:-
(a) wives } of male workers now working (b) minor children in Ceylon. 
(c) dependent non-working parents 
1 See 36. 
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Labour unrest can of course be aggravated by other separations (e.g. brother and 
brother, brother and sister, father and grown-up son etc.) and the following figures, 
now to hand, are inclusive of all separations and present a fuller picture:-
(1) Number of families in which there has been separation under the ban 3568 
(2) Number of families in which separation has been remedied by return 
permits granted by India 1240 
(3) Number of families in whose case permits have been refused 39 
(4) Applications under reference to Indian Government 2289 
2. Although these figures are more impressive than the former ones it will be 
remembered that the Indian estate population is more than 600,000; and I have been 
informed by planters of long standing that the unrest is most pronounced among the 
Ceylon-born labourers, who have had the benefit (?) of education in estate schools 
and not amongst the immigrant labourers who are nearly all illiterate. I consider in 
fact that the separation of families is a minor, if not negligible, cause of labour 
unrest: any ponderable effect of the ban on the labour situation has lain in the 
anchoring here of coolies who would (if the ban did not prevent their subsequent 
return here) go on holiday to India. This, I believe, (there are no available figures) 
resulted in a considerable surplus of labour over requirements during the first four 
months of the year, and is likely to have the same result again even if it does not (I 
myself apprehend that it does) at the moment persist. 
3. The causation of Labour Unrest in Ceylon is complex and composite; I believe 
the following to be chief factors:-
(1) The "new consciousness of labour" which is world-wide but which has been 
accelerated among our Indian labourers by:-
(a) the recent visit of Nehru, whose appeal to labourers flattered their rising 
sense of self-importance. He told them to realize their collective power for 
bargaining with their employers and always to remember their Indian nation-
hood. To anybody who has heard the Indians clap whenever Gandhi or Nehru 
figures in the News reels at the Nuwara Eliya cinema the importance of Nehru's 
visit requires no further proof or argument; 
(b) the growing infusion of young !iterates from the estate schools into the 
labour forces. These read such papers as the Sama Samajist 'Samathanam' to the 
illiterates and the cooly can now be 'got at' by the printed word. In some estate 
schools night classes in English have been held; the products of these are bound 
to present a tiresome problem, and in a few cases are already doing so. 
(2) The Indian labourer's vote has not only become a bone of Indo-Ceylon 
contention, thereby raising nationalistic feelings; but the vote is being unscrupu-
lously canvassed by three separate factions (i) NatesaAiyer, (ii) the Sama Samajists 
and (iii) the Ceylon Indian Congress, each of whom has its own labour union . 
. Whether Corea's effort to make these unions responsible machines of representa-
tion and conciliation will meet with any success remains to be seen. I will say no 
more at this stage, except that he and Gimson are doing their best. 
(3) Anachronisms in estate management, especially the survival of the head 
kangany system on most estates. The Planters are now furiously considering this 
and other questions (such as revision of wages) but very much at the eleventh 
hour. 
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(4) Nerves. The Planters have never experienced labour troubles before and are 
panicky. The coolies have never been fussed over by politicians before nor have 
they previously dabbled in unions and strikes; they are effervescent. The war has 
upset everybody's nerves, and it is significant that labour unrest has so far been 
confined to the up-country where altitude has a very marked effect on people's 
psychology. It was a bit of a shock to my wife and myself to find a planter's wife 
who stayed with us recently at Queen's Cottage expressing definitely pro-Nazi 
views. We dealt with her kindly but, I think, effectively. Finally, Ceylon politics are 
not a sedative to the nerves of anybody! 
4. I am keeping a copy of this letter in my "Things Ceylonese" file and you may 
care to do the same. 
Minute on 49 
The revised figures are interesting, but the actual numbers in the several categories, 
except pos$ibly category 1, are probably not very important. The disturbing effect is 
produced by the uncertainty and delay rather than by the actual proportion of 
refusals of permits. In the rest of Sir Andrew Caldecott's letter it is odd to my mind 
that he nowhere includes as a cause of the unrest of Indian labour the pronounced 
policy of the Board of Ministers in the last few years against the immigration and 
employment of Indians in the Island. The new "consciousness of labour" is not a 
phenomenon of the last year or two as is the epidemic of strikes amongst Indian 
labour on Ceylon estates. The recent visit of Nehru, which admittedly had the effect 
of giving practical form to the unrest, was due to the anti-Indian policy of the Ceylon 
Ministers, and the Indian labourers' vote has acquired a particular value because the 
Ministers' policy could best be fought by political methods. Neither "anachronisms in 
estate management" nor the "panicky nerves" of estate managers can be properly 
included in a list of causes of the labour unrest. The Ceylon Ministers have reasons of 
their own no doubt for advising the Governor that this is so, but the panicky nerves 
at any rate can only be regarded, and regarded sympathetically in the rather isolated 
circumstances of many estates, as being an unfortunate result of the unrest. 
The 1937 Annual Report of Ceylon draws attention to the first and partial ban on 
emigration from India which the Government of India imposed against Ceylon as a 
retaliation for political grievances against Ceylon, which that report described as 
being unrelated to the matter of emigration or of workers' conditions. The further 
and complete ban which the Government of India imposed last year was similarly a 
retaliation against the policy of the Ceylon Ministers, and as long as that policy 
persists it must bear the onus of being the primary cause of the disturbance of Indian 
labour. The fact that the leading role is played by the educated (generally 
Ceylon-born) worker is a natural one, and is a further pointer to the fact that the 
basis of the trouble is to be found in Ceylon politics and not in anachronisms in 
estate management. 
G.E.J.G. 
18.6.40 
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50 CO 54/975/2, no 50 4 June 1940 
[Labour unrest on tea plantations]: letter from G F Bolster1 to Mr A 
Lennox-Boyd2 
I am writing this letter to you in the hope that you will be able to put in a word in 
high places on behalf of the Planting Community in Ceylon in their efforts to save 
the Tea Industry of the Island. There is serious unrest amongst our labour which has 
been stirred up by agitators and Fifth Columnists who are guilty of serious sedition. 
Our difficulty is that the Governor, Sir Andrew Caldecott, refuses to use his powers to 
stop the activities of these rascals. In the meantime matters are going from bad to 
worse. 
The position is very complicated but roughly has developed as follows:- On the 
outbreak of war the Planters in the Dimbula and Uva Districts were mobilised for a 
month's training. While they were away agitators entered their estates, mostly at 
night, and began to stir up the coolies to strike and riot. The first District affected 
was Dimbula. The Planters returned to find their authority undermined and frequent 
strikes broke out. Up to the end of August there had been no trouble in any district. 
The Planters Association for a considerable time have recognised that a properly 
led Trade Union for the Tamil estate labourers was most desirable. However, 
seemingly over-night, large numbers of Unions had started and a state of chaos was 
reigning due to the rivalry between them. The scramble to encourage membership 
frequently resulted in fights between factions on the new estate. This new ramp 
offered most lucrative rewards in monthly subscriptions from the coolies of 25 cents 
each. It was no wonder many half educated rascals were not slow to grasp this new 
way of earning an easy living, and set to with a will to create trouble in every way they 
could. The result was dozens of strikes in nearly every case over no real legal 
grievance. The general method adopted was for Union coolies on an estate to cause 
trouble then follow it up with a strike making wide and sweeping demands dictated 
by the outside agitator. He then comes into the open as the representative of the 
coolies and tries to negotiate favourable terms with the Superintendent. Naturally 
some of these rascals soon skipped with their takings. There are five main Unions, 
two of which deserve attention. 
1. The Ceylon Workers Federation under Naki Tyer.3 
2. The All-Ceylon Workers Union whose main leaders are Dr. M.N. [sic] Perera 
and P.M. Velachamy (who was responsible for the serious Mooloya Estate riot near 
Kandy). This Union is really the Ceylon Communist Party or Sana Sancajists [sic], 
whose leaders include D.P. Gunawardene (member of State Council like M.N. 
Perera), Dr. Colvin de Silva, Dr. S.A. Wichremsingha, Leslie Gunwardene, 
Edmond Samarakkoddy and W.A.P. Jayatilaka. All these men are notorious rascals 
and most of them are jail birds. Jayatilaka, for instance, has done a term for rape 
1 Bolster was a tea planter of the Napier Division, Rookatenne Group, Hali-Ela. 
2 MP (Con) from 1931; parliamentary secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1938-1939, Ministry of Home 
Security, 1939, Ministry of Food, 1939-1940, Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1943-1945; minister of state 
for colonies, 1951-1952; minister of transport and civil aviation, 1952-1954; S of S for the colonies, 
1954-1959. 
3 A reference to K Natesa lyer. 
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committed on Lunugala Estate, Madulsima. Such are the leaders of labour! 
Having entered the arena rather late the Sana Sancajists did their best to exploit 
the situation in Dimbula. They then turned their eyes on the Uva District centring 
round Badulla. Up to March the Uva District was quite unaffected by the goings on in 
Dimbula. However nearly at once after the opening of the Union Office in Badulla 
trouble started. The Sana Samaj were first in the field and started to organise calls on 
some of the most important estates in the area. Their first try on was on Attempettia 
Estate. After a three day strike for no real reason their effort failed. Seeing that 
peaceful methods did not succeed they changed their tactics for the next four estates 
where they were engineering trouble. 
1. Unugalla Group. This took the form of a show down strike which thanks to the 
capable handling of the Superintendents was settled without any real trouble and a 
few reasonable requests were granted. The main point in this case is that there was 
no justification for a strike as the coolies could easily have obtained the requests 
that were granted by asking the Manager in a constitutional way. This did not suit 
the Union leaders, who included a number of the most impossible demands that 
could be imagined, quite regardless of the regulations laid down in the Labour 
Ordinances. 
2. Oodoowerre Estate. This is a private estate company owned by Mr. D.E. 
Hamilton. As this estate is next door to me I was indirectly concerned in the 
trouble. I can assure you that Hamilton pays his coolies high rates of wages and 
that his estate is run on model lines. The coolies had no justifiable complaint. The 
Sana [sic] Samajists however bore Hamilton a grudge as he stood for the Tala-
wakellie Seat in the State Council in the last election. Though he failed to get in 
he was very close to it. They therefore organised trouble in the Upper Division of 
the estate and a small incident was made the excuse for a strike. A police armed 
guard was required to escort the estate lorry to the factory. Hamilton's bungalow 
and the factory were threatened with burning. This creditable [?sic] behaviour was 
of course followed up by a letter from the Union making eight demands on behalf 
of the strikers. I saw this letter and it was obvious that they were not "bona fide" 
as they showed a complete lack of knowledge concerning the organisation of the 
estate. It was obvious that the demands were made up by the Same [sic] Samaj 
leaders in their Badulla Office. 
The above two cases show the complete folly of the present situation. These Unions 
are registered without any regard to their objects and intentions. The result is they 
have a free hand to cause great mischief. The serious side of the matter is that the 
All-Ceylon Workers Union is not a Union, in actual fact, it is a Political Party. 
3. Demodera Group. This is the largest group in the Ceylon tea industry, and the 
labour were always well paid and contented until the arrival of Velachamy. He held 
a meeting however at Demodera Railway Station and as a direct result of this there 
was a riot on the Wevelhena Division of the Group between Unionists and others 
whom they were trying to intimidate into joining the Union. 
This riot had a sequel in the Badulla Court when the Magistrate issued Notices 
banning the Sama Samajists from holding and addressing meetings. 
On Sunday May 12th the Same Samajists held a meeting (in spite of the ban) in 
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Badulla (Report Cutting No.3 enclosed).4 At this meeting the speakers referred to the 
police and magistrate as dogs. Dr. M.N. Perera further addressed another meeting at 
Demodera which again was the cause of a riot this time over 35 coolies were seriously 
hurt and many others suffered minor injuries. 
These speeches are of particular interest as they are always insulting to the Empire 
and openly seditious. There is a sample of the tripe which is being allowed. They 
usually are on these lines. "My children of India, Awake! Awake and open your eyes to 
the world. You are slaves. Why? Because you allow the English rascal to abuse your 
rights and liberty. You must fight to the death for these rights. The police dogs can 
do nothing as the Governor pig is afraid because the British Raj is being beaten by 
the Germans. The white pigs and their King are all running away. This is your 
chance now while their backs are turned. Arise now and seize your rights. If the dogs 
resist kill them". It is on these lines that the Sama Samajists address the coolies and 
is it any wonder that some of the least intelligent of them lose their heads and cause 
trouble. 
Now Boyd what I wish you to understand is this; the Governor attended the 
General Meeting of the Planters Association held in March at the Queen's Hotel, 
Kandy. At this Meeting he got up and said, before hundreds of witnesses, that the 
illegal activities of agitators would be stopped by the strong arm of the law. At last, 
we thought, after over four months of lawlessness, something would be done. Since 
then the Governor has done absolutely nothing and now the position is very serious 
indeed. He has been approached on three occasions by deputations of Europeans 
asking him to act. The last occasion was last Friday, May 31st. On each occasion 
Caldecott refused to do anything to prevent the activities of these agitators in spite of 
his promise. 
I heard a verbatim report from Mr. Percy Will who was one of this last deputation 
from the Uva District Branch of the Planters Association. His remarks were amazing. 
One is only left with the impression that the Governor is either a Red himself or an 
incredibly incompetent fool. This is the unanimous opinion of every Planter in this 
District. 
I hope the Censor will permit the following information to get to you as if you can 
do something for us you will do a great service. Now with Italy joining in this war, or 
at least it seems remarkably like it, the position of Ceylon requires careful 
consideration as raids on the Island become probable from Italian cruisers. Very 
frankly the native Sinhale troops of the Defence Force can not be trusted. Thus we 
will require every European that can carry a rifle. These agitators know this well and 
are doing the Naziz [sic] a great service by causing this unrest. For as long as this 
unrest continues 1/3rd of the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps cannot be mobilised. If we 
were mobilised suddenly, Perera, Gunawardene and others would be up here as soon 
as our backs were turned. I shudder to think of the consequences. The place would 
be shambles. The only way to prevent this is to arrest the whole gang. This is what 
we have asked the Governor to do. It has been done in India and everywhere else in 
the Empire. Why not here, particularly after Caldecott's promise in March. 
We all consider the tea to be a vital food for the Home and Fighting Fronts. Most 
estates are under contract to the Tea Controller to supply a vast quantity of tea. Is it 
right that under these circumstances agitators and other seditionists, in foreign pay, 
4 Enclosures not printed. 
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should be tolerated when they are doing everything in their power to upset the whole 
trade of the Island. I put it to you. Is it right? 
4. Having digressed I will now return to the Wewesse Estate trouble. These are 
dealt with in Cuttings No.l and No.2. I know Mr. Mayow, the Superintendent of 
this Estate, and can confirm that, until Velachamy began holding meetings on the 
Patna close to this estate, the labour force were quite contented. They surrounded 
the Bungalow and threatened to kill both Mayow and his wife and even dug graves 
close by. The police at the time were helpless so Mayow had to leave the estate. 
Now I come to cutting No.4. This is taken from a report published in the Times of 
Ceylon of the State Council Meeting on Tuesday, May 28th. Please read it carefully. 
This is sedition with a capital S. Then why in the name of Job is the Governor 
allowing these rascals to carry on in this manner. Ceylon is at war. Can such talk be 
tolerated? There is no Regular Army Battalion of Infantry in Ceylon so if there is 
serious rioting as a result of this sedition we Europeans will have to roll up our 
sleeves and put a stop to it. If the Governor acts it may well be that it may save this 
happening, but as we will have to do the dirty work, our lives and those of our women 
and children, are at stake, we think it only right to demand that action be taken at 
once. 
I do most earnestly appeal to you to put a word in the right place on our behalf. 
P.S. My father is Dr. F. Bolster of Biggleswade. 
51 CO 54/973/13, no 16 5 June 1940 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Lord Lloyd to 
Sir A Caldecott advocating postponement of the general election until 
the end of the war 
Much appreciate full statement of your advice in your personal and most secret 
telegram of 22nd May .1 Position as I see it is as follows: 
(I) We should avoid general election under existing constitution and especially 
the disturbance it would be likely to cause in local circumstances of Indian 
problem and general circumstances of war. 
(2) Postponement for one year on ground that I must have time to consider 
matter personally would seem to imply that I was going to dictate reforms from 
here. This could not be expected to satisfy Ceylonese aspirations. 
(3) For two reasons I do not favour your suggestion of one man commission to 
visit Ceylon as impartial investigator on my behalf. In the first place I do not think 
he could avoid giving all communities the chance to present their demands afresh, 
since they would assume critical moment had arrived for influencing my decision 
through agency of his report. Secondly, and more important, I obviously regard 
you yourself as fully informed and fully impartial and I should not like to give any 
other impression locally. 
1 See47. 
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(4) Postponement of election for only one year would scarcely be long enough to 
prevent disturbing effect of active preparation for election campaign. 
(5) In paragraph 9 of my predecessor's confidential (2) despatch of 26th January,2 
suggestion was made for round table conference in London after the war. I am not 
myself much in favour of such conference, and I hope that you will avoid any 
promise or commitment that reforms will not be decided upon until one has been 
held. 
(6) Dictation of reforms may eventually be forced on us, but I would much rather 
we did not have to do it during the war. 
(7) My present inclination is · therefore to take the . line that in view of general 
dissatisfaction with present constitution and desirability of avoiding unnecessary 
disturbance of community, general election should be postponed until victory has 
been achieved, when reform of Constitution can be considered afresh after such 
further consultation as may then seem profitable and desirable with leading 
interests in the island. 
(8) Risk of consequences of postponement for indefinite period as explained in 
your telegram No. 495 may be offset by possible inclination of parties in Ceylon to 
restrain themselves in the interval in order to show their capacity for self-
government. 
Please take into your confidence any one you consider necessary on my provisional 
views as set out above and telegraph what your conclusions are. 
2 See 23. 
52 CO 54/974/8, no HA 13 June 1940 
[ Ceylon Association] : note by G E J Gent for Lord Lloyd's meeting 
with a deputation representing plantation interests 
The deputation from the Ceylon Association to see the Secretary of State tomorrow 
at 4 o'clock will consist of the President Mr. Homer, the Vice President Mr. P.T. 
Edwards, Mr. Matthew, Mr. Masefield, Mr. Ferguson, and the Secretary, Mr. 
Baynham. All these represent plantation interests . The deputation will concentrate 
on the danger of the present labour unrest amongst Indian labour on the estates. 
A few weeks ago the Governor sent home for the Secretary of State a copy of a 
memorandum from the two chief European Plantation Associations in Ceylon which 
made two comprehensive requests:-
(a) that tea and rubber be proclaimed to be "essential industries" (under the 
Defence Regulations) which they consider would undoubtedly prove to be a severe 
check on seditious agitators. 
(b) that the Governments of India and Ceylon should be persuaded that the 
imposition of the ban on emigration from India is extremely detrimental to 
Ceylon's major industries and causes great hardship on Indian estate labourers 
who have been accustomed to passing freely between India and Ceylon. 
A few weeks ago too at the Annual General Meeting of the Ceylon Association in 
London, a resolution was passed and sent to the Secretary of State as follows :-
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"This Association deplores the present lack of concord between the Governments 
of Ceylon and India which is due not only to the discriminatory action of the 
Government of Ceylon towards many of its Indian employees but to the severe ban 
on emigration of Indian unskilled labourers to Ceylon instituted by the Govern-
ment of India, and regrets the consequent adverse effect on the general and 
industrial welfare of Ceylon. This Association expresses its earnest wish that 
endeavours will be successful whereby the contention between the two Govern-
ments will be terminated and decides that a copy of this resolution be transmitted 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies." 
The problem of the political relations between the Governments of India and 
Ceylon cannot usefully be discussed in a short note. We all deplore the present bad 
relations which derive from the respective nationalist feelings in the Parliamentary 
Institutions in India and Ceylon. In India the affairs of Indians overseas are 
notoriously a matter of 'face' to the Government of India. In Ceylon the ruling 
principle is 'Ceylon for the Ceylonese'-in both a political and economic sense. We 
have lost no opportunity of urging the Government of Ceylon to bear in mind that 
the basis of the Island's economic well-being-not merely the European tea industry 
but also the Ceylonese coconut industry-depends on the maintenance of good 
relations with India. The Secretary of State has at present under consideration the 
question of a personal conference with Mr. Amery to see if a detente can be arranged 
and the Indian ban on emigration to Ceylon removed. 
But the Ceylon Association's deputation will be urgently concerned with the 
present labour unrest which is undoubtedly extending to new areas where Indian 
labour is employed on the tea estates, and in which there are signs of the unrest 
being marked by petty violence and ill-humour. On many of the estates a war of 
nerves is going on amongst the European managing staffs who are often very isolated 
from contact with other Europeans. Moreover, the current opinion in planting 
circles is that in the absence of troops the Police Force is insufficient to control any 
dangerous situation which might develop. The chief European military volunteer 
force is the Ceylon Planters' Rifle Corps and the planters are of course apprehensive 
that estates would be denuded of European managing staff if this force had to be 
called out for action in a particular locality. They are also apprehensive that the 
attractions of coming home to join up in the Army may draw away from estate staffs 
some of the European assistants who are indispensable on the estates in present 
circumstances. 
In this situation the Ceylonese Minister for Labour, Mr. Corea, urged by the 
Governor and the Secretary of State, has been holding conferences both with 
representatives of the planters and representatives of the rival Indian Trade Unions in 
Ceylon for the purpose of promoting arbitration and conciliation, and for reaching 
agreement between the representatives of employers and employed on the removal of 
certain features of estate employment to which the workers claim to take exception; 
particularly this includes the 'Head Kangany' system. It is not necessary probably to 
go into this as the planters are in general agreeable to the abolition of this system 
which briefly is that the working contacts between the management and the Indian 
workers are carried on through the medium of an Indian agent, the 'Head Kangany', 
on the estate. No doubt many of the Kanganys misuse their opportunities to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the labourers, and a particular Head Kangany can abuse 
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his authority for oppression and victimisation of workers who are not fully amenable 
to him. 
These conferences under the aegis of the Minister are achieving considerable 
promise. New legislation is before the Board of Ministers for local Boards of 
Conciliation and the matter of compulsory arbitration (to which the planters have 
objected) is also under the Minister's consideration. There appears also to be a 
growing appreciation by both employers and workers of the value of the Labour 
Department of the Ceylon Government although the Controller of Labour has 
stressed the difficulty which he has experienced in getting the employers, in 
particular, to notify the Department in good time of the labour difficulty on the 
estates. Only too often no request is made to the Department by an estate manager 
until the trouble has developed to a serious stage. There has also been a lack of 
readiness on both sides to accept any compromise towards a settlement. For this 
reason the adoption of compulsion may be a necessary incentive to a more ready 
acceptance of conciliation. 
The deputation, in common with the general view, is likely to concentrate on the 
nefarious activities of one of the rival workers' organisations viz. the Sama Samaj, or 
'Communist', Party. It is true that most of the exhibitions of violence can be traced to 
the hand of this organisation. The Sama Samaj Union is not a registered union and 
the planters' representatives have declined to meet it in conference. They regard it as 
deplorable that the Ceylon Government have failed to proscribe it and to suppress it. 
The Governor has told us that he does not believe that such action would remedy the 
situation; it is of a nature which would flourish underground.1 Moreover, the 
Ministers would not consent to such a course. He says that investigations have not 
shown the Sama Samaj to derive any funds from the Communist International, nor 
have its agents been guilty of seditious activities with the troops or with recruitment 
for the forces . Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the two Sama Samaj members of the 
State Council have delivered themselves of such outrageous anti-British statements 
that the mischief of the Party's activities & policy ('anti-Imperialist' and 'anti-
capitalist' nominally) in present circumstances in Ceylon seems to be beyond doubt, 
and any reliable evidence that the deputation may be able to produce on the Sama 
Samaj question should, I suggest, be welcomed by the Secretary of State. We could 
hope to solve straightforward economic difficulties in Ceylon and even politico-
economic difficulties, but it will be made infinitely more difficult if a merely 
wrecking organisation is permited to 'rock the boat' in present circumstances 
without restriction. 
Finally, the Secretary of State will no doubt like to inform the deputation in 
confidence of the announcement to defer the General Election for two years which 
will appear on the following day, Saturday. It is the general belief that the 
postponement of the Election will ease the present tension amongst Indian labour in 
Ceylon since the urgency of their voting support for rival candidates representing the 
various Union Organisations will be removed. 
1 See 46, para 8. 
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53 CO 54/978/10 14 June 1940 
[Sama Samajists]: minutes by KW Blaxter and Sir G Bushe on the 
grounds upon which N M Perera and D P R Gunawardene might be 
arrested and detained 
[In these minutes Blaxter and Bushe (legal adviser, CO) are contemplating recommend-
ing pre-emptive action against the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), a Trotskyist group, 
whose two members in the State Council were using their privileged position there to 
oppose the war effort (cf 46, para 8 and 48). After his initial reluctance to take the action 
contemplated by the CO (see 55 and 56), Caldecott did authorise the arrest and detention 
of the Sama Samaja leaders, including their two members of the State Council (see 60) .) 
It is suggested that a telegram might be sent to the Governor on the following 
lines:-
The S. of S.'s attention has been called to the remarks made by Mr. Perera and Mr. 
D.P.R. Gunawardene in the State Council on the 29th May during the Debate on a 
Supplementary Estimate for Rs. 100,000 to meet the cost of the acquisition of land 
for an air base for the R.A.F} that the S. of S. regards the remarks made by these 
two members to be of such a nature as cannot be tolerated in the present 
circumstances; the S. of S. presumes that as the Powers and Privileges Bill has not 
yet received His Majesty's assent, there is at present no right of free speech in the 
Council; but that in any case it would appear likely that there exists at the private 
houses of these two members if they are searched literature and correspondence of 
such a kind as would justify their arrest; ask the Governor to consider at once what 
steps can be taken for the arrest of these two members. 
It might be well to ask the Governor to report to us how he proposes to proceed 
before any action is actually taken. It is perhaps unlikely that a mistake such as was 
made in the case of Mr. Bracegirdle should be made again, but we don't want there to 
be any risk of such an occurrence, and it would probably be safest that we should be 
informed how the Governor proposes to act before anything is actually done. 
K.W.B. 
14.6.40 
On thinking this over again, I do not think that the right of free speech really comes 
into it. Defence Regulation 18, which I presume the Governor has enacted, provides 
that the Governor may detain a person if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do 
with a view to preventing him acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or 
defence. Upon that I think the Governor is quite entitled to be satisfied that a person 
1 During the debate in the State Council on 29 May, Perera commented: 'At a time of intense suffering in 
Ceylon when every cent should be made available to the poor people of this country, when thousands were 
tendered homeless, it was criminal folly to vote money for the purpose which only consolidated their 
position as slaves.' Gunawardena made the observation that the British 'are a declining and decrepit 
empire' and continued: 'In view of the police terrorism that is going on such as the beating of labourers 
and labourers being charged falsely, it is criminal folly on the part of the country to vote money for the 
Royal Air Force who are not going to fight for them but to bomb defenceless men and women in this 
country. We are not going to be party to spending a single cent.' These, and other speeches during the 
debate, are reproduced in W S Muthiah & S Wanasinghe, Britain, World War 2 and the Sama Samajists 
(Colombo, 1996) pp 83-84. 
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who makes such speeches in the Legislature ought to be detained to prevent him 
acting in a manner prejudicial, etc. Of course, if they could get further evidence it is 
all to the good. We might say, therefore, that it is not clear what is the immunity 
enjoyed by members of the State Council in regard to speeches made there, but for 
the reasons given above that does not seem to us to come into the picture. 
H.G.B. 
14.6.40 
54 CO 54/978/7, no 19 14 June 1940 
[Reforms): despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the 
registration of Indian voters. Enclosure 2: extract from the minutes of 
a meeting of the Board of Ministers, 4 June 1940 
With reference to my Confidential despatches of the 23rd February1 and 17th May2 
on the subject of the registration of Indian Voters I have the honour to forward at the 
request of the Ministers the Hansard reports3 of the debate begun in State Council on 
14th May, continued on the 15th, 16th and 17th May, and concluded on the 28th 
May, on the following resolution moved by the Honourable Mr. S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike:-
"That in view of the serious situation that has arisen in connection with the 
registration of non-Ceylonese voters for State Council elections, this Council 
demands that immediate steps be taken to give effect to the proposals 
contained in paragraph 35 of Governor Stanley's despatch, dated 2nd June, 
1929, and approved by the Secretary of State in paragraph 10 of his despatch, 
dated l Oth October, 1929. 
The resolution was passed by 30 votes to 17. There was one abstention and certain 
other members who had spoken against the motion were absent at the division. 
2. An abstract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Ministers, held on 
·the 4th June, is enclosed: this extract contains a summary of the views of the 
Ministers in regard to the matters raised in the debate and describes the "immediate 
steps" which the Ministers desire should be taken. 
3. The extract also contains a statement made by the Legal Secretary in regard to 
the revision of the electoral registers which should take place this year and the 
decision by the Board of Ministers that further action in regard to the supplementary 
estimate should be deferred until a reply has been received to this despatch. 
4. As a result of the Council Debate I have received from the Indian Agent in the 
course of an interview a repetition of the representation made by him in June last 
year that 
1 See 26. 
"Indian opinion both in India and Ceylon is unanimous that the only logical 
and fair solution of the problem is a reversion to the simple test of residence 
of five years in Ceylon as recommended by the Donoughmore Commission. 
2 See 45. 3 Not printed. 
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The Government of India agrees with this view and strongly recommends its 
adoption." 
If any change is made in the present system of Indian representation we are, as you 
are aware, under obligation to consult the Government of India. 
5. In order to make clear my own position vis-a-vis the Ministerial attitude on the 
one hand and Indian opinion on the other, I can only reiterate what I have already 
twice written on this subject in previous despatches. As I read the Ceylon (State 
Council Elections) Order in Council, 1931, an Indian can be enfranchised by 
Article 7 (a) proving Ceylonese domicile of origin; 
(b) proving, if he has been resident for five years or more, Ceylonese 
domicile of choice. 
Article 8 (c) proving that he possesses the prescribed literacy and property 
qualifications, or 
Article 9 (d) proving that he has been continuously resident in Ceylon for five 
years and declaring that he intends to settle here permanently. 
Proof of domicile of choice (b) is notoriously difficult and (d) was provided to make 
enfranchisement easier for the intending settler. The past mistake of registering 
officers has been to register people under Article 7 without positive proof of domicile 
of choice. The more recent failure of three Government Agents to implement the 
Legal Secretary's Circular of August, 1938, was reported in my despatch of the 23rd 
February. A revision of the registers still appears to me all that is necessary to remedy 
these mistakes and failures. The Legal Secretary, however, holds the view that 
difficulties will persist so long as domicile remains the basis of franchise. 
6. I was unaware, when I formed (in connection with my reform proposals) the 
opinion expressed in the preceding paragraph, that the omission to prescribe in the 
Electoral Order in Council a fee of one rupee or less on a certificate of permanent 
settlement (as distinct from the stamp duty on an applicant's declaration, which is 
expressly waived by Article 9 (2)) was intentional; but this now appears plain from 
Lord Passfield's despatch No. 323, of the 20th June, 1930, which has since been 
brought to my notice. I was also then unaware that there is no general Fees 
Ordinance in Ceylon under which such a fee could be imposed. I had, however, 
before being informed on these two points, impressed on the Ministers my 
conviction that the proposed revision of the registers would not reduce the number 
of Indian voters but merely result in persons disqualified under Article 7 being 
re-registered under Article 9. It appears to me strangely inconsistent that those who 
so recently felt it necessary to debar Indian labourers from the Village Franchise (the 
grant of which would have involved the voter in an annual capitation of tax of Re. 1) 
should now think that the prescription of one single none-recurrent payment of Re. 
1 would deter the labourer from registering under Article 9. In any case the Re. 1 was 
not intended to be a deterrent (Sir Herbert Stanley explicitly recommended it as 
"only a nominal fee") and I am unable to support (vide paragraph 5 of enclosure (2)) 
the prescription of any payment that has a restrictive purpose. I am also advised that 
it would involve an amendment of the Order in Council. 
7. I am further unable to support any proposal (vide paragraph 4 of enclosure (2)) 
that the grant of the franchise to an Indian labourer should be made conditional on 
his deprivation of treatment or amenities to which a manual worker is entitled by 
local labour law and international convention. 
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8. As regards paragraph 3 of enclosure (2) I agree that domicile of choice must, 
for the purposes of Article 7, be proved positively. The purpose of the proposed 
revision of the registers was to delete registrations under Article 7 in respect of which 
domicile of choice had not been proved but merely assumed. 
9. In regard to paragraph 2 of enclosure (2) there is no objection to the Legal 
Secretary reporting to the Board of Ministers what in his opinion are adequate 
methods of proving five years' residence. Whatever his opinion is, it must stand; as 
he is the authority in whom control over elections to the State Council is vested by 
the Constitution. There can be no question of his taking directions from the Board of 
Ministers in the matter, and any report furnished by him on this subject would be for 
their information only. 
10. Paragraph 1 of enclosure (2) raises vexed questions of history and interpreta-
tion. Of the genuineness of the Sinhalese view that the present Constitution was 
accepted by them on the understanding that the recommendations contained in 
paragraph 35 of Sir Herbert Stanley's despatch of the 2nd June, 1929, would be 
implemented to the letter and in toto there can be no question. Mr. Wikramanayake 
undoubtedly spoke for his community when he said (Hansard, 12th December, 1929, 
page 1807):-
"With regard to the fear of the vote being given to the immigrant cooly, that 
too has been removed because the test to be applied is such that we need have 
no fears." 
On the other hand in a previous speech in the same debate (Hansard 1929, page 
1777) the Colonial Secretary had drawn the attention of the House to the fact that 
"the renouncement of the claim to a right does not necessarily mean that the right 
actually disappears." In the same speech he said that "there are many questions of 
detail which will have to be worked out in the later development of the scheme." The 
contention of those who voted for Mr. Bandaranaike's motion is that in the 
development of the scheme details were not worked out but principles dropped out. 
11. I have found that local records of correspondence that intervened between 
the Council Debate of December, 1929, and Lord Passfield's telegram of the lOth 
June, 1930 (published here as Sessional Paper :XXXIV/1929), confused and incom-
plete. That telegram, however, should have made it clear to any who read it with care 
that any deprivation of rights inherent in the grant of a certificate of permanent 
settlement would not extend to the abrogation of any obligations imposed by Statute 
on an employer towards his employees, and that therefore the jettison of privileges 
previously envisaged (e.g., in Mr. C. W. W. Kannangara's speech reported on pages 
1813 and 1814 of the 1928 Hansard) would not in fact eventuate. 
12. Any idea of now going back on Lord Passfield's telegram after the passage of 
ten years appears to me quite outside practical politics, inconsonant with Ceylon's 
obligations under international conventions, and incompatible with such a develop-
ment of responsible democratic tradition as alone could form the basis of any future 
constitutional advancement in this Island. 
Enclosure 2 to 54 
. . . 24. The Board considered a memorandum, dated 25th April, 1940, submitted 
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by the Legal Secretary on the question of the revision of the Electoral Registers. 
A Supplementary Estimate for Rs. 248,500 for the purpose was also placed before 
the Board. 
Before considering these items the Ministers summarised their views in regard to 
the matters raised in the recent debate as follows:-
(1) The Order in Council does not appear, on the face of it, to conflict with the 
assurances resulting from the combined effect of paragraph 35 of Sir Herbert 
Stanley's despatch and paragraph 10 of Lord Passfield's despatch: hitherto it has 
been read as giving effect to those assurances: it is only recently that it has been 
realised that, by administrative methods and interpretation, those assurances have 
been defeated. 
(2) Instead of the Committee proposed by Sir Herbert Stanley in paragraph 35 of 
his despatch the Board of Ministers would be agreeable to the Legal Secretary 
reporting to them what, in his view, were adequate methods of proving five years' 
residence for the purposes of Articles 7 and 9 of the Order in Council and the other 
matters contemplated by Sir Herbert Stanley in his despatch as being within the 
purview of this Committee. 
(3) Persons claiming the franchise on the ground of domicile of choice must 
prove positively that they have acquired such a domicile. 
(4) The holder of a certificate of permanent settlement must be, in law and in fact, 
deprived of special rights, privileges, etc. In so far as such rights, etc., depend on 
statutory obligations of employers, the employers must be relieved of those 
obligations in respect of holders of certificates of permanent settlement. 
(5) A fee must be charged for a certificate of permanent settlement (under the 
1930 Order in Council a declaration was not exempt from stamp duty, but the duty 
was not collected). Under the 1931 Order in Council the declaration was 
specifically exempted from stamp duty. Contention is that, if stamp duty cannot be 
charged on the certificate without amending the Stamp Duty Ordinance, the 
Governor could prescribe a fee for the issue of the certificate without amending 
the Order in Council or any other legislation. 
The discussion was adjourned and resumed again at 2.30 p.m. All members were 
present except the Minister of Health. 
The Legal Secretary then explained that the revision of the electoral registers was 
divided into three parts:-
(a) expunging the names of persons who had become disqualified under Article 6; 
this work was small and required little or no extra staff or expenditure; 
(b) entering new names on the register: this work was small so far as persons 
claiming literacy and property qualification were concerned, but it was difficult so 
far as persons claiming a domicile of choice under Article 7 were concerned; 
(c) revising the qualifications of persons already on the register; if anything 
substantial was to be accomplished within the time available, considerable staff 
and money would be required. 
There were two limitations on the amount of work that could be accomplished 
under head (c), namely, the time table prescribed by the Order in Council which 
necessitated all the inquiries being completed by the 1st of August and the limited 
number of suitable staff available. 
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The scheme which he had prepared seven weeks ago contemplated the employ-
ment of 200 officers of Civil List status for a period of two months. With this staff the 
maximum number of persons on the register whose qualifications could be tested 
would have been 400,000, i.e., less than 14 per cent. to 15 per cent. of the total 
number of electors; only one month was now available and the staff could not be 
increased. Indeed it might be doubtful whether 200 officers of the status required 
could ever be made available, and if they could, it would only be at the cost of very 
considerable dislocation in public business. With only one month available the 
quantity of the revision which could be accomplished under head (c) would be less 
than 8 per cent. of the total number of electors. 
The Board decided that, in view of the fact that any revision of the registers which 
could be undertaken in the time available would be inadequate, a supplementary 
estimate for the amount asked for by the Legal Secretary should not now be 
presented. Further action should be deferred until a reply had been received from the 
Secretary of State to the proposed despatch which is to report the recent debate on 
the State Council electoral registers. 
55 CO 54/97 4/8, no 12 15 June 1940 
[Sama Samajists]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord Lloyd to 
Sir A Caldecott on the need for firm and effective action 
I am continually receiving warnings from various sources both representative of 
European commercial interests and others of serious deterioration of public order in 
Ceylon and failure to take effective action against Sama Samajists is particularly and 
widely emphasised. I have just received deputation from Ceylon Association which 
stated inter alia that you had stated:-
(1) you were not prepared to use special powers to prevent intimidation and 
threats of violence by agitators because such action would not be supported by 
Secretary of State and because it would require a regiment from India; 
(2) Ministers would not agree to tightening up existing law relating to sedition; 
(3) you would only take action against Communist movement in Ceylon if 
evidence was forthcoming that it was financed from outside. 
I do not know whether there is any substance in above statement, but I can assure 
you that I shall give you all possible support in regard to any measures you may have 
to recommend for ensuring firm and effective action against all and any disturbers of 
law and order or persons whose activities are likely to be prejudicial to efficient 
prosecution of war. I regard such firmness as paramount duty of Government in 
present emergency, regardless of opposition by Ministers or non-co-operation by 
State Council which must now be a subordinate consideration. I have not had any 
suggestion from you that police and other forces of order at your disposal would be 
inadequate to suppress disorder in the Island, but if you have any doubts on that 
point I request that you will consult your military and police authorities and let me 
have your views as soon as possible. 
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56 CO 54/97 4/8, no 13 18 June 1940 
[Sama Samajists]: inward unnumbered telegraph (reply) from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd 
Your Secret and Personal telegram of 15th June. 1 Deterioration of public order in 
Ceylon has been greatly exaggerated and with suppression of troubles on Wewessa 
estate position throughout the island is again normal, though, of course, possibility 
of further outbreaks of labour unrest is being continuously watched. I have 
throughout been in constant touch with Labour Police and military authorities and 
neither of the latter has any doubt of the ability to make arrangements for disorder in 
the island should it ever arise. I have already reported by my telegram No. 569 Secret 
that we can spare 50 men of the Rifle Corps for active service. I have always regarded 
firmness my paramount duty in matters affecting security and the prosecution of the 
war, and would not hesitate to request enactment of recently drafted Order in 
Council enabling me to take over Government if events should require and justify 
such a course. At the same time I have considered it essential to refrain from 
precipitate action at the dictation of the Times of Ceylon or on representations from 
other (? group omitted) which are only half informed and put forward in ignorance 
or disregard of their full implications. Of the representations quoted in your 
telegrams I can only conjecture that (1) may be a strange distortion of conversation 
reported in paragraph 15 of Government Ceylonese No. 8. As regards item (2) Legal 
Secretary informs me that proposed legislation was dropped on his advice that it 
would make conviction more difficult than under existing law. Item (3) may possibly 
reflect obiter dictum of mine that if Samajist party were ever found receiving money 
or literature from Moscow I should take immediate action under Defence Act. 
A present difficulty is that the tone of recent articles and correspondence in the 
Times of Ceylon is stirring up feeling and friction between educated Ceylonese and 
local European community. Such articles and letters make it clear that its 
management would not be receptive of advice from myself or other authority and I 
apprehend that Minister may press for consorship of the press as only effective form 
of restraint, a course to which I am opposed if it can possibly be avoided. I am most 
grateful for your assurance of support, and I hope action reported to-day in my 
telegram No. 579 Secret which has been taken after continuous watching of Samajist 
[sic] activities and establishment of data may have a reassuring effect on Ceylon 
interests in London and elsewhere.2 
1 See 55. 
2 Lloyd replied on 24 June that he was 'glad to have your assurance, and I am confident that in association 
with authorities responsible for law and order you will continue to watch local opinion and advise me if 
and when you consider any special measures are necessary' (CO 54/974/8, no 13). The secretary of state, 
however, remained concerned over anti-British agitation in Ceylon (see 63) . 
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57 CO 54/977/7, no 9 29 June 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': tenth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO. 
Minutes by Lord Lloyd and K W Blaxter 
General situation in the island 
1. These Notes will not be placed under headings as usual, being in the nature of 
a general review. 
2. At this critical period of the war, when France has collapsed and capitulated, I 
think that it would be correct to regard the people of this Island as divided into 
several political strata in relation to their local and Empire citizenship:-
(a) Left-wing Samajists [sic], who in these dark days have come out definitely 
anti-British. Five of their leaders are under detention or awaiting arrest, and other 
members are being prosecuted for offences under the Defence Regulations. This 
stratum does not comprise more than 1/z% of the population. They are under 
constant watch by the Police. 
(b) The non-English speaking classes which may be roughly divided into (i) 
urban, (ii) agricultural and (iii) labour. There is no inherent antipathy to British 
Rule in any of these three categories. Members of all of them however, whether 
Sinhalese or Tamil, are impressionable and excitable fellows. They are an easy prey 
to politicians, and will respond to nationalistic and socialistic speeches. The 
postponement of the next elections gives them a respite from much such oratory. 
The Lake House vernacular newspapers (a great increase in whose circulation 
shows that real interest is being taken in the war by this stratum) are a thoroughly 
loyal and healthy influence. 
(c) The clerical classes. These are all English-speaking and are predominantly 
pro-British. They contain, inevitably, individuals who have been dismissed from 
former jobs for misconduct and others who have not achieved the promotion they 
hoped for. Malcontents of this kind sometimes relieve their feelings in the trains 
and buses that bring them daily to Colombo by expressing satisfaction with 
unfavourable war news. Such persons are neither important nor entirely negligi-
ble: they need watching but not hunting. 
(d) The upper native classes. Members of these fall into two categories (i) The first 
comprises those who dislike the new constitution as having involved them in a loss 
of political or administrative status. It includes the majority of those aristocratic 
families which once furnished Executive and Legislative Councillors in the days of 
Crown Colony Government and of the Karawa Christian families which (with the 
advantage of missionary education) tended of old to become a monopolistic 
element in the structure of the clerical and subordinate services of Government. 
People born into such families consider modern politics and elections a dirty 
game, talk of the good old days when the country was run by English Gentlemen, 
and are generally reactionary. The influence of such families is waning fast but, 
such as it may be, it is definitely pro-British. (ii) The second category consists of 
the novi homines1 under the present constitution. They are not pro-British but 
pro-Ceylonese. They consider Ceylon's proper niche in the world scheme to be that 
1 In a side note to his report Caldecott defined them as 'The new nationalists'. 
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of a Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. They are not therefore 
anti-British (the Union flag is very much in evidence at all celebrations in village 
or town) but they resent criticism by the local British er of the present administra-
tion and are very jealous and resentful of the British share in the development of 
the Island. They are techy, tiresome and unable to get beyond the shadow of the 
parish pump. Now that the pump's shadow has fallen within and become eclipsed 
by the dark shade of the French collapse and Italian belligerency there is a more 
realistic response to the Empire's cause. The Ministers and nearly all the State 
Councillors and politicians belong to this stratum. 
(e) The European community is also in two strata. (i) The reactionaries may be 
considered first. Nearly all the older planters and some 25% of the business men in 
Colombo belong to this group. They consider that Britain made no greater mistake 
than when she gave a large dose of self-Government to Ceylon; they loathe the 
present administration and its politics; they resent the rising consciousness of 
labour and the emergence of Trade Unions; they will join the minority communi-
ties in any tirade against the Sinhalese Ministry but otherwise they have no truck 
with them or any other 'native politicians'. They want a speedy end made of the 
present constitution and "the Ministers to be shown where they get off'. They are 
against any reforms that will not represent an effective diminution of self-
Government. The older Planters are psychologically, educationally and politically 
of the type that was common in Malaya in the fi rst fifteen years of the century: 
many of the Malayan pioneers in fact hailed from Ceylon. That type in Malaya 
began fading out over twenty five years ago under the ministrations of the Labour 
Department (N.B. Ceylon has never had an adequate Labour Department) and 
suffered final extinction under the castigations of Mr. Ormsby Gore in 1928. It is 
impossible not to feel sympathy for the Rip van Winkles of Ceylon; but there is no 
doubt that plantation interests will be better served both technically and politically 
by the younger men now coming on, many of whom express impatience with their 
bosses' anachronisms. (ii) The second European stratum may be labelled "the 
Moderates". · They are less vocal than the reactionaries but possess the brains that 
most of the latter lack. They consider that the grant of a considerable measure of 
self-Government to Ceylon was justified; that universal suffrage was a blunder of 
the first magnitude; that the experiment of the Executive Committee system is one 
that should never have been tried out on an infantile democracy; that considering 
these handicaps the present constitution might have worked worse (though 
perhaps not much worse) than it has done; that the lot of the Britisher, official or 
unofficial, becomes yearly more individious as nationalism grows (but does not 
broaden); that there is no putting back the hands of the political clock at this late 
hour, however bad the time it is keeping; and that, in short, we must do our best 
by reforms and in everyday politics to make the best of a bad job. Nearly all 
European officials belong to this stratum. It is a philosophy of sanity but not of 
enthusiasm. Nevertheless there are many, both official and unofficial, who 
conscientiously and with little thanks work hard to oil the wheels and keep the 
country going with as little friction as possible. So long as they continue in this 
effort there is no cause for excessive despondency or apprehension. They deserve 
every encouragement and I repose my faith in them. 
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Stabilization 
3. In "Things Ceylonese No.9"2 I remarked that there had been no stabilisation of 
the local political position. The past five weeks have however brought with them 
developments that have had a marked stabilizing effect. These developments may be 
summarized as follows:-
(i) the Planters' Association have agreed to recognize properly registered Trade 
Unions, under persuasion from the Minister and Controller of Labour. 
(ii) the Planters' Association (though there has been, I believe, some subsequent 
dissension) decided to appoint a Commission of their own to probe the causes of 
labour unrest. This is a notable advance from the attitude that the sole cause was 
political agitation by Sama Samajists and others. 
(iii) On a number of estates Managers of the new school of thought have begun 
putting their houses in order. More Scout Troops have been started on estates and 
the first Soccer match between the employees of one estate and those of another 
has been played at Nuwara Eliya. It was fully reported in the press and the level of 
play was good. Volley ball is being introduced on more and more estates. 
(iv) prosecutions for rioting and disorder during the recent unrest have in the 
law's own time (which is ever slow) led to many convictions and suitable 
sentences. 
(v) The Ceylon Estate Workers' Union has 'lost face' among labourers because of 
its failure to supply strikers on the Rangbodde Estate with rice and also as a result 
of the prosecutions of rioters some of whom have, in their defence, blamed the 
Union; 
(vi) Encouraged by the bad news from Flanders the Samajist Members became 
openly seditious in State Council on the 28th May. The Ceylon Daily News refused 
to publish a report of their speeches but the Times of Ceylon did. The Executive 
Committee of Home Affairs approved my taking extra powers under the Defence 
Regulations for the issue of detention orders, prohibition of meetings and 
prescription of flags. New regulations were promulgated on 3rd June. 
(vii) The Hansard issued on 12th June (based on proofs corrected by members 
themselves) confirmed substantially the newspaper report of the seditious Council 
speeches, though there had been rumours of inaccuracy. On the 14th June two 
Samajist vernacular newspapers (Sinhalese and Tamil) published flagrantly sub-
versive matter. On Sunday the 16th (the Home Minister being away) I conferred 
with the Chief and Legal Secretaries and the Inspector and Deputy Inspector 
Generals of Police. After full examination of the data we agreed that we could not 
strike without fear of driving influential liberals like Bernard Aluwihare into the 
Samajist Camp and without endowing the Samajists with any public sympathy. 
(viii) On the 17th, after consultation with the Home Minister and the Chief 
Secretary (with the Legal Secretary and Inspector General of Police present) I 
issued detention orders against Dr. Colvin de Silva (President of the Party), Dr. 
N.M. Perera and Mr. D.P.H. Gunawardana (State Councillors), Mr. Samarakoddy 
(leading member of the Party and a proctor) and Mr. Leslie Gunawardene, who 
largely finances the party. The last-named is still eluding arrest.3 
(ix) On the 21st June I was informed by the Legal Secretary that young 
2 See 46. 3 See 60. 
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Bandaranaike had been all blood and thunder at a Ministers' meeting and that 
trouble might be expected in Council next week. I received however a request from 
the Ministers to meet me in discussion on the 24th, at which meeting Senanayake 
said that at this time of peril to the Empire they were all behind me and 
Bandaranaike remarked that, having visited the Samajists in jail and having heard 
what they had to say, he thought that they were properly detained. 
(x) On the 25th of June the Home Minister made a short statement about the 
detentions which was accepted without challenge. The Lake House press has 
calmly and sensibly supported the detentions from the first. 
(xi) On the 26th June the State Council voted a first contribution of Rs 5 million 
towards war expenditure. 
Difficulties surmounted and endured 
4. The position of the Ministers, and preeminently of the Governor, has been 
rendered most difficult throughout the process of stabilization by the political tactics 
of the European reactionaries (see paragraph 1 (e) (i) of these Notes) which have 
received also support from a number of the Ceylonese "old gang" (paragraph 1 (d) (i)) 
and of disgruntled anti-Government clerks (paragraph 1 (c)) . The "Times of Ceylon" 
by lending its columns to the campaign of vilification against the Ministers and 
myself has undoubtedly increased its circulation, but at the same time it is now 
banned from the houses of many thinking Europeans and most leading Sinhalese. I 
have of course resisted all Ministerial suggestions for a repression or suppression of 
the paper under the Defence Act. Nothing would have been more stupid or fatal to 
European-Ceylonese co-operation. On the 26th June the Minister for Home Affairs 
did the right thing by summoning the Manager of the paper and asking him to stop 
articles likely to cause friction. From subsequent editions it appears that the 
Minister's homily and appeal have not been in vain. 
Aftermath 
5. I understand that signatures are still being obtained by a "Times of Ceylon" 
anonymous correspondent "J.B.K." for affixation to a Memorial for direct transmis-
sion to Whitehall . As the signatories are not being allowed to see the memorial their 
signatures must be rather "in the air". "J.B.K." is, I understand, a Mrs. Ashton with 
whom I have had quite a lot to do in connection with the Overseas League and Royal 
Empire Society. She struck me then as a nice and well-intentioned woman, but 
somewhat ill-balanced and oratorical. Another memorial is being fostered by a Mr. 
Aitken, who resigned the Police before reaching pensionable status many years ago 
owing to some disagreement with Dowbiggin. He has got himself into trouble with 
the Comrades of the Great War Association, by trying to identify the Association with 
the Memorial, and with the Police by alleging that they have not been backed up by 
the authorities. Both the Comrades and the Police have, I am told, written 
repudiatory letters to Aitken; who has however already committed himself to his 
statements by sending an advance copy of the memorial by hand to Field Marshal 
Lord Birdwood "in order to ensure its safe delivery to Lord Lloyd". I am of course well 
trained by past experience to endure and ignore anti-gubernatorial machinations, 
having had the privilege of serving under Sir Laurence Guillemard and Sir Cecil 
Clementi. Thank goodness, however, I have not to contend with the disloyalty of any 
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colleagues in the service (as had the former) or with the extreme but unprincipled 
cleverness of a Ward-Jackson, as had the latter. 
Thankfulness 
6. I cannot end these notes without an expression of my thankfulness that, 
whatever the future may have in store, the very tricky and critical period of the 
immediate past has been successfully steered through. At this time of Britain's ordeal 
there promises indeed to be greater mutual restraint and collaboration between the 
public, the Council, the Ministers and myself than at any time hitherto. The 
postponement for two years of the General Election has undoubtedly helped 
tremendously in achieving the stabilisation reported in these Notes; indeed I 
consider it the biggest single factor in the general improvement of the local 
situation. 
Minutes on 57 
The governor seems unable to draw the moral from his own actions. An unimpress-
ive report. I should like to know more about the Governor's record. P.S. please tell 
me. 
L. 
[nd] 
This report differs from the previous ones and is a general review of the position in 
Ceylon as on June 29th, that is, when the defeat of France was complete and the 
effects of it were becoming known. It is more encouraging than previous reports in 
that it seems to show what we hope is the case, viz., that the worst of the trouble in 
the Island may be over. The defeat of France and its possible consequences have 
clearly had a sobering effect on all classes and communities in Ceylon save the Left 
Wing Samajists who have by these events been encouraged to become openly 
anti-British. They are only a very small section of the population and, as the 
Governor shows, their actions in early June were such as to enable him to order the 
detention of the five leaders without much criticism of his action being shown in any 
quarter. I cannot get the file at the moment, but my recollection is that the 
information given here on page 1 that other Samajists are being prosecuted for 
offences under the Defence Regulations is the first we have heard that others besides 
the five leaders are being proceeded against. Also Sir Andrew Caldecott states on page 
7 that Mr. Leslie Gunawardene is still eluding arrest. This is, I think, our first 
information on this point and he may of course have been arrested by now. 
2. The Governor speaks of the improvement which has resulted from the 
postponement of the general election for two years. The two decisions (1) to 
postpone the election and (2) to detain the Samajist leaders have clearly had a 
sobering effect in many directions. In addition to this, there is now the hope that an 
informal conference between representatives of the Government of Ceylon and the 
Government of India will be held shortly to discuss means of improving relations 
between the two countries. All these facts, together with the realization throughout 
Ceylon of the critical days through which the Empire is passing lead one to hope that 
there may be a general improvement in Ceylon affairs in the near future. 
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3. The Secretary of State has already seen this report-see his minute at the end 
of the report. Mr. Eastwood has already spoken to him with regard to Sir Andrew 
Caldecott. 
4. The Governor's position is a difficult one. He cannot have at his disposal the 
close collaboration and advice of senior officials which is available to the Governors 
of most of the Colonies. Under the Ceylon Constitution, the three Officers of State, 
the Chief Secretary, the Legal Secretary and the Financial Secretary, are Members of 
the State Council and are treated as Ministers in charge of Departments and are in 
many respects in the same position as the Ceylonese Ministers. The Governor has 
therefore to play a lone hand and at t ime has not available to him the channels of 
information which are open to Governors elsewhere. Also he has to be guided at all 
times by the Royal Instructions as to his relations with Ministers and to the 
promotion of self-government in the Island. 
K.W.B. 
9.8.40 
58 CO 54/97 4/6, no 17 3 July 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord 
Lloyd to Sir A Caldecott conveying the views of Lord Linlithgow 
Your private and confidential telegram of 11th May. Viceroy in personal telegram to 
Secretary of State for India states as follows. Begins.-Our forbearance toward 
Ceylon appears to be repaid by anti-Indian ministerial pronouncements in Ceylon 
and projects of anti-Indian character, such as immigration restriction, limitation of 
Indian franchise, further restrictions on employment of non-Ceylonese on Govern-
ment contracts, prohibitions of sale of private land to non-Ceylonese. Confidential 
information suggests more rigorous retrenchment of non-Ceylonese daily-paid 
labour than we anticipated. Ends. Viceroy goes on to report increasing embarrass-
ment to Government of India from pressure of public opinion to take further 
retaliatory action against Ceylon and particularly advises that measures to safeguard 
copra industry in India are becoming increasingly necessary quite apart from 
question of retaliation against Ceylon. I am sure that you appreciate that measures 
suggested in India against Ceylon trade would have very serious effect on island's 
economic position as well as being extremely undesirable from point of view of 
Imperial unity in fact of present crisis. It is to my mind imperative that Ministers 
should clearly understand extent of economic threat to Ceylon which is likely to 
result from their intransigeance [sic] vis-a-vis Indians, and while I have no informa-
tion on certain of reported matters of Ministers' policy mentioned above, I could not 
pretend to be surprised if Viceroy's report were well founded. Possibly new symptoms 
of realistic appreciation of present emergency by Ministers and their supporters of 
which recent gift to His Majesty's Government is evidence may promise hope of 
Ministers being convinced of urgency of need to come to terms with India by direct 
negotiations in which it would be essential for them to make substantial and real 
modifications of their present policy in return for securing modification of Indian 
ban on emigration and preserving as much as possible of copra market in India. I 
suggest you should have very early discussion with Board of Ministers with a view to 
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communication being sent to Government of India to reopen question of inter-
governmental discussion at earliest date on basis of modus vivendi at least for period 
of war. 
59 CO 54/974/6, no 18 5 July 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from 
Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd 
Your telegram of 3rd July, 1 secret and personal, reached me simultaneously with 
communication from Chief Secretary to the effect that Minister[s] at Board meeting 
on 2nd July had pressed that their proposal for legislation to control immigration 
should be sent direct by him to the Indian Government for its observations instead of 
through you to the India Office in accordance with the Colonial Office circular 
despatch of 24th June, 1925. This is the first time that the Ministers' proposals have 
been finalised and referred to me and they follow substantially the confidential 
memorandum which I sent with my personal letter to Gent, dated 30th May, except 
for one very important and unacceptable alteration, i.e., the delation of Clause 14 
which left existing machinery for immigration of estate labourers undisturbed. 
Receipt of these proposals would anyhow have necessitated my summoning Ministers 
to Conference and I now propose to tackle them on broader basis of your telegram. I 
have so often repeated to Ministers my strictures on anti-Indian tactics and 
utterances, and so frequently emphasised the importance of rapprochement that I 
would like your permission to reinforce my arguments by quoting in my conversa-
tion with them (which will be of a secret and personal nature round my table) 
following passages from your telegram under reply-first from words "Viceroy in 
personal telegram" down to "economic threat to Ceylon," and, secondly, from words 
"suggest you have very early discussion" to end of the telegram. If my powers of 
persuasion should be successful as to which I am not too sanguine though I shall 
strive my hardest, care will need to be taken that the first conversations with India 
are exploratory and that any measure of agreement reached is subject also to your 
agreement and that of Secretary of State for India. Ministers' present attitude 
towards the Indian ban on emigration is that it is salutary because there is at the 
moment a surplus of Indian labour on estates and because the disturbing separation 
of families could easily be avoided if Indian Government carried out its obligation to 
ensure the welfare of its nationals by issuing special permits to enable their reunion. 
They so far fail to appreciate that the ban if it becomes permanent will result in a 
dilemma most dangerous to the economic welfare of the island, i.e., either disgusted 
by their inability to take their usual holiday in India and moved by growing sense of 
Indian nationalism labourers may start a general exodus from Ceylon and cause 
immediate shortage of labour; or in determination not to lose their livelihood they 
may completely sever their connection with India and in succeeding generations 
present an increasingly serious racial and economic problem. Now that General 
Election has been postponed question of limitation of Indian Franchise referred to by 
the Viceroy is no longer at all pressing problem but can be considered in connection 
1 See 58. 
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with reforms and in full consultation with India. Prohibition of sale of land refers 
presumably to the recent consideration by the Executive Committee of Lands of 
legislation on the lines of the Malay Reservations Enactment of the Federated Malay 
States. As regards restrictions on contract of labour and alleged more vigorous 
retrenchment of non-Ceylonese employees I will discuss the position with Ministers 
but as far as I am at present informed I doubt whether either item has much in it. 
60 CO 54/978/10, no 13 12 July 1940 
[Sama Samajists]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the 
arrest and detention of the Sama Samajist leaders 
I have the honour to report, in accordance with paragraph 1 of your Secret (3) 
despatch of 22nd December 1939, that on the 18th June 1940, I issued detention 
orders under regulation 1 of the Defence (Miscellaneous No.3) Regulations (a copy of 
which I attach) 1 in respect of the following persons:-
(a) Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, President of the Lanka Sama Samaja party; 
(b) Dr. N.M. Perera, Member of the State Council and Treasurer of the same party; 
(c) Mr. D.P.R. Gunawardana, Member of the State Council and a member of the 
Committee of the same party; 
(d) Mr. Edmund Samarakkody, a member of the Committee of the same party; 
(e) Mr. Leslie Goonewardene, a member of the Committee of the same party. 
2. The first three persons named were taken into custody on the 18th June. Mr. 
E. Samarakkody was taken into custody on the 19th June, but Mr. Leslie Goonewar-
dene has so far successfully evaded detention. 
3. The persons detained have been informed or their right to make representa-
tions to me in writing and to object to the Advisory Committee which I have 
appointed. The Committee consists of Mr. Justice Moseley, Mr. A.C.G. Wijeyekoon 
and Haji Sir Macan Markar. 
4. The reasons for their detention are set out in the document dated 24th June of 
which a copy is enclosed: this document was communicated to the persons detained 
on the 25th June, in order that they might make representations to me if they desire 
to do so. 
I have not yet received any such representations but the Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee informed me on the 9th July that he had received a communication, 
which appears to express a wish to make objections, from each of the four persons 
detained. 
5. The grounds of detention rest primarily on publications of the party, both oral 
and printed, which are prejudicial to public safety and the defence of the Island and 
not on the activities of the party in relation to labour disputes. 
These publications reached their climax in the speeches of Dr. N .M. Perera and Mr. 
D.P.R. Gunawardana in the State Council which appear on pages 1008-1010 in the 
enclosed copy of Hansard and in the issue of the Samadharmam dated the 14th June 
of which a summary is enclosed. The latter publication was issued after the 
regulations were made. 
1 Enclosures not printed. 
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6. The extent to which the Minister for Home Affairs and his Executive 
Committee co-operated in the making of the regulations and of the detention orders 
is indicated in the enclosed statement which the Minister laid upon the table of the 
State Council on the 25th June 1940. 
7. The persons detained are at present accommodated in Welikada Prison and are 
receiving the same treatment as civil prisoners. This prison is the only prison in the 
Island with accommodation for special class prisoners but segregation is impossible 
in this, or in any other prison, in the Island. In order to prevent any possibility of 
undesirable association with regular prisoners steps are being considered for the 
removal of the persons detained to a special place of detention. 
61 CO 54/974/1, no 1 19 July 1940 
[European civil servants]: despatch from Lord Lloyd to Sir A Caldecott 
on the conditions of employment for European officers 
I have the honour to refer to your confidential (2) despatch of the 26th of March, and 
my reply confidential (3) of the 21st of May, regarding the appointment of Mr. H. H. 
Jansen, as Deputy Chief Engineer and Manager, Electrical Undertakings. 
2. I felt considerable misgivings regarding your proposal to appoint Mr. Jansen, 
even on probation, to this post, but in view of the very full consideration which you 
had given to all the factors involved, I decided that I should not be justified in 
withholding my sanction. 
3. I think it well, however, to bring to your notice the views which I formed on 
this matter. In the first place, I took great exception to the action by the Minister for 
Communications and Works in making his support for a personal allowance for 
Major Braze! dependent upon the acceptance of the proposed arrangement regarding 
Mr. Jansen and on Major Brazel's giving Mr. Jansen what the Minister and his 
Executive Committee consider to be a fair chance. If there is a case on merits for a 
personal allowance, it certainly should be granted without conditions of this kind. If 
there is no such case on merits, the appointment of Mr. Jansen does not make such a 
case, unless it is conceded that Mr. Jansen comes so seriously short of filling the post 
satisfactorily that the Director's responsibilities are materially increased. 
4. Furthermore, I felt some reluctance in giving my approval to this proposal, in 
view of the importance of maintaining the efficiency of the Department of Electrical 
Undertakings. It is clearly important that the deputy to the Chief Engineer and 
Manager should be a person who is thoroughly competent to fill the post. If the 
person appointed to the post were to turn out not to be fully competent, there would 
be a risk of serious financial loss to the public funds of Ceylon apart from the 
deterioration of an important public utility service. 
5. An additional disquieting feature of the position is the well justified fear which 
is being created that, if a candidate from outside the Colony is selected for a Ceylon 
appointment, his position may be made unpleasant and possibly even intolerable for 
him. I know that you are fully aware of these factors in the general situation, but 
there is no doubt that such apprehensions very much restrict the number of 
applicants who are likely to come forward for any post which the Ceylon Government 
may wish to be filled by recruitment from overseas. 
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6. Finally, I cannot overlook the fact that it appears to be increasingly difficult to 
stand fast against recommendations for appointments submitted by the Ceylon 
Government which, if no political factors were involved, would not receive approval. 
Article 88 of the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, provides that the 
appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of public 
officers shall be vested in the Governor, and I do not think that a situation ought to 
be allowed to grow up where the provisions of that article are subordinated to purely 
political expediency. 
7. I do not wish you to think that I am necessarily advocating any drastic change 
of policy in dealing with cases of this kind, and I appreciate fully the difficult position 
in which you are placed in this important matter. I none the less thought it right to 
put my misgivings clearly before you, and I shall be glad to receive any observations 
you may have to offer in the light of my comments. 
62 CO 54/97 4/6, no 24 23 July 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on a proposed mission to India by a deputation 
of Ceylon ministers 
Secret and personal. 23rd July. Your telegram of 15th July, secret and personal. I had 
conference with the Board of Ministers yesterday at which all were present except 
Silva and Bandaranaike from whom notice of inability to attend was received at last 
moment though six days' notice had been given. I had not for fear of leakage, 
communicated beforehand the subject for discussion, so that it can have had nothing 
to do with either of two absences. That the meeting was not unpropitious will be seen 
from the following personal telegram that I have sent to the Viceroy. 
Begins.-Following telegram is being sent to-day by Chief Secretary to the 
Secretary to the Government of India's External Affairs Department. Begins .-Board 
of Ministers in conference with Governor yesterday expressed the desire to send to 
India as soon as possible a mission consisting of probably three Ministers and one 
Officer of State in order to (1) review and discuss in the course of informal 
conversations with Indian authorities all questions that require full understanding 
and adjustment between India and Ceylon; (2) clear up any misapprehension that 
may be found to exist on either side; (3) explore the possibility, and pave the way, for 
later formal conference and negotiations; and (4) generally promote mutual 
understanding and goodwill. Owing to the presentation of the Budget to the State 
Council, proposed mission could not leave here before the end of the first week in 
September but in order that preparations can be put in train betimes this 
Government would be grateful for early information by telegraph as to whether your 
Government will be willing to receive such an exploratory mission. Ends. I should be 
most grateful if you could see your way to exert your influence to secure a welcome 
for the proposed exploratory mission and without any pre-conditions because I feel 
that such a mission may be able to remove some of the obstacles that have so far 
stood in the way of formal negotiations. I am strengthened in this feeling by the fact 
that I myself have invariably found personal contact with my Ministers the best 
method of overcoming domestic difficulties. My hopes of the beneficial outcomes of 
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the mission are encouraged by the generally more realistic attitude of the Ministers 
since the present phase of the war began and by the lull in the local politics that has 
followed the postponement of our General Election for two years. At the same time 
there is considerable anti-ministerial criticism which would receive immediate 
impetus if it could be represented that the mission was being sent to India under any 
form of pre-condition. Another reason for anticipating good results from the 
proposed mission lies in the opportunity which it will afford for the correction and 
explanation of the mis-statements, misrepresentations and distortions that have 
obtained currency in the newspapers or in gossip, e.g., that proposed legislation will 
prohibit the sale of private land to non-Ceylonese whereas it contemplates only the 
reservation of defined areas for indigenous agriculturists on the Malayan model. I 
therefore very much hope that proposed mission may be permitted to materialise and 
for my part, I will do all I can to foster a spirit of rapprochement and consideration. 
Ends. 
Paragraph 2 of your telegram. Ministers desire control of immigrants to be 
included in the list of subjects to be discussed by the proposed mission with the 
Indian authorities. 
Your paragraph 3. Ministers themselves anticipate that employment of Indians 
discharged or resigned is likely to be raised in the discussion with the mission which 
would not of course fail to listen to any representations put forward, though there is 
little or no likelihood of accommodation in this particular matter. 1 
1 The Government of India accepted the proposal for informal exploratory discussions and on 22 Aug Lloyd 
sent a congratulatory message to Caldecott and the Board of Ministers (CO 54/974/6, nos 28-29 and 32). 
63 CO 54/978/12, no 12 16Aug 1940 
[Situation in Ceylon]: minute by G E J Gent on Lord Lloyd's concern 
over anti-British agitation in Ceylon 
The Secretary of State spoke to me yesterday about affairs in Ceylon. He is 
continuing to receive from various sources substantial complaints of anti-British 
agitation, subversive pamphlets distributed in the estate areas and intlamatory [sic] 
speeches by communist agents etc. Many of those which I have seen relate to the 
period before 18th June when the Governor issued detention orders under the 
Defence Regulations against five leading members of the Sama Samaj ("Commun-
ist") Party including the two State Council members of the Party. I told the Secretary 
of State that my impression of affairs in Ceylon was that in the last two months there 
had been a distinct improvement in the general attitude of the Ceylon Ministers 
towards the war effort and also in the general morale of the Island and a lessening of 
the tension on estates. This could be attributed to the decision to postpone the 
General Election for two years and the action taken against the Sama Samaj Party 
leaders as well as a realisation of the war position. This improvement was marked 
by:-
(1) the successful renewal of the approach to the Government of India for 
Indo-Ceylon discussions on the various differences which have been disturbing 
their relations; 
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(2) the vote of a handsome sum of money by the State Council to H.M.G. as a war 
contribution and the subsequent impressive and continuous stream of official and 
unofficial contributions for the same purpose; 
(3) the absence in recent weeks of evidence reaching the Ceylon Association from 
European interests in Ceylon of disturbances, strikes etc. 
The Secretary of State wishes the Governor to be reassured as to the importance 
which he attaches to a watchful and vigorous policy being maintained by the Ceylon 
authorities against any subversive anti-British activities locally whether Sama Samaj 
or other, and secondly, he wishes the Governor to be asked to send home translations 
of pamphlets, vernacular press extracts and so on obviously of an anti-British 
character which may be detected in Ceylon. Lastly he proposes to send personally to 
the Viceroy a telegram to express his grateful thanks and his earnest hopes in the 
matter of the informal preparatory discussions which have now been agreed upon by 
the Governments of India and Ceylon to be held early in November for a free 
discussion of all the various differences which have been poisoning the relations 
between the two territories. I submit three telegrams for this purpose, two personal 
and one official. 
64 CO 54/977/7, no 10 20 Aug 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': eleventh periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for 
CO. Minute by Lord Lloyd 
Better times; club support for wartime effort 
1. Nearly two months have passed since my last instalment of these Notes. 1 The 
saying that no news is good news is applicable to this period. The postponement of 
the General Election enabled local politicians to stop talking and the collapse of 
France started them thinking. The result has been a greatly enhanced effort for war 
funds which is reflected in the figures of remittances to England. The organisation of 
Social and Sports Clubs into collecting media under a central working Committee 
has done much to get people of different communities together and to induce a 
healthy rivalry in the amounts subscribed. The prime movers in this direction have 
been L. Nicholls, Director of the Bacteriological Institute and present President of 
the Royal Colombo Golf Club, and O.E. Goonetilleke, Auditor General. Senanayake 
has also done his bit in boosting the movement. 
Newspaper help 
2. Whatever criticisms I may have to pass from time to time on the "Times of 
Ceylon" for irresponsibility in politics, the zeal of this newspaper in canvassing 
subscriptions for the Gloucester and local Sailors' Funds and in organizing and 
assiduously running it's "Send a Plane" fund is most praiseworthy and successful. 
Their fifth plane has just been subscribed. The Ceylon Daily News and the Ceylon 
Observer are also affording great assistance, by propaganda and reports of progress, 
to the Ceylon War Purposes, St. Dunstan's and King George's (Sailors) funds. 
1 See 57. 
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Exit Peter Batten 
3. I hear that the Times of Ceylon have sacked Peter Batten (the Australian 
journalist whose pen has literally filled half their columns for them during the past 
three years) and that he leaves for Australia to-day. He had his points; but on the 
balance the Island will be well rid of him. I am informed that he was responsible for a 
number of mischievous paragraphs, e.g. the statement (which has since been 
published in the London Times) that a wireless transmitter was found on the 
premises previously occupied by one of our internees, for which there was no basis 
outside his imagination; and an article querying the internment since the outset of 
the war of a German Buddhist priest (known to have Nazi opinions) on the ground 
that Italian Roman Catholic Bishops and priests (all of them under constant 
surveillance by the Police) have not since been interned. 
Swing of the "Times" pendulum 
4. I have in recent instalments of these Notes criticized the Times of Ceylon for 
unnecessarily antagonising the Sinhalese. In paragraph 4 of No.lO I mentioned that 
Jayatilaka had sent for the Manager of the paper and given him a talking to. The 
Times now appears to me to have gone unwisely far in the opposite direction by its 
leader of the 14th August entitled "Dominion Status for Ceylon", of which a copy is 
attached.2 I know Sir Baron quite well by now, and am quite certain that he was not 
"inspired by the statesmanlike pronouncements made recently by the Secretary of 
State for India and the Viceroy" and that he never expected a declaration of post -war 
Dominion Status at this or at any early juncture. All that Sir Baron meant to say (and 
indeed he said no more) was that the request for reforms would not be pressed 
during the war, but that his countrymen expected them to be taken in hand as soon 
as victory was achieved, and that in the mean while the Secretary of State and the 
Governor might get agreed changes in train for early implementation when the war 
ends. His allusion to Ceylon's "rightful position among the free nations of the British 
Commonwealth" was a quite usual expression of the well-known and long standing 
policy of the Ceylon National Congress to aim at Dominion Status as an ultimate 
goal. 
Follow my 'leader' 
5. The Times has hitherto constantly and emphatically demanded a retention of 
the Governor's present reserve powers, and I rather doubt whether its editorial staff 
realize that such retention would be inconsonant with Dominion Status. The 
publication of a leading article of this nature by a journal associated in the Sinhalese 
mind with conservative or even reactionary European opinion in this Island is bound 
to accelerate the tempo of demands for reform. Thus the very next day after its 
appearance Mr. A. Ratnayake gave notice in State Council of the following motion:-
"That this Council invites His Excellency the Governor to make an immediate 
declaration to the effect that Ceylon will be granted Dominion Status upon 
conclusion of the war". 
I have no idea yet when the motion will come up for debate; at present the Council is 
fully occupied with the budget. 
2 Not printed. 
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Indo-Ceylon relations: official mission 
6. It was fortunate perhaps that Bandaranaike was not present (though his 
excusing himself at the eleventh hour after receiving long notice was impolite) at my 
meeting with Ministers when I proposed an exploratory "good will mission" to India. 
I have commented before now on his self-appointed role of "opposition Minister" at 
all my conferences. His inclusion in the Mission (together with Corea, Senanayake 
and Huxham) is however very necessary and has been since arranged. It is he who 
has made the nastiest and stupidest utterances about Indians and his inclusion will 
enable the Indian authorities to take their measure of him and at the same time 
prevent him from upsetting the results of the Mission on its return to Ceylon. 
Congress to meet Congress 
7. From what I read in the papers the official Exploratory Mission may not be the 
only Ceylon approach to India. The Ceylon Congress apparently intends to send a 
deputation to the Indian Congress; and if Corea, this year's President of the former, 
finds himself a member of both missions he will need to be warned of the difficulties 
and potential improprieties of dual status. 
Possible developments 
8. I am not a prophet; but, as these Notes are intended to be a faithful portrayal of 
what passes through my mind from month to month, I do not refrain from 
expressing ideas for fear that they may be proved wrong by the event. I should not be 
surprised if, as a result of the get-together act the staging of which has now been 
successfully arranged, there emerged an entente between Indian and Ceylon 
politicians additional to and distinct from the desired agreement between the two 
Governments. The discharge of Indian daily-paid employees by the Ceylon Govern-
ment was magnified out of its proper perspective on both sides of the Palk Strait for 
the purposes of local politics. That episode is now past and dead and I do not 
anticipate that either side will find much difficulty in composing the corpse for 
decent mutual burial. On general questions lying outside this particular issue my 
impression was that Nehru and the Ceylon Ministers found themselves last year far 
more often in consensus than at variance with each other's point of view. Of course 
the official mission will not as such meet Nehru or any other Indian Congress 
Leader; but there are bound to be many opportunities for unofficial contact and 
conversation between the Ceylonese Ministers and Indian Congressmen. On the 
immigration-emigration issue I fancy that Indians and Ceylonese will be at one in 
pressing for a rigid restrictive control and it is very necessary that the Controller of 
Labour (Gimson) should accompany and advise Corea in the interest of Ceylon 
employers and employees. His attendance has been arranged. 
Changed ministerial attitude towards India 
9. Nehru, I understand, lost no opportunity during his visit to Ceylon of laying 
emphasis upon Ceylon's geographic and economic identity with India. In their 
context (i.e. his protest against the discharge of Indian employees) his remarks 
annoyed and antagonized our Ministers. One of them is said to have retorted that 
British Imperialism was better than Indian Imperialism. I have been under a 
continuous necessity during the last two years of impressing on Ministers the need 
for keeping on good and neighbourly terms with India: but when I recently (having 
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previously obtained permission) read to them the Viceroy's telegram to the India 
Office criticising Ceylon's recent attitude I noted a receptivity never met with before. 
This I attribute neither to the Viceroy's criticism nor to my exhortations. It is no 
doubt partly due to the present grim crisis of the war and a desire to promote Empire 
unity (it is now fully realized by the Ministers and the Island's intelligentsia that in 
the event of our defeat Ceylon would lose not British bonds but British freedom) but 
equally due, I think, to the reflection that India is sure shortly to obtain Dominion or 
similar status, and thereby the ability to bring pressure to bear on Ceylon without 
effective restraint from Whitehall. 
Relation of Ceylon to a federal India 
10. It should not be forgotten that young Bandaranaike in his earlier political 
career definitely advocated the inclusion of Ceylon in a Federal India. A resurrection 
of this idea as a result of the forthcoming Mission to India is not therefore outside the 
bounds of possibility. I doubt if Jayatilaka or Senanayake could be wheedled by Nehru 
or anybody else into supporting it, but to younger politicians it may well appear a 
short -cut to Dominion status and the ethnic, geographical and economic arguments 
in favour of it are difficult to counter. I consider it advisable that the possibility of 
this development should be borne in mind. 
Minute on 64 
The two or three instalments of 'Things Ceylonese' which I have seen do not impress 
me. The Governor confesses he writes of things as they "pass through my mind". 
They do rather read so. He avoids speaking of so many things that really matter in 
Government-Law and Order; the welfare of the people; their content or discontent; 
the press and so on-I wonder if he is like his writing. 
L. 
27.10.40 
65 CO 54/977/7, no 11 23 Aug 1940 
[Indian labour]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent 
1. I am most grateful for your secret and personal letter of the 3rd July 
concerning the aetiology of our labour unrest and for the opportunity thus given for 
expressing my dissent from the view that the primary cause of the disturbance of 
Indian labour on estates is the anti-Indian policy and utterances of the Ministers and 
State Council.1 
2. The Censor has just sent for my perusal a telegram containing a report on 
current local conditions sent by the local branch of Harrisons Crosfield's to their 
London headquarters. It contains the following passage:-"Exercise of emergency 
powers for arrest (allusion is of course to detention of Samajist leaders) has assisted 
labour situation but there is still undercurrent of agitation notably confined to 
European estates." The [italics are] mine. If the Sinhalese attitude towards India is 
1 cf 49. 
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the primary cause of labour unrest, how do you explain the fact that the big 
estate-owning Sinhalese employers of Indian labour have throughout experienced 
practically no trouble at all? Would they not be the first on whom Indian coolies 
would visit the anti-Indian sins of Sinhalese Ministers and State Councillors? 
3. Again why is it, if the primary cause be as stated by you, that in all the records 
taken of agitators' or politicians' speeches to coolies references to Government's 
discharge of Indian labourers or the ban on emigration from India have occupied 
only an infinitesimal space? 
4. On receipt of your letter under reply I re-read paragraph 3 of mine of the 27th 
May after a three month's interval, and it still seems to me as accurate a summing up 
of the causes of labour unrest as any such short summary can be. I only wish indeed 
that I could accept your diagnosis of a primary cause; because I foresee rapproche-
ment with India as a result of the November conversations and, if your theory is 
correct, this should spell an end to our labour unrest-whereas my aetiology 
provides no such promise of respite. In dealing with Asiatic psychology it is 
sometimes helpful to see a position through Asiatic eyes. I quote therefore the 
following passages from the July diary of young Rajendra, Deputy Controller of 
Labour, Hatton:-
Jst July. So far nearly a thousand labourers have applied for repatriation from 
the planting districts of Dimbula, Dickoya and Nuwara Eliya . .. Most of these 
labourers have convinced themselves that the conditions of employment 
which they found tolerable during the past 100 years are unendurable now. 
Many of them have admitted to me that they will face starvation in India: but 
they prefer starvation to continuing on the estates. This is a remarkable state 
of mind; for it must be admitted that conditions on estates though not ideal 
are better today than ever before. 
3rd July. I was long under the impression that the factions are due to rivalry 
between Congress and the Federation. Further experience shows that they 
arise out of there being on nearly all estates labourers who are satisfied with 
the status quo and others who are dissatisfied. The latter become suspicious 
when the former do not join in agitation against the Management. It is also 
my experience that high-caste labourers are generally supporters of the status 
quo. The Trade Union movement finds its largest support among the lower 
castes. 
25th July . There is a remarkable difference between the attitude of the 
Dimbula and the Dikoya planters towards the problem of labour unrest. 
Dimbula and Dikoya are adjoining districts but they are tackling their 
problems in very different ways. Dikoya believes in "moderation and tolera-
tion," as the Chairman of its Planting Association said at their last meeting. 
The result is comparative peace in nearly all the estates. Sangam leaders who 
led strikes in November and December are now useful members of the labour 
force, and in a number of cases are helping the Management in maintaining 
discipline. Not a single labourer has been repatriated from this district. 
Dimbula believes in repression and stern measures . ... The demand for large 
scale repatriation is spreading. There is tension on most estates. I wonder 
when Dimbula will learn that no progressive movement has ever been 
stamped out by purely repressive action." 
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5. I still have no doubt whatever that, in Aristotelian phraseology, the new 
consciousness of labour is the "Material Cause" of our unrest and that "Efficient 
Causes" have been Nehru's visit and the attention paid to labourers by politicians 
when they thought there would be a General Election next Spring. So long as the 
Material Cause persists a succession of efficient causes are bound to arise and to give 
us trouble. I fear from your letter that you may think me unsympathetic towards 
planters. That however is not so; I am most sorry for them having to suffer a sudden 
eruption of unrest after a longer period of peace than has been enjoyed by employers 
elsewhere and which doubtless seemed to them permanent. For the "Dikoya School" 
of planters (i .e. those who are tackling the material cause of the problem) I have not 
only sympathy but admiration. As for the Dimbula Die-Hards I regret that it is 
impossible for me to conceal my disagreement with their tactics or my apprehension 
for their future . 
P.S. Just as this letter is being typed the following telegram from Robertson 
Company to Robertson Bois, London, has come in from the Censor. "Consider 
emergency powers have been effective and labour troubles generally better with 
possible exception of Dimbula where tardy appreciation of Trade Union movement 
has tended to hamper better feeling and improvement and has involved appreciable 
demand for repatriation." 
66 CO 54/974/10, no 9 31 Aug 1940 
[Police]: letter from Lord Lloyd to Sir A Caldecott on the circum-
stances under which an investigation should be conducted into the 
shootings on the Mool-oya estate 
I sent you officially in a despatch of the 1st June a memorandum prepared in the 
Home Office giving a statement of the practice and policy in the United Kingdom 
regarding the issue of instructions by the Home Secretary to the police in matters 
coming within their statutory obligations. 
I noticed, in connection with the Mooloya Estate riot, that, after consultation with 
the Legal Secretary, you agreed that an inquiry was desirable "in view of the 1928 
Committee's report." I gather that this refers to paragraph 4 of that report, where the 
following passage occurs:-
"Where an act of shooting results in a proceeding in which the question of the 
culpability of the officer concerned is the subject of inquiry in a court of law 
the facts and circumstances are fully investigated in public. But in cases in 
which no such judicial investigation has taken place the position cannot be 
regarded as satisfactory from the point of view of the public or of the Police. 
The knowledge that every case in which any member of the public has been 
shot at by a member of the Police Force will be investigated by some 
authorized person other than an officer of the Police Force-preferably a 
senior judicial officer-will reassure the public while at the same time acting 
as a check upon any tendency to shoot without careful consideration and we 
recommend the adoption of this suggestion." 
I should like you to know that in my view the report goes much too far in 
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suggesting that every case in which any member of the public has been shot at by a 
member of the police force will be investigated by some authorized person other than 
an officer of the police force. Each case must, I think, be determined on its merits, 
and I certainly would not subscribe to a general rule of the kind suggested. So far as 
United Kingdom practice is concerned, you will see from the memorandum in my 
despatch that frequently when riots have taken place it has been alleged that the 
police acted in an unwise or provocative manner, and there are demands for an 
inquiry into the conduct of the police, but there has been no recent case in which 
such an inquiry has been granted. In India we generally set our faces against such 
inquiries. On the slightest provocation Congress would demand inquiries into the 
action of the police, but there is a real danger of weakening the authority and 
intiative of the police in times of emergency, if they feel that they will have to face 
public inquiry into their actions. I am not saying that an inquiry may not at times be 
necessary, for example, when the Governor on a careful review of the circumstances 
considers it desirable, or when there is a demand in Parliament here based on 
reasonable grounds. As you know, Parliament was taking before the war, and will no 
doubt continue to take when conditions are again normal, an increasing interest in 
Colonial affairs; so we may expect to have demands for inquiries when the police have 
had to take strong action against rioters, involving shooting. But the point I want to 
make is that in my view such inquiry should not be granted as a matter of course; 
and I thought it right to let you know this, as apparently you were guided by the 1928 
Committee's suggestion when considering the Mooloya Estate case, and I did not 
wish you to assume that I accept their view. 
67 CO 54/973/14, no 21 3 Sept 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on a 
resolution passed by the Sinhala Maha Sabha demanding dominion 
status. Minutes by K W Blaxter and G E J Gent 
In compliance with a request by Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike as President of the 
Sinhala Maha Sabha I have the honour to forward copies of a Resolution1 passed at 
the Annual Session of that body held on the 24th August, 1940, demanding 
Dominion Status for Ceylon and requesting an assurance that this demand will be 
met at the next revision of the Constitution. 
2. The Sinhala Maha Sabha has figured in previous correspondence on constitu-
tional issues and all that I need say of it here is that membership of the Sabha is 
confined to the Sinhalese and that its representatives in the Ministry are Messrs 
Bandaranaike, Kannangara and Kotalawala. I understand that a recent movement to 
affiliate it to, or elsewise link it with, the Ceylon National Congress has been without 
result. 
3. From an article which appeared in the "Ceylon Observer" on the 26th August I 
gather that the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress is considering 
the following draft resolution:-
1 Not printed. 
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"that the Secretary of State be requested to make a declaration with regard to 
political reforms in Ceylon before the expiry of the statutory period of the 
State Council." 
The ultimate aim of ·the Congress has long been known and declared to be 
attainment of Dominion Status. Whether therefore, in face of the Sabha's resolution 
now forwarded the draft Congress motion will be allowed to survive in its present less 
adventurous form remains to be seen. 
4. The issue of constitutional reform rests at present with Your Lordship's 
announcement of the 15th June that, in view of general dissatisfaction with the 
present Constitution and of questions that have arisen regarding cognate problems 
of franchise and delimitation of constituencies, the general election has been 
postponed; because such postponement is necessary in present circumstances if 
careful decisions are to be reached on these questions before new elections are held. 
5. An acknowledgement by Your Lordship of the receipt of the Sabha's resolution 
appears to me all that is necessary or advisable. 
Minutes on 67 
The Sinhala Maha Sabha is the extreme Nationalist organisation, the leading spirit 
being Mr. Bandaranaike, who is such a bitter opponent of Indian immigration into 
Ceylon. It is to be expected that this body would come out for Dominion status, & I 
don't think that the resolution need be taken too seriously, though the number of 
supporters of demands for Dominion status is likely to increase steadily. The Ceylon 
National Congress is the more moderate body with a bigger following. 
A letter has recently been sent to Sir A. Caldecott inviting his views on the next 
step which should be taken in consideration of constitutional reform. There has not 
yet been time for him to reply. 
? reply requesting Gov. to inform the President of the Sabha that S. of S. has 
received their resolution. 
K.W.B. 
18.10.40 
The Sinhala Maha Sabha is a comparatively recent creation of Mr. Bandaranaike, the 
Minister for Local Administration in Ceylon, and has much the same extreme 
Sinhalese nationalist colour as the Hindu nationalism of the Hindu Maha Sabha in 
India. The Ceylon National Congress claims to have a wider basis with some 
representatives of the minority communities in its membership. The latter is 
certainly the more important political association in the island, and is sending an 
unofficial delegation from Ceylon to discuss Indo-Ceylonese problems with Congress 
in India. 
The Governor suggests that the draft resolution of the National Congress which he 
mentions in paragraph 3 of this despatch may be put into stronger terms under the 
influence of the Sinhala Maha Sabha; but any alteration of Congress policy in the 
direction of a demand for Dominion status, unless the minorities obtain assurances 
from the Sinhalese that their claims will be safeguarded, is a most unlikely 
development. 
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The problem of procedure in the matter of making headway with the constitution-
al position is being discussed on other papers but there is no need to be rushed on 
the score of this resolution by the Sinhala Maha Sabha. Simply ask that the president 
of the Sabha may be informed that the resolution has been received by the Secretary 
of State. 
G.E.J.G. 
22.10.40 
68 CO 54/978/7, no 20 17 Sept 1940 
[Reforms]: outward telegram no 558 from Lord Lloyd to Sir A 
Caldecott on the registration of Indian voters 
Your Confidential despatch, 14th June. 1 Indian franchise. I feel sure that Board of 
Ministers will understand that the resolution adopted by the majority in the State 
Council on the 28th May advocating the amendment of the Ceylon Constitution for 
the purpose of restricting opportunities of non-Ceylonese immigrants to achieve 
enfranchisement in Ceylon would need to be considered by His Majesty's Govern-
ment with full regard to views of all concerned. 
Indian view, both official and unofficial, is not in doubt, and it must be expected 
that the successful outcome of projected conversations between Ceylon and Indian 
representatives would be seriously and perhaps fatally prejudiced by action of the 
kind advocated in the State Council Resolution opposed as it was in the State Council 
itself by representatives of minority communities in the Island. I recognise 
importance attached by Board of Ministers to restriction of privilege of franchise as 
present Constitution provides to immigrants who are genuinely making their 
permanent homes in Ceylon, but for their part I hope the Board will on further 
reflection agree that those who thus genuinely choose to adopt status of Ceylonese 
should not suffer special disabilities as compared with other labourers in Ceylon. 
Such discrimination would appear to me difficult to contemplate. 
The question of Indian franchise must be considered in association with other 
problems of constitutional reform, but at this juncture especially it would be 
undesirable to disregard Indian susceptibilities. It must be assumed that Indian 
representatives at forthcoming Conference will seek full discussion on policy of 
Board of Ministers and State Council Resolution. I propose, therefore, to suspend my 
consideration of the Resolution pending the outcome of that Conference. In the 
meantime I hope that the Board will decide to proceed with revision of registers. 
1 See 54. 
69 CO 54/974/1, no 2 17 Sept 1940 
[European civil servants]: despatch (reply) from Sir A Caldecott to 
Lord Lloyd on the conditions of employment for European officers 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Lordship's Secret despatch of the 
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19th July, 1940,1 on the subject of the appointment of Deputy Chief Engineer and 
Manager, Electrical Undertakings and the probationary promotion thereto of Mr. 
H. H. Jansen. 
2. I desire to associate myself entirely with the exception taken by Your Lordship 
to the Minister's action in this matter; with Your Lordship's reluctance to approve 
recommendations that are not based primarily on considerations of administrative 
efficiency; with the disquiet, doubt and apprehension that have long been felt by 
many as to the tolerability of the conditions under which European officers now 
serve in this Island; and with Your Lordship's expression of the danger and improbity 
of subordinating correct principles of appointment to arguments of political 
expediency. I am indeed grateful for the opportunity given me of offering in a single 
despatch my general observations on a situation which causes me misgiving no less 
than it does Your Lordship. 
3. Article 86 of the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, on the face of 
it vests in the Governor complete control of the Public Service. By recourse to Article 
22 this control can in fact be rendered final and absolute in its application to any 
particular case. What is beyond gubernatorial control is the political atmosphere in 
which officers will have to serve. This point needs emphasis because the average 
public officer cannot feel, or do, his best in an uncongenial and antipathetic 
environment. 
4. I have no hesitation or doubt in stating that quite 95 per cent of the present 
European employees of this Government have long found their environment 
uncongenial and difficult, if not positively hostile. The older of them are restrained 
from retirement under Article 88 only by considerations of domestic finance or by a 
sense of obligation to stick to their jobs for the duration of the war. Of the younger 
men, to whom Article 88 does not apply, not a few express regret at ever having come 
here and dissatisfaction that our local conditions should not have been realistically 
explained to them in England before they accepted appointment. 
5. I can also state without doubt or hesitation that social and political opinion in 
this Island among all non-European communities is predominantly and progressive-
ly nationalistic and thereby in effect, if not in essence, anti-British. The great 
majority of Sinhalese and Tamils want to see as many Britishers out of the Island as 
possible, and as few of them as possible into it. It is true that among the educated and 
propertied classes there are many who realise that for a number of posts recruitment 
from Britain will for some years to come be necessary. But when it comes to an 
actual indent these very persons will be found joining in the protestations against it; 
for the reason that they have sons, nephews or other relatives whose chances of 
public employment they do not wish to prejudice. There is undoubtedly unemploy-
ment in the upper classes, even amongst youths who have been educated in Europe. 
6. For protest and opposition against European recruitment every facility seems 
to have been provided. First, under Public Service Regulation 13 an Executive 
Committee will have its say; then the State Council will debate a "March Resolution"; 
next the Budget Debate will provide the opportunity to delete financial provision for 
any appointment which the Governor fills uncomformably with the wishes of the 
Executive Committee and State Council. Finally there will ensue all the pother, Press 
publicity and recrimination inseparable from the enactment of a Governor's 
1 See 61. 
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Ordinance to restore the deleted provision. All this will be very enjoyable for the 
politician; for the Public Service (and in particular for the appointee or promotee 
concerned) it can only be detestable. 
7. Fuel for awkward argument is often taken from published correspondence. At 
the moment of writing I am having a tussle with the Ministers over European 
recruitment for the Port Police. The Home Minister quoted to me in conversation 
the passage in paragraph 5 of Lord Swinton's despatch No.620 of the 14th November, 
1932 (Ceylon Sessional Paper :XXIII/1933) which anticipates that "the recruitment of 
European Officers will be confined to the filling of a limited number of posts for 
which special experience or qualifications are required." What special qualifications 
or experience, the Minister enquired, will a European recruit for the Port Police 
possess that a local Burgher candidate would lack. I replied that he would be British 
and that in dealing with Europeans, Australians and New Zealanders (including 
Troops) passing through our pivotal Port I considered an adequate proportion of 
British Inspectors in the Port Police essential. That reply was of course sound sense; 
but, if it were given to a similar query in State Council, the Governor would at once 
be accused of improperly attaching a racial significance to Lord Swinton's words and 
a debate of a nature most injurious to the morale of the Port Police would inevitably 
ensue. 
8. I have heard it said here that the lot of our European officers would have been 
less unpleasant, and contentions as to their recruitment or retention fewer, if control 
of the public service had not been vested in the Governor and a Public Services 
Commission composed entirely of European Officers of State. Possibly; but the 
Services would not in my opinion have stood for any other arrangement and 
retirements under Article 88 would have been wholesale. The fundamental error in 
my view was that of bringing Executive Committees (which are nothing better than 
haphazard agglomerations of political busybodies) into every question of recruitment 
or promotion and on the ground floor. This is the effect of Public Service Regulation 
13, which was the outcome of pages 140--41 of the Donoughmore Report. If any 
body, other than the Public Services Commission, had to be consulted it should have 
been the Board of Ministers, as being less irresponsible than an Executive Committee 
and in personal contact, whenever necessary, with the Governor. As things are, 
should the Board of Ministers agree to introduce a "March Resolution" for outside 
recruitment against the advice of an Executive Committee the motion is likely to 
meet with opposition from a majority of the Councillors who will side with their 
unportfolioed colleagues on the Executive Committee. 
9. My recommendations for the reform of the Constitution contained an 
emphatic request for the cancellation, whatever happens, of Public Service Regula-
tion 13 and suggestions for a recomposition of the Public Services Commission. 
Although implementation of these proposals might improve the position, we have 
now reached a stage at which it is necessary to realize that, whatever is done, 
opposition to European employment has become a political stalking-horse which will 
be trotted out on every possible occasion. Members of the State Council, if deprived 
of their powers of interference as members of Executive Committees, will carry on 
their attacks from the citadel of the "March Resolution." It might perhaps have been 
possible at their inception in March, 1933, to refuse to take cognizance of such 
resolutions even as advisory motions. The full correspondence concerning them will 
be found in Sessional Paper XXIII/1933. To have done so, however, would have 
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meant merely the transference of opposition and protests to the Budget Debate or to 
special ad hoc motions. Even if the salaries of officials had been made non-votable by 
Order-in-Council, the antagonistic atmosphere that surrounds the European Officer 
would not have been dissipated; on the contrary it would in my opinion have been 
intensified. 
10. It is true that some Ministers (notably Mr. Senanayake) are in favour of 
recruiting highly qualified Europeans for key posts on high salaries for a term of 
years. Their aversion is not so much to the employment of Britishers as to their 
emplacement on the permanent and pensionable staff. Even so such temporary, 
highly-qualified and highly-paid experts cannot hope to escape the antipathy and 
mistrust that surrounds the permanent European official. I recommend that your 
Personal Branch should obtain, by interview or otherwise, from Professor L. P. 
Abercombie (who recently visited Ceylon to advise on the siting and planning of the 
Kandy University) his impressions and memories of how a leading British authority 
can be treated by Ceylon Ministries. 
11. The Ceylonese antipathy towards British officers is of course nothing new. I 
remember the late Mr. J. Strachan when he returned to Malaya as General Manager 
for Railways, relating insults and indignities to which he had been subjected by 
members of the Finance Committee of the old Legislative Council during his 
directorate of Public Works in this Island, which could not probably be matched 
to-day. The trouble is that the long duration of this antipathy has generated among 
many European Officials a reciprocal antipathy towards the Ceylonese. The atmos-
phere may not be actually deteriorating, but its inimicality is persistent and its effect 
on those who live in it is accumulative. Moreover the anti-European complex is no 
longer confined to politicians, but is to be found in some strata of the public service 
itself. In considering therefore a European recruitment there has to be set against 
the advantages of superior qualifications and ability, in the candidate the disadvan-
tages of imperfect collaboration and continual fractious criticism of his work after 
appointment. There is also the consideration that, as the nature of our local 
conditions becomes more and more widely known, fewer and fewer good European 
candidates will be attracted. 
12. I deem it right that I should at this point confess the increasing difficulty that 
I personally experience, after not quite three years in the Island, in fighting against 
the reciprocal antipathy mentioned in the preceding paragraph. There is an Eastern 
proverb to the effect that many small pricks make one big sore. If a friend of mine 
were to ask, on behalf of himself or of a person in whom he was interested, for my 
personal advice as to acceptance of a Ceylon appointment I could not with a good 
conscience advise him in the affirmative. 
13. In the recent cases of Mr. Strong (Conservator of Forests) and Mr. Bradby 
(Principal of Royal College) I have succeeded by personal suasion and influence in 
obtaining a more or less willing request for European recruitment and a decent 
reception of the person appointed. I trust that the same will soon be predicable of Mr. 
Ivor Jennings, the Principal designate of University College; although I have just read 
in the newspaper that a portrait in oils of Professor Marrs (than whom young Ceylon 
could not have had a wiser, more patient or kinder mentor) has been slashed into 
ribbons by some disgruntled student. If persuasion should fail in the case of a 
recruitment or appointment that I consider essential, I shall not hesitate to ask your 
permission for the exercise of my powers under Article 22. It must however be 
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realized that every time resort is had to these powers stimulus and impetus will be 
given to the insularity and nationalism of our politicians, and the hostility of the 
atmosphere in which European officials have to work will be thereby enhanced. 
14. I am painfully aware that the wholly unsatisfactory position reported in this 
despatch represents but a single facet of a general political situation that is equally 
unsatisfactory. Ceylon's loyalty to the Empire during this war, which I assess at over 
99 per cent, should not be mistaken for something that it is not. It is due to two 
things, first, the realization that Nazi victory would set an end to Ceylonese 
nationalism; second, a high sentimental regard for the King's Person and Throne. 
The general election has been postponed and Sama-Samajist leaders are under 
detention. We are thus enjoying a lull, but not a calm. So soon as a victorious end to 
the war is in sight agitation will again be rampant for constitutional reform, for 
Dominion status, even for Swaraj. The pivot of my own Reforms Proposals, now two 
years old, was the anticipation that true political parties might emerge from the 
introduction of a Cabinet system. My experience over the last two years has belied 
that hope. The foundations of political parties could only be laid by the present 
Ministers and the two, or at most three other politicians to whom the word 
"Statesman" could conceivably be applied even in a restricted local sense. Unfortu-
nately the Ministers have played so long and with such finesse in the dual role of 
Ministers on the one hand and creature-Chairmen of Executive Committees on the 
other that whatever may be left of the Dr. Jekyll in them can never be strong or 
courageous enough to shake off the Mr. Hyde. They are opportunists, not creators of 
policy; trimmers, not leaders; puppets, not agents . The appointment of a Commis-
sion to examine and report on the whole problem of Ceylon will in the opinion of all 
my advisers prove inevitable. 
70 CO 54/973/17, no 1 10 Oct 1940 
[Indo--Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 2098-S from Lord 
Linlithgow to Mr Amery on the visit to India by a deputation of Ceylon 
ministers 
Arrangements have as you know been made for a Ceylon deputation containing two 
Ministers (Messrs. Corea and Senanayake) for informal official discussions on 
matters of common interest early in November. Announcement has now been made 
by Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress that these two gentlemen 
will thereafter, with certain others, constitute a delegation to discuss with Indian 
National Congress the question of present and future relations between India and 
Ceylon regarding all matters of mutual interest. 
2. We cannot of course predict at this stage what the relations of Government of 
India with Congress may be early in November. But I cannot help feeling that it is 
somewhat improper that Ministers on an official visit to this country (? should) (2 
corrupt groups) after official visit, discuss with Congress matters which, at least so 
long as Government of India are a Government, can only be regulated by that 
Government. It may be of course that they have no appreciation of the possible 
embarrassment to us of their treating the Indian National Congress as a kind of 
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parallel Government: but I think that you will agree that we are (? justified in) taking 
some exception to this move. I shall be glad if you would mention to the Colonial 
Office. If the Colonial Office feel that they cannot or should not intervene to dissuade 
ministers from their intention, I agree that there will be nothing for it but to 
acquiesce. 
71 CO 54/973/16, no 16 15 Oct 1940 
'Note on the postponement of the election': joint note by G E J Gent 
and K W Blaxter 
Under the provisions of the Ceylon Constitution Order in Council as they stood last 
year the Governor had to dissolve the State Council after it had been in being for five 
years if it had not been dissolved sooner. 
For some time past it has been clear that in certain ways the Ceylon Constitution 
has not been working well; and when Sir Andrew Caldecott went to Ceylon as 
Governor in 1937 he was instructed to examine the constitutional position and to 
submit recommendations. These recommendations were duly received, and it was 
decided as a next step that they should be laid before the State Council for their 
consideration. The debate in the State Council showed lack of agreement between 
the Sinhalese and the minorities on most of the important questions. (e.g., the 
retention of the Executive Committees, "weightage" in the representation of the 
minority communities, communal franchise). Mr. MacDonald then suggested 
various methods of procedure for further pursuit of a solution. At this stage, the 
Spring of 1940, we received from Ceylon reports of increasing unrest amongst the 
Indian labourers in the Island. This unrest was due, partly to the growing 
consciousness of labour in Ceylon, under the fostering guidance of Pandit Nehru 
who paid a personal visit to Ceylon, and partly to suspicions aroused amongst the 
labourers of an anti-Indian policy of the Ceylon Ministers and the retaliatory ban 
placed by the Government of India on the immigration of "unskilled" labourers from 
India; this ban was imposed owing to the Government of India's dissatisfaction with 
the policy followed by the Ceylon Government in the treatment of Indians in the 
Island, and this quarrel between the two Governments over the rights of Indians in 
the matter of the franchise and employment, and the terms on which they may enter 
or reside in the Island, is still unresolved. 
A General Election to the State Council was due to be held not later than January 
1941 and certain politicians in Ceylon-both Sinhalese and Indian-were using the 
occasion of the coming election to stir up communal feeling and unrest amongst 
Indian labour. 
It was necessary to take action to "stop the rot" and it was decided:-
(1) to detain under the Defence Regulations certain leaders of the Sama Samaj 
(Communist) party who were particularly active in stirring up trouble and whose 
representatives in the State Council had just indulged in some inexcusable 
defamation of the British defence forces; and 
(2) to pass an Order in Council to enable the elections to be postponed for two 
years . These measures were taken last summer and have certainly resulted both in 
a relaxation of the political tension and a lessening of labour unrest. 
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The actual words of the official announcement of postponement of the election 
was as follows:-
"In view of the general dissatisfaction with the present Constitution and of 
the questions that have arisen regarding cognate problems of franchise and 
delimitation of constituencies, an Order-in-Council will be enacted to enable 
the postponement for two years of the election which is due not later than 
next January under Article 19. This postponement is necessary in present 
circumtances if careful decisions are to be reached on these questions before 
new elections are held." 
The Election of a new State Council is, under the present Constitution, 
immediately followed by the Councillors distributing themselves by vote to form the 
seven Executive Committees of the Council. Each Committee then elects its 
Chairman, and the resulting seven Chairmen are appointed by the Governor to be his 
Ministers; and they then have a rather indefinite corporate existence as the Board of 
Ministers (which also includes the three Officers of State-Chief Secretary, Legal 
Secretary, Financial Secretary). The suspension of the General Election means that 
the election of new Executive Committees (and Chairmen) is also suspended; and the 
Jaffna (Tamil) Association's present desire is that a special arrangement should be 
made to permit new Executive Committees (and Chairmen) to be elected, despite the 
suspension of the General Elections, in the hope that their community may snatch 
up one of the chairmanships and so have a Tamil on the Board of Ministers. 
72 CO 54/977/7, no 12 18 Oct 1940 
'Things Ceylonese': twelfth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for CO 
The budget 
1. The State Council has wasted more time and paper than ever over the budget; 
and, as a result of insertions and additions, the last state of the estimated deficit is 
worse than the first. The Leader of the House introduced the Supply Bill with an 
assurance that after its passage a Reservations Committee would, similarly to last 
year, be immediately appointed for the purpose of reducing provision wherever 
possible. The State Council however showed itself more interested in increasing than 
in decreasing expenditure, and at a Board Meeting held immediately after the close of 
the Budget Session the Ministers with apparent weakness decided not to appoint the 
promised Reservations Committee but to review the financial position in three 
months' time. 
Qualified assent thereto 
2. The Acting Financial Secretary had at my request previously impressed on the 
Ministers the very serious view which I take of the financial situation, and they had 
appeared to him to take the warning to heart. I am indeed inclined to the view that 
their failure to appoint a Reservations Committee now is due to the consideration 
that three of them (Senanayake, Corea and Bandaranaike) are about to leave on our 
Exploratory Mission to India and fear that, if a Committee were to get busy during 
their absence, the expenditure of their three Ministries might be pruned more than 
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that of departments under the remaining Ministers. In assenting to the Supply 
Ordinance I have informed the Board of Ministers in writing that my assent is 
conditional on the promised Reservations Committee being appointed immediately 
on the Mission's return from India, i.e. in about six weeks' time. This short 
postponement will enable us to gauge the prospects of Indo-Ceylon agreement on 
questions of trade and tariff and to watch the trend of International developments in 
the Far East. 
New loan money 
3. It will be necessary in the near future to raise locally more money under our 
Loan Ordinance for loan works already in hand. The Ministers, I understand, are in 
favour of a prospectus to the effect that any money so raised and not found to be 
required for immediate disbursement will be applied to war purposes. I have told the 
Acting Financial Secretary that I am opposed to any idea of baiting a loan for local 
uses with a problematical and probably unrealizable relevancy to war purposes. The 
two things must be kept distinct. Here the matter rests for the moment. 
The financial secretary 
4. Mr. Huxham who has been on furlough in Kashmir will join our delegates to 
the Delhi War Supplies Conference towards the end of this month, and will also take 
part in the exploratory Conference on Indo-Ceylon relations. In his absence I have 
enjoyed working with Mr. C.H. Collins as Acting Financial Secretary. He combines 
tact with firmness, and enjoys the confidence and friendship of the Ministers and of 
many of the State Councillors in a marked degree. I have heard from European as 
well as Sinhalese sources that both he and Mr. Wodeman have carried more weight 
in Council Debates than has been associated with Officers of State for a long time. 
The secretariat 
5. On Mr. Huxham's return to Ceylon Mr. Collins will take up his new 
appointment of Deputy Chief Secretary. Under Mr. Wodeman and him the Secretar-
iat will be strongly captained. The transfer of Mr. Hartwell to Palestine has meant 
loss of the Secretariat officer responsible for War and Defence fi les; but he has been 
replaced by Mr. Renison, my knowledge of whose work as Private Secretary in 
1937-38 gives me confidence that the efficiency of the Defence work will not suffer. 
The Bandaranaike Ratwatte wedding 
6. I attended the wedding of "Young Banda" to Miss Ratwatte (daughter of 
Dissawa Barnes Ratwatte and niece of the late Sir Cudah) at Balangoda and, a week 
later, their ceremonial home-coming to Sir Solomon Bandaranaike's residence near 
Veyangoda. This marriage is of great sociological and political importance. Whatever 
opinion one may hold of young Bandaranaike as Minister for Local Administration, 
or as founder and leader of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, or as a pervert for political 
purposes from Christianity to Buddhism, or as a master of nationalistic rhetoric, one 
is bound to admit that he has taken to himself a wife who appears thoroughly nice, 
placid and sensible and that this union between a first-rank family of the lowlands 
with a first-rank family of the Kandyan highlands represents an accretion of 
considerable political influence to the Sinhala Maha Sabha. This is already noticeable 
in the parental attitude towards the happy pair. When I first met Sir Solomon (three 
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years ago) and Barnes Ratwatte Dissawa (two years ago) both were extreme examples 
of "the old gang", and their first topic of conversation was the rottenness of the State 
Council and of Ceylon politics in general. !Is ont change tout cela. Both were 
purring, sometimes audibly, as the Sinhala Maha Sabha address of loyalty and 
flattery to the bridegroom was read out and when young Banda in his reply 
passionately referred with his usual irredentism to the renascence of Lanka. As he 
spoke in Sinhalese, which I cannot understand, Sir Solomon volunteered to interpret 
and muttered the choicer morsels of his son's oratory into my ear; and with obvious 
gusto. It was nice indeed to behold the old man (who has served us so well) such a 
proud parent. Three years ago the relations between father and son appeared to me as 
bordering on estrangement. 
7. The rising tide of nationalism can of course no more be checked here or in 
India than could the waves which wetted Canute. The immersion therein of the two 
old conservative families of Dias-Bandaranaike and Ratwatte was only a question of 
time, and its acceleration by this wedding need not be unduly deplored. On the other 
hand a good wife and the discipline of married life may help to provide young Banda 
with the ballast that hitherto he has so sadly lacked. 
Indo-Ceylon relations 
8. Mr. Corea (Labour, Industry & Commerce) has been the first Minister to leave 
for India. He will be a member of our delegation to the Delhi War Supplies 
Conference as well as of the exploratory 'goodwill' mission. He has left early for two 
reasons. The first is to get into touch with coconut interests (and officials concerned 
with them) in Travancore, and the second is that foretold in paragraph 7 of my last 
Notes, i.e. as President of the Ceylon National Congress he is to pay a visit to the 
headquarters of the Indian Congress. In bidding me goodbye he told me that this 
visit would take only a day, and that there was no programme for discussions. I 
warned him that he was a Minister as well as President of Congress, and he gave me 
the impression that he sufficiently understood the niceties and dangers of this dual 
role . 
9. I hear that the Planters' Association are sending two representatives to be in 
Delhi during the informal discussions, in order that the Ministers may be able to 
keep in touch with planting interests. The Ministers have apparently agreed to this 
arrangement, and the Association's choice of representatives (Messrs Temple and 
Newton) is a happy one. Mr. Temple has asked to see me before he goes. The Ceylon 
Indian Congress is also sending an emissary to watch developments at Delhi, but I do 
not know his name. As far as I am aware the Ministers have taken no cognizance of 
this arrangement, and the emissary is likely to possess only a nuisance, if any, value. 
War funds 
10. Ceylon's pecuniary contributions to War Funds and War Charities stood on 
October l Oth as follows :-
1. *Send a Plane Fund .. . 
2. Jaffna Plane Fund 
3. Ceylon Government War Purposes Fund 
4. *Gloucester Fund (Red Cross & St. John's) 
5. King George's Fund for Sailors 
6. *Local Sailors' Fund . . . 
640,249 
39,898 
738,897 
406,783 
35,254 
35,869 
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7. St. Dunstan's Fund 
8. Hospital Supply Association (for cost of materials which the 
Association makes up) 
9. *Air Raid Distress Fund 
10. Government contribution 
11. Colombo Municipal contribution 
TOTAL 
[72) 
30,825 
22,294 
29,379 
5,000,000 
200,000 
Rs 7,179,448 
The items prefixed by an asterisk are being run by the "Times of Ceylon"; Nos. 1 and 
9 were initiated by that newspaper and Nos. 4 and 6 taken over by it shortly after 
initiation. The Local Sailors' Fund, which is for the entertainment of men of H.M. 
Ships visiting Colombo, has enabled the equipment of a "Fleet Club" which 
challenges comparison with any other club of its kind in the world. There can be no 
port in the Empire where men of the Royal Navy are more welcomed or better cared 
for. Colombo has not always had this reputation. 
Times of Ceylon 
11. I had a long interview a fortnight ago with the Managing Director of the 
Times of Ceylon, Mr. P.J. Matthews, on the subject of War Funds. From that subject 
the conversation drifted to generalities and Matthews remarked that rumour had it 
that I disapproved of his paper. To this I replied that I considered that (a) some of its 
criticisms of the administration during the second quarter of the year had been 
unwise and hysterical and (b) that its more recent "Dominion Status for Ceylon" 
leader had been premature and injudicious. He replied that as regards (a) many 
people had thought that we should not get through the summer with its problems of 
labour unrest, Sama-Samajism etc without a constitutional bust-up and had felt that 
the sooner the bust-up was induced the better. Events had proved that that feeling 
had been erroneous, and the handling of the situation by the administration had 
been justified by its results; of which he and everybody else was very glad and 
appreciative. His paper had however all along faithfully reflected what was honest, if 
wrong, public opinion among many strata of the community. As to (b) he agreed that 
his leader-writer had dived too soon and too deep; but that was the worst of these 
leader-writers! After a long and interesting conversation, in which points of 
agreement largely outnumbered points of disagreement, he expressed the hope that 
if at any time I felt any doubt or concern about his paper I would invite him to talk 
things over. This was a very different termination of an interview from that in which, 
in November 1937, I asked the Acting Editor (Mr. Peter Batten whose departure I 
reported in my last Notes) 1 to refrain from falsely inventing agenda and proceedings 
of my conferences with Ministers at Queen's House. To this request Mr. Batten 
retorted that invention was the mother of journalism and that if an Editor couldn't 
get fact it was his business and vocation to substitute "intelligent imagination". 
Our policy of de-imperialization 
12. I am a member of the Overseas League and have been responsible for others 
joining. I must confess however to grave doubt as to the wisdom of the League's 
latest stunt in propaganda, i.e. the broadcast dissemination (as a supplement to their 
1 See 63, para 3. 
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magazine) of Sir Norman Angell's2 pamphlet "What is the British Empire?" We have 
done our best to unconquer our conquests; disannex our annexations; turn what 
was originally an empire into a group of sovereign and independent nations; indeed 
the empire, so far as most of it is concerned, long since came to an end ... "If 
valueless" (argued an American) "why not give up the empire?" To which the answer 
is that we are giving it up to people who live there. To which the Ceylon nationalist 
retorts "Sez you?" There is a way and a time to say things. In this matter and in so far 
as Ceylon is concerned I do not consider that now was the time or Sir Norman 
Angell's the way. However the pamphlets are now all over the Island and the wind has 
been sown. 
Tea coupons 
13. I have often commented on the extreme difficulty of the Governor's job here. 
He is outside the Governmental machine until something goes wrong and then he is 
called in without any previous inkling to set things right. Last week Mr. Senanayake 
suddenly demanded an interview at which to inform me that the price of tea coupons 
was so high that many might fail on their contracts under the Tea Supply Scheme. 
Thereafter at consecutive conferences with him, the Tea Controller, and the Legal 
Secretary or his representative I satisfied myself at least on one point, which is that 
neither the Minister nor the Controller know (nor under the present law possess the 
means of ascertaining) who holds the coupons, how many are being held against 
contracts and how many are in the hands of speculators. The Minister will introduce 
a bill to give the Controller the necessary powers of control over coupons as soon as 
Council reassembles in mid-November, and in the mean time Emergency Regula-
tions have been framed to the same end under the Defence Act in the hope of 
safeguarding the contracted supply to Britain and the Forces. I am not however at all 
satisfied myself of the possibility of dealing satisfactorily with the post-contractual 
position in the first quarter of 1941. If the figures given to me at the conferences are 
correct there will (including 33 millions to be issued in November) be 98 million 
coupons extant to cover all tea exports between now and March 31st next. Fifty 
million pounds are still to be supplied to the Ministry of Supply on the present 1940 
contract, and if a similar amount were needed for the first quarter of 1941 coupons 
would be insufficient by two million even if there were no contracted exports for 
America, Australia, etc. The difficulty has of course arisen from the 5% cut in the 
international quota; the coupon market prices having risen in unison with those of 
the commodity market. A free coupon market is in fact irreconcilable with a 
contractual scheme for tea supply to Britain at a fixed price so long as the prices 
offering in American and Australian markets are not fixed but rising. It is a pity that 
this was not foreseen by the Ministry. 
A new acting minister 
14. Mr. Rajah Hewavitarne's election to be Chairman of Mr. Corea's Executive 
Committee during the latter's absence in India is a happy one and I had pleasure in 
swearing him in as Acting Minister. Mr. Sri Pathmanathan who acted for Mr. Corea 
last year made persistent but unsuccesful efforts to get me temporarily to release the 
2 Author and lecturer; correspondent of a nul\lber of American newspapers; Labour MP for Bradford 
North, 1929-1931; Nobel Peace Prize, 1933. 
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two Communist members of the Committee out of their Place of Detention at Kandy 
for the purpose of voting for him. Mr. Sri Pathmanathan's recent speeches and 
tactics have not been such as to qualify him for any ministerial portfolio.3 
3 Lloyd minuted (9 Nov 1940) on this report: 'Very interesting. No. 12 is much better than its predecessor.' 
73 CO 54/973/17, no 6 22 Oct 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the visit to India by a deputation of Ceylon 
ministers 
With reference to your secret and personal telegram of 19th October. 1 I interviewed 
Ministers yesterday and at their request have sent confidential telegram to the 
Viceroy which is repeated to you by my telegram No.931.2 Ceylon National Congress 
is hopelessly unsystematic and I understand decision to send representatives to make 
contact with the Indian Congress was the decision of the Working Committee only 
and not of the Congress so that it is doubtful what, if any, standing such 
representatives possess. I further understand that two out of five representatives will 
probably not go in which case there will be only Corea who is President of Congress, 
Senanayake and George Silva, Member for Kandy. Last named is notoriously 
irresponsible and in my opinion, it is well that the two former (who thoroughly 
realise that they must do or say nothing that would embarrass the Government of 
India or in any way affect official conversations) will be there to restrain him. I am 
informed that delegation to the Indian Congress has also been sent by Ceylon Indian 
Congress and I do not anticipate much constructive result from this triangular 
contact. 
I cf 70. 
2 Tel 931 read: 'Board of ministers desire me clear that members of forthcoming ministerial mission to the 
Government of India have no intention of treating with the Indian National Congress on any question of 
lndo-Ceylon relations. Any conversations which any of them may have with political leaders in India will 
be strictly unofficial and informal. 
2. Ministers have undertaken to meet the Indian Congress Leaders on behalf of Ceylon National 
Congress but not in their Ministerial capacity and their discussions will be on the subject of the influence 
of the Indian National Congress upon the Ceylon Indian Congress and other Indian bodies in Ceylon. 
Please give any publicity that you may think desirable to this communication' (CO 54/973/17, no 5). 
7 4 CO 54/975/4, no 13 29 Oct 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from T W Davies to S Caine on the visit 
by Ceylon ministers to India 
[A principal at the CO and a member of the UK trade delegation to the USA in 1938, 
Davies acted as an observer for the CO at the Eastern Group Conference, Delhi, in 1940. 
He also acted as an observer at the Indo-Ceylon ministerial talks and visited Ceylon. His 
correspondence with Caine (assistant secretary, head of the Economics Dept within the 
General Division of the CO) was sent do the private secretary to the viceroy.) 
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You would have seen the telegram from Ceylon to the Secretary of State No. 919 of 
the 15th October about my proposed visit to that colony. You will have noticed from 
it that preliminary conversations regarding India and Ceylon relations are to take 
place next month. Actually they are to start on the 4th November, and I cannot 
conceive that they will not be over before the Eastern Group Conference is over. In 
fact, I think it is very unlikely that they will last more than a week. Their existence, 
therefore, should not mean any delay in my departure for Ceylon. 
2. On the part of Ceylon, three Ministers are going to take part in these 
discussions-Corea, and two others who are expected to arrive almost immediately. 
On the side of India, I understand that Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai will be in charge. 
These discussions are to be entirely political, I understand. They will relate only to 
the immigration question. If that is settled, there should of course be no difficulty 
whatsoever in coming to an economic agreement. I lunched with Corea and the 
Ceylon Delegation (with the exception of Huxham who was out) to-day, and I 
understand from them that the crux of the matter is the question whether (a) birth 
in Ceylon and the absence of evidence of choice of Indian domicile, or (b) a period of 
years in Ceylon (which must not be unduly long), coupled with a declaration of 
permanent settlement, must be accepted as constituting domicile and conferring full 
citizenship rights. 
3. I think Corea appreciates how highly undesirable it would be to let these 
political talks create a deadlock with a resulting Tariff War. He also, I am sure, 
appreciates the fact that if it comes to Tariff War, the trump cards are in the hands of 
India, since the loss of Ceylon's Indian market for copra would be a severe blow to 
her. Corea tells me that the two Ministers about to arrive here are by no means such 
reasonable men as he is himself. As you will know, I have up to the present been 
ignorant of Ceylon politics. I hope to meet the Ministers in a day or two. One of 
them, I believe, (I cannot remember his name for the moment) was Secretary of the 
Oxford Union when I was up. 
4. Apparently these impending political discussions (of which the purpose is to 
prepare the way for the economic discussions) were Corea's idea. He went on to say 
that he believed that he made a mistake in making the proposal since, if they come to 
nothing, India may fulfil the threat she has previously made to denounce the interim 
trade agreement which, in the absence of such political discussions, she might 
perhaps allow to continue in being even for the duration of the war. If this is so, I 
think Corea certainly did make a mistake. It seems to me obvious that if the trade 
agreement could be extended for the duration of the war, Ceylon ought to be very 
much more than satisfied. 
75 CO 54/975/4, no 19 16 Nov 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from T W Davies to S Caine on the 
breakdown of the ministerial talks 
I hardly know whether it is worth while or not continuing my previous letter No. 9 of 
6th November about the Ceylon "Goodwill" talks. Before you read this letter, you will 
probably have received an official report from the Government of Ceylon. But the 
perhaps erroneous views which have been formed by an innocent observer may 
138 WAR AND POSTPONEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM [75) 
nevertheless be of interest. They are based principally on Gimson, Controller of 
Immigration in Ceylon who was present at the talks, and upon persons concerned 
from the Government of India side, with just a little Huxham thrown in. I have not 
since I last wrote to you been in other than brief social contact with the Ceylon 
Ministers, Messrs. Bandaranaike and Senanayake, partly accounted for by the fact 
that they were often out of Delhi on off days. 
2. The point upon which the Goodwill talks turned was simply the question of the 
terms upon which an Indian immigrant into Ceylon should obtain the rights of 
citizenship. There is no point in my setting out in detail exactly what the position is 
in Ceylon now, what the Indian side wanted, and what the Ceylon side would offer. It 
is apparent that on this elastic and technical matter there was every opportunity to 
take stand upon any one of myriad planks if necessary, and there ought to have been 
abundant grounds for a compromise. The way that the thing was actually worked was 
most peculiar. As I indicated in my earlier letter, the talks were given out as being 
preliminary and exploratory. I had an account of them from Gimson from day to day 
as they proceeded, and he never quite gave up hope. Corea and Huxham sometimes 
said they were hopeful, sometimes hopeless. Gimson said that he was amazed at the 
patience of Bajpai and his fellow representatives of the Government of India. They 
were everlastingly forbearing even though Bandaranaike was rude to them on one 
occasion. There came a t ime when Gimson drew up some compromise proposals 
which he thought might possibly be the basis of an agreement, and he gave them to 
Corea who said that he agreed with them and would show them to his fellow-
Ministers. When the next meeting came, Corea had these proposals before him on 
the table, but they were turned face downwards so that his brother-Ministers should 
not see them; and at that meeting Senanayake and Bandaranaike were so uncom-
promising that the talks could not go forward. Gimson asked the Secretary of the 
Goodwill Delegation a little later what Bandaranaike and Senanayake had thought of 
his proposals, and the Secretary replied that they had never seen them! 
3. The same day the Ceylon and Indian representatives came to draw up a Press 
Communique. The Indians wanted to say that the talks had been "adjourned", the 
Ceylonese insisted on substituting the words "broken down". Surely, the Indian side 
suggested, it would be as well for the Ministers to telegraph back to Ceylon? but no, 
they said it was not worth doing more than informing the Governor by telegram and 
the Communique had better be issued tomorrow. 
4. The Communique was accordingly issued the next day, and the next thing that 
the Government of India knew was that they received a telegram from the Governor 
of Ceylon to the Viceroy saying that the Ministers had no authority to come to any 
conclusions and, therefore, had no authority to let the talks break down without 
prior reference to him. This, of course, was after the Communique had appeared in 
the Press. 
5. The whole thing is to me, with my absence of background knowledge of Ceylon 
politics, obscure. It seems also to be obscure to Gimson. I think one can understand 
the attitude of Bandaranaike who just wants everything to break down. This will gain 
him votes in Ceylon, and things have gone just as he would have wished. Senanayake 
has possibly trailed along in his footsteps . What about Corea and Huxham? Corea is a 
more sensible man than the other two Ministers, and furthermore he is personally 
interested in copra since he owns plantations. The breakdown of the Goodwill 
negotiations therefore, if it is followed by a tariff war on the part of Indian authorities 
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(which may not be the case), may have adverse effects on his pocket. These are the 
reasons why I should have thought that he would at least have shown Gimson's 
compromise draft to the other two Ministers. 
6. I said before that certain people in India contemplate with tranquility, or even 
with pleasure, the possibility of breaking Ceylon economically; and with equal 
tranquility people like Huxham have mentioned the possibility of a trade war 
between the two countries, Ceylon, for instance, prohibiting the imports of India. All 
this time the Eastern Group Conference is rolling along, busy considering, amongst 
other things, how Ceylon should in future increase its imports from India, and how it 
will be getting from India a number of things which it has hitherto been getting from 
the United Kingdom. 
76 CO 54/975/4, no 5 25 Nov 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward telegram no 698 from Lord Lloyd to 
Sir A Caldecott on the breakdown of the ministerial talks and a 
suggested compromise 
Your telegram No. 974. Your telegram No. 976. 
1. I very much regret to hear that informal preliminary negotiations with 
Government of India have broken down before opportunity appears to have been 
given for discussion of trade problems of immediate urgency to Ceylon. 
2. Status of resident Indians in Ceylon and restrictions on Indian immigration 
appear to me to be problems incapable of agreement with India if Ceylonese 
proposals are persisted in, and failure on this account to make headway with 
rapprochement with India has such threatening prospects for Ceylon that I find it 
difficult to leave matters to take their course in view of my responsibility to His 
Majesty's Government and Parliament for good order and government of the island. 
3. Subject to your advice as soon as you receive Minister's report, which I should 
like to have with least possible delay, it may even be necessary for me to consider 
proposing to the Secretary of State for India that he should suggest to Government of 
India a modus vivendi on following lines pending more permanent settlement 
between Governments of India and Ceylon, viz.:-
(a) no change in the present immigration law in Ceylon; 
(b) no change in the present Order in Council provisions for franchise which 
would however be more strictly operated; 
(c) assurance that I shall not approve discrimination against resident Indians in 
matter of public employment including daily paid employment. 
On last point (on which Government of India would no doubt expect satisfaction) I 
should like your advice as to effective powers of His Majesty's Government under 
present Order in Council. 
4. In return we should secure from Government of India (a) assurance of no 
change in present trade advantages in India for Ceylon produce, (b) relaxation of 
present ban on emigration of Indian workers to Ceylon at least to extent of workers 
and their families returning to island from temporary visit to India. 
5. I fear that I should have to expect that undertakings in paragraph 3 on behalf 
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of Ceylon would not be acceptable to Ceylonese Ministers, and that negotiations on 
that basis with Government of India would have to be undertaken by this Department 
in London and might result in resignation of Ministers and possibly non co-operation 
by majority of State Council. 
6. Even so, it may be necessary to consider that course as alternative to drifting 
into such further difficulties with Government of India as might bring widespread 
distress and demoralisation in Ceylon at a crucial stage in the war. It seems to me 
deplorable that while Board of Ministers have shown admirable appreciation of need 
of united front in war effort and have been discussing at Delhi co-operation in war 
production with representatives of India and other Empire countries this impasse in 
Indo-Ceylon relations should be prolonged in present critical time.1 
1 Caldecott responded in tel 1002 of 27 Nov: 'Present position is that short-hand proceedings of 
Conference are being printed and should be ready by the time Huxham and Corea return from War Supply 
Conference next week when they will collaborate with Senanayake and Bandaranaike who have already 
returned in preparation of formal report for submission to Board of Ministers and myself. I have impressed 
on Ministers absolute necessity of silence on this subject until the Board and myself have had time fully to 
consider the report and resultant situation. Report should be read[y] for consultation by the time I return 
from India on or about 18th December, after which I will report fully to you' (CO 54/975/4, no 8). 
77 CO 54/975/4, no 9 27 Nov 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the breakdown of the ministerial talks and 
the question of trade retaliation 
My telegram No. 1002.1 Following is excerpt from private letter to me from James, 
member of Indian Legislative Assembly and of Standing Emigration Committee. 
Begins:-"Nobody here wants to take up the question of trade retaliation. Both 
countries can play at that game. Moreover everybody wants to avoid open quarrel on 
trade matters between two countries in the Empire. So the situation may be allowed 
to rest for the time being in the hope that better counsels may prevail in Ceylon and 
that the British Government may assist in persuading Ceylon Ministers to face the 
necessity for reasonable compromise." Following corroboration of above comes from 
Huxham:-
"I am hopeful that India will maintain the status quo so long as no fresh step 
is taken to the detriment of Indians in Ceylon. All reports so far reaching me 
ascribe the breakdown of the Conference to the antics of Bandaranaike and it 
is in my view preferable that he should have done his mischief during the 
negotiations rather than torpedo the Agreement in the State Council after it 
had been reached by the Mission, which he would certainly have done if he 
had not been a member of the Mission. After interview with Senanayake this 
morning I am not certain that the breakdown of discussions may not have 
been due to his inability to make himself plain in English as well as to the 
interruptions of Bandaranaike and I propose while in Madras to discuss the 
whole position with Rutherford who was member of the Indian delegation. As 
1 See 76, note 1. 
[78] 
2 See 76. 
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I understand the position India is not insisting on undertaking suggested in 
paragraph 3(c) of your telegram No. 698,2 and I do not altogether despair of 
reaching a settlement that will not involve non-co-operation here even 
though it may have to be imposed by you from without. Although therefore I 
realise the necessity to remove the present impasse without delay I feel it 
advisable thoroughly to examine and digest the proceedings of the recent 
Conference before taking any further action. 
78 CO 54/973/13, no 24 18 Dec 1940 
[Reforms]: despatch from Lord Lloyd to Sir A Caldecott on the 
postponement of reform until the end of the war 
I have the honour to refer to Sir An drew Caldecott's confidential despatch of the 23rd 
of April1 on the subject of constitutional reform in Ceylon. 
2. I have had this question under my consideration in the light of the comments 
which you make in that despatch and in subsequent correspondence, and the 
announcement which was made on the 15th of June to the effect that an Order in 
Council would be enacted to enable the postponement for two years of the general 
election which was due to take place not later than January, 1941. As there stated, 
this postponement was considered to be necessary in the circumstances then 
existing, if careful decisions were to be reached on constitutional reform and certain 
cognate problems before new elections were held. 
3. At the time when this announcement was made it seemed likely that it would 
be possible to proceed with the active consideration of constitutional reform during 
the period of the war, but new circumstances have arisen which make me regard it as 
impracticable to contemplate the further examination of this question until the war 
is over. Since the collapse of France the war has entered a critical phase which is 
likely to continue for many months to come, and I feel sure that you, the Board of 
Ministers, and responsible opinion generally in Ceylon will agree that it is essential 
that all our energies should be bent during the coming days on the prosecution of 
the war to a victorious conclusion, when careful decisions can be taken in an 
atmosphere freed from the threat which overclouds the institutions of representative 
government at the present time. I feel that the right course will be to make a public 
announcement to this effect at an early date. 
4. When victory has been won, it is the full intention of His Majesty's 
Government to proceed to a reform of the constitution. The announcement should 
make this abundantly clear, and should state also that when the time comes, His 
Majesty's Government will, before reaching their conclusions, take into full con-
sultation the representatives of the interests substantially concerned. The manner in 
which this consultation should be carried out cannot now be determined. If the war 
continues for a considerable time, a contingency for which we must be and are 
prepared, it may be necessary to advise His Majesty to enact a fresh Order in Council 
1 See 37. 
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enabling a further postponement of the general election in Ceylon. This would be 
done when the right moment came, and in taking that course His Majesty's 
Government would be applying in Ceylon the same procedure which operates in this 
country, since, as you know, the intention is that no general election shall be held in 
the United Kingdom while the war effort demands all our energies. 
5. I shall be glad to receive at an early date any observations which you wish to 
make upon the views expressed in the previous paragraphs of this despatch. Subject 
thereto I shall be obliged if you will transmit to me the draft of a suitable 
announcement for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. When the terms 
of the draft announcement have thus been in general agreed upon, I should desire 
that the Board of Ministers should have the opportunity of being consulted in 
confidence before it is published, and I should hope that it would be possible to 
satisfy any wishes they might express for the amendment of the form or of the terms 
of the announcement provided that the draft were not substantially altered. I should 
also consider it to be a courtesy to the State Council if it were arranged for the 
announcement to be made in Council simultaneously with its general publication 
here and in Ceylon, and I should be glad to have your advice as to procedure for that 
purpose. 
79 CO 54/982/111, no 32 23 Dec 1940 
'Why Indo-Ceylon talks failed: Mr Senanayake's review of events': 
press report from Ceylon Daily News [Extract] 
The proceedings of the 22nd Ceylon National Congress commenced at Mirigama at 5 
p.m. on Saturday amid enthusiastic scenes and in the presence of a very large 
gathering of Congressmen, visitors and a teeming crowd of villagers. 
The President, Mr. E. A. P. Wijeyeratne, arrived on the Congress grounds 
conducted in a mile-long procession, with over a dozen elephants from the Mirigama 
Resthouse. On arrival at the grounds, a party of youths formed a historical pageant 
depicting Parakrama-Bahu the Great after his second coronation as Lord of Lanka. 
Mr. D. S. Senanayake, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, then delivered 
his address. 
He warmly welcomed the delegates and referred to the many problems affecting 
the social and economic life of the people, with whom he had come into close 
personal touch in his ten years' work as Minister of Agriculture. 
Among the present evils, he mentioned the limited scope given to the activities of 
local bodies and the evils of the system of undivided ownerships of land. 
Status of Indians 
Mr. Senanayake then went on to give an account of what had happened at the 
Indo-Ceylon Exploratory Conference last month. 
He said that the Conference commenced with the question of the status of Indians 
now in Ceylon. 
"We placed before the Conference", said Mr. Senanayake, "certain tentative 
proposals laying down the conditions under which the status of Indians should be 
determined. 
"They were as follows:-
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(1) "Persons of Indian descent who possess a Ceylon domicile of origin, i.e. those 
born in Ceylon of a father having a Ceylon domicile of origin or of choice, will be 
considered Ceylonese and will be entitled to all rights and privileges of Ceylonese. 
(2) "Other persons of Indian descent now resident in Ceylon. These will be 
entitled to the rights and privileges accorded to British subjects. Within this class 
those who possess a Ceylon domicile of choice (which must include 5 years' 
residence) will be entitled to State Council franchise but will not be entitled to 
certain privileges reserved for Ceylonese, e.g. under the Land Development 
Ordinance and the Fisheries Ordinance; and to apply for posts under the Ceylon 
Government. The whole of this class, i.e. other persons of Indian descent now 
resident in Ceylon, will be entitled on application to certificates of residence, 
subject to such conditions as may be set out in the certificate." 
Three classes 
"On our proposals Indians now in Ceylon may be divided into three classes:-
"(i) The second generation of Indians who have made Ceylon their permanent 
home. To those we give full rights of citizenship and treat them as Ceylonese for 
all purposes. 
"(ii) Those Indians now in Ceylon who have made Ceylon their permanent home 
irrespective of who their parents were, and have resided at least five years. To those 
we not only give the right to reside and earn their living but also they will be 
entitled to the franchise. But they will not be entitled to certain special benefits, 
e.g. obtaining Crown land under Government schemes, etc. 
"(iii) Those Indians now in Ceylon who have not settled permanently here but 
continue to have connections with India. These will be entitled to obtain 
certificates to enable them to continue to reside and earn their living, but they will 
not have any other rights such as the franchise ." 
Counter-proposals 
"The representatives of the Government of India rejected these proposals and made 
the following counter-proposals:-
"(!) Our category (i), giving full rights of citizenship to the second generation of 
Indians permanently settled in Ceylon, to remain. 
"(2) Full rights of citizenship, with the exceptions stated below, to be conferred on 
all Indians who can furnish proof 
"(a) of five years' residence, and 
"(b) of permanent interest in the Island. 
"The fact that a married person lives in Ceylon with his wife and children should 
suffice to raise the presumption of permanent interests. Similar test to be adopted for 
unmarried persons. The only exceptions from the full rights of citizenship applicable 
to this class are:-
"(1) They may not claim the right to appointment in the Ceylon Government 
Services but their descendants are to be entitled to it. 
"(2) They may not claim grants of Crown land already set apart for the Ceylonese, 
but they are to have equality of rights to all other Crown land. 
"(3) Other Indians not coming under the above classes to be entitled to engage in 
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any lawful vocation or calling which they now exercise, without discrimination. 
These Indians now in Ceylon may however qualify in the future to come within 
category (2)." 
"Impossible to agree" 
Continuing, Mr. Senanayake added that the difference between the proposals made 
by the Ceylon delegation of Ministers and by the representatives of the Government 
of India, was as follows:-
"We proposed that the franchise should be given to all Indians now in Ceylon who 
have permanently settled down here, and that full rights of citizenship should be 
given only to the second generation of such Indians. Their proposal is that full rights 
of citizenship with very minor restrictions should be given to all Indians who have 
lived five years in Ceylon and have their famil ies here. 
"Their proposals would practically amount to our having to confer full rights of 
citizenship on the entire 900,000 Indians now in Ceylon irrespective of the fact that 
their real home is India and not Ceylon, except to those who choose to leave Ceylon. 
"We found it impossible to agree to these proposals and so the Conference had to 
end in this unsatisfactory manner. We suggested that the proposed Indo-Ceylon 
trade talks be taken up, but the representatives of the Government of India said that 
as no mutual goodwill had been established they were not prepared to discuss 
questions of trade between the two countries." 
Restrictions in India 
Mr. Senanayake next referred to what India herself does in regard to British subjects 
from other parts of the Empire who reside in India. 
He said: "Under the Foreigners' Act of 1939 of Madras the following definition of 
'Foreigner' appears. I understand that this is taken from the Government of India 
Act. 
'Foreigners' includes [sic] every person other than:-
'(1) a British subject domiciled in the United Kingdom; 
'(2) a British Indian subject; 
'(3) a Ruler or a subject of an Indian State, and 
'(4) a Consul General, Vice Consul or a person appointed by a foreign Government 
to exercise diplomatic functions'. 
"So that, if the law of India prevailed in Ceylon, all the Indians living in Ceylon 
would be classed as 'foreigners' and not entitled to any rights of citizenship. Our 
proposals are to give those who have made Ceylon their home certain definite rights, 
and we are told that this is discrimination ... . " 
Betrayal of the people 
Mr. Senanayake next spoke of the assurances given to Ceylon by Sir Herbert Stanley 
in 1929 and by Lord Passfield, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies. Though, 
according to that assurance, the requirements for Indians were proof of permanent 
settlement in Ceylon and at least five years' residence, what actually happened was 
that all estate labourers were registered wholesale, without any enquiry regarding 
permanent settlement. 
"This is how the British carried out this undertaking to the people of this country", 
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said Mr. Senanayake. "This betrayal of the people, of the Kandyan people, is one of 
the darkest blots of British Administration in Ceylon." 
He next referred to the present economic state of the Kandyans, who were in a 
miserable plight in territory nominally theirs but actually in the hands of British 
capitalists and peopled by Indian labourers. 
The same conditions existed in other parts of the country. 
"No one but a man who is absolutely blind or dishonest can fail to see that within 
the last few decades the Indians in Ceylon have made enormous strides in ousting 
our people out of their business and property. Compared to their own country, 
Ceylon has been a veritable paradise to them, said Mr. Senanayake. 
Imaginary grievances 
Continuing he said:-
"When those are the facts, it is a most depressing thought that some among them 
whose parents have made fortunes in Ceylon and who today are living in comfort and 
luxury only because of the hospitality of the people of Ceylon, should betray this 
country by carrying to India lying tales of imaginary ill-treatment and imaginary 
grievences. All this is for their own selfish political ends. 
"I make bold to say that the chief reason why our Conference with the 
representatives of the Indian Government failed was because of the poisonous 
atmosphere already created by these so-called Indian leaders from Ceylon, who are 
betraying this country. 
"The Indian delegates broke off the Conference because mutual goodwill had not 
been established. What chance was there for mutual goodwill when the air had 
already been poisoned?" 
In other countries 
Mr. Senanayake mentioned that the Indian problem existed not only in South Africa 
and Ceylon, but in many other countries. 
Self-governing countries like South Africa had passed stringent regulations. In 
French Indo-China stern measures had been adopted to prevent property passing 
into the hands of Indian money-lenders as a result of the recent economic 
depression. 
In Siam (Thailand) there were very stringent regulations against the entry into 
that country of Indians and Chinese who have hitherto exploited the country. 
"We in this country have been so far looking to the British for protection of our 
interests, and I have shown you how grievously the British officials in Ceylon have 
disappointed us", said Mr. Senanayake. "But I have every confidence that if the true 
position, the real plight of our people is placed before the British public and the 
British Parliament we shall have the protection which we need." 
In concluding Mr. Senanayake said:-
"I appeal to you with all the earnestness at my command to realise that unless we 
stem the tide of this growing domination of Indians in Ceylon in our economic and 
political life, our extinction as a Ceylonese nation is inevitable." 
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80 CO 54/977/7, no 13 30 Dec 1940 
[Things Ceylonese]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent on the 
governor's proposal to discontinue his periodical reports. Minute by 
K WBlaxter 
My last instalment of "Things Ceylonese" was dated the 18th October1 and, when I 
left for India for treatment at the beginning of December, I left in my safe a number 
of notes for incorporation in the next instalment. On my return I found these quite 
out of date; and have reached the conclusion that, whereas these Personal Jottings 
were calculated to be of some value in the Colonial Office when I started them in 
September 1939, and the Air Mail would deliver them to you a week after they were 
written, the present time Jag of a month or more between despatch and delivery 
renders a considerable proportion of their subject matter anachronistic and even 
potentially misleading by the time of their receipt. Moreover nearly all Ceylon's 
important problems are by now the subject of regular despatches (in many cases of 
telegraphic despatches) and the arrival of month-old personal impressions may tend 
to obscure and confuse particular issues rather than to elucidate and clarify them. I 
have therefore decided to discontinue the series, but I shall not of course hesitate to 
write personally about local problems and difficulties whenever it may appear useful 
or helpful to do so. 
Minute on 80 
I am sorry that Sir A. Caldecott has discontinued these notes. Actually the time Jag 
may be more than a month. Some mails take considerably longer than a month to 
reach us, & of course the comments, particularly on the political situation, or say, 
labour unrest, are out of date on receipt. Even so the notes had news in them which 
was interesting, even if rather late in arriving, & we could make allowance for the 
delay in appraising the Governor's comments. For example, there were interesting 
comments in No. 12 on Mr. Banderanaike's [sic] marriage to Miss Ratwatte.2 We shd. 
not have got this information from any other source. This is only one instance. 
I suggest that we shd. ask Sir A. Caldecott whether he cannot continue the series, 
saying that the notes have much interesting information in them & and that we will 
make full allowance for the delay. 3 
1 See 72. 
3 After an appeal by the CO, Caldecott resumed his reports, see 89. 
K.W.B. 
20.2.41 
2 See 72, para 6. 
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81 CO 54/973/13, no 25 30 Dec 1940 
[Reforms]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent urging the 
appointment of a constitutional commission. Minutes by KW Blaxter, 
G E J Gent and Sir G Bushe 
I find that I have never answered your letter No.55569/6/1940 of the 21st September, 
1940, which (having gone all the way by sea) did not arrive until just before I left for 
ray treatment in India. In the third paragraph you speak of "implementing the 
understanding that within the next two years a procedure for further considering the 
Reforms question should be thought out and agreed". The understanding, however, 
as viewed here is that a new Constitution will be ready for the next General Election 
in two years time; nor can I see how the present Constitution, Council or Ministers 
could be expected to function for more than two years. The present ship of state 
though still afloat is leaking at every plank, and Nationalist demands become inflated 
with our every step towards victory in the war. At its recent rally at Mirigama the 
Ceylon Congress has copied from the Indian Congress demands for independence (as 
distinct from Dominion Status) and for the right of Ceylon to determine her own 
Constitution. I am more than ever convinced that a Commission must visit Ceylon 
and make its report before there can be any constitutional reform, and I am strongly 
of the opinion that the appointment of one should not await termination of the war. 
This, I believe, is the view of all informed opinion in Ceylon. 
Minutes on 81 
Sir Andrew Caldecott's letter of the 30th December has crossed our official despatch 
to him of the 18th December.1 What he favours in his letter is the opposite to what 
we have proposed in our despatch. 
The reasons which led us to send our despatch are given in my minute of the 1Oth 
December. These reasons certainly still hold good. The critical period of the war, to 
which we referred in our despatch, is likely to last for some time. Also there seem to 
me to be two further possible objections to considering this matter during the war, 
which have not been mentioned previously:-(!) if we attempt a revision of the 
Ceylon Constitution before the war ends, it might be more difficult for H.M.G. to 
maintain their present policy of postponing further consideration of the constitu-
tions in India and Burma until the war is over. The three questions do not necessarily 
hang together, but it might be said that if we can carry through a revision of the 
Ceylon Constitution in wartime, it should be possible to do the same with India and 
Burma. If we are to proceed with the revision of the Ceylon Constitution at once, I 
think we ought to make sure that the India Office and Burma Office have no 
objections to raise. (2) It is not possible to say now what will be the policy of H.M.G. 
with regard to Colonial affairs generally when the war is over. The whole question of 
Colonial Administration is bound to come up at the Peace Conference, and it does 
not seem a very suitable plan that we should start a revision of the Ceylon 
Constitution now, which may not conform with the policy decided upon for the 
period following the war. 
1 See 78. 
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None the less, I do not think it can be said that it will be impossible to send a 
commission to Ceylon at once if that course is thought to be essential. I think, 
however, that we must await the Governor's reply to our despatch of the 18th 
December before the matter can be formally considered further. 
K.W.B. 
24.2.41 
The actual announcement of the postponement of the Elections is in 17 A in this file. 
The new latest date for the General Elections was then postponed to January 1943. 
The objection to proceeding with any Constitutional Award in war-time in Ceylon 
was due to the belief that its chief effect would be to rouse to a pitch of tension the 
sharp communal differences which interfered with the war effort, and particularly 
with tea and rubber production in Ceylon, in which a large element of Indian labour 
is employed. That consideration to my mind is no less important now than it was last 
summer. 
The fact that "nationalist demands" have become inflated with our every step 
towards victory and have now attained to a demand for independence as distinct from 
Dominion status is not surprising having regard to the pace which has been set by 
Congress in India. 
In his letter to Mr. MacDonald, No. 7 in this file, 2 Sir Andrew Caldecott attached 
some value to the opinion of Mr. Senanayake, the de facto leader of Ministerial policy 
in Ceylon, to the effect that the Secretary of State would find that there was only one 
way to deal with reforms in Ceylon, viz. that he must say "I am prepared to give you 
this and this but not that or that: take it or leave it". It must be assumed that 
substantial claims by Mr. Senanayake and his fellow Sinhalese Ministers in their list 
of Reforms could not be conceded by H.M.G. without the strongest protests not only 
from British interests in the island, but also from the Government of India; and 
whether an impasse of that sort should be brought on while we are still engaged in 
the crisis of a war seems to me more than doubtful. 
I believe that if necessary the State Council Elections should be postponed again if 
the war situation next year requires it, and that we should not envisage in Ceylon, 
any more than in Burma or India, further Constitutional concessions until the 
victory has been achieved. It may, however, be desirable that, on the occasion of any 
new Order-in-Council to postpone the Election date further, we should consider the 
advisability of providing at the same time for the State Council to re-elect the 
Executive Committees and each Executive Committee to re-elect its chairman, so 
that the Board of Ministers may be reconstituted with something of a new mandate 
from the State Council. 
For the present I should be inclined to await the Governor's reply to the S. of S's 
despatch of the 18th December (No. 24 on this file). 
G.E.J.G. 
11.3.41 
I agree. I still firmly hope that when the time comes there may be a Conference here 
and not a Commission to Ceylon. 
2 See 37. 
H.G.B. 
18.3.41 
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82 CO 54/975/4, no 20 31 Dec 1940 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 1088 from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the response of the Government of India to 
Mr Senanayake's speech on the breakdown of the ministerial talks 
Indo-Ceylon relations. Regretto report following developments since my telegram, 
No. 1067. In spite of my warning and admonition to Ministers on 18th December and 
understanding reached that in any public allusion to breakdown of recent Confer-
ence they would not (repeat not) go beyond general statement on lines of 
communique issued in India, Senanayake at rally of Ceylon National Congress on 
21st December made long speech1 on lines of report of delegation, of which I have 
refused publication before the 28th January. Indian Government telegraphed 25th 
December that reports of this speech caused them much embarrassment and that 
they wished to regard themselves as free to take public in India into complete 
confidence as regards what passed at the Conference. I replied 27th December that 
although I still felt in principle that any official statement in regard to joint 
Conference by either Government should be previously notified by one to the other, I 
nevertheless realised that speech of Senanayake, although completely unauthorised, 
made it impossible for me to question freedom of Government of India in the 
direction indicated. Speeches made at Village Committee's Conference, 29th Decem-
ber, by three Ministers for Local Administration, Communications and Works and 
Education, are also calculated to cause offence in India. Leading articles in Daily 
News to-day shows some Minister has already communicated to Editor my deter-
mination to veto any measure affecting Indians now in Ceylon that conflicts with our 
undertakings, and that all Lake House newspapers, both English and vernacular, will 
adopt violently anti-Indian line and lend Senanayake uncompromising support. In 
reply to your telegram, no. 765, paragraphs 4 and 2. Telegram cited was published 
here as Sessional Paper No. 16 of 1930 and was in the hands of our delegates to 
Conference vide paragraphs 11 and 12 of my despatch of 14th June Confidential both 
on subject of registration of Indian voters. This telegram and passage of prospectus 
under Indian Immigration Rules, quoted in my telegram, No. 1069, are most 
important among what I term "still current undertakings," which include also 
elect(ed) (? Electoral) ? Reform Order in Council itself. Search for other possible 
relevant documents is still being made. 
1 See 79. 
83 CO 54/975/4, no 21 1 Jan 1941 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on local reactions to the breakdown of the 
ministerial talks 
Developments reported in my telegram, No. 10881 show that the position must get 
1 See 82. 
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worse before it gets better. I have made it abundantly clear to Ministers ever since I 
insisted two years ago on amendment of Village Communities Bill that there can be 
no betrayal of our undertakings to India. Three of them are now out to assault this 
position by frontal attack and there can be no compromise. Following from Daily 
News, 30th December, is sort of article we must expect from Lake House Press; 
abbreviated quotation begins:-"If reserve powers are used to settle questions in 
manner inimical to the interests of the country and express wishes of its people we 
shall be faced with very grave situation indeed. Textile quotas were forced on Ceylon 
in spite of public opinion throughout the island. Present emergency? has a political 
background not unlike Swinton. But if he or his advisers here or in England believe 
the same process can be repeated with impunity they are gravely mistaken. Ceylon 
Delegation placed perfectly fair proposals before the Indian Government and any 
attempt to go further than those proposals will lead to grave consequences." 
Quotation ends. Senanayake might perhaps be said to have already afforded sufficient 
grounds for demanding his resignation but such action would only make him 
Nationalist martyr and excite anti-Indian passions among Sinhalese generally. 
Position is more likely to clear if I give time for politicians to blow off steam and for 
more moderate opinion to rally as it did last spring to my support. If, however, there 
should arise any indication of inter-racial disorder I shall take immediate steps to 
prevent it and the authorities concerned agree that I can rely entirely on the loyalty 
of the police, and also, if necessary, of the native units of Defence Force. Preceding 
sentence does not mean that I anticipate serious trouble but that I should not be 
unprepared for it if it came. I learned in India that Sir Girja Bajpai who presided over 
the abortive conference will shortly be on holiday in Madras Presidency and I have 
telegraphed 28th December suggesting that he might come on to Colombo on short 
private visit as my guest at the Queen's House so that we could talk the position over 
together. No reply yet received from the Viceroy. 
84 CO 54/982/111, no 5 25 Jan 1941 
[Indo-Ceylon relations] : inward telegram no 56 from Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Lloyd on the undertakings given to the Government of India 
Following is draft message from Governor which if you approve I propose to have 
read in State Council on the 11th February as indicated in my telegram, No. 47, 
Secret. Draft has been made with the assistance of the Legal Secretary. Circum-
stances render it undesirable that I should send draft to India for approval but 
perhaps you will see fit to communicate it to India Office. Up to the present there has 
been no breach of these undertakings but proceedings _of Conference sent to you by 
air mail of 16th December show clearly, e.g. , pages 28 and 55 that Ceylon Delegation 
intend future breaches in respect of Indians already in the island and on such basis 
Indians naturally refuse to negotiate. Message begins:-
Undertakings given to Government of India. 
1. In connection with recent informal conference at Delhi between a Ministerial 
Mission from Ceylon and representatives of the Government of India it appears to me 
desirable to place on contemporary record in the easily accessible form of a message 
to the State Council, a schedule of certain matters in respect of which undertakings 
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have been given by the Government of Ceylon or by His Majesty's Government to the 
Government of India, together with references to latest statements made in relation 
to such undertakings. 
2. Having regard to circumstances in which these undertakings were given I hold 
the Government of Ceylon bound by them to the Government of India in respect of 
all Indians now in the Island or on short and temporary absence from it, and I hold 
myself bound as Governor to withhold approval, ratification or assent in respect of 
any act, regulation or measure to which the Government of India has not agreed and 
of which effect would be to deprive any such Indians of benefits of undertakings. 
3. The subject of State franchise and statements in regard to it are not included 
in schedule because it is a matter governed by order of His Majesty in Council and 
not by local Regulations or Ordinances requiring my approval, ratification or assent. 
Here follows schedule in two columns headed (1) Subject Matter and (2) 
Statement-
Subject Matter. 
Item 1. 
Restriction on 
immigration of Indians 
Item 2. 
Municipal Franchise. 
Item 3. 
Free repatriation in cases 
of sickness or of 
unemployment due to 
industrial depression. 
Statement. 
Paragraph 112 of memorandum sent by the Governor 
to the Viceroy, 22nd August, 1921. Quotation begins:-
Any restriction by means of passport regulations or by 
law on immigration of other classes of Indians, e.g., 
traders, tourists, professional gentlemen, etc.-There 
are no restrictions on immigration of classes men-
tioned or of any Indians as such. There are legal 
restrictions on immigration of destitutes, vicious per-
sons and stowaways irrespective of nationality. Quota-
tion ends. Footnote explains that phraseology "other 
classes" means Indians other than recruited labourers. 
Paragraph 16 of letter from the Colonial Secretary to 
the Government of India of the 27th July, 1922. 
Quotation begins: As regards municipal franch ise 
members of the resident Indian community enjoy 
equally all privileges of indigenous population, and they 
are entitled if elected to hold seats on local municipal 
bodies. Quotation ends. 
Paragraph 4 of letter of the 28th October, 1922, from 
Colonial Secretary to the Secretary to the Government 
of India Departments of Revenue and Agriculture 
(Emigration) in reply to a request for an additional 
guarantee that Indian labourers would be free to return 
if unable to maintain themselves in times of industrial 
depression. Quotation begins: I am to state that this 
Government is ready to make provision to meet the 
cost of returning emigrants to India in the case of (a) 
sick men and (b) men thrown out of employment owing 
to retrenchment in times of industrial depression. 
Quotation ends. 
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Item 4. 
Legal Rights. 
Item 5. 
No intention of altering 
Ceylon Law to detriment 
of Indians. 
Paragraph 23 of information relating to Ceylon for 
publication under rule 17 of Indian Emigration Rules 
sent to the Government of India for approval on 4th 
April, 1929. Quotation begins: Legal and social posi-
tion. Indians in Ceylon have same legal rights as 
members of local population, and to-day can acquire 
and hold land. Quotation ends. Note the statement that 
information was approved by the Government of India 
on 1st July, 1930, and a Tamil or Telugu translation has 
since been furnished to every assisted immigrant before 
leaving India. 
Passage from Secretary of State's telegram No. 50 of the 
lOth June, 1929, published in Ceylon as Sessional 
Paper No. 16 of 1930. Quotation begins: His Majesty's 
Government wishes to make it clear that there is no 
intention of repealing or amending to the detriment of 
Indians any of the laws of Ceylon affecting their 
position or privileges. Quotation ends. 
85 CO 54/984/10, no 1 27 Jan 1941 
[Communism]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd on the 
activities of communist bodies in Ceylon 
With reference to Your Lordship's Secret telegram No.494 of the 18th August, 1940, 
and in continuation of my Secret despatch No. (2) of the 26th September, 1940, I 
have the honour to forward a further Report by the Deputy Inspector General of 
Police, Criminal Investigation Department, on the activities of Communist Bodies in 
Ceylon.1 It will be seen from paragraph 6 of the present Report (to be read in 
conjunction with paragraph 17 of the last one) that these Bodies now number two, 
the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and a new 'Stalinistic' United Socialist Party. The first 
Resolution to be passed by the new party was one condemning the old for serving the 
capitalists and imperialists; the rift in the movement has gone deep. 
2. I have not considered it worth time or paper to have copies of the translations 
of four of the five documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Report type-written for 
transmission with this despatch. They consist of the usual voluminous tirades 
against Capitalists, Imperialists, the Ministries, the Police, the Ceylon Labour Party, 
the Stalinists, and in short everybody and everything that does not appertain to the 
Sama Samaja Party. A translation of the fifth document will however be found 
annexed to the Report. "Suriya Mal" is the Sinhalese name for the yellow tulip-like 
flower of a tree (Thespesia Populnea) very common in the coastal region of this 
Island. Its political symbolism is explained in the fourth paragraph of the translation. 
The fact, recorded in paragraph 1 of the Report, that for the first time in seven years 
1 Enclosures not printed. 
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no Suriya blossoms were sold or worn on November 11th (when the sale of poppies 
reached a record figure) is proof indeed of the eclipse of the Communists and of the 
true feeling of the people towards the War. 
3. In conclusion I may add that, although I have not as yet received an official 
account of the All Ceylon Estate Workers' Union Meeting at Kandy mentioned in 
paragraph 4 of the Report, I have been credibly informed by an unofficial observer 
that it was a "complete frost". The only unsatisfactory feature of the present position 
is Mr. L.S. Goonewardene's continued evasion of the Police (paragraphs 3 and 5). 
86 CO 54/981/14, no 10 31 Jan 1941 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Lloyd 
on ministerial proposals for the restriction of immigration into Ceylon 
I have the honour to address Your Lordship in continuation of my Confidential (2) 
despatch of the 27th August, 1940, on the subject of ministerial proposals for 
restriction of immigration into Ceylon. 
2. I caused Your Lordship's telegram No. 669 of the 15th November to be 
forthwith conveyed to the Board of Ministers, but I am still in the position of having 
received no communication from them on this subject. The Minutes of a Meeting of 
the Board held on the 21st January contain however the following item:-
"The Board considered, at the request of the Minister of Local Administration, 
the need for immediate action to deal with the restriction of immigration and 
decided that legislation should be prepared immediately (if possible within a 
fortnight) by the Legal Secretary in accordance with the previous decisions 
arrived at by the Board on the subject, and that priority should be given to the 
drafting of this legislation." 
3. The Chief Secretary has since submitted for my perusal a Memorandum by the 
Legal Secretary relative to the ministerial demand for the immediate drafting of 
legislation on the basis of the enclosure to my previous despatch. A copy of this 
Memorandum is enclosed. 1 I understand that the Legal Secretary's Memorandum 
will be considered at a Board meeting to be held on the 4th February, at which the 
Chief Secretary will at my request again draw the Ministers' attention to Your 
Lordship's suggestion that, for the avoidance of future difficulty, a copy of any 
proposed legislation should be sent in draft for your prior consideration before 
introduction. 
4. I am further informed by the Chief Secretary that, at the request of the 
Minister for Agriculture and Lands, 12th February has been set aside for a debate in 
the State Council on "Indian immigration and franchise." I am in telegraphic 
correspondence with Your Lordship on the position arising out of the breakdown of 
the recent Indo-Ceylon talks; a breakdown which has in my opinion been caused by a 
failure of the Ceylon delegation to realize the sanctity of past undertakings. I 
mention this point in the present context only because the Legal Secretary has once 
more indicated to the Ministers the need to guard against a breach of faith in the 
penultimate clause of the last paragraph of his Memorandum. 
1 Not printed. 
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87 CO 54/980/4, no 16 14 Feb 1941 
[Diary of stay in Ceylon]: report by T W Davies for CO 
[Davies submitted with this diary separate notes (not printed here) on (1) the constitu-
tion, (2) Indo-Ceylon relations, (3) personal relations between the British ~':Id Ceylonese, 
(4) the Ceylon Civil Service, (5) import control. He also appended an additional note on 
colonial policy and minuted separately: 'It will be noted from the diary that Sir Baron 
Jayatilaka and Mr. Bandaranaike both asked that what they said might be conveyed to the 
Secretary of State. ') 
November 29th: the aerodrome 
I arrived by air on the evening of Friday, November 29th. The landing ground at 
Colombo compared very favourably with those at Madras and Trichinopoly both of 
which were partially waterlogged. Apart from Colombo I believe there is only one 
other landing ground in the whole of Ceylon. 
Mr. Wodeman 
I stayed with Mr. G.S. Wodeman, Chief Secretary and during most of my visit O.A.G. 
Mr. Wodeman grows upon one. He is not showy, but in a few days one is impressed. 
He is admirable in Ceylon. Where many are thrown into a state of high nervousness 
by ministerial antics, he remains imperturbable. As he himself points out he has not 
a white hair in his head. It is a pity I think that he should not be made a Governor 
somewhere. My one criticism would be that he lacks dignity . When as O.A.G. he went 
to the cinema, part of the audience pressed out in front of him. 
Incidentally the lack of outward respect shown for the O.A.G. was rather notable. 
It seems to me a great pity that neither the Europeans nor the Asiatics in the streets 
take off their hats when the King's representative goes by. Even some European 
troops I saw on one occasion lounging about outside their quarters and not getting 
up as the O.A.G. drove past. 
November 30th: Lady Pieris 
I attended a lunch given by Lady Pieris. Lady Pieris is a relic of the old luxurious days 
when Ceylonese were proud to mix up with high European officials. Her son, 
cultured and probably rather ineffective, was also present. I fear these people cut 
little ice in 1940. 
The Colombo municipal commissioner 
I afterwards attended an A.R.P. demonstration by firemen (professional) and clerks 
mostly employed by the Municipality. It seemed quite good. I sat next to Mr. [S P 
Wickremasingha] the Municipal Commissioner, i.e. Town Clerk of Colombo. He is 
said to be very efficient. The municipal elections were due in a week, and he cynically 
though no doubt truly commented upon the corruption that would take place. 
Certain English people say that the Mayor has been trying to engineer a strike in the 
harbour in order to acquire votes. 
Sir A. Caldecott 
I dined with the Governor. No one else was present except his family and Private 
Secretaries. Sir Andrew was due to go to Madras in a couple of days for medical 
treatment. 
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I understood Sir Andrew to say that the United Kingdom Government (or probably 
it was the Governor of Ceylon - i.e. himself) was pledged to move forward not back, 
as a next step in regard to the constitution. If this is really his impression, it is surely 
a false one! 
Sir A. Caldecott and ministers 
I heard several criticisms of Sir Andrew on the ground that he tried to interfere with 
the Ministers constantly. He apparently summons them to meet him about once a 
week. Sir E. Stubbs, 1 it was said, seldom made himself felt by Ministers, but when he 
did it was like a ton of bricks! I am told the Ministers now hardly treat Sir Andrew 
with common politeness: for instance at a recent meeting Mr. Bandaranaike walked 
in very late without either apologising or taking his pipe out of his mouth. 
And European officials 
As a result of subsequent conversations with various people I got the impression that 
Sir Andrew does not sufficiently support European officials when they get into 
trouble with Ministers in cases where it is no fault of their own. 
I understand that Sir Andrew recently stated that he thought it unfair to them to 
ask European cadets to come to Ceylon in future . I feel that this is essentially the 
view of an elderly man. Conditions of service in Ceylon are delightful. After speaking 
to junior members of the C.C.S. I am confirmed in my impression that I personally 
would be glad to enter the service. There are of course political worries that beset the 
civil servant here more than in Africa, but the senior civil servants make too much of 
them. They will not affect in the same way new recruits, who will breathe that 
atmosphere from the beginning. I am sure that the C.C.S. is still an admirable career 
to the young Englishman, and it will (a) shut off a pleasant career and (b) do 
irreparable harm to Ceylon if European recruitment is not started again. 
The private secretaries 
Sir Andrew has no A.D.C. but 2 Private Secretaries, Mr. O'Regan and Mr. Dobbs. 
Both these young men seemed to me very good: each has a striking personality and is 
exceedingly intelligent. 
December 1st: rubber estate 
This Sunday Mr. Wodeman took me to visit the rubber estate of his nephew, Mr. 
Notley. Naturally enough at a time like this no difficulties are being experienced over 
rubber. The Indian labour problem does not arise. 
December 2nd: Mr. F. C. Gimson 
I was taken to see the tea growing country by Mr. Gimson, Controller of 
Immigration. Mr. Gimson was exceptionally kind to me. He is a curious character-
sometimes a little vague and dreamy, but very reasonable. He is a great enthusiast for 
the I.L.O. and a great admirer of Mr. Butler. He is a strong believer in the importance 
of encouraging economic trade unionism in Ceylon. By taking thought and planning 
for this he believes it may be possible to prevent an undesirable form of political trade 
unionism springing up spontaneously among the Tamil workers on the tea estates. 
1 Governor of Ceylon, 1933-1937. 
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Mr. Gimson 
I understand that many planters regard Mr. Gimson and his ideas with a good deal of 
distrust. 
We stayed the night at what Mr. Gimson regarded as one of the most progressive 
tea estates in Ceylon, and also the one which paid best. This was Mr. Irvine Stewart's 
Tiensin Estate at Bogowautalawa. 
Mr. Irvine Stewart (tea planter) 
Mr. Stewart is a prominent visiting agent. He is a most enthusiastic man who likes to 
regard himself (and seemingly justifiably) as the father of the labourers on his estate. 
The estate itself to a layman looks in perfect order and so does his factory . He pointed 
out with pride the lines on which his Tamil labourers lived. I confess they looked to 
me very poor and sordid. The hovel in which the ordinary Ceylonese villager lived 
would appear preferable. However the free maternity, medical and educational 
services which Mr. Strewart showed us seemed first class and there could be no 
doubt he is a most beneficent employer. His thesis is that his Indian labour force is 
his most valuable asset and it pays to be beneficent to it. This is borne out by his 
balance sheets. 
Mr. Stewart is not liked by the Planters Association. According to Mr. Stewart 
some planters are wildly reactionary. Thus one recently broke the umbrella of a 
Ceylonese official who had been sent to see him holding it was impudent for a native 
to carry one in face of a European. Another young man who inherited an estate said 
with a sigh of relief after a year of it "At last I've broken the Tamil labourers of the 
habit of approaching me direct with their troubles". This last, according to Mr. 
Stewart, illustrates the tendency of the younger planters to breakaway from 
paternalism. 
December 3rd 
Mr. Gimson had arranged for me to meet members of the Planters Association at 
Kandy. Mr. Scott, the Chairman, was ill but I met Mr. Conway Davies (Deputy 
Chairman), Mr. Dalgety, Mr. Dulling, Mr. Cordon Pyper, and the Secretary. 
Views of the Planters Association 
Generally speaking they had no complaints. They expressed some alarm at the 
existence of communist propaganda. They thought there was a danger of Trade 
Unions becoming political rather than economic. They said labour troubles were to 
be expected in connexion with the 1942 elections, and that these would have 
repercussions in southern India. There are apparently at present two competing 
Trade Unions among the Tamil labourers. 
Their chief worry was of course Indian immigration. They said their one concern 
was that movement should be free. The details of the citizenship did not concern 
them. 
They thought that the export of papaine to Canada should have a future. I asked 
them what their views were on ministerial government. They said they had no 
objection to it: it had its uses . Ministers had done no harm to planters' interests 
except that they showed a tendency to fix wages in a totalitarian manner. I was very 
surprised at this attitude. Actually Mr. Barney Villiers, a more astute member of the 
Association who had heard what his colleagues had said, prayed me some days later 
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not to take theirs as the official attitude of the planters as ministerial government 
was definitely inimical to their interests. 
December 4th: Mr. Collins 
I spent some time in the Financial Secretary's office. Mr. Collins was acting. 
Apparently there has been great competition between him and Mr. Murphy (who is 
very popular with all) for the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary and Mr. Collins has 
won. I thought he made a definitely good impression. 
The influence of the financial secretary 
I of course heard criticisms of Treasury control----e.g. that it was essential to build 
storage for 3 months supply of rice but that the Treasury would not allow it. On the 
whole however I think their influence is too little rather than too great. They are at 
least controlled by a European and have a sense of responsibility. 
Mr. Tennison of the Financial Secretary's office seemed very good. I showed both 
Mr. Collins and Mr. Tennison the views of the Board of Trade on the export drive as 
set out in the telegram to Mr. Lococh at Delhi. This generally is a subject which has 
caused some bewilderment in Ceylon as elsewhere. 
One particular enquiry that Mr. Collins made was why are chocolates still 
obtainable from the United Kingdom in unlimited quantities. 
The Naval C. in C. 
I lunched with Admiral and Mrs. Leathem. Admiral Leathem said that Colombo was 
not liked by Naval Officers-it is too cliquey. He obviously thought the Ceylon 
administration not much good. I later had some experience of the Navy Office and 
they were not perhaps very cooperative. They employ young women to do their most 
secret decyphering: I don't know if this is general practice in the Navy, but I would 
not have thought that the discretion of the girls employed for this purpose at 
Colombo could always be relied on. 
During the day I had an interview with 5 out of the 7 Ministers, and I attended the 
State Council. 
Sir B. Jayatillike [sic] 
Sir Baron Jayatillike, Home Affairs, senior minister, asked that the following should 
be conveyed to the Secretary of State. He would like the Secretary of State to 
consider the question of amending the constitution at an early date so that the draft 
of a new constitution might be presented to the present State Council before the 
general elections. The Committee system should go. At present each minister acted 
independently of every other, and none was responsible. It was undesirable that the 
elections should be deferred beyond 1942. 
Mr. Kannangara and Mr. W.A. de Silva 
Mr. Kannangara, Minister of Education, and Mr. W.A. de Silva, Minister of Health, 
each gave a short talk on their respective Departments. Both seemed very enthusias-
tic. Mr. Kannangara was in Buddhist costume, and spoke very well. Mr. de Silva 
seemed rather past his best. 
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Colonal Kotalawala [sic] 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kotalawala, Minister of Communications, was a man I was sorry 
not to see more of. At a very short interview he arranged a later meeting to make a 
point about the hydro-electric power scheme, but he never turned up. Colonel 
Kotalawala said he had now entered into contract for the whole of the hydro-electric 
scheme. He was getting the civil engineering part done first and the other part was 
held up. He is of the type of rich Asiatic who is always visiting Paris. He appears to be 
a playboy, very rich but able. (He and Mr. Senanayake are the principal owners of the 
plumbago mines where conditions of labour are said to be appalling-Europeans 
who go down the mines are sick). It was he who started a furore by dismissing the 
daily paid Indian labour employed by his Department. With Messrs. Senanayake and 
Bandaranaike, he is the most influential of the ministers. 
The State Council 
The State Council which I attended in the afternoon, was typically discussing a motion 
of censure on the Governor for appointing some European sub-police inspectors 
(which the Board of Ministers had advised him to do). The mover was Mr. George de 
Silva, an amusing buffoon. Mr. Senanayake spoke for, and voted against, the motion. 
His son, Mr. Douglas [sic: Dudley] Senanayake wanted to have the ministers included 
in the censure. The motion was carried by one vote. Among the majority-i.e. those 
who censured the Governor, seemed to be the Deputy Speaker, who was wearing the 
uniform of an officer of the R.N.V.R. and one European, Mr. Freeman, ex C.C.S. who 
did it on the ground that the sub-inspectors ought to be in the army. 
The Council was somewhat reminiscent of the House of Commons but still more 
so of the Oxford Union Society. As soon as the debate was over members rushed out, 
like schoolboys, to have their tea in a mood of complete irresponsibility. In the same 
spirit, the moment the Ceylon-Indian talks had failed Mr. Bandaranaike and Mr. 
Senanayake cried out to Mr. Gimson "Come on, come on, lets go and play bridge." 
I had tea with Sir Baron in the Council House and was introduced to the Speaker 
and a number of members. 
Enquiries by the chief censor 
Later on I saw the Chief Censor, Mr. Leech, and Lieutenant Commander Charasse 
who does economic warfare work at the Navy Office. 
Mr. Leech said that Colonial Office telegrams on censorship matters sometimes 
caused confusion by using technical words in a non-technical sense e.g. "in transit". 
He asked what Ministry of Economic Warfare's wishes were regarding mails 
addressed to and from persons on the Black List. 
It would be more convenient from the censorship point of view if the War Trade 
List went in countries (like the Statutory List) instead of alphabetically. 
Are Ministry of [Economic] Warfare fully satisfied with Ceylon censorship reports? 
Are they too long? 
Is French property to be put under the Custodian? 
Mr. Corea 
I dined with Mr. Corea and also had an interview with him during the day. Mr. Corea 
is credited with being the best of the Ministers. He is a Christian (alone of the Board) 
and married to a Tamillady. He is quiet and shy. He probably himself realises, and 
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the other Ministers also no doubt know, that he enjoys a good reputation with the 
English and this detracts from what little influence he might otherwise have with his 
colleagues. Mr. Corea is very likeable but his influence on import control at least 
cannot be regarded as satisfactory. He seems to be of the good weak category. 
Mr. Corea introduced me to Sir Wilfred de Soysa, an owner of coconut estates, and 
fellow guests at dinner were Mr. and Mrs. Wirrawadena.2 Mr. Wirrawadena is 
proprietor of the 2 principal Ceylon newspapers. Opinion in Ceylon seems to be that 
the local press is very good. It seems to me incredibly parochial, matters like the 
premature publication of some unimportant local examination papers receiving as 
much or more publicity than first rank war news. Ceylon papers are 16 pages long 
and contain very little . This wastage of newsprint cannot be stopped by the 
Administration "for political reasons". 
December 5th: Mr. Leigh Clare and Mr. Jones 
I paid the first of several visits to Mr. Leigh-Clare, Collector of Customs, and also to 
Mr. C.E. Jones, Controller of Imports Exports and Exchange and his staff. 
Import control 
So far as exchange and export control are concerned Mr. Jones works up to the 
Financial Secretary. So far as import control is concerned he works to Mr. Corea who 
merely has to refer to the Financial Secretary for advice. He does not always take that 
advice. As moreover that advice, even when tendered, is often already modified in the 
light of political circumstances the position is not wholly satisfactory. Cuts are not 
made which on exchange grounds ought to be made. Petrol is not rationed, nor is 
newsprint to any extent. American cars are still imported, and so on. The Minister 
threatens to give an open licence for steel imports from the United States up to the 
limits of pre-war trade. 
Mr. Jones seemed to me very good, but he has no free hand. He reports the 
position fully from time to time to the Colonial Office. He is in the process of 
tightening up and I am certain that within the limits allowed him by Mr. Corea the 
Colonial Office may be satisfied that he is administering import control admirably. 
He is fully aware of all the factors. 
Incidentally Mr. Corea sees all secret despatches about import control. His 
executive committee have delegated all their functions to him in the matter of 
import control, so they don't see them: but I think it most undesirable that even Mr. 
Corea should since they often touch on matters such as our future economic policy, 
vis a vis Japan which may be of the highest secrecy. 
Mr. Jones said that he was granting import licences for aluminium from Shanghai. 
The importers in Shanghai must have paid dollars for it but they were prepared 
nevertheless to let it go to Ceylon for sterling. 
Mr. Bandaranaike (minister for local government) 
Mr. Bandaranaike gave me an interview. Mr. Bandaranaike who used to be a 
Christian recently turned Buddhist to gain political kudos . He usually wears 
Buddhist dress but today exceptionally was in European clothes. As always with me, 
he was friendly, affable and even amusing. He has a wild look in his eye: I understand 
2 This should read 'Wijewardene'. 
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there is madness in his family. He is quite irresponsible, shouts everyone else down 
when he is excited, is hated by European officials. Nevertheless I have a feeling that 
he would be susceptible to influence if some European really took pains with him and 
made of him a friend. It is typical that this wild, though not uncultured man, should 
be the son of the ultra conventional and 'honours' loving Sir Solomon Bandaranaike, 
who can hardly approve of his son's carryings on. He is very proud of the office he 
held in the Oxford Union. He is certainly susceptible to flattery and, as I said, I 
believe he would be to friendship. 
Mr. Bandaranaike spoke in the following sense, requesting that the gist of it might 
be conveyed to the Secretary of State:-
Mr. Bandaranaike on the constitution 
The Secretary of State having given it out as a reason for the suspension of the 
elections that he is going into the matter of the reform of the constitution, an early 
announcement of what he proposes to do is desirable. The appointment of a 
Commission to examine the subject should not be necessary: it would only create 
controversy and turmoil. The Secretary of State should have enough material before 
him by now to justify his taking a decision off his own bat. 
The working of the Executive Committee system had disclosed faults and he (Mr. 
Bandaranaike) had acquiesced in the recommendation for a cabinet system. His 
personal view was that the existing system might be remodelled however (Mr. 
Bandaranaike at this point was probably thinking of the desirability of his getting 
votes from the minorities). The faults of the Committee system were (a) the 
impossibility of fixing responsibility or of calling anyone to account: and (b) lack of 
coordination: Ministers tended to support each other provided they got support for 
their pet projects in return. These defects, said Mr. Bandaranaike, might be rectified 
by so amending the constitution as to strengthen the powers of the Ministers with 
reference to the Executive Committee and the powers of the Board of Ministers with 
reference to each individual minister. 
The Officers of State should be abolished. 
The Public Service Commission should be reformed. Ministers must have the 
ultimate control of the civil service. Some public servants feel hostility towards 
Ministers. Mr. Senanayake had been particularly unfortunate with his officials. (In 
European circles Mr. Senanayake is credited with having driven at least 3 high 
British officials into premature retirement). 
Mr. Bandaranaike on the Indian question 
With regard to the Indian question and the failure of the recent "goodwill" talks, Mr. 
Bandaranaike hoped that the Secretary of State would wait till he received the full 
representations of the Ministers before he took any action. The situation was 
difficult: and the possibility of anti-Indian demonstrations in Ceylon could not be 
ignored. 
I called on Mr. Samson, President of the Chamber of Commerce, and subsequently 
lunched in the company of Mr. Barney Villiers and Mr. Claude Bois, prominent 
business men. On the whole they had no complaints. The pre release of 5% of next 
year's tea quota was welcome news to them. Their chief worry was recent legislation 
that had altered the manner of dealing with tea coupons. They feared this might 
operate to their disadvantage, but it was only a 'might'. 
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In the afternoon I visited Mr. Hobday, Government Agent, Western province, and 
formerly Food Production Officer: and Mr. Coomaraswamy, Food Controller and 
Price Controller. 
Sir Mohamed Macan Markar 
I met Sir Mohamed Macan Markar jeweller, ex-Minister of Communications, and 
leader of the Moormen or Muslim minority. Sir Mahomed urged that if the Executive 
Committee system was abolished, some other method of protecting minorities 
should be devised in its place. Minorities should be better represented in the Council. 
Constituencies should be smaller. 
Later in the evening I visited the Chief Justice, Mr. J.C. Howard: and at dinner I 
met Mr. Sudbury and Mr. Murphy. 
December 6th: Mr. Balfour 
Mr. Balfour, Director of Industrial Development, took me to see the Government 
Coir Factory. This works entirely for the internal market. 
Mr. Balfour is a curious personality. Though educated in England, he is apparently 
a Tamil. It is commonly said that he has been very slow in getting promotion owing 
to an indiscretion he committed when acting as Public Trustee (or in some such 
office) some years ago, when he is alleged to have made some money by buying up 
part of the Ceylon estate of a deceased owner from some ignorant heirs living in 
Europe. Mr. Balfour is full of ideas, which is rare for a civil servant. Some of the ideas 
are wild, but few seem to· be stupid. Mr. Balfour is an amateur chemist of some skill 
and a man of the greatest enthusiasm. He now occupies the very post for him and 
one he has long coveted. In spite of his defects, I think him probably a valuable man. 
Mr. Senanayake 
Mr. Senanayake gave me an interview today. It is a moot point whether he or Mr. 
Bandaranaike is more hated by European officials. Probably Mr. Senanayake takes 
the cake: he is said to have driven a number of Europeans into retirement. He is not 
so noisy as Mr. Bandaranaike but probably cleverer. Like all these people he is 
charming personally. He has also undeniably a real enthusiasm for agriculture. He 
has never got over being imprisoned in the 1915 riots . 
Mr. Senanayake's chief points were the following. (1) The Public Service 
Commission should be reformed and the Civil Service brought under the disciplinary 
control of Ministers. (2) There should be coordination of ministerial authority. (3) 
The constitution has only worked because it has been ignored. (4) There are criticism 
and protracted delays over such things as the Estimates and public appointments. 
Mr. Hoare and cotton piece goods 
Mr. Hoare, former controller of restricted imports, took me to a wholesale seller of 
cotton and art-silk piecegoods to see the sort of article imported into Ceylon. Mr. 
Hoare said that the piece good quotas have not been abolished in Ceylon and are still 
announced. (This perhaps needs looking into). 
I lunched with Mr. Murphy of the Secretariat and [the] head of the Criminal 
Investigation Department, who both agreed that the imprisonment of certain 
communists had done a world of good. 
The greater part of the afternoon I spent in the Treasury and with Mr. C.E. Jones. 
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December 7th 
Mr. Leigh-Clare3 took me round the harbour, I was surprised at the absence of 
guards. Mr. Leigh-Clare would of course be well known but none challenged us at the 
gates at all. 
Maldivian tribute 
I attended the ceremony of the Maldivian Tribute. I hope the cowries which form part 
of the tribute are not currency in the Maldives. They are quite useless in Ceylon, 
though pretty. If they are currency in the Maldives, Greshams law must operate and 
prices rise after the annual tribute has been paid. 
Mr. Drayton 
I dined with Mr. Drayton, Legal Secretary. Mr. Drayton is a firm believer that, in 
spite of political discomforts, Ceylon is a far pleasanter place for a European to serve 
in than is Africa. 
December 8th: Mr. Huxham 
I called on Mr. Huxham, who had returned from India the previous day. Mr. Huxham 
is not liked by civil servants in Ceylon, probably because he did not come through the 
regular channels. He is undoubtedly a clever man. He is also a persistent man and he 
gets what he wants, a trait which on occasions such as the Eastern Group 
Conference, is as useful to Ceylon as it is irritating to others. But for all his ability 
Mr. Huxham is rather an enigma. He has possibly become rather orientalised: one 
feels with him that there may be an arriere-pensees-that there are more reasons for 
Mr. Huxham's attitude than appears upon the surface. When he sets out to please Mr. 
Huxham has a charming smile which should go down well. 
Mr. Huxham spoke of what Ceylon could do as a result of Delhi. He feared that 
Messrs. Corea and Balfour would over-enthusiastically embark on projects. Where an 
article is in short supply throughout the Eastern Group, there Ceylon can set about 
producing and count not the cost thereof. But where a product is already being 
produced elsewhere, there Ceylon should initiate production only if she can do so at 
a competitive cost. 
Mr. Buxton 
I had a talk with Mr. Buxton of Messrs. Vavasseurs about coconut products. One of 
his points was that it was a pity to reserve shipping space for coconut charcoal and 
not for desiccated coconut. According to him the charcoal is no longer needed in 
great quantities for gas masks whereas the desiccated product is very valuable if only 
as a sugar substitute in confectionery. 
December 9th 
This day was chiefly occupied by embarking on and subsequently disembarking from 
the S.S. Nyki which I found out might take a week to get to Penang. 
Mr. Saravanamuttu 
In the late afternoon I visited Mr. Saravanamuttu the Tea and Rubber Controller. It is 
3 Commissioner, Colombo port. 
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he who distributes the quotas. He has a high reputation among planters. He thought 
the coupon ordinance all right. 
Mr. C. Bois 
I also called on Mr. Claude Bois, a Colombo business man. He was somewhat alarmed 
at the taking of young men off the estates in Ceylon. He thought this process had 
gone quite far enough. One must guard against an emergency. 
He thought that the franchise should be altered. Universal suffrage led to a lot of 
scallywags being elected to the State Council. Ceylonese of the better type would 
often not offer themselves for election because they did not wish to associate with 
men of the calibre of many of the present members. 
December 1Oth: Mr. Sudbury 
I had a talk with Mr. Sudbury, secretary to the Governor. Mr. Sudbury is palpably 
exhausted. Fortunately he is just going on leave. He said that so far as he knew no 
pledge had ever been given that the next constitutional step in Ceylon would be a 
forward one towards home rule, unless the various declarations of His Majesty's 
Government on 'trusteeship' could be so interpreted. 
The railway workshops 
I visited the Railway Workshops at Ratnapura. They impress a layman as being on a 
very big scale. It is here that Ceylon hopes to do her war-production-shell cases, 
and so on. 
I boarded the S.S. Bloemfontein (Java Pacific Line) about 1 p.m. and we sailed an 
hour later. 
88 CO 54/982/1/1, no 27 5 Mar 1941 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from G E J Gent to Sir A Caldecott on 
the proposed immigration bill 
In your telegram, No. 140, Secret, of the 24th of February about Indo-Ceylon 
relations, you asked for the Secretary of State's permission for the State Council to 
be informed of the purport of the Secretary of State's telegram, No. 669, Confiden-
tial, of the 15th of November, 1940. In that telegram, amongst other statements 
made, there was one that if certain proposals were included in the Immigration Bill 
as passed by the State Council the Secretary of State would feel bound on his present 
understanding of the proposals to advise His Majesty to refuse assent to the bill while 
these proposals formed part of it. 
We are advised that constitutionally it would be improper for a statement to be 
made in the State Council as to the advice which the Secretary of State would give to 
the King in certain circumstances which have not yet arisen. If a statement to that 
effect were made in the State Council when the Bill was introduced, it would in effect 
be telling the State Council before the Bill is even debated or passed by the Council, 
that, if certain provisions are included in the bill, no matter what arguments may be 
adduced in favour of them and irrespective of what majority may be procured His 
Majesty will not assent to the bill as long as those provisions remain part of it. To do 
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this might give rise to considerable trouble. The Secretary of State, and especially 
His Majesty, must not try to influence proceedings in the State Council by threats in 
advance as to what will be done if certain provisions are included in a bill. 
We were proposing to reply to you on these lines when your telegram No. 152, 
Secret, of the 27th of February, arrived. The new position reported in that telegram 
seemed to show that in any case the statement would not now need to be made, and 
we therefore sent you our telegram No. 145, Secret, of the 28th of February. But you 
may like to know of the legal advice which was given to the Secretary of State on this 
particular point. 
89 CO 54/984/4, no 1 29 Mar 1941 
'Things Ceylonese': thirteenth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for 
CO 
Ceylon nationalism and the Indian question 
1. The most important developments since my temporary discontinuance of 
these Notes have been the breakdown of the Indo-Ceylon Exploratory conversations 
and the Ceylon Nationalist reaction to that breakdown. 
2. Ceylon Politics have become completely dominated by rivalry between the 
Ceylon National Congress and the Sinhala Maha Sabha. The former is represented in 
the Ministry by Senanayake, Corea and de Silva; the latter by Bandaranaike, 
Kannangara and Kotelawala. Jayatilaka belongs to the Congress, but his influence 
with the people of the Island is now personal and focussed on the past rather than 
political and relevant to the future. He is Leader of the State Council in name only. 
3. There is no important difference in policy between the Congress and the 
Sabha. In fact it would be true to say that neither has any real or constant policy. The 
essential distinction between them is that most Congress people would like to see 
Senanayake Leader, and the Sabha members Bandaranaike. 
4. In these circumstances rivalry between them takes the form of competing for 
Sinhalese adherents (the Sabha has no use for the Minorities, and the minorities 
have no use for either Sabha or Congress) by fostering and inflaming Sinhalese 
nationalism. This is the only political plank that either side possesses. 
5. In this race to be the most nationalistic party the Ceylon Labour Party has 
recently become a third competitor. For all intents and purposes this is a one-man 
party, and its one man is Mr. Goonesinha who succeeded in being elected as Mayor of 
Colombo for last year. In the recent Municipal elections he managed with difficulty 
to retain his own seat of Maradana, but nearly all his nominees for other seats were 
rejected. His election tactics were characterized by rowdyism, racialism, and 
impersonation of voters; and the vigilance of the Police alone prevented rioting. 
Since his vacation of the Mayoral chair and the rebuff of his Party at the Municipal 
polls Goonesinha has thrown off the mantle of responsibility and respectability which 
(to his credit) he wore during his Mayoralty and has come out again in his true 
colours of a nationalistic demagogue and tub-thumper. 
6. The political atmosphere described in the preceding paragraphs was not of 
course favourable to the New Delhi conversations. A delegation containing both 
Senanayake and Bandaranaike offered nevertheless the only if slender chance of 
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obtaining early agreement and understanding between the two Governments. If 
either of these two leaders had been omitted from the delegation any agreement 
reached would have been forthwith torpedoed in the State Council by the other. Even 
the present position is preferable to such a denouement. 
7. The Financial Secretary's inclusion in the delegation was for the purpose of 
dealing with points of tariff and preference. Mr. Huxham was on furlough in India 
and went straight to the Conference from his leave. I had no opportunity therefore of 
seeing him before he joined the delegation. Although his subjects were never reached 
in the conversations Huxham appears from the shorthand proceedings to have joined 
without reserve in the discussions on questions of political status, immigration etc. 
and in a manner that has caused me great surprise. Such a bald and sweeping 
statement as "We do not accept the Jackson Report" (proceedings p. 47) came ill 
from an Officer of State, nor were other of his recorded remarks any more wisely 
conceived. 
8. The Financial Secretary's contribution to the social side of the Mission was 
even less fortunate. On the day of his arrival he received, and accepted in writing, an 
invitation to dinner from Sir Girja Bajpai. All the other guests arrived but at 8.45 
p.rp . there was still no Huxham. The host 's Private Secretary thereupon rang up the 
Hotel and was told by the absent guest that the dinner was not on his list of 
engagements and that he was not coming. In self-defence the Private Secretary 
thereupon produced to Sir Girja Bajpai Huxham's letter accepting the invitation; and 
with this unhappy incident the dinner of welcome to the Ceylon Delegates began. 
News of it reached me unofficially and I taxed Mr. Huxham with it on his return. His 
reply was that he was very sorry but that he just forgot; and that at 8.45 p.m. it was 
too late to get into dinner things. 
9. The Sinhalese is no match for the Indian in intellect or in debate and his 
ostrich-like reluctance even to glance at inconvenient facts leaves him without 
sinews for defensive argument. I am now being accused of digging up in my Message 
to Council past undertakings in view of which, if I had represented them to my . 
Ministers, they would have refused to approve the sending of any delegation. In 
actual fact the delegates took with them the files containing those undertakings, but 
as they did not suit their book they chose just to ignore them, with results 
necessarily fatal to the conversations. 
10. Having had Sir Girja Bajpai to stay with me (a most entertaining guest whose 
visit we thoroughly enjoyed) I feel some sympathy with our delegates for having 
found themselves up against such an astute strategist. During his stay with me he 
suggested that the Agent to the Government of India would be better stationed in 
Colombo then in Kandy in order to be in more immediate touch with local politics. I 
replied that the Agent's concern was not with Ceylon politics but with the welfare of 
Indian labour, and that Kandy was obviously the best centre for the latter purpose. 
He then said that what was really wanted was a superior Indian Officer in Colombo 
possessing a status, similar to that of a Consul General, enabling him to watch the 
interests of Indian Nationals. I replied that I had understood that India was 
demanding full Ceylon citizenship for her emigrants after five years residence here 
(owing to the ban there are very few with less) and that if they became Ceylon 
citizens they would stand in no need of an Indian Consul General. Bajpai then shifted 
his ground and talked of "somebody more like a Trade Commissioner perhaps than a 
Consul General". At this stage our conversation was interrupted. 
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11. Although I have found it necessary in my Message to State Council to keep 
Ceylon reminded of her past undertakings, and am therefore being dubbed by some 
of our extreme nationalists a pro-Indian, nobody realizes more than I do that Indian 
claims often need discounting and her [sic] tactics very careful watching. Whether it 
be Nehru or Bajpai who speaks, the desire for Indian domination is clear; and I fear 
that the attitude of some Europeans in India towards the Colonial Empire is not 
unlike that of the public school boy towards the lower preparatory school. They 
suffer from a great Indian Peninsularity. 
12. The Indian Government's application of their ban on emigration (which in 
regard to future immigrants no Ceylon interest, planting or otherwise, wants 
removed) to those estate workers already in the Island who would like to take a 
holiday in the old country is quite unconscionable. Even Ceylon politics would stop 
short of inflicting such hardship on Ceylon nationals. The wretched 'Palaiyal' or 
immigrant of long standing naturally wont take leave unless he can return to his job 
after it, so that the whole of that proportion of the estate population that used to be 
in annual flux between here and India is now 'frozen' in Ceylon and constitutes an 
unwanted surplus. The fluidity, of which the importance was stressed in the Jackson 
Report, no longer exists. 
13. The quota and stock positions in the tea industry are such that the present 
year's production must be curtailed by some 25 million pounds. This will inevitably 
entail discharge of labour, and almost certainly repatriation of Indians as in 1933. 
That such an already difficult prospect should be worsened by India's 'freezing' of the 
palaiyals is indeed tragic. Any approach by this Government to the Indian Govern-
ment on this question is opposed by the Ministers concerned on the grounds that (a) 
the imposition of the ban was unilateral action by India and can at any time be 
unilaterally modified by them in the interest of their own nationals; (b) that any 
recommendation from Ceylon might be interpreted as facilitating immigration or 
re-immigration of Indians, would therefore be contrary to Ministerial policy, and 
would further exacerbate anti-Indian feeling. 
14. If the Agent of the Government of India (Mr. Rhagavan, I.C.S. has recently 
replaced Mr. Vittal Pai) were really protecting the interests of Indian labour in the 
Island he would long before now have urged his Government to enable the palaiyals 
to go to India on some form of 'exeat' enabling their return. I understand that the 
Planters may shortly ask him to place their views on this matter before his 
Government; they have of course every right to place such a request before him as 
the ban is the act of his Government and has been imposed without reference to 
Ceylon. 
Labour problems 
15. Major Orde-Brown's1 visit has come at a most opportune juncture. There are 
complaints afoot on both sides that the Seven Point Agreement between the Planters 
and the Labour Unions is not being properly observed and questions of disputed 
interpretation have already arisen. Major Orde Browne has stayed with me here and 
at Kandy, and will pay a visit to Queen's Cottage, Nuwara Eliya, next month. His 
1 Major G SU Orde Browne, labour adviser, CO, visited Ceylon, Mauritius and Malaya to report on labour 
conditions. The sections of his report dealing with Ceylon were published in Aug 1943 as SP XIX with the 
title Report on Labour Conditions in Ceylon . He had arrived in Ceylon on 14 Mar 1941. 
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influence will be most salutary in all quarters, as there has been talk by the Ceylon 
Indian Congress of a General Strike and the Planters' Association by a majority of 
(roughly) 160 to 100 has taken for its Chairman an Uva planter by name of Hamilton 
as "one who calls a spade a spade and will not funk a show-down". Having spoken 
with him after his election I doubt whether Hamilton will prove as impervious and 
intransigent as some of his critics fear . That, however, remains to be seen. 
16. There has been so much work on hand, so many interviews and engagements 
that the writing of the preceding paragraphs has been frequently interrupted and 
resumed at odd intervals. I hope however that they will afford a bird's eye view of the 
pressing problems to which they relate. As a mail goes out this afternoon and I have 
the rest of my morning scheduled I must close these Notes at this point and leave 
other matters over for my next instalment. 
90 CO 54/980/15, no 3 3 Apr 1941 
[Bandaranaike]: inward telegram no 250 from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Moyne on the proposed dismissal of Mr Bandaranaike. Minutes by 
G E J Gent and Sir G Bushe 
In continuation of my telegram No.152 and my telegram No.203. 
Both Bills have passed second reading and will come before Standing Committee 
next month after Easter recess. India has refused to comment on the Bills and 
maintains her refusal to consider questions of immigration apart from general 
settlement of all outstanding questions. Ministers have not yet made any further 
protest against my message and with one exception their attitude appears to be 
moderating. Exception is Bandaranaike to whom yesterday I addressed letter 
requiring him to explain how he can reconcile with his ministerial position (1) 
recent decision of his Executive Committee to withhold approval for contributions 
from Local authorities to the war funds under Ordinance No.32 of 1940 pending 
enactment of "satisfactory" legislation on the Indian question (2) series of alleged 
public utterances of his including a resolution of his party to boycott the Governor. If 
he is to retain office I shall of course demand immediate cancellation of (1) which has 
met with general condemnation. I will telegraph developments next week. 
Minutes on 90 
The two Bills were relatively harmless (1) an Immigration Bill of the ordinary type 
without the discriminatory provisions against "non-Ceylonese" which were at one 
time contemplated by the Board of Ministers. (2) a Registration Bill solely for 
compiling and maintaining a register of non-Ceylonese in the Island. 
Mr. Bandaranaike, Minister for Local Administration, is the protagonist of the 
Sinhalese crusade against Indians (including Tamils) in the Island. His party is the 
extreme Sinhalese Nationalist Association known as the 'Sinhala Maha Sabha', of 
which he was the founder a few years ago and remains the principal figure. (1) in this 
telegram has been the subject of an enquiry from the Ministry of Information and I 
have sent Mr. Usill there a copy of this telegram for his information. 
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As regard the power of the Governor to get rid of a Minister I can find no 
provisions in the Order in Council for his doing so except on an address from the 
State Council (§37). 
I suggest a telegram to the Governor as in draft herewith.1 He would, I think, 
appreciate such an expression of support from the Secretary of State. 
C.E.J.G. 
5.4.41 
I know of no provision in the Order in Council for the dismissal of a Minister other 
than Article 37, and I think that the existence of this article would be regarded as 
exhaustive of the Governor's powers. I have put forward therefore a new theory about 
which I am not prepared to say more at the moment than that it is worth thinking 
about; and no doubt the Governor will realise that we are not in any way committed 
to the view that there is an overriding power in the King to dismiss a Minister. 
1 See 91. 
H.G.B. 
7.4.41 
91 CO 54/980/15, no 4 8 Apr 1941 
[Bandaranaike]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Lord 
Moyne to Sir A Caldecott 
Your telegram No. 250. 1 I am sorry to hear of your difficulty with Bandaranaike 
whose behaviour seems to be intolerable. As regards (1) in your telegram my view is 
that such a decision by the Executive Committee for Local Administration purport-
ing to bring pressure by such methods on other executive authorities of Government 
as well as Board of Ministers and Legislature is gross abuse of their powers in 
particular field of local administration. As regards point (2) in your telegram if 
Bandaranaike were associated with resolution or failed to dissociate himself from it 
his conduct is to my mind quite incompatible with his Ministerial Oath. 
Are you advised (1) that apart from Article 37 of the Order in Council you have 
power to terminate a Minister's appointment or (2) that a Minister is a servant of His 
Majesty and that therefore he can be dismissed by the King as distinct from the 
Governor? 
1 See 90. 
92 CO 54/980/15, no 5 13 Apr 1941 
[Bandaranaike]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Moyne 
Your telegram of the 9th April. 1 Personal. Present position is that Bandaranaike is 
1 See 91, where the date of Moyne's telegram is recorded as 8 Apr. 
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reported in the newspapers as having stated in public speeches that he has been 
misunderstood, that he wants England to win the war and that he has never 
advocated discourtesy towards the Governor. His reply to my demand for explanation 
is not yet in the form that I can accept and after consultation with the Legal 
Secretary I have sent further letter to him today. Reply to your question (1) is in the 
affirmative, vide opinion of Howard as Legal Secretary enclosed with my despatch of 
the 21st June 1938 Secret with which present Legal Secretary agrees. As regards (2) 
Legal Secretary feels that this is question which your advisers may be better able to 
answer but if reply is in affirmative he presumes that the power of His Majesty to 
dismiss will be in addition and not to the exclusion of the Governor's power of 
dismissal. There is no repeat, no deterioration in general position. 
93 CO 54/980/15 18-21 Apr 1941 
[Bandaranaike]: minutes by SirS Abrahams1 and Sir G Bushe on the 
governor's power to dismiss a minister 
Sir G. Bushe 
As a result of the discussion between yourself, Mr. Roberts-Wray and myself it would 
appear that we were all agreed that the Governor has no power to dismiss a Minister 
either (1) by importing the provisions of Section 9(c) of the Interpretation 
Ordinance, 1901, (Section ll(f) Revised Edition 1938) into the Order in Council, 
1931, and adapting them for the purpose desired; or (2) by exercising the prerogative 
powers imputed to him in paragraph 7 of Mr. Howard's opinion of 15th June, 1938. 
As to (1) it was our view that Article 37 of the Order in Council was exhaustive of 
the Governor's powers of dismissal of a Minister under that instrument since any 
attempt to effect dismissal by means of the Interpretation Ordinance would be, if 
inapt for no other reason, inconsistent with the pattern designed by the Order in 
Council for the working of that part of the constitution relating to the appointment 
and termination of appointment of a Minister. 
As to (2) the power of the Governor to dismiss any servant of the Crown by virtue 
of the Royal prerogative is not something inherent in his authority as the King's 
representative but depends upon the constitutional instruments by which he is 
appointed and his functions are defined. The Governor of Ceylon therefore has no 
power as Governor to dismiss a Minister. 
The prerogative power of the King to dismiss a Minister as a servant of the Crown 
holding office at the Royal pleasure is one which we found to be fraught with much 
difficulty and one which would obviously require careful unhurried consideration to 
decide. Presumably a communication should go to Ceylon stating that the views of 
the Legal Secretary as to the power of the Governor to dismiss are inacceptable, but 
that so far as the power of the King to dismiss is concerned the question is not free 
from difficulty and requires consideration. 
1 Assistant legal adviser, CO. 
S.S.A. 
18.4.41 
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There are two very learned persons in Ceylon taking the opposite view and therefore, 
both as a matter of courtesy and because if they have further arguments I should like 
to hear them, I think we should give some reasons. I suggest that we should insert 
after the first full stop in the telegram the following "Reasons shortly are (1) Article 
37 is exhaustive of the Governor's powers to dismiss a Minister under the Order in 
Council and even if Interpretation Ordinance, apt to govern construction of a 
constitutional Order in Council provision referred to would be inconsistent with the 
pattern of the Order in Council in relation to the appointment and termination of 
appointment of a Minister; (2) the Governor has no general power to dismiss the 
King's servants, but only so much of the prerogative as is delegated to him by the 
constitutional instruments." 
H.G.B. 
21.4.41 
94 CO 54/981114, no 8 22 Apr 1941 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 288 from Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Moyne on the reservation of the immigration and registration 
bills 
Your telegram No. 260. Grateful if Secretary of State for India might be asked to 
communicate to the Government of India your order that immigration and 
registration bills must be reserved. Reason for this request is that, although I made it 
quite clear by my message to State Council and subsequently in my reply to 
ministerial protest, that I shall reserve these bills, and although Clause 4 of the Royal 
Instructions makes reservation imperative, I have received unofficial but credible 
information that Government of India is waiting to see whether they are actually 
reserved or not, before it considers representations from Ceylon Planters' Associa-
tion, made through Indian Government Agent here, for the relaxation of its 
immigration ban in respect of the return to Ceylon of estate labourers on holiday. 
Present position is that there is no provision whereby labourer can take accustomed 
periodical trip to India because h is return is prevented by present method of working 
ban. Result is that large number of labourers are frozen here causing both discontent 
and surplus labour. Major Orde Browne who has given attention to the situation, 
authorises me to state that he is impressed by the seriousness of the problem of 
surplus labour on estates, although accurate figures are not available, and that he is 
satisfied as to its connexion with ban. If India once persist in refusal to provide 
holiday trips under ban it will not only perpetuate real hardships as regards nationals 
but will present Ceylon ministers with case for compulsory repatriation of surplus 
labour which is what they want. I should be glad if these considerations could be 
represented to Secretary of State for India, although owing to attitude at present 
taken up by my Ministers it is impossible for me to represent them direct to India as 
the views of this Government. 
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95 CO 54/980/15, no 6 23 Apr 1941 
[Bandaranaike]: outward telegram no 278 from Lord Moyne to Sir A 
Caldecott on the governor's power to dismiss a minister 
Your secret telegram No. 276. 
I am glad to hear of your successful pressure on Bandaranaike. As regards your 
secret and personal telegram of 13th April 1 I am advised that Governor has no (repeat 
no) power to dismiss Minister either by (1) importing provisions of Interpretation 
Ordinance into State Council Order-in-Council1931 and adapting them for purpose 
desired, or (2) by exercise of prerogative powers impute to him in Legal Secretary's 
opinion of 15th June, 1938.2 Reasons shortly are (1) Article 37 is exhaustive of the 
Governor's powers to dismiss a Minister under the Order-in-Council and even if 
Interpretation Ordinance is apt to govern construction of a constitutional Order-in-
Council provision referred to would be inconsistent with the pattern of the 
Order-in-Council in relation to the appointment and termination of appointment of a 
Minister; (2) the Governor has no general power to dismiss the King's servants, but 
only so much of the prerogative as is delegated to him by the constitutional 
instruments. 
Question whether H.M. has power to dismiss Ceylon Ministers is not free from 
difficulty and requires consideration. 
In these circumstances do you recommend that amendment of Order-in-Council 
should be prepared and held ready for enactment to meet any situation in which 
Governor might have to dismiss Minister in whom he had lost confidence? It would 
be necessary also to make it clear that Minister on dismissal would also cease to be 
Chairman of Executive Committee. 
1 See 92. 2 See 93. 
96 CO 54/984/4, no 2 1 May 1941 
'Things Ceylonese': fourteenth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for 
CO 
Mr. S. WR.D. Bandaranaike 
1. In No.l2 of these Notes1 I reported the wedding of "Young Banda" to a lady of 
the Kandyan nobility and I expressed the hope that a good wife and the discipline of 
married life might provide him with the ballast that he had hitherto so sadly lacked. 
That hope has already been torpedoed by Bandaranaike's subsequent behaviour. On 
. the domestic side an unpleasant altercation, in the course of which he denied his wife 
both board and bed, was overheard by fellow guests (European) in a Government 
Resthouse; while his public behaviour has necessitated my calling into question his 
retention of ministerial office. 
2. People here always speak of "Young Banda", as if some allowance were 
permissible for youth and immaturity. It should be realized however that he is a man 
of forty, and has never yet shown any signs of acquiring principle or constancy. fie 
1 See 72. 
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possesses eloquence, the power of quick and telling repartee, and agility in debate. If 
he were not indolent, he could also exercise a considerable mental capacity; but he 
finds it easier to peddle words than to deal in facts with the result that he never 
considers it worth his while to learn his brief or to match sound with sense. His 
recently deceased mother (a member of the aristocratic Obeyesekera family) was 
generally recognized as volatile and irresponsible so that her son may perhaps owe 
these traits to inheritance. Be that as it may I fear that in any estimate of Ceylon's 
political future he must be set down as an independable factor likely to upset the 
most careful calculations. 
3. In the first annex2 to these Notes are copies of the recent correspondence 
which has passed between me and Mr. Bandaranaike. In reference to the enclosure to 
my first letter of the 2nd April I should say that the reports of the Minister's 
statements were taken partly from Press shorthand and partly from Police longhand 
notes . There were numerous discrepancies between them and I was advised by the 
Legal Secretary that I could rely on neither source; nevertheless the tone of the 
Minister's speech in State Council (the proof of which he himself corrected for 
Hansard) leaves neither of us in doubt that, even if his other public statements have 
been misreported, they must have been of such a type as to render the words they 
wrote down credible at any rate to the reporters. 
4. I have been reliably informed that the recipient's immediate reaction to both 
my letters was to seek out his colleagues and to try persuade them to join in a general 
walk out such as took place in February last year. They replied however that they 
disapproved of his action regarding contributions to the War Funds and also of his 
speeches, and that if he wanted to resign he could do so alone. The results have been 
his submission to my demand for a cancellation of the decision of his Executive 
Committee; a number of speeches in which he has said that he has been 
misunderstood and that he wants us to win the war; leading and other articles in all 
three English papers condemning him; and a momentary political eclipse. In Ceylon 
however political memory is short and consistency at a discount; it would be too 
sanguine therefore to expect any very long respite from Mr. Bandaranaike's vagaries. 
It is a tragedy that at this time of necessity for the utmost co-operation in war effort 
the most favourable thing that can be said for his possession of a portfolio is that he 
is more observable and more under restraint in the ministerial boat (and thereby less 
dangerous) than he would be outside it. 
Indo-Ceylon relations 
5. On April 21st Mr. Senanayake came to see me and began conversation by 
saying that he was most anxious to come to terms with India and wondered whether 
something could not be done to effect a settlement. He then proceeded to outline 'a 
possible basis' which, if he had put it forward in Delhi last November, would almost 
certainly have avoided the breakdown of conversations. I promised to base a 
2 Annexes not printed. They are filed separately on CO 54/982/2, no 8. They contain correspondence 
between Caldecott and Bandaranaike arising from a decision on 19 Mar 1941 by the Executive Committee 
on Local Administration to withhold its sanction to contributions to war funds by local bodies pending (a) 
a satisfactory settlement of the position on certain undertakings which the governor stated had been given 
by the Ceylon government to its Indian counterpart in regard to the Indian question (see 84), and (b) the 
passage into law in a satisfactory form of the bills relating to this question (see 90). 
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Memorandum on his suggestions and to let him · see it. The next day I received a 
letter from Sir Baron Jayatilaka requesting an interview at which to discuss the 
Indo-Ceylon problem which, he wrote, "demanded urgent solution". I replied by 
telephone, telling him of Senanayake's visit to me and suggesting that they should 
see me together on April 25th. I finished my Memorandum in time to supply them 
with copies beforehand, and at our meeting a number of alterations in it were made 
by them but none of such a nature as to alter its general purport. 
6. The question then arose as to how to get the Memorandum to India. They 
could not officially subscribe to it at the present stage because, if they did so and 
India turned it down, they would be criticised as having changed their views without 
achieving anything thereby. I therefore undertook to transmit the Memorandum 
secretly and personally to the Viceroy as a ballon d'essai. The second enclosure to 
these Notes is a copy of my letter to the Viceroy with its enclosure. 
7. Mr. Gimson, Controller of Labour, who accompanied the Ceylon Delegation to 
India, tells me that in his opinion the Memorandum affords reasonable prospect of a 
settlement. However that may be, it represents a great advance towards reasonable-
ness in Sinhalese opinion and I feel that we are nearer a solution than we were. 
Labour unrest 
8. Except on the Government Hydro-Electric Scheme Works at Norton Bridge 
(where employees have gone out against the orders of their Union and without 
waiting for the finding of a Conciliation Board) there is no Strike on at the moment, 
and the Controller of Labour reported to me verbally last week that things are better 
than they have been for a year. 
Surprise (?) election result 
9. The Colombo North seat in State Council fell vacant recently by the death by 
Mrs. Naysum Saravanamuttu. It was contested in the Ceylon National Congress 
interest by her husband, the present Mayor of Colombo, and in the Labour interest 
by Mr. M.J. de Silva. The latter won it by a majority of nearly three thousand. The 
Labour party will now have two members in Council; the other being its leader, Mr. 
Goonesinha. 
10. The result has been a surprise to most people, but not to those who keep their 
eyes open for signs of the times. Universal suffrage might conceivably (?) have 
worked all right for Ceylon if registration as a voter had remained to be applied for. 
When in 1935 Government assumed the responsibility of registering every qualified 
person a mass of voters emerged to whom politics meant nothing, but a vote meant 
getting a free ride to the poll and (to avoid an uglier word) a douceur in some form or 
other. An immediate result was that most respectable people in Ceylon fought shy of 
standing for State Council because they knew that to fight clean for the support of 
such constituents was synonymous with losing the contest. This was the first stage in 
a development which has now reached its second and corollary stage; i.e. respectable 
people will not go to the polls at all, because of the vicious atmosphere of rowdyism 
and dirty play that surrounds them. In this latest election in Colombo North only 
half of the electors polled. 
11. The police are certainly to be congratulated on having maintained order; but 
the Police cannot guarantee a clean fight, much less a reasonable exercise of the 
franchise. I have heard no 'election stories' about Colombo North yet, but a 
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European who heard an Electoral address by the ex-convict Batuwantudawe (recently 
returned for Kalutara on the death, and in the place, of his popular and pitied father) 
informed me that his most telling argument ran as follows:-"Why do I ask you to let 
me represent you? It is because I am just one of you; and nobody need be fearful of 
addressing me, not even the lowest; for who could be lower than I have been, serving 
time in a common prison for impersonation and cheating". 
12. As the annexes to these Notes are of unusual interest I will not delay their 
transmission by adding any more paragraphs to this instalment. 
97 CO 54/980/4, no 4 8 May 1941 
[Reforms]: outward telegram no 307 from Lord Moyne to Sir A 
Caldecott on the statement to be made to Ceylon ministers 
Your telegram 21st April. I assume that proposed statement is for use as reply to 
Ministers only and not for publication. I note your strong recommendation in favour 
of despatch of Commission to Ceylon, but you will appreciate that difficulties in 
wartime of securing adequate personnel are likely to be insuperable; moreover visit 
of Commission might be expected to bring to a head communal tension at time when 
this should be avoided. Nothing has occurred to suggest that claims of Sinhalese and 
of minorities could be reconciled by any recommendations which Commission could 
make. In these circumstances I think that conference in London after war may well 
be better procedure. I imagine Ceylonese representatives would be unlikely to be 
prepared to visit this country under present conditions, even if conference earlier 
were thought feasible. 
If further postponement of election has later to be decided upon, possible method 
of meeting criticism that Ministers are clinging to office at all costs, would be to 
provide for Executive Committees to be re-elected, or alternatively Ministers could 
resign and submit themselves for re-election by Executive Committees. 
I suggest that reply to Ministers could be shortened to read as follows:-"Urgency 
and importance of constitutional question is fully recognised by His Majesty's 
Government, and progress will be made as soon as circumstances permit of full 
consideration of present difficulties. Before taking decisions on a matter of such 
importance to well-being of Ceylon His Majesty's Government would desire that 
principal interests involved should be fully consulted by means of commission or 
conference. Ministers will appreciate that this is not possible to arrange under 
present war conditions." 
You mention deterioration of position. While I know that Indian controversy is 
acute, I was not aware of deterioration in other respects which could be attributable 
to constitutional difficulties. Please inform me in what ways position has worsened 
and give me your further views generally in light of above remarks. 
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98 CO 54/981/14, no 13 15 May 1941 
[Ceylon Indian Congress]: inward telegram no 250 from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Moyne transmitting a message of protest from the 
Ceylon Indian Congress over bills to regulate immigration and the 
registration of voters 
Following from Ceylon Indian Congress. 
Begins. Ceylon Indian Congress, representing Ceylon Indians with membership of 
over 120,000, condemn and protest against the principles and provisions of two bills 
now before the State Council, one for regulating and controlling entry of non-
Ceylonese into Ceylon, the other for registering persons in Ceylon not possessing 
Ceylon domicile of origin, as absolutely unnecessary, vexatious, contrary to express-
ed and implied agreements undertaken between India and Ceylon governments, and 
gravely threatening the fundamental rights, interests and honour of Indians; has 
demonstrated by such unanimous condemnation protests of Ceylon Indians by over 
35 crowded public meetings all over Ceylon, and pray that consent to the said bills be 
refused. Ends. 
99 CO 54/981/14, no 10 
'Indians in Ceylon ': CO note 
May 1941 
The history of Ceylon from time immemorial has reflected in its every chapter the 
close relations between the island and the Indian Continent, and a large Tamil 
population has long been settled in the Northern part of the Island. 
Indians, mostly from South India, have gone to Ceylon for employment as 
labourers and traders, and since the birth of the tea and rubber industries Indian 
workers have moved to and fro between India and Ceylon in great numbers in the 
course of their work on the estates. In the past no particular difficulties have arisen 
over this influx of Indians into the island, and with a minimum measure of control by 
the Government of Ceylon and the Government of India, these workers have been 
able to pass backwards and forwards freely between the two countries. 
It was soon after the 1914-1918 war that more carefully regulated arrangements 
to control the immigration of Indians into Ceylon were made. In 1922 the 
Government of India passed its Emigration Act, and much correspondence passed 
between the two Governments as to the exact terms on which further immigration of 
Indians into Ceylon should be allowed, the Government of India insisting upon 
certain rules which were in their view required to safeguard the interests of Indians 
overseas. At that date Ceylon agreed to the appointment of a resident Agent of the 
Government of India in Ceylon. From this date, therefore, a more comprehensive 
system was introduced for controlling the movement of Indians between the two 
countries. Suitable regulations were made by the Government of India and 
legislation was passed by the Government of Ceylon to regulate conditions of 
employment on the estates, and in the constitution framed for Ceylon ten years ago 
the political rights of all residents in the Island were given a new definition. 
The total population of Ceylon is about 51Jz million of whom the most numerous 
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elements are the Sinhalese 3lfz million and the Tamils 1lfz million. Of the latter a 
substantial number have for generations past been settled in the Island and others 
come to and fro between the Island and India-in 1938, 180,000 Indians including 
50,000 labourers were recorded in such migration. 
Nationalistic feeling has increased in India and in Ceylon, and the economic 
problems which have affected the world so much since the 1914-1918 Great War 
have had their effect also upon the position of Indians in the island. 
Of late, there has grown up a feeling in Ceylon, particularly among the Sinhalese, 
that there are too many Indians in the island, and that they are taking away work 
from the Sinhalese. The Government of India, in turn, have felt constrained to press 
for fuller recognition of the rights of Indians who have settled down in the island and 
have the intention of making it their home. 
The conflict of views between the two Governments came to a head some two years 
ago when the Ceylon Government decided to reaffirm their policy of giving 
preference in Government employment to locally born Ceylonese, and to discharge a 
number of daily-paid Indians who had been recently taken into Government 
employment, and also to offer a scheme of voluntary repatriation to other 
"non-Ceylonese" in Government employment. This led the Government of India to 
place a retaliatory ban on the further emigration of Indian labourers to Ceylon which 
upset the normal free movement of such Indians between India and Ceylon. 
There has also of late been a considerable growth in Ceylon of labour unrest, 
particularly on the estates, the causes of which reflect both the growing conscious-
ness of labour as to its political and industrial rights and also the social disturbance 
created by the intern.wtion of their free contacts with their homes and relatives in 
India. 
In an attempt to solve round the table the differences between the two 
Governments arrangements were made for a delegation from the Ceylon Govern-
ment to meet a delegation from the Government of India last November, but the 
negotiations broke down. The Ceylon Ministers then decided to introduce two Bills 
into the State Council to provide for the control of future immigration into Ceylon 
and for the registration of non-Ceylonese residing in the island. The Bills are 
considerably less drastic in form than at one time seemed likely, and they are at 
present before a Standing Committee of the State Council. The two Bills will be 
reserved for the signification of His Majesty's Pleasure before they can be placed on 
the Statute Book. In order that certain undertakings towards Indians in Ceylon by 
which the Ceylon Government is bound may be publicly appreciated in the Island the 
Governor has issued a message to the State Council which sets out the substance of 
those undertakings. 
The following reports1 are ·attached:-
(1) Report on Immigration into Ceylon by Sir Edward Jackson. 
(2) Sessional Papers VIII, IX, AND X of 1941 which give the history of the 
Exploratory Conference in India. 
(3) A copy of a message from the Governor regarding undertakings given to the 
Government of India. 
(4) Sessional Paper XIV of 1941 which contains the Ceylon Ministers' protest in 
regard to the message, and the Governor's reply to that protest. 
1 Not printed. 
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100 CO 54/980/4, no 5 28 June 1941 
[Reforms]: inward telegram (reply) no 495 from Sir A Caldecott to 
Lord Moyne on the governor's reform proposals 
Your telegram No. 307. Secret.1 Position is deteriorating in following major 
respects:-
(a) There is no longer any consensus of co-operation or even consultation 
between members of so-called Homogeneous Ministry except when Nationalist or 
Communist considerations dictate in any matter ad hoc combination. 
(b) Executive Committees realise more and more the power and opportunities for 
interference. 
(c) As a result of (a) and (b) defects enumerated in paragraph 13 of my 1938 
reforms despatch are now much worse. 
(d) Members of present State Council have become so stale and indolent that both 
in Council and Committee important measures are constantly held up for lack of 
quorum while only sensational items in the agenda, such as motions of censure or 
criticism are debated at length in full house. 
(2) Any statement now to be made to Ministers must be in a form communicable 
by them to the public, political elements amongst which are growing restive and in 
particular Sinhala Sabha party has begun to raise outcry that three years after my 
reforms despatch, and nearly two since State Council debate thereon, there is still no 
indication of the extent to which His Majesty's Government would be prepared to 
consider reforms along the lines proposed. There is also general criticism of delay in 
view of decisions taken in war time in case of West Indies.2 Demand is now for 
Dominion Status. 
(3) It is recognised on all sides that no measure of agreement can ever be 
obtained by appointment of commission or by conferences however constituted held 
here or in England. Success of any reforms will lie not in pleasing all or any 
communities but in causing each to shed equal number of tears. My suggestion of 
commission was not based on any hope of agreement but on consideration explained 
in last sentence of paragraph (5) of my Secret and Personal telegram of lOth June last 
year. 
(4) My recommendations for reforms remain as in my original despatch, as 
modified by my Confidential despatch of 28th October, 1939,3 with the following 
exceptions:-
( a) Question of Indian franchise must now await resumption of conversations 
with India, my telegram No. 447. Secret. 
(b) Insolvency and present or past conviction of crime should disqualify for 
membership of State Council; this is necessitated by recent return of ex-convict in 
by-election, and by public demand for enquiry into bribery and corruption of 
1 See 97. 
2 A reference especially to the proposed reform of the Jamaican constitution (see 101) which was 
subsequently enacted in 1944. 
3 See 9. 
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Councillors which State Council itself has recently supported by formal resolu-
tion. 
(c) I revert to recommendation in paragraph 24 of original despatch for retention 
of Legal Secretary as Legal Adviser. 
(d) Financial Secretary should be replaced by Financial Controller in purely 
advisory capacity as I first envisaged, vide second sentence of paragraph 26 of 
original despatch. 
(e) Public Services Commission should consist of Principal Secretary to the 
Governor, Legal Adviser and three unofficials nominated by the Governor. 
(5) In view of impossibility of early commission or of ever achieving agreement 
by conference, Chief and Legal Secretaries agree with me that requirements of 
present situation would be best met by message from you to the effect that His 
Majesty's Government would be prepared to view favourably reform along general 
lines indicated in the preceding paragraph and suggest proposals should be 
crystallized here in the form of a draft new Order in Council for detailed 
consideration by His Majesty's Government. Preparation of such a draft will enable 
quick decisions on clear issues and avoid misunderstanding or obscurity. (? I urge 
moreover) Committee recommended in paragraph 6 of my original despatch should 
also be appointed so that its report may be considered by you at the same time as 
draft Order in Council. 
(6) Message from you in above sense would allay suspicion often expressed that 
war is being made the pretext for delaying consideration of reforms and there would I 
think ensue general agreement that the next general election should be postponed 
until after the war or until new Constitution is ready. It would also arrest the 
deterioration mentioned in paragraph (1) (d) above and re-animate the State 
Councillors. 
101 C054/980/4 11-15July1941 
[Reforms]: minutes by Sir G Bushe and Sir C Parkinson on the 
problem of an imposed solution 
There are, as it seems to me, three possible things that one can do about the Ceylon 
constitution:-
(1) Go backwards and govern the island and have no nonsense about it; 
(2) Go right forward into self-government on the Southern Rhodesia lines and 
throw your minorities to the mercy and good sense of the majority; 
(3) To have another compromise which protects or purports to protect the 
minorities, and which gives, or purports to give, reserve powers to the Governor. 
I should have thought that the only one of these which could be dealt with without 
consultation and negotiation between the parties in Ceylon would be No. 1. I do not 
see how you can expect anything in the nature of a liberal constitution to work if it is 
imposed from here. 
H.G.B. 
11.7.41 
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Secretary of State (through Mr. Hall) 
The fact that we can embark on an important measure of constitutional reform in 
Jamaica (not to mention Trinidad and British Guiana) during the war makes it 
difficult, at first sight, to refuse to undertake constitutional reform in Ceylon until 
the war is over. But (even apart from Mr. Gent's point about India and Burma) the 
answer is clear. In the case of Jamaica the proposed changes are not a matter for 
violent controversy; in Ceylon, with its racial majority and minority problems, the 
position is entirely different. 
It is perhaps tempting to take the line that the Ceylonese will never agree among 
themselves: so let us introduce our own scheme of reform, and tell them that that is 
what we believe to be fair and that they will have to settle down and work the new 
constitution. But is that really wise? We may, of course, be driven to it if and when a 
conference fails, just as in the case of Palestine in 1939. But dictated settlements do 
not achieve finality and they almost certainly do achieve dissatisfaction and political 
unrest, and it is worth while struggling hard for an agreed scheme of reform even if 
in the end the attempt fails. 
I agree that it would be well to telegraph as in draft.1 
1 See 102. 
A.C.C.P. 
15.7.41 
102 CO 54/980/4, no 8 23 July 1941 
[Reforms]: outward telegram (reply) no 496 from Lord Moyne to Sir A 
Caldecott 
Your Secret telegram No. 495. 1 I am genuinely desirous of promoting beneficial 
reform of constitution as soon as possible without insisting on local agreement, but 
is it advisable to proceed with changes which in present conditions may create effects 
more damaging to Ceylon than mere indolence or slow motion on part of State 
Councillors? I quite understand what you mean in saying that touchstone of success 
of reforms would be equal shedding of tears by all communities, but is there any 
advantage in effecting that result in wartime unless and until it is necessary to relieve 
any intolerable distress which one or other of communities is suffering? 
2. Your appreciation of position shows that principal defects of Committee 
system summarised in your despatch of 13th June, 1938, have tended to become 
more apparent and injurious to efficiency but at present we have something like 
political truce in Ceylon with emergency powers temporarily exercised by Govern-
ment to ensure executive action in matters arising out of defence requirements. 
Before that is disturbed I should have to satisfy Parliament as well as Government of 
India that any changes to which substantial minority communities object are 
nevertheless urgently necessary in face of war conditions and in face of His Majesty's 
Government's policy towards constitutional changes in Burma and India. I do not 
think that principal measures in reforms scheme, e.g., abolition of Executive 
Committees and Officers of State and institution of Cabinet system, would pass this 
1 See 100. 
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test in present circumstances and I believe you would agree that there would be no 
advantage in effecting merely a few relatively unimportant reforms now. 
3. Subject to your further views I am still therefore inclined to think that 
statement to Ministers in terms of paragraph 3 of my Secret telegram No. 3072 is 
most candid and practical course. It was intended for publication but if you consider 
its terms or form could be improved with that object I shall be very ready to 
reconsider.3 
2 See 97. 
3 Moyne sent a further tel on 23 July which read: 'I hope you will not be disappointed at the contents of my 
telegram No. 496. The facilities for inefficiency and obstruction offered by the present constitution must 
sometimes drive you almost to exasperation and you must often be tempted to think that anything would 
be better than the indefinite continuance of the present state of affairs. But I must confess that I am loath 
to stir up controversy on this most difficult subject during the war unless it is absolutely necessary to do 
so, for there is no obvious solution that we can feel clearly right in enforcing through thick and thin. I am 
sure that you will understand this point of view' (CO 54/980/4, no 9). 
103 CO 54/980/4, no 11 15 Aug 1941 
[Reforms]: inward telegram (reply) no 633 from Sir A Caldecott to 
Lord Moyne on the statement to be made to Ceylon ministers 
Your telegram No. 496. 1 may I suggest slight variation of the statement proposed by 
your telegram No. 3072 as follows:-
"Urgency and importance of Constitutional Reform is fully recognised by His 
Majesty's Government and progress will be pressed for as soon as circum-
stances permit. Before taking decisions on the proposals, concerning which 
there has been so little unanimity but which are of such importance to the 
well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would desire that the 
position should be further examined and made the subject of further 
consultation by means of Commission or Conference. Ministers will appreci-
ate that this is not possible to arrange under war conditions but the matter 
will be given immediate post war priority." 
Statement along such lines will of course involve question of further postpone-
ment of general election. Leader of State Council speaking on the budget has stated 
the personal opinion that the Counsellors are stale and that the election should be 
held next year. I would wish however to await ministerial and general political 
reactions to the statement before submitting any recommendation. 
1 See 102. 2 See 97. 
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104 CO 54/980/11, no 1 22 Aug 1941 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 651 from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Moyne transmitting the view of the Board of Ministers that HMG 
should apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Ceylon 
My telegram No. 633.1 
Board of Ministers have officially notified the view that further delay in making 
pronouncement on actual position regarding reforms is not in the public interest 
and have requested me so to represent to you by telegraph. Private member 19th 
August gave notice of motion containing following paragraph:-
"This Council therefore requests H.M.G. to give effect to the eight-point 
Anglo-American declaration2 by immediate assurance that proposals for full 
self-government will be granted to this country and requests the Board of 
Ministers to frame constitution for approval of this House and to take 
immediate steps to secure the assent of His Majesty to same". 
1 See 103. 
2 ie the Atlantic Charter, for coverage of which -see BDEEP series A, vol 1, S R Ashton & SE Stockwell, 
eds, Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-1945, part I, 26 & 27. 
105 CO 54/984/4, no 3 23 Aug 1941 
'Things Ceylonese': fifteenth periodical report by Sir A Caldecott for 
CO 
The ministers 
1. Since my last instalment of these Notes1 Mr. Bandaranaike has, I hear from the 
Legal Secretary, assumed the role of Governor's champion in the Board of Ministers. 
He has certainly been extremely affable and courteous to me: sed timeo Danaos. 
2. Mr. George de Silva, Member for Kandy, is acting as Minister for Health. 'Our 
George' is generally liked for his honesty of speech and action. In a character so 
volatile and undisciplined by restraints of rhyme or reason such honesty is somewhat 
hard to distinguish from irresponsibility. He is doing a lot of good however by 
rushing about the Island on hospital inspections which the substantive Minister, Mr. 
W.A. de Silva, has been too decrepit and senile to perform for a long time. The leave 
granted to the latter by the State Council followed the death of his wife, whose social 
service and philanthropy had endeared her to many, especially to her fellow 
enthusiasts in the Buddhistic religion. The old man is long past his period of 
usefulness and it is a great pity that he does not permanently lay down his portfolio. 
The budget 
3. The Ministers' refusal to budget for the imposition of an all-round excess 
profits duty tax on the revenue side or for a full payment of Defence items on the 
expenditure side has elicited a large measure of criticism and condemnation from the 
1 See 96. 
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European community, nearly all of which is deserved. A case for debiting some of the 
Defence expenditure to loan account could be made out if profits arising out of the 
war were first adequately taxed for war purposes. This the Ministers refuse to do on 
the pleas that before the war the tea, rubber and plumbago industries were 
abnormally depressed and that a great proportion of the present improvement 
represents not war profits but reasonable adjustment of past deficits. The falseness of 
such a theory will in due course be proved by post-war economic history, and my 
impression is that the Ministers know this perfectly well and do not really believe in 
their own arguments. 
4. Messrs Senanayake and Kotelawala both have extensive plantation and mining 
interests, and a profiteering mentality is often openly charged against both. There is 
probably something in this, but the general ministerial attitude towards public 
finance cannot in my view be explained so simply. I ascribe it to two main causes. 
The first is psychological and lies in their reactions to the character and manner of 
the Financial Secretary. The saying that a man is the creature of his career is not 
inapplicable to Mr. Huxham. His long service in the Board of Inland Revenue 
followed by his able initiation and primal administration of the Income tax 
organization here have inevitably evolved in him an efficiency and an outlook not 
unrestricted by specialism. He has neither statesmanship, administrative tact nor 
diplomacy and his idea of persuasion is to proclaim to the Ministers that if this thing 
is done, or if that thing is not done, the Secretary of State will need to advise refusal 
of the Royal Assent or order exercise by the Governor of his reserve powers. This of 
course is an inevitably unsuccessful method of approaching colleagues to whom a 
mere mention of Whitehall is as a red rag to a bull. The second main cause of the 
Ministers' imperviousness to sound financial considerations is not psychological but 
ratiocinative. They rather look forward to future bankruptcy than apprehend it. In 
their view it will provide the opportunity, nay the necessity, of raiding the roost of 
personal emoluments and of reducing the wealth and standard of living enjoyed by 
public servants to a local and non-European level. 
Envious dislike of public servants 
5. The dowry that a young Ceylonese Civil Servant can command in the local 
marriage market is the highest that the market attracts. The reasons for his 
desirability as a son-in-law include the following considerations. The average 
Ceylonese officer has his children well educated, but with remarkable cheapness, at 
the Government's Royal College or at one of the big State-aided schools in Colombo, 
Kandy, Galle and Jaffna. He has never to pay the expenses of two establishments or to 
provide holiday homes for his children. His womenfolk do not wear expensive 
European frocks but prefer the more beautiful but much less costly sarees of India. 
His domestic budget amounts therefore to much less than that of his European 
confrere though their emoluments (except in the case of recent appointees) are 
precisely the same. The result is that the Ceylonese holders of Government 
appointments (in the classes ordinarily recruited in other Colonies from Europe) 
form the best off and most securely placed sections of the population. 
6. When to their comparative affluence is added their association with, and 
natural preference for, the ways of bureaucracy rather than those of democracy, their 
unpopularity with Ministers, State Councillors, politicians and nationalists needs no 
further explanation. If Ministers and State Councillors had not themselves accepted 
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remuneration at rates which nationalists represent as unnecessarily high for the 
requirements of a national life, criticism in State Council of the salaries enjoyed by 
the older Civil Servants would be even more frequent than it is. Successive revisions 
of scales of pay for new entrants to the Services have always had a lower level in view; 
but the provisions of Article 87 of the Order in Council, the recent refusal of the 
Secretary of State to approve consideration by a Commission of the pay of serving 
officers and my own refusal to entertain the idea of a salary levy have temporarily 
deterred the Ministers and Council from pressing any attempt to deprive present 
holders of Government appointments of the terms on which they hold them. The 
urge to do so is however always present in their minds. 
7. It must be remembered also in this connection that the machinery of 
territorial administration in this Island remains of the Crown Colony form; that a 
Government Agent or Assistant Government Agent still regards himself as, and 
indeed still largely is, a 'Raja of Bhong'. This fact, and the public servant's 
consciousness of it, is most obnoxious to the 'democratic' politician. There already is 
talk abroad of substituting for the Government Agents and their Kachcheries a 
system of Provincial and District Councils. Their Chairmen would be "elected 
representatives of the people" and all that would be required of Civil Servants would 
be to carry out in a clerical or subordinate capacity the policies and dictates of the 
Councils. 
8. Of the democratization of Ceylon it must be confessed that so far there are but 
few signs of the real thing. The aim of the self-styled 'democrats' is merely to push 
the public service out of the saddle and to hoist their own persons into it. It is 
certain, I fear, that Government Servants will more and more become subjected to 
attacks inspired by general jealousy of their position, the determination of dema-
gogues to usurp their high places, and by the odium inseparable from the protection 
of Whitehall afforded to them by Articles 86 and 87 of the order in Council. It is a 
great pity that in the early days of Ceylonization of the Services a distinction was not 
made by means of an Overseas allowance or otherwise to adjust the salaries of local 
and overseas recruits to their respective economic circumstances. General accept-
ance of the fact that Ceylonese officers are overpaid must naturally prejudice their 
popularity. 
Labour unrest 
9. The position is better than it has been for a long time, and at the moment of 
writing there is no strike that I know of anywhere. I have throughout our difficulties 
been impressed by the way in which Mr. Gimson, as Controller of Labour, and his 
two Deputy Controllers at Hatton and Badulla have kept their heads. The two 
Deputies are Ceylon-Tamil members of the Ceylon Civil Service, and the following 
excerpt from Mr. Rajendra's diary for June gives a retrospect of his eighteen months 
work at Hatton:-
"/n Kandy: 14th June. Assumed duties in Kandy. I have left Hatton after being 
there for exactly 18 months. The early months there were very trying. Labour 
Unrest was wide spread and there was absolutely no contact between the 
employers and the Trade Unions. My appearance on the scene as Deputy 
Controller was viewed with suspicion by both the Trade Unions and the 
employers. I was soon able to win the confidence of the Trade Unions because 
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my instructions were to encourage the growth of healthy and progressive 
Trade Unions. Winning the confidence of the employers was a slower process. 
At the outset they expected me to support them in their efforts to suppress 
Trade Union activities. When I explained that the policy of Government was to 
encourage healthy Trade Unionism, they resented my presence and often 
disapproved of the advice I tendered. With personal contact with individual 
employers the attitude changed first in Dickoya and later in Dimbula. 
Strangely enough my departure from Hatton is regretted more by the 
employers than by the Trade Unionists. After having gone all out to establish 
contact between the Trade Unionists and the employers, during the later part 
of my stay in Hatton, I had often to criticise the incompetent manner in 
which the Trade Unions were run. The Congress often took the criticism in 
good part but the Federation, which is more dishonestly run than incom-
petently, was inclined to resent any criticism. I am sure Mr. Natesa Iyer 
welcomes my transfer." 
10. The other Deputy Controller at Badulla has recently started a movement in 
Uva Province for Social Service by the wives of Planters among women and children 
on their estates. It is meeting, I am glad to say, with response. The growth of the Boy 
Scout movement on the plantations continues to make excellent progress. As far as I 
see or hear of him Mr. Hamilton is proving a good and reasonable Chairman of the 
Planters' Association. He is not happy about things of course, and tells me that 
returns furnished by District Planters' Associations show that the number of 
instances in which estate employees have been reported to have resorted to restraint, 
intimidation, assault or violence against employers or their Agents since the seven 
point Agreement with the Labour Unions came into force thirteen months ago is 
over eighty. From his account of two cases of 'intimidation' I should have ·labelled 
both 'insult' or 'rudeness'. I have little doubt that few of the 80 reported cases can 
have been criminally actionable; though the number reflects the unpleasant 
atmosphere in which some unfortunate planters are living. 
11 . The recent Harbour Strike, the facts of which I have reported to the Colonial 
Office, needed to be nipped in the bud. As four Ministers were affected (Labour, 
Communications, Defence and Home Affairs) and as everybody's job tends to be 
nobody's I hurried down from Kandy, conferred with the Board of Ministers, and got 
the nippers applied with unanimity and prompt effectuality. The Port workers had 
legitimate grievances, but strike tactics had been stimulated by a few political 
agitators of Communist complexion. 
Indo-Ceylon relations 
12. The Conversations are to be resumed here on 1st September; the wording of a 
communique to this effect being still the subject of telegraphic correspondence 
between the two Governments. The personnel of the Indian delegation is not yet 
known but it will be led by Sir Girja Bajpai. The Ceylon delegation has been chosen 
by the Board of Ministers and will consist of Mr. Senanayake (Leader), Mr. Corea and 
Mr. Drayton. This means that our delegation will be identical with that which went 
to India last year except that Mr. Drayton takes the place of Mr. Bandaranaike who 
(being against the resumption of talks) voluntarily stepped out. I gather that the 
Board would have liked the inclusion of Sir Baron Jayatilaka, but that (a) Mr. 
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Senanayake made it clear that he himself must again lead the delegation and (b) Sir 
Baron was not going to be led. Mr. Huxham will not take part in any conversations 
until the stage of trade negotiation is reached. This cannot be until October as the 
Indian Trade Delegate is not yet available nor is India prepared to talk trade until 
agreement has been reached on other matters. 
13. Indians in the Madras Presidency and in Ceylon are representing the recent 
Indo-Burman Agreement as a betrayal by India of her nationals in Burma. I fear that 
this political agitation, which is obviously causing the Indian Government embar-
rassment cannot be expected to contribute towards the much hoped for success of 
the renewed Indo-Ceylon conversations. 
106 CO 54/980/11, no 2, WP(G)(41)82 27 Aug 1941 
'Ceylon constitution': War Cabinet memorandum by Lord Moyne on 
the policy statement to be made to the Board of Ministers 
In November 1938, Mr. MacDonald submitted recommendations to the Cabinet 
relating to the reform of the constitution of Ceylon. The Governor had made certain 
proposals for reform, and Mr. MacDonald sought the authority of the Cabinet for 
publishing these and arranging for them to be debated in the State Council of 
Ceylon. The intention was that, if general opinion was in favour of the principles of 
the proposals, an amending Order-in-Council should at once be drafted for putting 
them into effect. These recommendations were approved by the Cabinet. 
2. The Governor's proposals were debated at length in the State Council, but 
resulted in a pronounced failure of the representatives of the Sinhalese majority 
community and those of the minority communities (Ceylon and Indian Tamils, 
Burghers, Moslems and Europeans) to reach any basis of agreement. Further 
examination of the problem was interrupted by the outbreak of war. There has 
followed a kind of informal political truce on this subject between the communities 
in Ceylon, and the local advocacy of communal claims has not been publicly pressed, 
though there is no reason to doubt that they would appear with no loss of virulence if 
opportunity were given. To avoid this, the life of the State Council, which should 
have expired not later than January 1941, was prolonged by Order in Council last 
year for a period up to two years-ostensibly to provide further time to consider the 
question of constitutional reform. 
3. It has become increasingly clear that a settlement cannot be satisfactorily 
carried out until the war is over. In view of the opposition of the minorities to the 
recent proposals, I do not see how any substantial reforms can be brought into force 
until there has been a further examination of the whole position either by a 
commission sent to Ceylon, or by the summoning of a conference in Ceylon or, 
preferably, in London. Neither of these courses is feasible in present conditions. 
Moreover, it would be difficult during the war to carry into effect further substantial 
advances in the already advanced constitution of Ceylon, if in India and in Burma the 
lines of constitutional progress are not to be settled until the war is over. A decision 
by His Majesty's Government to reform the Ceylon constitution in any other 
direction than that of increased powers for the Ceylon Ministers and elected 
representatives would be in conflict with reasonable expectations and would confront 
us with very serious reactions in the Island. 
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4. The Governor reports that there is some deterioration in the local political 
position and that the present State Council is getting stale. Even so, I feel that there 
are greater objections to attempting to reform the constitution now than to allowing 
it to operate a little longer. At present communal feeling is not asserting itself in the 
political field, and the Governor has powers under Defence Regulations which he can 
and does exercise to ensure necessary executive action in matters arising out of 
defence requirements; whereas the knowledge that the reform of the constitution 
was under active examination would at once intensify public expressions of 
communal feeling, and might lead in present conditions to a difficult problem of law 
and order in the Island with some reactions even in political circles in India. 
5. I propose therefore to instruct the Governor to issue to the Ministers in Ceylon 
the following statement which has been provisionally agreed with the Governor:-
"His Majesty's Government have had under further consideration the ques-
tion of constitutional reform in Ceylon. The urgency and importance of the 
reform of the constitution is fully recognised by His Majesty's Government, 
but before taking decisions upon the present proposals for reform, concern-
ing which there has been so little unanimity, but which are of such 
importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would 
desire that the position should be further examined and made the subject of 
further consultation by means of a commission or conference. The Board of 
Ministers will appreciate that this cannot be arranged under war conditions, 
but the matter will be taken up with the least possible delay after the war." 
This announcement would be intended for publication in the State Council by 
arrangement with the Ministers and would be published in this country at the same 
time. If the Board of Ministers wished to suggest any amendment of the form or 
terms of the statement before its publication, I should be ready to agree provided that 
it were not substantially altered. 
6. As soon as the statement has been made public, it will be necessary to 
consider, in the light of the local expression of feelings, whether a further extension 
of the life of the present State Council should be arranged, or whether an election 
should be held in or before January, 1943.1 
1 The War Cabinet approved the statement on 28 Aug (WM 87(41)10) and the decision was conveyed by 
Moyne to Caldecott in tel 598 on 30 Aug (CO 54/980/4, no 15). 
107 CO 54/980/4, no 18 1 Oct 1941 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 774 from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Moyne conveying the response of the Board of Ministers to HMG's 
statement 
Your telegram No. 598.1 My telegram No. 754. Ministers have asked me to telegraph 
the following expression of their views. Begins:-The Board of Ministers has 
carefully considered the letter of His Excellency The Governor of 1st September, 
1 See 106, note 1. 
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1931, conveying proposals of His Majesty's Government regarding reform of Ceylon 
constitution and are strongly opposed to such proposals for the following reasons:-
1. The proposals involve a delay in dealing with the question of constitutional 
reform for a period, which is both indefinite and may be protracted. Such delay is 
most undesirable because the present constitution was accepted as an experiment 
over ten years ago, during which period serious defects in the constitution have 
manifested themselves; an indefinite continuance of the constitution, in its 
present form, is detrimental to the best interests of the country. It must further be 
pointed out that the life of the present State Council has been extended for two 
years by the Secretary of State for specific purpose of dealing with the question of 
reform. 
2. The appointment of a commission or holding of a conference for further 
investigation-(a) Is unnecessary because His Excellency The Governor, at the 
request of the Secretary of State, has fully examined the constitutional position, 
and, after consultation with all sections of opinion, has submitted his recom-
mendations. These recommendations have also been carefully considered by the 
State Council, which has expressed its views thereon. (b) Is most undesirable, 
because, while such a commission or conference is not likely to produce any fresh 
material which would be helpful in dealing with the problem, it will undoubtedly 
create much bitterness and ill-will amongst the various sections of the people of 
the country. Ends. 
My letter to which the Ministers have thus replied made it clear that you were 
prepared to consider only minor amendments to the draft statement not (repeat not) 
involving substantial alternations. 
108 CO 54/980/4, no 19 1 Oct 1941 
[Constitutional reform]: inward telegram no 775 from Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Moyne conveying the views of representatives of the minorities 
Four members of the State Council, Ponnambalam, Mahadeva, Pereira and Jayah 
interviewed me to-day on behalf of Ceylon Tamil Indians and Moslems of whom they 
are the representatives. They explained that, while they are most anxious not to 
embarrass the Imperial Government with the question of local constitutional 
reforms at this juncture, nevertheless they felt it their duty to emphasise that the 
continuance of the present inadequate representation of minority communities 
under the existing constitution is inimical to the minorities' interests. They urge 
therefore that if the Commission is unable to come out here before the termination 
of the war, Parliamentary Committee should, on the model of the Round Table 
Indian Conference, be appointed to meet delegates from all the Ceylon communities 
at any venue convenient to such Committee. They add that their present position has 
become intolerable and cannot be ameliorated by fresh election on the present 
electoral basis. Preceding representations, which I telegraph at their request, have 
been occasioned by the unauthorised newspaper statement reported by my telegram 
No 754. 
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109 CO 54/980/4, no 20 7 Oct 1941 
[Reforms): outward telegram (reply) no 701 from Lord Moyne to Sir A 
Caldecott 
Your telegrams 774 and 775.I Please inform Board of Ministers that I have received 
and considered their views as expressed in telegram under reference, and that the 
course they advocate had been most carefully considered before His Majesty's 
Government had reluctantly reached their conclusion that, in face of wide measure 
of local disagreement, no substantial changes in existing Constitution could be 
introduced without further opportunity for examination of conflicting views of 
various interests concerned, which is impracticable in war conditions, but will be 
taken as soon as peace is won. 
2. As regards your telegram No. 775, please inform four representatives con-
cerned that I note and much appreciate their desire not to embarrass His Majesty's 
Government at this juncture: but that possibility of arranging adequate Commission 
in existing conditions was found to be quite impracticable if it were to be of required 
standard of representation and authority. It was precisely for reason that no decision 
for substantial changes in existing Constitution ought to be taken without most 
careful re-examination of views and interests of all concerned in Ceylon that 
conclusion was reluctantly reached that necessary consultation could not be carried 
through under war conditions. 
1 See 107 & 108. 
110 CO 54/980/4, no 28 3 Nov 1941 
[Reforms): inward telegram (reply) no 863 from Sir A Caldecott to 
LordMoyne 
Your telegram No. 701. 1 Statement which was the subject of your telegram No. 5982 
was placed before the State Council on the 28th October. Ministers in Board meeting 
same day expressed (a) the view that:-
(i) Local circumstances are not materially different from when reforms were last 
discussed here. 
(ii) Fullest representations on the subject are already before you. 
(iii) No need therefore for further consultation by means of commission or 
conference or 
(iv) For deferring question of reforms until after the war and 
(b) Request that I should communicate their dissatisfaction to you by telegraph. 
I will inform them that I have done so. 
1 See 109. 2 See 106, note 1. 
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Ill CO 54/980/4, no 29 7 Nov 1941 
[Reforms]: outward telegram (reply) no 773 from Lord Moyne to Sir A 
Caldecott 
Your telegram No. 863.1 Confidential. Please inform Board of Ministers that I have 
received their communiction, and that I hope that they will give their minds 
constantly to the question of how best the present conflict of views in Ceylon on the 
constitutional problem may be resolved and a general measure of agreement secured 
amongst all interests in Ceylon as to the reforms which are desirable. I cannot help 
doubting whether it is the case that Ceylon and her important general interests have 
been so untouched by the world events of the last two years that it can rightly be said 
that the local circumstances are not materially different now. Rather am I impressed 
with the urgent need for unity and concord to be sought by statesmen in Ceylon no 
less than in other parts of the Empire, and I hope that the Ministers and the leading 
members of all important interests in the island will lose no opportunity to work for 
agreement before decisions have to be taken which must affect Ceylon's orderly and 
peaceful welfare for years to come. 
1 See llO. 
112 CO 54/980/4, no 30 10 Nov 1941 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Moyne 
Much regret my omission to make clear in my telegram No. 8631 my view that 
communication by me to you of Ministers' dissatisfaction was the only action 
required thereon and that no reply thereto was advisable. It is certain that 
communication to Ministers of your telegram No. 7732 would cause immediate 
deterioration of political situation without any compensatory advantage. Newspaper 
to-day reports resolution of Ceylon Congress Committee to boycott any conference 
or committee appointed by you after the war; but both this resolution and Ministers' 
expression of dissatisfaction are merely face-saving reactions to recent statement of 
His Majesty's Government and will be best ignored. In these circumstances beg to 
request that your telegram No. 773 may be cancelled. 
1 See llO. 2 See lll. 
113 CO 54/980/5/1, no 1 23 Dec 1941 
[Reforms]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent surveying the 
history of the reform proposals 
I am most grateful for your letter 18330/12A/41 of the 15th November (in which you 
ask whether as regards reforms procedure we are now in complete suspense with no 
hope of any further constructive thinking on the problem by the several political 
sections in Ceylon) because it affords an excellent opportunity of removing any risk 
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of our being at cross purposes in this tricky matter. The answer to your question is, I 
regret to say, undoubtedly in the negative. 
2. In my Confidential despatch of 28th October, 1939,1 I wrote (paragraph 6) 
"I am convinced that nearly all our political fissures radiate from the vexed 
question of minority representation" 
and in paragraphs 35, 36 and 39 of that despatch I supported Howard's (third) 
proposal "to make a further effort to settle the question of the representation". To 
this end I suggested appointment of the Delimitation Committee recommended in 
paragraph 6 of my Reforms Despatch of 13th June, 1938, and agreed to by State 
Council in its eleventh Motion on Reforms. When Mr. MacDonald asked me to 
discuss with him certain points of my Reforms Despatch during my short trip to 
England in August and September 1938, I understood him to agree with me as to the 
fundamental necessity of appointing this Committee (whatever State Council might 
think about it) as a basis for reform; so that after Howard had on page 64 of his 
appreciation of the Reforms Debate (page 64, Vol. II of the first enclosure to my 
despatch of 28th October, 1939) given his opinion that 
"if the question of representation was settled and some of the other proposals 
slightly modified the Scheme of Reforms would be accepted". 
it came as a shock to me to receive a direct rejection of our joint view in paragraph 5 
of Mr. MacDonald's despatch of the 26th January, 1940:-
"the third course suggested by Mr. Howard is that a further effort should be 
made to settle certain questions of representation in the State Council. I 
recognize it to be possible that useful, although limited, results of a kind 
generally acceptable in the Island might be achieved by this means, but I 
cannot see that it would serve as a substitute in any measurable degree for a 
plan to make headway with the general problem of constitutional reform".2 
3. Events made it impossible to take immediate action on Mr. MacDonald's 
suggestion for "convening a Governor's Conference of the Board of Ministers and 
other leaders representative of the chief interests in the Island with a view to 
discussing the best means of achieving agreement". On the 19th February I 
confidentially conveyed to the Ministers the sense of the despatch, but before a 
Conference could be arranged the Ministers went on strike (February 28th, 1940) 
and remained 'out' till 17th March. On the 16th March the Times of Ceylon published 
a leading article entitled "Case for Royal Commission", which ended with the words 
"despite the other anxieties of the War the Secretary of State should regard Ceylon as 
a war problem and send a Royal Commission before it is too late". This rapidly 
became the shibboleth of all Minority politicians and when on the 18th April, 1940, I 
met the Board of Ministers at Nuwara Eliya the demand for a Commission had 
become exceedingly vocal. Nevertheless the Ministers, to their credit, did not pay 
undue attention to it and from my confidential despatch of 23rd April, 1940,3 it will 
be seen their refusal to join in any Conference was due to (a) reluctance to bargain on 
the question of an increase of Minority representation by more than ten seats and (b) 
1 See 9. 2 See 23. 3 See 37. 
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lack of information as to what the Imperial Government would be prepared to 
concede in the event of intercommunal agreement being achieved. 
4. The following months witnessed a marked deterioration in Ceylon politics. 
Labour unrest and the collapse of France affected local European psychology, which 
became impatient of Ceylonese democracy. I was told by leading articles in the 
"Times of Ceylon" newspaper to govern or get out, and there is no doubt that a 
majority of Europeans in the Island (which did not however include the best brains 
or wisest heads) wanted, and tried to manoeuvre, a 'show down'. At the outset of this 
unpleasant phase I sent my most Secret and personal telegram of the 9th May, 1940, 
asking for a Commission of Investigation and a postponement of the next General 
Election until its report had been considered. The Secretary of State's statement of 
12th June, 1940, announced the postponement for two years of the general election 
in order that careful decisions might be reached on problems of constitutional 
reform, franchise and delimitation of constituencies. This was interpreted here as 
indicating that His Majesty's Government would have the matter under active 
consideration on the data already before it. There was nothing in the way of 
Commission, Committee or Conference for statesmen and reformers to bite on to. 
The abortive Indo-Ceylon Conference in the autumn of 1940 and its aftermath 
within the State Council and outside during the winter and spring kept our 
politicians busy. By the time however that Lord Lloyd's confidential despatch of 18th 
December, 1940,4 (stating the impracticability of further examining our constitu-
tional question until after the war) had reached me the Ministers were asking me to 
obtain by telegram a report on progress. In the following interchange of telegrams 
with the Colonial Office, having accepted the impracticability of an early Commis-
sion, I again (telegram of 28th June last) asked for permission to appoint the 
Redelimitation Committee recommended in paragraph 6 of my Reforms Despatch, 
and suggested the drafting of a new Order-in-Council along the lines of my 
despatches for detailed consideration by His Majesty's Government. Acceptance of 
either recommendation would have given local leaders something to bite onto. The 
approved announcement to State Council on 28th October, 1941 (that after the war 
the position will be further examined and made the subject of further consultation by 
means of a Commission or Conference) has unfortunately not provided this 
something to bite on; with the result that current reform talk has drifted right away 
from my Reforms Despatch and the Council Debate thereon and now revolves 
nebulously round the Atlantic Charter and Dominion Status. The latter has been 
recommended in successive issues of the hitherto reactionary "Times of Ceylon", and 
it is obvious that the implications and obligations of Dominion Status are either not 
understood or are being deliberately ignored by people who should know better. 
5. The view of the Ministers and other Majority spokesmen is that the Colonial 
Office is unnecessarily delaying a decision in a matter on which it possesses full data. 
Such talk I of course invariably oppugn; but there is small use in my doing so as long 
as minority leaders make a boastful pretence of having staved off reforms by their 
memorials and protests. There is in such circumstances no chance whatever of a 
get-together between majority and minority leaders, and delivery to the Ministers of 
the message contained in the Secretary of State's telegram No.773 of 7th November 
4 See 78. 
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(implying that it was within their power to promote unity and concord) would have 
only antagonized them and elicited further remonstrance. 
6. The Second Indo-Ceylon Conference (and the disagreement that has since 
arisen from the agreement reached by it!) has kept political minds and tongues fairly 
fully employed until recently. Now Japan's entry into the war and her initial 
successes have thrust every other consideration out of mind, and everybody has 
plenty to do in organizing emergency services and preventing panic. This state of 
affairs is quite likely to have an effect on the attitude, ministerial and public, towards 
the question of a further postponement of the next general election. The Ministers 
have, I understand, the question under consideration and I will make my recom-
mendations as soon as I know their views. 
7. The reason why my "Things Ceylonese" have petered out is that for some time 
past I have been so pressed by work that I have no time to write them. This week 
(owing to silly scares and panics) work is worse than ever and I cannot join my wife 
for Christmas at Nuwara Eliya. 
Mark Young's5 leadership at Hong Kong makes one proud to belong to the Colonial 
Service and Thomas6 from all accounts is doing splendidly in Malaya. Our newly 
arrived G.O.C., Inskip/ is A 1: so is Arbuthnot,8 the Naval Commander-in-Chief. 
So we are lucky. 
Every good wish for the New Year, and may it bring victory! 
5 Sir M A Young, gov of Hong Kong, 1941; interned, 1941-1945; resumed duties, May 1946-May 1947. 
6 Sir S Thomas, gov of Straits Settlements and high commissioner for Malay states, 1934-1942. 
7 Maj-Gen R D Inskip, GOC, Ceylon, 1941-1942; retired Sept 1942, re-employed, Oct 1942-Feb 1946. 
8 Admiral Sir G S Arbuthnot, c-in-c, East Indies, 1941-1942. 
114 CO 54/985/5, no 1 19 Feb 1942 
[Fall of Singapore]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord Moyne 
to Sir A Caldecott on the strengthening of Ceylon's defences 
1. With the fall of Singapore and the enemy's penetration of Burma and the 
Netherlands East Indies, Ceylon has become a vital point in our Indian Ocean 
defence area, and particularly the security of the island as a naval and air base for our 
future operations against Japan is a matter of the very highest importance. Much 
planning is now concentrated on strengthening the defences of Ceylon. 
2. I have addressed you in separate telegrams on various aspects of civil defence 
in the island in which immediate and thorough-going action is required by the 
Government of Ceylon to meet difficulties with labour which have already appeared 
in essential services, and to instil a sense of security and resolution in the general 
population. 
3. You have, under the Constitution, powers in an emergency such as we are now 
faced with, to assume the direct administration of any Department of Government, 
and it will be essential that this power should be used without hesitation if in any 
matter such action will conduce to the strengthening of the island's capacity for 
defence and of its usefulness to the Allied war effort. I appreciate, of course, that if 
such action needs to be taken, it is likely to be at the expense of good relations with 
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the Board of Ministers and the State Council, but unfortunate as that may be, it must 
have no more weight than it is worth in the scales of Empire Defence. My impression 
is that hitherto Ministers have on the whole adapted themselves fairly well to war 
measures, and I hope that they will be found capable of the far more intense activity 
which is now demanded of them. But you have expressed opinions to me more than 
once as to their staleness and lack of vigour, and it may be that in such measures as 
special rations for Indian labour, and special measures of co-operation and accom-
modation with India, the effort may be too much for them. It is for that reason that I 
feel it necessary to impress upon you that the Government of Ceylon must not fail in 
the present crisis at any point, and that you must be prepared at any time to take up 
your emergency powers. 
4. Against this possibility are you satisfied that you have available adequate staff 
of experienced and energetic officers to serve you in any field of administration which 
may be concerned? If you have any doubts I shall do my best to supply your needs, 
and I shall be grateful for your advice as to the best course to adopt to introduce 
them into Ceylon. 
115 CO 54/985/5, no 3 24 Feb 1942 
[Fall of Singapore]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Cranborne 
Grateful for your telegram of 19th February.1 Vital importance of defence of Ceylon 
fully recognised here and my replies on matters alluded to in your paragraph 2 will 
show that energetic action has been and is being taken. Constitutional question 
demands realistic approach. When the Far East war broke out there were three 
possible courses 
(1) to attempt continuance of normal administration by Executive Committees. 
Necessity for speed and coordination made this impossible and the Committees 
themselves were persuaded to delegate their powers to the Ministers in all matters 
of defence. This made 
(2) assimilation to Cabinet Government possible and State Council by passing 
block defence vote to be allocated by the Board of Ministers completed transfer of 
power and responsibilities in all war and defence matters from the Executive 
Committees to de facto Cabinet. If the Committees or the State Council had 
refused to effect such transfer resort might have been necessary to 
(3) gubernatorial assumption or control under Article 49. Such assumption would 
have been inevitably followed by ?lack of cooperation, alienation of sympathy of 
great majority of the population which is now happily with us and consequently 
the outbreak of internal disorders. I therefore bent all my energies to achieving 
solution (2) and I am well satisfied with the result. Temporary reaction of the State 
Council after having parted with executive power in defence execution was 
inevitable and took the form of 
(a) vote of non confidence in the Board of Ministers which was, after much 
effervescence, defeated by 37 votes to 5 and 
1 See 114. 
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(b) by subsequent adjournment of important war resolutions owing to lack of 
quorum. 
I met (b) by immediate proclamation under Article No.l7 reassembling Council and 
pointing out in an address that the Government of Ceylon is a trinity of the 
Governor, the Board of Ministers and the State Council in which each element must 
collaborate with the other two and that I relied on such collaboration to preclude the 
necessity for any revocation or ?replacement of my Royal instructions which results I 
should regard as defeat on our home front. State Council responded by forthwith 
putting through all urgent business required of it. This was before the receipt of your 
telegram. Present position in regard to ministerial cooperation and energy is good 
and far better than I dared to anticipate and it has been improved by the resignation 
on account of ill health of the Minister for Health who had become senile. Election of 
successor is on Wednesday and confirmation of acting Minister George de Silva is 
likely and desirable. 
Concerning other points in your telegram, I am glad to report that racially 
discriminative ration for Indian labour has never been proposed here. As regards 
cooperation with India, Senanayake leaves for Delhi tomorrow by invitation of the 
Indian Government to discuss food supply. Relations between the people of the 
Island and Indian troops are generally satisfactory. Exodus of Indian labour alluded 
to in former telegrams unfortunately continues, but is due to nervousness about the 
Eastern War and has nothing to do with politics. 
Your paragraph 4. If it became necessary to take over departments under Article 
No.49 senior Government Officers would, in my opinion, continue loyal to the 
Service, but I should expect serious deterioration in clerical and subordinate ranks, 
which would only be aggravated if senior officers were brought in from outside. As I 
have already said such action on my part would precipitate non cooperation and 
internal disorder, and I do not contemplate it except as a last resort to which I see no 
need why we should be brought. 
116 CO 54/985/5, no 4 27 Feb 1942 
[Fall of Singapore]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Lord 
Cranbome to Sir A Caldecott 
Your secret and personal telegram of 24th February .1 
Your appreciation is most helpful to me, and I shall be grateful if you will continue 
to keep me closely informed of developments and prospects in the political situation. 
I note with approval the action you took in keeping the State Council up to its 
responsibilities in respect of 3(b) in your telegram. 
The needs of the food position are being urgently pressed here, and I shall be 
grateful for information with least possible delay as to result of Senanayake's 
discussions in India. 
As regards your last paragraph, situation I had in mind is that you might be forced 
to assume control of Departments if Ministers and State Council scattered under 
influence of enemy air action for instance. They might then, from their places of 
1 See ll5. 
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refuge in the island, resent your assumption of control and obstruction and non-
co-operation might be fomented. We must not let realism stop short of the point at 
which Government will have to be carried on in difficult and critical circumstances, 
and I must be sure that you as Governor have no risk of shortage of reliable officers 
to carry on essential tasks under your directions. Admittedly this would be last 
resort, and like you I hope it would not be reached, but if it is reached it would be 
essential that administration should be effective without any risk of failure. 
117 CO 54/980/4, no 39 27 Feb 1942 
[Elections]: outward telegram no 218 from Lord Cranborne to Sir A 
Caldecott on the postponement of the elections 
My telegram No. 131 of the 7th February-postponement of elections. It is suggested 
that best method of amending Order-in-Council would be to provide that Article 19 
shall have no effect until the Council last appointed and elected shall have been 
dissolved by virtue of Article 18 and a fresh Council shall have been appointed and 
elected. This is the form of instrument adopted in other Colonies. Order of 24th July, 
1940, could be revoked without prejudice to things done by virtue thereof. 
If, however, you consider that reference should be made to end of war it would be 
possible to add a proviso that the Governor shall dissolve the Council say not later 
than one year after date upon which the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 
expires. 
In either case publication of order could be accompanied by an assurance that the 
Council would be dissolved as soon as practicable after the termination of hostilities. 
I shall be glad to receive your observations on these suggestions. 
118 CO 54/985/6, no 3 3 Mar 1942 
[Impact of war]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord Cranborne 
to Sir A Caldecott on the appointment of a commander-in-chief, 
Ceylon 
War Cabinet have had under consideration position of Ceylon in light of develop-
ments in the war with Japan. Ceylon is now a key point for the concentration of 
forces and for defence of our communications in the Indian Ocean and War Cabinet 
have decided that Ceylon and its Dependencies should be temporarily placed as a 
"military area" under the supreme control of high service officer with title of 
"Commander-in-Chief Ceylon". All civil and military authorities in the area will be 
subject to his directions. On the civil side you will continue to carry out the civil 
functions of Governor subject to the Commander-in-Chiefs overriding authority. I 
should have wished to give you time to explain the projected change to your 
Ministers but I fear that the military situation does not permit of the delay which that 
would occasion. I shall be telegraphing more fully but I wanted to let you know at 
once of the special arrangement which is to be made and to assure you that this 
exceptional appointment is entirely due to the absolute necessity of subordinating all 
other considerations in the present grave emergency to that of fighting efficiency. 
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119 CO 54/985/6, no 9 5 Mar 1942 
[Commander-in-chief, Ceylon]: directive from the Chiefs of Staff to 
Vice Admiral Layton 
Following from Chiefs of Staff. 
You are appointed Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon. All naval, military, air and civil 
authorities in the area, including the Governor and the Civil Administration, will be 
subject to your direction. 
2. Your immediate task is to ensure that all measures necessary for the defence of 
Ceylon are taken forthwith and that the military and civil measures are properly 
co-ordinated. The Governor has emergency powers under the Constitution, and the 
power of issuing Defence Regulations, which he can use to the extent you may 
require for any such measures. 
3. You will convene and preside over any council or conference from time to time 
which you consider necessary for the effective co-operation of all services in Ceylon. 
4. You will report as soon as possible whether, in order to carry out the tasks 
specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, it is necessary for you to assume supreme 
command of all the fighting services allotted to the defence of Ceylon, and what staff 
and other arrangements this would entail. 
5. On all military matters your immediate superior will be the Commander-in-
Chief, India. As to civil matters, the Governor of Ceylon will remain at his post and 
will exercise the civil functions of Governor subject to your overriding authority and 
direction. 
6. You will communicate with higher authority as follows:-
(a) On military matters you will address Commander-in-Chief, India and repeat to 
the Admiralty for communication to the Chiefs of Staff. 
(b) On civil matters you will address the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
will ensure that the Governor is consulted and informed to the necessary extent. 
You will consult with the Governor as to the desirability of his continuing to 
communicate direct with the Secretary of State for the Colonies on civil affairs not 
touching upon defence issues. 
7. In the exercise of your authority in civil affairs you will have regard to the 
importance and value of the maintenance of the services of the civil government as 
long as they can operate effectively in the prevailing conditions. 
120 CO 54/985/6 9 Mar 1942 
[Commander-in-chief, Ceylon]: minutes by G E J Gent and Sir C 
Parkinson on Vice Admiral Layton's appointment 
Today the C.-in-C. Ceylon is telling the Ministers (who are all members of the War 
Council)-see No.lO-the 'position' regarding his appointment. 
There are recent telegrams from General Wavell1 and from Admiral Layton which 
1 Commander-in-chief, India, 1941-1943; supreme commander, SW Pacific, Jan-Mar 1942, viceroy of 
India, 1943-1947. 
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seem to show some lack of definition as to the nature of the latter's present 
functions, and I feel that it is most desirable to have ready an approved form of 
official announcement against the inevitable leakage of information which will result 
from the explanation the C.-in-C. is to give to the War Council at Colombo today. 
The form of a communique (from No.lO Downing Street) which we had proposed 
last week is as follows:-
'In the present emergency His Majesty's Government have decided that 
Ceylon should be placed under the supreme control of a Service Officer with 
the title of "Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon". 
Vice-Admiral Layton has been selected for this appointment and all naval, 
military, air and civil authorities in the area will be subject to his directions. 
He will be responsible for ensuring that all measures necessary for the 
defence of Ceylon are taken and that military and civil measures are fully 
co-ordinated.' 
General Ismay2 is reported to have preferred no announcement in order not to 
convey information to the enemy. 
At present the enemy is talking of "feverish" preparations in Ceylon-see the 
attached German broadcast3 -would it, on the balance, serve our cause best for 
British opinion here and in the East as well as the enemy to know that such feverish 
preparations were being directed and co-ordinated by a supreme defence Comman-
der? 
It seems to me that official silence will become an impossible course as well as an 
undesirable one in the very near future, and that we should have a form of words 
agreed here and telegraphed out at once to the C.-in-C. for concurrence and very 
early simultaneous publication here, in the East, and in the Dominions. 
Secretary of State (through Mr. Macmillan) 
G.E.J.G. 
9.3.42 
We discussed this at this morning's meeting when Mr. Macmillan was present. We 
may find difficulty still with the Chiefs of Staff owing to their own uncertainty as to 
what they want Vice-Admiral Layton to do, i.e. whether he is to be in executive 
command of all Ceylon forces or not. I agree with Mr. Gent that there should be a 
communique, which would have to be concurred in by the C.-in-C., Ceylon. The 
arguments for a communique may, I think, be summed up as follows :-
(!) Propaganda value in this country for the Government, as showing that they 
are taking the position in Ceylon very seriously. 
(2) Correction of misunderstandings which may arise from "leakage" through 
Ministers in Ceylon as to the exact position. 
(3) To clear the air for all concerned as to what the arrangement, as set forth in 
the first three paragraphs of No.6. 
If you agree, the best plan might be for you to send an urgent minute to the Prime 
Minister enclosing the draft of a communique, which would be telegraphed to the 
2 Chief of staff to minister of defence (Mr Churchill) . 3 Not printed. 
198 WARTIME CONDITIONS [122] 
C.-in-C., Ceylon, for concurrence, and at the same time Mr. Thornley4 might send a 
copy of your minute to Colonel Hollis at the War Cabinet Offices.5 
4 Private secretary to Lord Cranborne. 
A.C.C.P. 
9.3.42 
5 See 123 for the communique as issued. 
121 CO 54/981115, no 5 14 Mar 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord 
Cranborne to Sir A Caldecott on Indian immigration and food supplies 
Government of India's telegram of 26th February to Chief Secretary regarding Indian 
immigration. Viceroy has telegraphed lOth March to Secretary of State for India 
personally to following effects. Begins. 
(1) No reply yet received from Ceylon to Government of India's telegram 26th 
February. 
(2) Government of India would be ready to accord immediate exemption in 
respect of labour requirements for Naval, Military and Air Force works provided 
that 
(a) Ceylon Government makes request for such labour; 
(b) Ceylon declare that they will not proceed with draft immigration ordinance; 
(c) satisfactory guarantees are forthcoming regarding non discriminatory 
treatment, pay, compensation for injury or death and protection. 
With regard to maintenance of ban in general Viceroy states that strict rice 
rationing in Ceylon makes it difficult for Government of India to maintain an 
impediment upon return to India of those who might find themselves short of food, 
but that in any case Government of India must await Ceylon Government's final 
reaction to proposals made regarding supplies of rice from India. Summary of 
Viceroy's telegram ends. 
As regards last point I should like to be kept promptly informed of developments in 
Senanayake's conversations regarding food supply from India. 
122 CO 54/981115, no 6 16 Mar 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations] : inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from 
Sir A Caldecott to Lord Cranborne 
Your telegram of 14th March.1 
Senanayake returned from India on 13th March having successfully achieved the 
object of his mission, summary of results of which is as follows:-
Subject to certain conditions regarding methods of trade and distribution of food 
grains, Government of India have agreed to consider Ceylon as within the economic 
1 See 121. 
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orbit of India concerning Ceylon's primary food requirements and to permit release 
of rice and food grains accordingly. Ceylon cannot however expect to be in better 
position than India herself if rationing necessitated in India owing to shortage, hence 
Ceylon expected to share deficiency. India will ascertain exportable quantities from 
various areas having regard to the varying conditions of supply in those areas. 
Government of India's policy is to restrict storage to minimum and request made not 
to build up stocks exceeding two months. Government of India have agreed to export 
of rice above the monthly average of next two months. Owing to transport difficulties 
export of rice preferred to paddy. Indian Government expressed definite preference to 
maintenance of purchase through trade channels and will assist in finding exporters 
shipping. 
Reply has not yet been sent to the Government of India's telegram of 26th 
February but I will endeavour to expedite. There is of course no prospect of obtaining 
labour from India for defence works so long as the present nervousness among local 
Indians continues, of whom more than 30,000 have returned to India during the 
three months ending 5th March. Censorship Telegraphs Interception shows Hindus-
tan Construction Company intended to recruit labour in India for military contracts 
at Trincomalee but failed to attract any recruits. 
123 CO 54/981/15, no 7 18 Mar 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from 
Sir A Caldecott to Lord Cranborne 
Your personal telegrams of 12th and 14th March.1 
Following is text of reply sent today to telegram from the Government of India 
dated 26th February. 
Begins. Ceylon Government agree that the present circumstances demand that 
further consideration of the Joint Report should be suspended until conditions 
favourable to its resumption recur. The Government also agrees to the continuation 
of the status quo on the understanding that the status quo includes the maintenance 
of your ban on the emigration of unskilled labour. Should circumstances arise in 
which the Ceylon Government might find it necessary and possible to recruit labour 
for the duration of the war for war purposes, this Government would ask for the 
relaxation of the ban for that purpose. Ends. 
Insistance on the maintenance of the ban is essential, because it is the only check 
on the exodus to India reported in my previous telegram. We referred to India on 
lOth March a proposal to extend to adult males of every race including Indian 
labourers, the same prohibition of departure from the Island except under exit 
permit as that already applied to Europeans. There were operative difficulties locally 
inherent in this proposal, but the reply of India made it quite impracticable and we 
have told them that we will not proceed with it. Their demands included the fixation 
of the exact numbers of Indians to be retained in each of the essential services, 
various guarantees in respect of persons so retained and facilities for the return to 
India of persons not so retained. Fortunately the latest information is to the effect 
that the exodus is no longer affecting harbour labour. 
1 See 121. 
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124 CO 54/985/6, no 64 19 Mar 1942 
[Commander-in-chief, Ceylon]: inward telegram no 293 from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Cranborne transmitting a message to the Board of 
Ministers on Vice Admiral Layton's appointment 
Reference my telegram No. 1235/17. 
Following is the text of message drafted by the Legal Secretary which the Governor 
will send to the State Council on 24th March. Board of Ministers have been shown it 
and will support the position indicated therein. Message begins. 
There will to-day be tabled for the information of the Honourable Members the 
terms of appointment of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. It is desirable that 
I should at the earliest possible moment make clear to the Honourable Members 
certain matters relating to this appointment which are necessarily not apparent from 
the published documents. 
On lOth March the Honourable Members were informed:-
In the present emergency H.M.G. have decided that Ceylon should be placed under 
the supreme control of a Service Officer with the title "Commander-in-Chief, 
Ceylon". 
Admiral Layton has been selected for this appointment and all Naval, Military, Air 
and Civil authorities in the area will be subject to his directions. He will be 
responsible for ensuring that all measures necessary for the defence of Ceylon are 
taken and that the Military and Civil measures are fully co-ordinated. 
On the same date they were also informed that His Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief had made the following statement:-
"1 intend to leave the civil administration of the Government in the hands of 
the Governor, his Ministers and the State Council until such time as I might 
see fit to intervene, which I hope will be never; but if I do intervene it will be 
in the earnest and sure opinion that such interference is necessary in the best 
interests of our Empire". 
The first point which I wish to make is that the sole reason for the appointment is 
the recent change in the war situation in the Far East, which has made it a matter of 
paramount necessity that there should be unity of command of the forces in Ceylon 
and that military and civil measures should be fully co-ordinated with all speed 
possible. It is for this reason, and not by reason of any past or anticipated incapacity 
or default on the part of the Board of Ministers or the State Council, that the 
appointment has been made. 
In my last address to the State Council I described the Government as trinitarian 
to that partnership H.M.G. have added His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and 
conferred upon him overriding powers, but His Excellency has stated that he intends 
to leave the civil administration of the Government in the hands of myself, my 
Ministers and State Council until such time as he might find it necessary to 
intervene. Attention in this connection is invited to paragraph 7 of the Commander-
in-Chiefs directive which reads as follows:-
"In the exercise of your authority in civil affairs you will have regard to the 
importance and value of the maintenance of the services of the civil 
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Government as long as they can operate effectively in prevailing conditions". 
Honourable members will wish to know what changes in their position are made 
by the appointment of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief so long as he does 
not find it necessary to intervene. This question is best answered by considering what 
their position was immediately prior to this appointment. 
At that time not only were all legislative or executive acts of Council subject to my 
assent or ratification, but it was also possible for the Council's powers of executive 
control to be taken out of their hands under Article No. 49 of the Order-in-Council. 
Furthermore the Governor possessed the power to legislate without the advice of the 
Council which is created by Article XXII of the Order-in-Council, and the power 
without the advice of the Council to legislate by Defence Regulation. It was also 
constitutionally possible for martial law to be declared. 
It is of course apparent that the position to-day is not that of martial law although 
situation may arise in which it will be necessary to declare martial law. Until that 
time comes, which both His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and myself hope 
will be never, the position is that the powers of executive control possessed by the 
State Council will be subject to no greater limitation than they were prior to the 
appointment of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and that the only means by 
which local substantive legislative measures can be passed will be the same as they 
were prior to that appointment, namely, Ordinance, Governor's Ordinance, or 
Defence Regulation. 
The Ministers remain my Ministers and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief 
agrees that I should continue to communicate with the S. of S. on civil matters. 
In order to secure prompt co-ordination of military and civil measures a War 
Council has been established which consists of His Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief, myself, the members of the Board of Ministers and representatives of the Navy, 
Army and Air Force. The good results of this arrangement are already visible. Where 
defence and civil requirements conflict, the problem is investigated by a committee 
appointed by the War Council and such committees are already functioning in regard 
to the problems of co-ordinating civil and military food supplies, requisition of 
educational premises, priority of allocation of labour and materials between civil and 
military works, etc. Such committees consist of Ministers or other representatives of 
the civil authorities and representatives of the fighting services. 
There is complete understanding between His Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief and myself in regard to all our respective functions and I have no doubt that 
the existing arrangement is admirably adapted to the present emergency. I feel 
confident that it will have your loyal support and co-operation. Message ends. 
125 CO 54/980/5/1, no 9 29 Mar 1942 
[Constitutional reform]: outward telegram no 379 from Lord 
Cranborne to Sir A Caldecott transmitting a message to the president 
of the Ceylon National Congress 
Your telegram No.244. 
Please convey following message to President of Ceylon National Congress in reply 
to his message contained in your telegram under reference. Begins. 
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I have received and carefully considered your message telegraphed to me by 
Governor on the 7th March. His Majesty's Government have definitely undertaken to 
appoint a Commission or Conference on constitutional issues as soon as possible 
after the war. His Majesty's Government are in no doubt that the people of Ceylon 
realise that it is necessary to win the war before the continued existence of 
democratic principles can be assured to any state or nation. His Majesty's Govern-
ment have also to bear in mind the lack of unanimity about constitutional reform 
manifested in the State Council during the Debates of 1939. This difficulty must be 
further examined before final decisions can be taken on matters of such importance 
to Ceylon. They feel that at the present time the effect of a declaration on the lines 
desired by the Ceylon National Congress could only evoke misunderstandings, 
doubts, questions and arguments and thereby turn thought and action from the war 
effort. His Majesty's Government do not therefore propose to make any anticipatory 
statement. They repeat their declaration that Ceylon's constitutional reform will 
receive earnest and early attention once the victory has been won. Ends. 1 
1 Cranborne repeated the pledge made in the last sentence of this tel in a further message to the Board of 
Ministers which rejected a request made by the latter that Sir Stafford Cripps, then on a mission to 
examine constitutional issues in India, should visit Ceylon. The message explained that the Cripps Mission 
would be confined to the problems of India and that, as a member of the War Cabinet, Cripps would have 
to return to Britain immediately and would not have time to visit Ceylon (CO 54/980/5/1, no 12, outward 
tel no 389, Cranborne to Caldecott, 1 Apr 1942). 
Later in the month four minority members of the State Council-Jayah, Natesan, Pereira and 
Ponnambalam-forwarded to the S of S through the governor a request that in furtherance of the war 
effort, it was imperative to set up immediately a national government in which minority representatives 
would have a voice. Cranborne replied reiterating the view that HMG would re-examine the issue of 
constitutional reform once victory had been won (CO 54/980/5/1, no 21, inward tel no 411, Caldecott to 
Cranborne, 20 Apr 1942, and no 23, outward tel no 490, Cranborne to Caldecott, 29 Apr 1942). 
126 CO 54/985/4, no 11 3 Apr 1942 
[War]: letter from K W Blaxter to War Office on the use of Ceylonese 
manpower in the military defence services of the island 
I am directed by Viscount Cranborne to transmit, for the consideration of the Army 
Council, copies of telegrams exchanged with the Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, 
regarding a debate on 24th March in the State Council of Ceylon on a motion for the 
adoption of compulsory military service for Ceylonese, and to draw their attention to 
the statement that all necessary recruits for the defence of the Island can be obtained 
by voluntary means. 
2. In view of the experience in Malaya and of the criticism which has been 
continually expressed in Parliament and the Press that insufficient opportunities for 
military service were accorded in that territory to the local population and in view of 
the threat to Ceylon which has been created by the Japanese successes in the East, 
Lord Cranborne would like to be certain that the fullest possible use is made of 
Ceylonese man-power in the military defence services of the Island, apart from the 
engagement of large numbers of Ceylonese for civil defence services and in essential 
labour organisations. 
3. Lord Cranborne will be grateful if the Army Council may be moved to give very 
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early consideration to this question with a view to timely instructions being sent to 
the General Officer Commanding in Ceylon. 
127 CO 54/984/10, no 10 14 Apr 1942 
[Sama Samajists]: inward telegram no 393 from Sir A Caldecott to 
Lord Cranborne on the escape of Sama Samajist prisoners 
[This tel explained the circumstances under which four Sama Samajist prisoners---Dr 
N M Perera, D P R Gunawardene, Dr Colvin R de Silva and Edmund Samarakkody-who 
had detained under the Defence of the Realm Ordinance since June 1940, escaped from 
the detention barracks at Kandy early in the morning on 8 April.] 
Your secret despatch (3) of 22nd December, 1939. 
Warrants in force 8th April for detention of 22 members of Sama Samaja Party in 
following circumstances. Before dawn that morning all four detained persons 
mentioned in my secret despatch of 12th July 19401 escaped from Kandy Prison with 
the help of the gaol guard who absconded with them. Preliminary investigation 
indicated negligence inside and assistance outside the prison. With the approval of 
the C. in C. I therefore interdicted the gaoler and issued warrants against the second 
line Samajists. Position today, is that eleven have been arrested while the remainder, 
together with the four escaped prisoners and absconding guards, are in hiding. 
Power has been taken by Defence Regulations to attach the property of those evading 
detention. Person named in paragraph 2 of my despatch of 12th July 1940 has never 
yet been traced. No objection so far from persons arrested. Position under the 
constant attention of the C. in C. and myself. 
1 See 60. 
128 CO 54/985/4 9-11 May 1942 
[War]: minutes by K W Blaxter and Lt Col W L Rolleston1 on 
compulsory military service in Ceylon 
I thought that Col. White, the late Commandant of the Ceylon Defence Force, might 
be able to give some useful information on the question whether Ceylon's own 
resources of officer and N.C.O. material have or have not already been fully taken up. 
I asked him to come, and had a talk with him yesterday. It will be seen from Major 
Preston's minute of 6.5. that the War Office are quite agreeable to our having this 
discussion with Col. White. 
It is hardly correct, I think, to say that Ceylon's own resources in this matter have 
been fully taken up, since it must be possible to take in to the Ceylon Defence Force 
further Ceylonese personnel of the type which could be turned into officers and 
N.C.O.s, but of course time would be required to get them trained up to a standard 
where they would be of real use . Some expansion of the Ceylon Defence Force has, of 
course, been proceeding for some time. The only way probably of organising further 
1 Head of military staff, CO. 
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units of the Force which would be of real value would be to have a certain number of 
British officers and N.C.O.s to give some strengthening to the Ceylonese personnel. 
This is the practice in the Indian Army, and there is, of course, some British 
personnel in some of the Ceylonese units. Here, however, we come up against a 
political difficulty . The Ceylonese Ministers strongly oppose the introduction of 
British officers and N.C .O.s into posts in Ceylonese units which they argue could be 
fi lled by Ceylonese. There are, for example, a considerable number of Ceylonese 
N.C.O.s who have been members of the Force for a considerable number of years, 
and the Ceylonese Ministers argue that if further officers are required, they should be 
found from these N.C.O.s rather than by the introduction of British personnel. The 
natural place from which to obtain the British personnel, whether officers or N.C.O.s 
for the Ceylonese units is from the Ceylon Planters' Rifle Corps. That Corps has 
already been reduced to quite a small body of some 350 strong as a result of the 
departure of a certain number of members of the Corps either to the Middle East or 
India, and also by the non-calling up of a considerable number who are required to 
remain on the tea and rubber estates. Colonel White, during his period as 
Commandant, had actually made a move in the direction of using a few of the 
members of the Corps as officers of the Ceylon Light Infantry. But the opposition 
from the Ministers was so strong that the idea was dropped. The Ceylon Ministers 
have a deep-rooted dislike of the C.P.R.C. owing to past associations. Mr. Senanayake 
went so far as to say, in a heated moment, that he would rather have members of any 
nationality employed as officers of the Ceylon Light Infantry than members of the 
C.P.R.C. 
The upshot is that even if it was thought desirable to reduce still further the cadre 
of this small Corps, it would be very difficult on political grounds to take members of 
the Corps and use them for supplying "strengthening" British personnel in the 
Ceylonese units. 
Colonel White explained that there was no difficulty in obtaining Ceylonese 
officers for the Ceylonese units. There are a large number of young Ceylonese who 
have just left the schools and colleges in Ceylon who are without employment, and a 
number of these young men are anxious to become officers in the Defence Force, 
fi rstly because it provides them with employment, and secondly because it gives 
them a good social status. Actually, some of these young officers who have done 
courses in India have given quite a good account of themselves. But that does not 
mean that these young officers would necessarily have sufficient strength of 
character to be responsible for a whole Ceylonese unit without some British 
strengthening. 
I do not really think that there is much more which can be done by way of 
expanding the Ceylon Defence Force than the developments which are already taking 
place, and the reasons given by the War Office ... against attempting a further 
expansion of the Force at present seem to be convincing. 
As to the question of conscription, I cannot believe that we should attempt to 
pursue this idea further at present. It does not seem to be much use organising large 
bodies of men on a military footing unless there is the necessary equipment 
available, and from the War Office letter this clearly is not the case, save by reducing 
India's supply. The introduction of such a measure would be bound to take 
considerable time, and many months would be bound to elapse before such a scheme 
could be brought into effective operation. The introduction of such a measure could 
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hardly, therefore, be a means of assisting in repelling the immediate threat to Ceylon 
by the Japanese, although the knowledge that such a measure was being introduced 
might act as a stiffening to the morale of the Ceylonese. 
The State Council rejected a motion for conscription in March, but from the 
account given in No. 10, the Council seem hardly to have been brought face to face 
with the square issue, and if the Council were asked now to approve conscription and 
the resolution was introduced as a Government measure with the full backing of the 
C.-in-C., I should say that it would have a fair chance of being accepted. 
(Conscription as discussed in this minute relates, of course, to the conscription of 
the Ceylonese population. There is already conscription for Europeans for service in 
the Ceylon Defence Force.) Even so, having regard to the difficulty that there would 
be of providing satisfactory officer and N.C.O. cadres within reasonable time for a 
Ceylonese Army, I should doubt whether we should press a proposal for the 
introduction of conscription upon the Ceylon Government at present. 
K.W.B. 
9.5.42 
It is unfair to conscript people unless you give them arms, equipment, training and 
reasonable leaders. My recollection of a talk I had with Col. White (recorded 
elsewhere) is that he did not advise any further expansion of the C.D.F. 
Have we asked C in C recently what he thinks about it? .. . C in C should be in a 
position to balance political and military requirements. 
W.L.R. 
11.5.42 
129 CO 54/985/4, no 16 9 June 1942 
[War]: inward telegram no 57 from Vice Admiral Layton to Lord 
Cranborne on the expansion of the local defence forces 
Your telegram No.53. (re Formation of Home Guards). 
Local military forces in Ceylon expanded since the outbreak of war as follows. 
C.G.A. from 364 to 485. 
C.L.I. from 1 battalion to 4. 
Two battalions of auxiliary military pioneers recently raised and a third forming. 
Increase in Ceylon engineers from 264 to 3,585 authorized and taking place. 
Militarization of pivotal railway personnel in hand and similar scheme of posts and 
telegraphs under preparation. Scheme in hand for utilization of local personnel as 
guards for dispersed aircraft. In Colombo the town guard and reserve C.P.R.C. 
personnel have operational role in emergency. Arrangements already in hand to use 
suitable personnel on territorial basis for reporting enemy movements after invasion. 
Four battalions essential services labour corps enrolled. Excise personnel employed 
on organizing coast watching system to report shipping movements. G.O.C. reports 
that all the above stretch military resources to the utmost. Neither weapons nor 
organizing and training staffs are available for extending Home Guard into rural 
districts on British lines. No Ceylonese or British civilians with military background 
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live in those districts except planters already much reduced by embodiment in 
C.P.R.C., and Home Guard training would reduce the output of essential commod-
ities. To sum up, as suggested in paragraph 5 of the telegram under reference, most 
economical course is to concentrate on using suitable manpower for the expansion of 
local forces to the fullest extent. This is being done to capacity. 
130 CO 54/981115, no 8 14 June 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 4658 from the Govern-
ment of India, Department of Indians Overseas, to Mr Amery on Indian 
labour in Ceylon 
Reference my telegram No.1495 dated 26th February 1942. Regret attempts to 
secure compromise agreement with Ceylon Government have failed. In reply to our 
approach quoted in telegram referred to above Ceylon Government agreed to 
suspend consideration of joint report and further proceedings in regard to Immigra-
tion Ordinance provided we agreed to maintain our ban on emigration of unskilled 
labour. We in reply welcomed Ceylon Government's ready response but pointed out 
ban on emigration had been intended to prevent further flow of unskilled labour 
from India to Ceylon. War conditions render any such emigration highly improbable. 
Ban was in practice operating not to prevent such emigration but to obstruct return 
to India of Indian labour in Ceylon from fear that subsequent return to Ceylon would 
be prevented by reason of ban. We therefore proposed to relax ban so far as it applies 
to all Indians already in Ceylon. Ceylon Government have now finally refused to 
accept our proposal on the following two grounds:-
(1) That during negotiations preceding joint report it was recognised that ban 
operated as described by us and that consequently while ban was maintained there 
was no immediate need for Immigration Ordinance. They also urge that during 
negotiations Government of India delegates agreed to maintain ban until problem 
of political and economic position of Indians in Ceylon had been settled. 
(2) That lifting of ban might encourage efflux from Ceylon of labour required in 
rubber and tea industries both of which are of vital importance in war effort. 
2. As regards first argument while it is true effect of ban upon Indian labour in 
Ceylon was clearly recognised by us, Ceylon Government do not appear to have 
appreciated first that war conditions themselves now render both ban and Immigra-
tion Ordinances in practice unnecessary and second that our proposal which still 
prohibits emigration of new labour to Ceylon is solely intended for war period after 
which whole problem must be re-examined. As regards second argument we have 
informed Ceylon Government that in our opinion control of labour for war purposes 
if necessary should be achieved by measures specifically designed to that end and not 
by indirect operation of measures designed for entirely different purpose. 
3. Position is now that Indian labour in Ceylon has for nearly 3 years been 
prevented on account of ban from paying normal visits to India for temporary 
domestic purposes. Result is very real hardship to large number of Indian labourers 
and their families. We feel strongly that our proposal to relax ban in favour of Indians 
now in Ceylon is urgently needed and cannot in effect be regarded as attempt to alter 
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situation in Ceylon in our favour while Ceylon agree to hold their hand over 
Immigration Ordinance. Moreover we understand Ceylon Government have already 
prepared an ordinance and regulations which will give them sufficient control over 
labour considered by them to be essential. We therefore propose at the end of this 
month to inform Ceylon Government that we regret they have not been able to 
accept our proposal but that we feel that it is necessary in the interest of Indian 
labour and must therefore relax ban as suggested by us. We shall greatly regret if 
Ceylon Government decide to proceed further with Immigration Ordinance especial-
ly as on Ceylon Government's own showing there is no surplus labour on estates and 
ordinance would therefore have the effect of excluding from Ceylon labour which 
they themselves admitted they need. 
131 CO 54/981115, no 9 19 June 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord 
Cranborne to Sir A Caldecott on Indian labour in Ceylon 
Your Secret and Personal telegram of 18th March. 1 Indian immigration. I have now 
seen further report by Government of India to Secretary of State on latest 
negotiations between Governments of India and Ceylon.2 From this it appears that in 
reply to message quoted in your telegram under reference, the Government of India 
stated their intention to relax the ban on emigration as far as it applies to Indians 
already in Ceylon, on the ground that it was operating not to prohibit emigration, 
but to obstruct return to India of Indian labour in Ceylon. Government of India have 
reported that Ceylon Government finally refused to accept their proposal on 
grounds: (1) that in negotiations preceding Joint Report, it was recognised that ban 
operated in this manner, and that consequently while ban was maintained there was 
no immediate need for Immigration Ordinance; and that during negotiations 
Government of India delegates agreed to maintain ban until problem of political and 
economic position had been settled; and (2) that lifting of ban might encourage 
efflux from Ceylon of labour required for work in essential industries. 
Understand that Government of India have replied to (1) that Ceylon Government 
do not appear to appreciate that war conditions render both ban and Immigration 
Ordinance in practice unnecessary, and that their proposal still prohibits emigration 
of new labour to Ceylon for war period, and that as regards (2) they have informed 
Ceylon Government that in their opinion control of labour for war purposes should 
be achieved by measures specifically designed to that end. They therefore propose at 
the end of this month to inform Ceylon Government that they feel it is necessary, in 
the interests of Indian labour, that their proposal should be accepted, and that they 
are, therefore, relaxing ban. They have expressed the hope that the Ceylon 
Government will not proceed further with the Immigration Ordinance especially as, 
on their own showing, there is no surplus labour on estates, and Ordinance would 
have effect of excluding from Ceylon labour which Ceylon Government has admitted 
it requires. 
I should be grateful for your observations on the situation generally. It appears to 
1 See 123. 2 See 130. 
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me that essential requirement is to prevent as far as possible further exodus of 
essential labour. This may require further consideration of exit permit system in 
respect of which Government of India have already stated that they see no necessity 
for their prior permission if measure is introduced by Commander-in-Chief for 
defence purposes. Have there been any further developments since the Commander-
in-Chiefs telegram, No. 33, of the 3rd May? 
At the same time I trust that Government of Ceylon will not think it necessary to 
proceed with general Immigration Ordinance proposals, since that might lead to a 
deterioration of political relations at a time when defence needs including food 
supply demand in Ceylon's interest maintenance of intimate association. 
132 CO 54/981115, no 10 21 June 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from 
Sir A Caldecott to Lord Cranborne on Indian labour in Ceylon 
Your secret and personal telegram of the 19th June. 1 Owing to pressure of work, and 
to the visit of H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester it is difficult for me to reply adequately 
to your telegram under reference at once. Three points, however, stand out. 
(1) That if India announces relaxation of ban as a fait accompli without notice, 
Indo-Ceylon relations, already strained, are bound to deteriorate; 
(2) That if no notice is given, we shall not have been able to set up administrative 
machinery necessary to prevent embarrassing efflux, not only from plantations, 
but from other essential services; 
(3) That India's conception of maintenance of status quo is that Indians leaving 
Ceylon now, for reasons of personal security, will have a right to return at any 
future time when the danger is past. This interminable right, the Minister cannot 
consistently, or within the bounds of political possibility, concede, and the 
unilateral raising of the ban would certainly be followed by legislation to deny such 
right, though such legislative action might not perhaps take the form of 
proceeding with the Immigration Bill. This arrangement has been made clear to 
India in the interchange of telegrams since the 18th March, copies of all of which 
are contained in my telegram No. 753 which follows . Whatever happens, it is 
essential that if the ban is to be lifted, I should be in a position to discuss the 
situation with the Minister as soon as possible, and that it should not (repeat not) 
be lifted until administrative machinery to secure the continuance of all essential 
services has been set up to the satisfaction of myself and the Commander-in-Chief. 
Grateful if you will represent both these points to the Government of India. 
1 See 131. 
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133 CO 54/979/9, no 1 11 July 1942 
[Kandyans]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord Cranborne on a 
memorial from the inhabitants of the Kandyan provinces. Enclosures 
1&2 
I have the honour to transmit a memorial addressed to me by the inhabitants of the 
Kandyan Provinces. The President of the Kandyan Youth League who submitted the 
memorial to me has requested that it be forwarded to Your Lordship and to His 
Majesty the King in Council. It is observed that while the petition relates almost 
entirely to Kandyan aspirations, more than 200 of the signatories (or over 10 per 
cent. of the total) bear distinctly non-Kandyan names. 
2. I have given careful consideration to these and certain earlier representations 
recently made by the Kandyans, both lay and cleric, including representative 
Kandyan Chiefs and High Priests, and, after consultation with my Officers of State 
and the Minister for Home Affairs, I have approved a policy under which all 
recruitment of Divisional Revenue Officers for the Kandyan Provinces is reserved for 
the Kandyans, the term "Kandyan" being interpreted in a liberal sense to include:-
(a) any son of a Kandyan father; and 
(b) any son of a Kandyan mother whose parents are permanent residents in a 
Kandyan district, whether the mother has been married according to Kandyan 
Marriages Ordinance or the general non-Kandyan law. 
3. As regards educational facilities, there is ground for the argument that the 
inability of the Kandyans to keep pace with other communities in matters 
appertaining to general welfare and advancement is in large measure attributable to 
inadequate educational facilities. But the position is improving and it is my hope that 
this improvement will be steadily maintained in future. I enclose for Your Lordship's 
information a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Minister for Education in this 
connection. 
4. The memorialists in basing their claims on the Convention of 1815 do not 
seem to appreciate that the system of administration of the Kandyan Provinces 
should not be regarded as fixed immutably by that convention, irrespective of any 
change which altered conditions may make inevitable in the interests of the efficient 
administration of the country. In the reply which I caused to be sent to the earlier 
representations referred to in paragraph 2, I subscribed to the confident hope 
expressed by the Donoughmore Commission (Report, page 107) that "Kandyan pride 
in their ancient Kingdom and historic institutions will form part of a larger national 
protagonism, and that Kandyan identity will best be preserved, and receive its 
noblest fulfilment, in the growth and final emergence of a strong and united 
Ceylonese nation." 
5. With reference to the electoral and constitutional changes advocated on the 
last page of the memorial (preceding the appendices) the memorialists should, I 
suggest, be reminded that questions of political reform cannot be pursued during the 
present conditions of emergency but must be relegated to the thorough investigation 
which has already been promised after victory is won. 
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Enclosure 1 to 133 
We the inhabitants of the Kandyan Provinces, beg respectfully to lay before Your 
Excellency their disabilities with the hope that Your Excellency will give them a fair 
hearing and such relief and redress as their case merits. 
Your Excellency may not be quite familiar with the exact conditions of this 
country, yet we cannot, therefore, rest content to let Your Excellency be influenced 
in forming an opinion on vital matters affecting the well-being of our people, wholly 
to those outside our territory without running the risk of having our case prejudged. 
Therefore, the inhabitants of the Kandyan Provinces desire to state briefly their case 
themselves. 
At the time the British Sovereign entered into a treaty with the people of the 
Kandyan Provinces, the Sinhalese were a sovereign power constitutionally, exercis-
ing political sway over the fairest, richest and the most extensive portion of territory 
in the Island. 
By the clauses of that treaty Sinhalese Nationality was guaranteed its continuity 
under the British, and the several terms of the contract imposed a definite trust both 
impliedly and explicitly which the British voluntarily accepted. 
At that time there were no people other than Sinhalese in this territory and none 
who did or could claim any political rights antagonistic to theirs or inimical to their 
advancement. All the land was theirs, owned either individually or communally, or 
nationally. All the Offices of the State were held by them. 
Foreign interests, far from dominating theirs, did not exist at all. Although at the 
period political unrest was present economically their position was sound and 
unchallenged. 
After 123 years of British rule it is true the country has been opened up with 
permanent plantations, producing for foreign markets, but a little consideration will 
show that these benefits have done little to improve the lot of the Sinhalese. Their 
economic condition has become deplorable. We say this not out of ill-will but as a 
statement of fact. We cannot exist and if the authority of the Government continues 
to be exercised to their detriment and fo r the purpose of supplanting them in their 
homeland by foreign elements, we are doomed to extinction. 
To-day, they own the least extent of land individually as well as collectively, with 
not even the smallest share in the national ownership. They are, besides, the most 
backward from a want of better and more liberal educational facilities. In the last 
malaria epidemic over 125,000 Sinhalese in this territory perished, due largely to 
malnutrition and the consequent loss of vitality. If our interests continue to receive 
less and less recognition from the Government, we will not only cease to exist as a 
political unit but perish altogether. If non-Sinhalese interests are given predomi-
nance in every case as has been done hitherto, then they are being forced into 
national extinction. 
This economic destruction and consequent human extinction is entirely due to the 
Government of the country which was totally alien and out of sympathy with the 
permanent population. The constitution formed under the Donoughmore report has 
intensified these difficulties and has doubled the problems. 
During the first thirty years of British connection with these provinces, this 
economic destruction did not take place. During this time the language of 
Government was Sinhalese; all officials were Sinhalese; all the land was in their 
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hands; the customary laws were maintained and protected; every village had its 
temple school; the Government, as promised, protected the religion and all the 
Buddhist institutions remained intact, and their temporalities well cared for and 
protected. Though there was trouble due to the so-called rebellions, the condition of 
the people remained sound and healthy. During this period the British connection 
with the Kandyan provinces was only by a Resident. The change of this well 
established form of Government against the wish of the people and of treaty 
obligations was the beginning of our destruction. Any form of Government which 
will not be able to remedy the mischief done will be of no use to us. The extent to 
which the economic and social life of the people have suffered should be realised 
before one can understand the peculiar problems that beset us. If it is necessary to 
know to what extent the economic and social life was destroyed by the unsympathetic 
form of Government, one must read the proceedings of the Parliamentary Commit-
tee appointed by Queen Victoria in I849 on Ceylon affairs, the reports of the Temple 
Land Commissioners of 1856 to 1866 and the final reports of the Paddy Tax 
Commissioners. The number of our villages destroyed; the number of people killed 
and the temples broken up can be fully realised, if these reports are read. Then and 
then only will it be fully appreciated what form of Government alone will remedy 
these mistakes and re-establish a broken country. 
The Sinhalese of this territory desire to co-operate with all, but, if such 
co-operation is interpreted to mean the total sacrifice of their national rights, with 
no guarantee of a proportionate share in the Government of their country, they can 
only stress their point of view as a distinct national entity. 
The grant of universal suffrage without a clear definition of domicile of those who 
are not permanently resident in this country on a territorial basis meant a definite 
loss of representation to the Kandyan Sinhalese alone. 
The introduction of an alien population as labourers, almost equal in numbers to 
the Sinhalese inhabitants, was economically an unkind and unsound act. That they 
be amalgamated on a territorial basis with us is an aggravation of the error. The 
labour population has an Indian Agent appointed by the Indian Raj and his sole 
business is to look after their interests. When anything goes wrong the local agent 
invokes the aid of the Raj to bring pressure on the Ceylon Government and not 
infrequently such pressure has been exerted on their behalf. With the exercise of the 
franchise they enjoy dual citizenship and double representation from within and 
without. This is a most disturbing political factor. 
As a solution to this problem the Kandyan National Assembly urged before the 
Donoughmore Commission the division of the island into three states, one 
comprising of the Kandyan Provinces, the other the Tamil, and the third the 
Maritime provinces, each having a government of its own, but joined together by a 
Central Government of a federal basis. This suggestion was rejected and the present 
constitution was recommended. Though it has worked for nearly eight years, it has 
not solved our problems. 
We are at one with the other communities in the desire for the development of· 
self-government in the Island. We feel very strongly that our special interests should 
not be sacrificed. Any form of Government which does not afford to us the share 
which is our due in the Government of the country, or adequate protection for their 
interests and exposes them to the domination of any other community or communi-
ties will be unacceptable to us. 
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The Kandyan Sinhalese have a special right to make this demand. When the 
Kandyan Country acknowledged suzerainty of the King of England by the Conven-
tion of 1815, a solemn promise was made that their interests would be protected by 
the British. Any form of Government, therefore, that fails to fulfil that obligation, 
would be a gross breach of faith with a people who trusted the plighted word of the 
British, and any reform of the constitution should be in so far as we are concerned, 
so adjusted as to implement that agreement. 
The Donoughmore Commissioners who appreciated some of our problems 
expected to give us relief by the constitution they suggested. In dealing with this 
subject they stated: "with the extension of the franchise which we have already 
recommended ... the political development of the Kandyans hitherto retarded will 
receive the stimulus which will enable the Kandyans to take their full share in the 
Government of the country and they will have small reason to fear the domination of 
the other communities .... " We equally believe that low-country Sinhalese will 
realise that the true policy for the country is one of comprehension and not 
domination and that the local patriotism will contribute to national contentment 
and progress. 
We submit that the results of the elections of 1931 and 1936, far from realising 
this hope expressed by the Commissioners, have in fact weakened the position of the 
Kandyan Sinhalese and their fears of domination by other communities have come 
true. 
Though 21 seats were allotted to the Kandyan provinces, which the Commission-
ers expected would be filled by Kandyan Sinhalese, what really has happened is that 
the majority of them have gone into the hands of others. As these facts are 
well-known we will not elaborate them here. 
In these circumstances we submit that the least that might be done to giv~ us our 
rightful share in the administration of the country, if no radical change in the 
constitution is contemplated at the moment, would be by the two following 
methods:-
1. The re-distribution of territorial electorates, such electorates being divided into 
Urban and Rural in order to give the town populations a chance of electing one of 
their own. 
2. The exclusion of the Indian Immigrant Labourer from the Sinhalese territorial 
electorates, special representation being given to them by creating estate elector-
ates. The Indian Labourer, as we have pointed out, has an Agent of the Raj to look 
after his interests. They do not form part of the permanent population. Their case, 
therefore, must be specially dealt with on the basis of Indian Immigrant 
Agricultural Labourer. Just now Indian interests, other than immigrant labour, 
are represented in the State Council by a nominated member. 
The only form of Government that will satisfy us must be so constituted as to 
enable it to give our religion that protection as is contemplated in the 5th clause of 
the Convention of 1815; that will enable the re-establishing of our destroyed 
religious institutions; that will enable us to re-establish our broken peasantry and 
their village institutions; that will enable us to get more and cheaper education. 
All these as contracted for in the Treaty. Any other constitution will never satisfy 
us. No form of Village Government wherein the controlling influence is in other 
hands will be acceptable to us. 
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The educational facilities in our territory has been so neglected that Your 
Excellency will be surprised to hear about them. A territory which had schools in 
every village and was well provided with educational facilities up to 1852, from that 
date onwards for a long period no education whatever existed. Even to-day we have 
only four secondary schools in all our five provinces; whereas in the North and West 
the country is studded with such schools. There are only about 700 Kandyans in the 
secondary schools of the Island, whereas there are about 13,000 in Jaffna and about 
12,000 in the Maritime provinces. How can we be expected to compete with them 
and secure our legitimate share of offices in the public service. Though large sums 
are spent annually by Government for higher education in the North and West we get 
a very small amount for our provinces . 
. These are some of the matters to which we would like to draw Your Excellency's 
attention at this moment. We have made no extravagant or unreasonable demand, 
we have asked only what is our due as a people and as one of the contracting parties 
to the Convention of 1815. To these demands we pray that your Excellency give the 
consideration they deserve. 
Enclosure 2 to 133: memorandum by the minister for education (Mr Kannangara) 
This memorandum deals briefly with the question of educational facilities in the 
Kandyan Provinces. It is perhaps true that the Kandyans are under-represented in 
the Public . Service of the Island, but it would not be correct to say that they are 
grossly under-represented. The cause of this under-representation in the opinion of 
the deputation that waited on His Excellency, is the inadequate educational facilities 
available to the Kandyans. Even if we assume that intelligence and aptitude for a 
particular vocation are evenly distributed among the various races-an assumption 
that may not be far wrong in its application to the few races or communities 
inhabiting the Island-social and economic conditions have a lot to do with this 
question. The mere provision of educational opportunities does not make a 
community efficient. These opportunities must be effectively utilised. However, in 
the past the inability of the Kandyans to keep abreast of the other communities in 
regard to general welfare and advancement was to a great extent due to inadequate 
educational facilities. But the figures for the various types of schools in existence in 
1930 indicate an improved provision of such facilities. They are:-
Government Vernacular Schools ... 
Assisted Vernacular and Bi-Lingual Schools 
Assisted English Schools ... 
694 
403 
59 
The figures for the whole Island were 1,412, 2,168 and 264 respectively. The present 
position in respect of each district of the Kandyan Provinces appears from the follow-
ing table:-
(a) Vernacular Schools. 
Kandy District .. . 
Matale District .. . 
Nuwara Eliya District 
Anuradhapura District 
Badulla District 
Primary. 
242 6 
93 
68 
132 
132 
(b) English. 
Junior. Senior. Collegiate. 
16 11 5 
3 3 
4 1 
3 
3 4 
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Ratnapura District 155 2 5 
Kegalle District 227 2 
Kurunegala District 285 4 2 
1,334 _§ 35 28 5 
Total number of schools for 
the Island 3,795 27 140 114 15 
These figures testify to further improvement at least in regard to quantity. 
2. There are a sufficient number of Sinhalese schools in the Kandyan Provinces 
but in view of the nature of the country and difficulties of communication at least 
150 more such schools have yet to be established in order to ensure that all the 
school-going children obtain at least an elementary education. The present-day 
Sinhalese schools are far from satisfactory as the content of education imparted there 
has so far not had much employment value, and it is proposed when the Special 
Committee on Education conclude their labours, to re-organize these schools so as 
to bring their curricula into closer relation with the needs of the country. The 
schools of the future will be established under the re-organized scheme. Altogether a 
little over 200 new schools are urgently needed all over the country, and the 
Executive Committee of Education has proposed to the Board of Ministers that these 
should be established within the next five years from funds raised on loan. Out of 
these 150 schools will be put up in Kandyan Provinces, mostly in the Kurunegala, 
Anuradhapura, Ratnapura and Badulla districts. 
3. Teaching is perhaps the only white collared profession which a complete 
course in a Sinhalese or Tamil school has led to so far and the Kandyans have had 
equal opportunities with others of entering the teaching profession as certificated 
teachers. They have, however, not entered in sufficiently large numbers and there 
are not many among them who possess the teachers' certificate. A few years ago in 
view of the large number of certificated unemployed teachers the Executive 
Committee laid down a rule that no uncertificated teacher should be appointed to 
Government schools, an uncertificated teacher being one who has passed the Senior 
School Certificate examination and has not proceeded to obtain any professional 
qualification. As this rule was stated to cause hardship to Kandyans and Muslims 
desiring to enter the teaching profession the Executive Committee decided to make 
an exception in their case and uncertificated Kandyan teachers are being appointed. I 
should, however, mention in this connection that the Kandyans have had a 
long-standing grievance that adequate facilities had not been made available to them 
for getting themselves trained as teachers. Out of 18 Assisted Training Schools only 
one is in the Kandyan Provinces, i.e., at Kandy. The Executive Committee was not at 
all satisfied with this position and proposed about four or five years ago to open a 
Government Training School at Kandy. There have been inevitable delays and the 
proposal has materialised early this year. I am sure that the Executive Committee 
realizes that still greater facil ities in this direction should be afforded to the 
Kandyans. 
4. Under the present conditions the minimum educational equipment which 
would enable a student to enter the middle ranks of the Public Service is a good 
secondary education which can be had only in a Senior secondary or Collegiate 
school. Out of a total of 129 such schools in the whole Island, 33 of them are in the 
Kandyan provinces. Although the proportion may not be regarded as unsatisfactory 
the large majority of the Kandyan people have been denied the opportunity of 
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obtaining a secondary education by reason of the uneven distribution of these 
schools-there is none in the Anuradhapura District and there are two only in each 
of the districts of Kegalla and Kurunegala. It should also be borne in mind that not 
one of these English schools is conducted and controlled by the Government. They 
are all managed by various private agencies (Missionary Societies and others) on 
whose will and pleasure have hitherto depended the location of the schools, their 
accommodation, the facilities they afford and their standard of efficiency. Except in 
the town of Kandy the greater proportion of the more efficient secondary schools are 
situated in the non-Kandyan districts. This is a state of affairs over which the 
Government has so far had very little control. The Assisted school system has 
developed without any plan, and in deference to vested interests Government has so 
far been chary of taking powers to plan and carry out a school system based on the 
consideration of affording equal opportunities to everybody capable of profiting by 
them. The redress that Government can and should afford to the Kandyans is to 
establish some efficient State secondary schools in the Kandyan Provinces. I have no 
doubt that this question will be borne in mind in formulating the educational policy 
of the future . 
5. The Executive Committee approved recently the establishment of Central 
schools in which English education for the most part will be free. Four such schools 
have already been established during the last financial year, one in each of the Kandy, 
Matale, Kegalla and Kurunegala districts, and it is proposed to establish some more 
this year in the Kandyan Provinces. 
6. There is also a scheme of scholarships for bright children of the age of ten from 
Sinhalese, Tamil and Bilingual schools. These are distributed on the basis of 
electorates and Provinces-one for each electorate and one for each province, the 
Western Province getting two. The children of Kandyan Provinces do participate in 
these Scholarships. 
7. Entry into the Civil Service and other higher ranks of the public Service 
demands the possession of a University education as a minimum qualification. In the 
matter of University education equal opportunities have all along been afforded to all, 
but certain able and competent students are unable to take advantage of the facilities 
afforded by reason of the economic status of their parents. To remedy this factor to 
some extent scholarships schemes have been in force. Yet the undesirable feature of 
most educational systems under which ability to pay determines largely the chance 
of higher education cannot be altogether removed. The number of Kandyans 
admitted to the University College during the past eight years is as follows:-
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937- 38 
5 
10 
4 
6 
1938--39 
1939--40 
1940--41 
1941--42 
9 
10 
4 
6 
In 1939 the Executive Committee of Education approved of a "concession clause," to 
be of force for a period of years, to the effect that if a sufficient number of Kandyans 
and Muslims has not obtained admission in the normal way five further places should 
be filled by candidates belonging to each community from the list of those who have 
attained a minimum standard in the admission test. So far only one Kandyan 
candidate was admitted to the University College under this clause and that was at 
the commencement of this academic year. It must, of course, be admitted that 
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compared to their population the number of Kandyans admitted to the University 
College has been rather poor. Perhaps economic causes may account for the small 
number of Kandyans seeking University education. Whatever the cause may be 
nobody who has the larger interests of the country at heart dare challenge the view 
that higher education should be restricted to those who can definitely profit by it 
whether rich or poor. So that the problem of Kandyan "backwardness" in education 
must be attacked at the beginning and middle of the educational ladder. Facilities 
should be made available at the very door of the Kandyans to enable them to obtain a 
good secondary education. This problem of securing an even distribution of 
educational facilities will receive the earnest consideration of the Executive Commit-
tee not only in respect of the needs of the Kandyans but also of those of all other 
communities or territorial groups occupying parts of the Island where educational 
facilities are at present insufficient. The recommendations of the Special Committee 
on Education on the question of a planned school system will be helpful and are 
awaited. 
134 CO 54/981115, no 18 17 July 1942 
[Ind~Ceylon relations]: outward unnumbered telegram from Lord 
Cranborne to Sir A Caldecott conveying the views of Lord Linlithgow 
on Indian labour in Ceylon 
My secret and personal telegram on 7th July .1 Indian Immigration. 
1. Secretary of State for India has now received personal reply from Viceroy, from 
which it is clear that Government of India feel that it now rests with Government of 
Ceylon to consider institution of any necessary measures for controlling exit of 
workers. 
2. He points out particularly that necessary Ordinance and regulations to control 
employers and workers in any industry considered essential by Government of Ceylon 
are already in draft and suggests that these measures, which do not differ widely from 
similar measures in India, could be brought into effect in very little time. 
3. Viceroy further (a) suggests that any efflux of Indian labourers to visit relatives 
in India could be controlled by issue of licences to leave to special number or 
percentage of labour force in particular industries at any given time; (b) states that 
Government of India have already promised to consider any application Ceylon 
Government might wish to make for recruitment of labour in India for war purposes. 
4. I should be grateful to know whether Ceylon Government now considers time 
has come for enactment of regulations to control exit of workers, which would 
appear to be the right course-1 hope that if so action in respective countries may be 
synchronised by arrangement between Governments of India and Ceylon. 
1 Cranborne sent a further tel on 29 July which read: 'Viceroy has now sent a personal message to the 
Secretary of State for India stating that his Government feel that they cannot postpone any longer their 
proposed modification of the ban on emigration to Ceylon and accordingly propose to give Ceylon 
Government about one (repeat one) week's notice that they shall take necessary action about middle of 
August. Viceroy has emphasized again that Government of India have most carefully considered possible 
reactions on Ceylon's war effort and that proposal is not intended as threat to Ceylon but simply as 
measure of justice to themselves and their nationals in Ceylon which cannot be longer delayed. 
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In the circumstances would be grateful for an early reply to paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference 
(CO 54/981115, no 21). 
135 CO 54/981115, no 23 3 Aug 1942 
[Ind(}-Ceylon relations]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Lord Cranbome transmitting a telegram from the 
governor to Lord Linlithgow on Indian labour in Ceylon 
Addressed to the Viceroy. Repeated to the Secretary of State. 
1. I have received secret and personal telegram1 from the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies stating that in personal message to the Secretary of State for India Your 
Excellency has represented inability of the Government of India to postpone any 
longer removal of ban on emigration from Ceylon and has stated that about one 
week's notice is likely to be given to this Government before announcement is made 
about the middle of August. The effect of such an announcement on our war effort 
must largely depend on its wording. If this were to admit of interpretation as an 
invite by your Government to our Indian labourers to seek sanctuary in India for so 
long as Ceylon is in danger of enemy attack and for so long as we are under the 
necessity of rationing food and substituting other diet for rice such an invite would 
inevitably undermine morale on plantations, create panic and at least in general 
efflux labour from estates. Any system of exit permits from the island would not in 
such circumstances serve to keep labourers on their place of employment once panic 
arose and we should attempt to deal with the situation by making Order under 
Defence Regulation No. 438 on the lines of draft communicated to your External 
Affairs Department by letter from the Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, 
No. 5947/14 of 28th May. If, however, the announcement by your Government 
should result in mass urge for repatriation no machinery that we can devise or 
implement under Defence Regulations or otherwise could keep labourers contented 
or efficiently at work. So that conditions of general dislocation and disorder would 
thus inevitably arise such as might require strong and stern repressive measures in 
order to preserve internal security. 
2. On the political side much will also depend on the wording of the announce-
ment by your Government. Position of Ceylon Ministers remains as explained in my 
telegram No. 19, of 3rd June. If the announcement were to postulate the right of 
re-entry for persons who leave Ceylon after the ban is lifted and want to return after 
an absence of more than twelve months (vide part I, Section B, of paragraph 11 of 
Joint Report of Delegation from India and Ceylon) demand for retaliatory legislation 
here will be inevitable and the negotiations of last September will have been useless. 
If, on the other hand, the announcement were to disclaim demand for re-entry of 
persons after absence of more than twelve months and were to state as its object and 
reason the desire to provide opportunity for reasonable holidays to visit relatives in 
India and attend to family business, etc., demand for legislation here might possibly 
be avoided or resisted and the September negotiations be preserved as basis for 
future agreement. 
3. For reasons given in the preceding paragraphs I shall be grateful if notice 
1 See 134, note 1. 
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about to be given to the Ceylon Government may contain actual text of proposed 
announcement by your Government and opportunity allowed to suggest any 
alterations conducive to present and future agreement between our two Govern-
ments which is our common aim. 
136 CO 54/981/15, no 31 24Aug 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 1142 from Sir A Calde-
cott to Lord Cranborne transmitting a telegram from the governor to 
Lord Linlithgow on Indian labour in Ceylon 
Following for Governor-General, No. 64. Repeated to Secretary of State. Begins. 
Your telegram No. 2553-S. Lifting of the ban on emigration. Ceylon Daily News this 
morning publishes press telegram from New Delhi, dated 22nd August, stating that it 
is understood that provisional arrangements have been reached between the Indian 
and Ceylon Governments under which (1) Ban will be lifted 1st September. (2) Fresh 
Ind<:H:eylon agreement will be negotiated after the war. (3) Ceylon will withdraw 
existing anti-Indian legislation, and undertake to refrain from new anti-Indian 
legislation. Until receipt of your telegram, No 2553-S, correspondence between the 
two Governments rested with my telegram No. 19, dated 3rd June, and decision of 
the Government of India to raise the ban on 1st September cannot be said to have 
been reached by agreement. With regard to (2) Ceylon Government has received no 
act of rejection by India, of the points of agreement reached in negotiations of last 
September. With regard to (3) there is no existing anti-Indian legislation in Ceylon, 
but on the contrary existing labour laws are preferential to Indians; nor has any 
undertaking been given by Ceylon Government in regard to future legislation. Above 
misstatements in New Delhi press telegram are bound to evoke criticism here, and 
demands for ministerial explanation, and I shall be grateful if the Government of 
India will secure early correction. 
137 CO 54/981/15, no 33 24 Aug 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 2580-S from Lord 
Linlithgow to Mr Amery transmitting a press note on the lifting of the 
Government of India's ban on emigration 
Following is text of press note referred to in my telegram No. 2553-S of 22nd 
August.1 Begins. The Government of India have decided to (? relax) with effect from 
1st September, 1942, their prohibition of the emigration of unskilled labourers to 
Ceylon so far as it affects labourers now in Ceylon. The effect of the ban on such 
labourers has been that, since its imposition three years ago, they have been 
prevented from paying their normal visits to India, for social and domestic purposes, 
for fear of not being allowed to return to their employer in Ceylon. The uncertainty 
about employment in Ceylon which was the reason for the ban being imposed cannot 
be considered to subsist in war time, when practically all Indian labour in Ceylon is 
employed on work essential to war effort. The Government of India are therefore of 
1 cf 136. 
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opinion that there is no justification for continuing to place any obstacle in the way 
of labourers wishing to pay their normal visits to India. The prohibition will continue 
to operate as heretofore in regard to labour not already in Ceylon. 
Estate labourers who obtain leave to visit India should get their identity certificate 
endorsed with the date of their arrival by the Protector of Emigrants at Mandapam or 
Tuticorin. Non-estate labourers who obtain leave should obtain identity certificates 
from the Agent of the Government of India in Ceylon before leaving and get them 
similarly endorsed on arrival in India. Ends. 
Addressed to Governor of Ceylon, repeated to Secretary of State. 
138 CO 54/980/17, no 2 4 Sept 1942 
[Food and price controls]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Cranborne on new administrative arrangements and a proposal for a 
wartime national Cabinet 
I have the honour to invite reference to my despatch No.239 in which I have reported 
the transfer of the following functions:-
"Food control in Emergencies" 
"Control of Prices of Foodstuffs in emergencies or to prevent profiteering", 
from the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Lands. 
2. I feel it necessary to inform Your Lordship as briefly as I can of the history and 
significance of this transfer. 
3. Public discontent with Mr. G.C.S. Corea's administration of these subjects as 
Minister for Labour, Industry and Commerce culminated in the moving in the State 
Council on July 8th of the following resolution:-
"That in view of the very widespread discontent prevalent throughout the 
Island regarding the most unsatisfactory manner the food rationing and 
Control Schemes are operating particularly regarding curry stuffs and sugar, 
this Council has no confidence in the Hon. the Minister of Labour, Industry 
and Commerce, who has utterly failed to formulate and work the above 
Schemes satisfactorily." 
The voting on the motion was Ayes 4, Noes 30; declined to vote 10. Ceylonese 
psychology, ever ready to criticize, always hesitates to condemn. Although the voting 
indicated confidence in Mr. Corea, the debate did not. Much less did the reaction 
thereto of the public and the press. 
4. On the 20th July I summoned the Ministers to Queen's House and warned 
them that public discontent was still boiling and that although steam had been let off 
in the censure debate the danger of explosion remained imminent and that, if 
nothing were done, they would sooner or later be blown sky high by a vote of 
non-confidence in the whole Board. The Ministers requested a few days in which to 
think things over. 
5. The result of their deliberations was a demand for Cabinet Government. 
Nothing was said of inviting non-Sinhalese to serve in a Cabinet (Sir Baron Jayatilaka 
alone made the suggestion in an obiter dictum) and I told them that I could not 
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entertain a mere proposal for Cabinet Government. After further consultation with 
them I appointed Mr. O.E. Goonetilleke, C.M.G., Acting Civil Defence Commissioner, to 
assume charge (in addition to his Civil Defence work, which is by now fully organized) 
of the purchase, pricing and distribution of food-stuffs under the Minister for Labour, 
Industry and Commerce. The Board of Ministers agreed to invite his attendance at all 
their meetings and the Commander-in-Chief gave him a seat on the War Council. 
6. The public confidence which Mr. Goonetilleke has so notably inspired as Civil 
Defence Commissioner rendered this appointment a sufficient antidote to the more 
violent symptoms of dissatisfaction with Mr. Corea's administration of food ques-
tions. The epidemic of diffidence in him remained however uncured, and a private 
motion for the creation of a separate Food Ministry was moved in State Council and 
referred by Council to the Board of Ministers for solution "within the ambit of the 
present Constitution". 
7. At this stage the idea of government by a special war-time national cabinet (to 
include the Officers of State, the present Ministers and two or more additional ones 
to cope with extra work occasioned by the war effort) was mooted both among the 
existing Ministers and among some minority members of Council. There were, I 
understand, certain conversations between these parties; but the project foundered 
on two rocks: on the ministerial side Mr. Bandaranaike refused to consider a Cabinet 
including Officers of State and on the side of the minorities an influential Member 
insisted on a quota of ministerial portfolios for the non-Sinhalese communities 
irrespective of qualifications. 
8. In the result the Board of Ministers formulated the solution summarized in 
paragraph 1 of this despatch. To the extent that it harnesses together in the food 
waggon our ablest Minister (Mr. Senanayake) and our ablest executive officer (Mr. 
Goonetilleke) the solution is satisfactory. To the extent that it leaves certain 
Ministers still overburdened by unforeseen accretions of war work it is unsatisfac-
tory; and the criticism that the Constitution should be broadened to our war effort 
rather than our war effort narrowed to the Constitution is heard in all quarters. It is 
possible therefore that the project mentioned in paragraph 7 of this despatch (which 
may or may not have been suggested by my Reforms despatch of the 13th June, 1938) 
may be revived at some future date. 
139 CO 54/981115, no 40 4 Sept 1942 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: despatch from R H Drayton to the Govern-
ment of India, Department of Indians Overseas, conveying the views of 
the Board of Ministers on the lifting of the emigration ban 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.F.35/42-0.S. dated 
the 20th August, 1942, and to state that your letter has been considered by the Board 
of Ministers who have asked me to reply as follows:-
The Board regret that the Government of India has not found it possible to meet the 
wishes of the Ceylon Government and has felt compelled to take unilateral action. The 
Board have already stated that, in their opinion, lifting the ban whether, wholly or 
partially, does change the status quo. Furthermore it may create economic and other 
problems in Ceylon which, in the interests of the war effort of Ceylon alone, apart from 
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any other consideration, will have to be solved. The Board may therefore be compelled to 
take action which will change the status quo. They will keep the Government of India 
informed of any such action but they must reserve the right to deal with such prob-
lems if they arise notwithstanding that the solution of any such problem may cause 
further changes in the status quo and may not have the concurrence of the Govern-
ment of India. The Board earnestly trust that no such action will become necessary. 
140 CO 54/980/5/1, no 27 8 Oct 1942 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 1401 from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Cranborne transmitting a message from ministers renewing their 
demand for dominion status after the war 
Ministers have requested me to telegraph to you the following message:-
Begins. There is growing concern in this country regarding our political status 
after the war. The State Council at its meeting on 26th March 1942 resolved that 
"this Council demands conferment of Dominions status on Ceylon after the war and 
requests that the British Government should give an assurance to that effect as has 
been done in the case of certain other British Possessions". The Ministers who are in 
entire accord with the resolution communicated it to you with the request that effect 
be given to it. In your reply dated 1st April19421 you state that you renew on behalf 
of H.M.G. their pledge of immediate re-examination of Ceylon Constitutional reforms 
once victory is won. We are deeply disappointed and dissatisfied with this reply which 
takes no account of a demand made by the Council on behalf of the whole country for a 
status to which the people of Ceylon are justly entitled. Ceylon has always given the 
greatest possible measure of co-operation in prosecution of the war. It has been 
repeatedly affirmed by leaders of United Nations that they are fighting for the freedom of 
the peoples of the world and against tyranny and oppression. The enthusiastic co-
operation in this war of a subject race like ourselves must be the natural result of 
expectations to share that freedom . Our demand is not only reasonable but will result 
in adding to the enthusiasm of the war effort. In these circumstances the assurance 
demanded by the State Council should be given without delay. Ends. 
Purpose but not text of the message was published yesterday by the Times of 
Ceylon in article by their political correspondent. 
1 cf 125. 
141 CO 54/980/5/1, no 29 15 Oct 1942 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 1445 from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Cranborne on the response to the ministers' demand 
Reference my telegram No. 1402.1 
When considering reply to Ministers, following points should be taken into account:-
(1) Acting Minister Home Affairs, who partook in message, was Tamil. 
1 cf 140. 
222 WARTIME CONDITIONS [142] 
(2) Only minority members who voted against council motion of 26th March were 
the British and Burgher. 
(3) Times of Ceylon, newspaper which purports to reflect local British opinion, 
has for some time past supported the demand for Dominion status, and in leading 
article of 9th October states "Right of every country to govern itself can no longer 
be contested. War is being fought to vindicate principles not merely of self 
government, but of independence. Ceylon has as much right as any other country 
to govern itself." 
(4) Co-operation of Ceylonese in war effort since entry of Japan has been 
admirable. 
I consider therefore that reply to message should be that immediate re-
examination of Ceylon constitutional reform after the war, to which H.M. Govern-
ment stands pledged, will be directed towards the grant to Ceylon of rule within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, to the maximum extent compatible with the 
security of the Island and of the Commonwealth. 
In view of its failure to meet approval, I refer with diffidence to proposal submitted 
in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 495 of 28th June, 1941;2 which if accepted would 
have obviated subsequent progressive demands. Latter have rendered its exact terms 
out of date, but I am strongly of the opinion that if H.M. Government could see its 
way to invite constructive and formative work along given lines on problem of 
constitutional reform now, it will not only ensure the maintenance of the war effort, 
but will also prove of inestimable value in meeting the post-war situation. Present 
drift is away from all moorings. 
Commander-in-Chief concurs in the above. 
2 See 100. 
142 CO 54/980/5/1, no 32 3 Nov 1942 
[Reforms]: outward telegram no 1251 from Lord Cranborne to Sir A 
Caldecott transmitting the draft of a reply to ministers 
My secret personal telegram of 3rd November draft message:-
Begins. The re-examination of the reform of Ceylon's constitution after the war, to 
which H.M.G. stands pledged, will be directed towards the fullest possible develop-
ment of self-governing institutions in Ceylon within the Commonwealth partnership. 
This development must obviously be conditioned by the extent to which Ceylon has 
the strength and unity to promote its own social and economic wellbeing, and it is, 
therefore, in the opinion of H.M.G., most important that the leaders of thought and 
affairs in Ceylon should carefully weigh the constitutional problems and their 
implications not only in the single interest of the island but in the larger interest of 
the Commonwealth on which the island's security and prosperity ultimately depend. 
The request that H.M.G. should now make a declaration on the lines advocated by 
the State Council as to the constitutional position in Ceylon after the war is to ask 
H.M.G. to pledge themselves to a course which might in the event be shown to 
provide neither a practicable solution for the Ceylonese themselves nor one which 
would contribute to the security of the Commonwealth. H.M.G. can however give an 
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assurance that they will approach the question of a revision of the Constitution in 
the spirit and intention defined at the beginning of this telegram, and with the fullest 
appreciation of the effort and resolution which Ceylon and her people have shown in 
defence of the Island and in the cause of the Commonwealth. Ends. 
143 CO 54/980/5/1, no 33 9 Nov 1942 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Lord Cranborne on the draft reply to ministers 
Your secret and personal telegram of 3rd November.1 
l agree that debate on the Resolution of 14th ? January was absurdly unimpressive, 
but this must be attributed largely to the influence exerted by myself and colleagues 
through Ministers and others, to obliterate windy talk about political reformation, 
when all the available time and effort is needed for the prosecution of the war. Voting 
on the Resolution struck me as not less impressive thah that on 12th December, 
1929, when the present constitution was accepted by majority of two. Certainly no 
progress has been made towards reconciliation of majority and minority demands, 
but settlement can never b~ achieved by consultation or agreement between them, 
but only by decision of His Majesty's Government. Please refer in this connection to 
paragraph 5 of my personal letter to Gent dated 23rd December.2 In these 
circumstances, I most strongly urge deletion of second sentence from draft message 
contained in your telegram 1251, that is to say, of all the words from "This 
development must be obviously" down to "prosperity ultimately depend". Sole but 
certain effect of this passage would be to resuscitate communal recriminations which 
would hinder the war effort, and fatally prejudice the chances of the election of Tamil 
Member, Mahadeva (who recently acted with success) as permanent Minister of 
Home Affairs, if Jayatilaka goes to India as our Representative. Realism dictates that 
we dismiss from the realm of (corrupt group) [?probability] all ideas of joint 
constructive deliberation between local communities, and remember that the whole 
of the Northern Province boycotted the present constitution and refused to return 
any Members to the State Council until 3 years after its inception. Ceylon Leopards 
have not changed their spots. C.-in-C. concurs in the above.3 
1 See 142. 2 See 113. 
3 As a result of Caldecott's representations, the statement was revised as follows: 'The re-examination of 
the reform of Ceylon's constitution after the war, to which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will 
be directed towards the fullest possible development of self-governing institutions in Ceylon within the 
Commonwealth partnership, having regard both to the single interest of the Island and to the larger 
interest of the Commonwealth on which the Island's security and prosperity ultimately depend. In their 
approach to the question of revision of the constitution in that spirit and intention, there will be on the 
part of His Majesty's Government the fullest appreciation of the effort and resolution which Ceylon and 
her people have shown in defence of the Island and in the cause of the Commonwealth' (CO 54/980/5/1, no 
39, unnumbered tel, Cranborne to Caldecott, 11 Dec 1942). 
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144 CO 54/980/5/1, no 34 10 Nov 1942 
[Constitutional reform]: inward telegram no 1586 from Sir A Calde-
cott to Lord Cranborne transmitting a message from minority repre-
sentatives 
Following message is sent at the request of the following six members of the State 
Council, Natesan,l Jayah,2 Dharmaratnam,3 Kaleel,4 Pereira,5 Ponnambalam6:-
Begins. On behalf of the minorities of the community of Ceylon, we respectfully 
reiterate that any declaration by H.M. Government on the future constitution of 
Ceylon must in fairness and justice provide for adequate and effective safeguard for 
the minorities in a balanced scheme of representation. Principles laid down by H.M. 
Government regarding the future Government of India and the rights of minorities 
therein are equally applicable to Ceylon. Ends. 
1 Indian Tamil (declined to vote on 26 March). 
2 Nominated member-Malay (not in house on 26 March). 
3 Tamil (voted for 26 March motion). 
4 Muslim (elected since 26 March). 
5 Nominated member-Indian (R.C.) (not in House on 26 March). 
6 Ceylon Tamil (declined to vote on 26 March). 
145 CO 54/980/5/1, no 35 10 Nov 1942 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Lord 
Cranborne on the message from minority representatives 
Message contained in my telegram No. 15861 was received by me after the despatch 
of my secret and personal telegram of the 9th November2 and is symptomatic of the 
communal intransigeance therein described. Its signatories however have no 
justification for the phrase "on behalf of the minority communities" as Mahadeva, 
member for Jaffna, subscribed to the message contained in my telegram no. 14013 as 
acting Minister of Home Affairs and there are other minority members also who do 
not follow the lead of Ponnambalam, who is the author of the present message. I do 
not therefore desire in any way to modify the recommendation contained in my 
previous telegram and if the reply to the Ministerial message is sent with the 
omission urged by me, answer to the present message would be that H.M. 
Government cannot at this juncture entertain schemes of representation, considera-
tion of which must await the re-examination of the constitution after the war to 
which H.M. Government stand pledged. 
1 See 144. 2 See 143. 3 See 140. 
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146 CAB 65/28, WM 153(42)4 16 Nov 1942 
'Ceylon: food supplies': War Cabinet conclusions on the supply of rice 
to Ceylon 
The War Cabinet considered a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (W.P. (42) 522) regarding the supply of rice to Ceylon. 
It was pointed out in the Memorandum that, in spite of the efforts made to obtain 
increased supplies from India since this question was discussed by the War Cabinet 
on the 14th September, the position remained unsatisfactory and a grave situation 
was now developing. Ceylon's minimum needs were 30,000 tons a month; and 
during October the Island had received only 1,250 tons from India, the only 
practicable source of supply. On the 20th October rice stocks in the Island amounted 
only to 23,000 tons, about a fortnight's supply. 
It was therefore recommended:-
(a) That the Government of India should take exceptional measures to ensure 
Ceylon's essential rice supplies, to the extent of 30,000 tons a month. 
(b) That, to supplement this supply of rice, shipments of wheat and flour from 
Australia should be assured at the rate of 15,000 tons a month. 
(c) That, if rice supplies could not be maintained at the rate of 30,000 tons a 
month, the shipments of other cereals from Australia should be proportionately 
increased. 
(d) That, if possible, additional quantities of rice, wheat and flour should be 
shipped to Ceylon for the purpose of building up a reserve stock of essential food. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was grateful to Sir Ramaswami 
Mudaliar1 for the efforts which he had made to increase the supplies of rice sent from 
India to Ceylon. Since his memorandum was circulated, he had had a further letter 
from Sir Ramaswami indicating that the Government of India now hoped to send to 
Ceylon a total of 36,500 tons of rice during November and December. While this 
would be helpful, it would not avert the risk of grave shortage, for, even if actual 
shipments equalled the estimates-as they had not hitherto-the Island would be 
left at the end of December with no reserve stocks at all. This was most dangerous, 
not only from the standpoint of defence, but also from the point of view of 
maintaining Ceylon's production of rubber and other essential raw materials. There 
were indications that the morale and efficiency of workers in the Island were already 
beginning to suffer from the food shortage. He therefore suggested that the 
Government of India should be pressed to ship an additional 20,000 tons of rice 
during the next two months. Failing that, he asked for increased shipments of wheat 
from Australia-though it should be realised that the possibilities of substitution 
were limited, since the rice-eating population of the Island would not accept other 
cereals in place of rice. 
Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar said that the Government of India were finding real 
difficulty in increasing these supplies. Though the total Indian crop was large, some 
of the small cultivators were withholding supplies, and Provincial Governments were 
finding great difficulty in getting supplies on to the market. There were also 
1 Representative of the Government of India on the War Cabinet. 
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difficulties of internal transport, for the areas nearest to Ceylon were those in which 
there was a deficiency. The Government of India had already exploited to the full the 
capacity of ordinary commercial agents to acquire supplies; it was only when these 
had failed that Provincial Governments had been asked to take exceptional measures 
to bring increased supplies forward. 
The offer to ship 36,500 tons in November and December was without prejudice to 
the possibility of making fresh allotments during those months; and the Government 
of India were already considering what further supplies could be obtained. They were 
fully alive to the urgency of Ceylon's need, and he thought it undesirable that any 
pressure should be brought to bear on them by the War Cabinet. 
The position should improve shortly, when the new crop would be available. 
Moreover, the Government of India had decided to establish a Central Secretariat to 
exercise co-ordinating powers over Food Supplies. This would enable the Central 
Government to exercise direct powers in this matter in the future . 
In discussion, it was pointed out that the supplies required by Ceylon represented 
less than 1 Vz per cent. of the total Indian crop. In view of the strategic importance of 
Ceylon in connection with the defence of India, and the extent to which the Empire's 
war effort now depended on Ceylon's rubber production, it was felt that India should 
make strong efforts to provide the rice required to meet the Island's minimum needs. 
The War Cabinet-
Invited the Secretary of State for India and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar to ensure that 
the Government of India were aware of the urgency of meeting Ceylon's minimum 
requirements for rice and the importance of building up reasonable reserve stocks. 
The Government of India should be urged to assure the delivery of 36,500 tons of 
rice during the months of November and December, and to make every possible 
effort to send increased quantities during that period. They should be asked, 
further, to arrange for larger shipments to be made after the beginning of the New 
Year. 
147 CO 54/980/18, no 3 19 Dec 1942 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir A Caldecott to Mr Stanley on ministerial 
portfolios 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Lord Cranborne's Secret despatch dated 
the 11th November, 1942, and to confess my doubt as to whether I can have correctly 
understood His Lordship's assumption, in paragraph 3 thereof, that there must have 
been particular reasons why the question of Mr. Corea's resignation did not arise out 
of the defeat of the motion of non-confidence in him by thirty votes to four with ten 
abstentions.1 This voting, as I ventured to point out, indicated confidence in Mr. 
Corea; and it is difficult to see how in view of it he could have been expected to 
consider, or anybody else to suggest, his resignation. Although I do not believe the 
voting in this matter to have represented the real feeling of many Members of 
Council in regard to confidence in Mr. Corea, it nevertheless showed very clearly that 
the great majority were definitely against any idea of a request for his removal under 
1 cf 138. 
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Article 37 of the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931. No question of his 
resignation can therefore in my view be held to have arisen. 
2. In regard to the fourth paragraph of Lord Cranborne's despatch I have always 
made it a point not, even vicariously, to question Ministers or Members about what 
goes on in the lobby of State Council. I am convinced of the wisdom of such 
abstention, though my intelligence in such matters is thereby limited to such 
information as may from time to time be volunteered. I regret therefore that I am 
unable to supplement paragraph 7 of my despatch of the 4th Septembe~ except to 
the extent of explaining that the 'influential member' was Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam, 
and that by "insistence on a quota of ministerial portfolios irrespective of qualifica-
tions" I meant to convey that (vide paragraph 18 of my Reforms Despatch of the 13th 
June, 1938) he insisted on a definite percentage of ministerial portfolios (what exact 
percentage I do not know) for non-Sinhalese members, whether or not there were in 
fact suitable non-Sinhalese for such appointment. My own profound disagreement 
with such a demand was expressed in my Reforms Despatch in the paragraph above 
cited. 
3. The very strong support given by most Ministers to Mr. Mahadeva in 
connection with his recent election to succeed Sir D.B. Jayatilaka as Minister for 
Home Affairs confirms the view which I expressed in the first sentence of the same 
paragraph, i.e. that the Sinhalese Ministers would be quite ready to welcome 
non-Sinhalese colleagues in a Cabinet, provided that they were chosen for their 
personal qualifications and not under a system of racial percentages. 
2 See ibid. 
148 CO 54/980/5/1, nos 49 & 50 11 Jan 1943 
[Constitutional reform]: inward telegrams from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting a further message from ministers and expressing 
the governor's view that a pledge of 'full responsible government and 
internal home rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations' after 
the war is now needed 
No 49: telegram no 71 
Your telegram No. 1411 and my telegram No. 1864. 
Ministers request me to telegraph the following submission:-
Begins. Although message1 received in reply to our message telegraphed to you 
8th Octobe~ concedes, for the first time, that the purpose of re-examination of our 
Constitution to which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be the fullest 
possible development of the self-governing Institutions in Ceylon within the 
Commonwealth partnership, we regret that your reply is in far too indefinite and 
conditional terms to allay the growing concern regarding our political status which 
we reported in our first telegram. It would indeed, if published, only magnify that 
concern inasmuch as it gives no promise of the full responsibility for government 
1 See 143, note 3. 2 See 140. 
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asked for. We are gratified that His Majesty's Government fully appreciates the 
co-operation of Ceylon and her people in the war effort, but we are unable to 
reconcile such full appreciation with a denial to us of the promises which have been 
given to the great neighbouring country, whose leaders and people have not (repeat 
not) co-operated as we have. Publication of your message would certainly evoke the 
criticism that, in order to obtain promises, it is necessary to extort them by 
non-cooperation rather than earn them by co-operation. We and our people are in 
whole-hearted support of the ideals of national freedom, national development and 
international co-operation for which the Allied nations are fighting, and we are 
convinced that, if we are given our merited status within the British Commonwealth, 
we can apply those ideals both to our own advancement and to the advantage and 
security of all sister nations within the family partnership. We maintain that by our 
war effort and by our progress under the present admittedly difficult constitution, we 
have amply earned the grant of our request and that, should it be denied to us, the 
resolution of our people must seriously deteriorate owing to their disappointment of 
not being trusted or rewarded. We therefore most earnestly request an urgent and 
careful re-consideration of the reply to our former message. Ends. 
No 50: unnumbered telegram 
Message of Ministers contained in my telegram No. 71 has been substituted for the 
one which I asked them to reconsider owing to its peremptory and intransigent 
terms. I am confident that all moderate political opinion in the island now demands 
full responsible government and internal home rule within the British Common-
wealth of Nations and that at this late hour no lesser assurance than this will meet 
the position. Commander-in-Chief requests me to convey his emphatic concurrence 
in the above view. 
149 CO 54/980/5/1, no 52 21 Jan 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott requesting clarification of the views of the governor 
and Admiral Layton 
Your secret and personal telegram of 11th January .1 
I note that you and the C.-in-C. advise that in order to meet the position no lesser 
assurance should be given now by His Majesty's Government than pledge of 
conferment of Dominion Status after the war. 
I find it difficult to reconcile full significance of Dominion Status for Ceylon in 
unforeseeable conditions of post-war world with Ceylon's obvious needs in matters of 
defence, commerce, and external relations generally. Further there are general 
Empire defence interests in the Indian Ocean which it must be the responsibility of 
H.M.G. to secure in their relations with Ceylon. 
Before I find it possible to carry further my consideration of Ministers' request I 
should greatly value your own and the C.-in-C.'s views:-
1 See 148, tel no 50. 
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(1) as to what serious consequences you expect if His Majesty's Government find it 
impracticable to go beyond assurance already offered; 
(2) what if any particular changes in the direction of responsible government 
(short of full Dominion Status) could safely be promised now for adoption after the 
war; 
(3) what if any particular reservations, e.g. bases or other facilities for Empire 
defence, or political and economic rights of minority communities must in your 
view be maintained in any further promise at this moment as to post-war 
constitutional advancement. 
(4) if the case of "certain other British possessions" mentioned in Ministers' 
message in your telegram No. l 4012 is intended to refer to India and Burma, have 
they overlooked the actual terms of the pronouncements in those cases (e.g. 
paragraph (d) of draft declaration for discussion with Indian leaders published 
30th March, 1942:3 and in the case of Burma statement by Governor in Burma 
Legislature on 26th August, 1940). 
You will, I am sure, appreciate that advice in your telegram under reference goes 
considerably beyond view which you expressed with concurrence of C.-in-C. in your 
telegram No.l4454 which postulated that self-governing powers must be restricted 
by overriding needs of local and Empire security. I should be grateful for a statement 
of the reasons for your change of view. 
2 See 140. 
3 Para (d) of the statement on India of 30 Mar 1942 referred to a constituent assembly which would be set 
up after provincial elections had been held at the end of the war. The entire membership of the lower 
houses of the provincial legislatures would form a single electoral college and proceed to elect a 
constituent assembly by means of proportional representation. The text of the declaration is reproduced in 
TOP!, vol I, 456. 
4 See 141. 
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[Reforms] : inward unnumbered telegram (reply)from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley on the meaning of full responsible government and 
internal home rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
Minutes by G E J Gent and Sir G Gater 
Your secret and personal telegram of 21st January.1 
1. My secret and personal telegram of 11th January2 did not (repeat not) 
recommend assurance of Dominion status, but of full responsible Government and 
internal Home Rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations . 
2. Words [in italics] entail full reservation to H.M. Government, under any 
Constitution to be granted, of control of:-
(a) External relations. 
(b) Provision for construction, maintenance, staffing, and manning of such Naval, 
Military, and Air defences as H.M. Government may from time to time pronounce 
1 See 149. 2 See 148, tel no 50. 
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necessary to the security of the Commonwealth, including that of the Island. 
Allocation of expenses under (b) between the Imperial and Ceylon Governments 
should be settled between them and fixed by separate agreement and not by the 
constitution which should provide only for fixation by agreement. 
3. View of the C. in C. and myself on the four points mentioned in your telegram 
are as follows:-
(1) We anticipate immediate and progressive loss of co-operation and decrease of 
war effort coupled with the deflection of the great bulk of now moderate opinion 
towards intransigent nationalism and demand for the right to secession. 
(2) We can only repeat that any assurance, short of what we have recommended, 
will not meet the position, and that danger lies in promising too little rather than 
too much. 
(3) There must be total reservation of control over defence, as stated in paragraph 
2 above. No stipulation of safeguards for political rights for the minorities should 
be included in the assurance, but see paragraph (4) following, which will 
adequately serve this interest. As regards economic rights, there are none that 
belong to a minority community by virtue of being a minority community. Any 
denial or limitation of power under the new constitution to pass legislation 
affecting property or trade of non-Sinhalese (if this is what is meant) would 
inevitably evoke antagonism and hostility far more inimical to their interest than 
the absence of any such constitutional protection. 
(4) Ministers and Members of the State Council referred to India and Burma, but 
unlikely that they looked up the pronouncements to which you refer, especially as 
that relating to Burma does not appear on record here. 
As regards paragraph (d) of the draft of the Indian Declaration, any assurance to 
be given to Ceylon would necessarily, of course, include the statement that the 
present constitution must continue to operate until a new constitution has been 
approved by H.M. Government, in accordance with the terms of the assurance and 
until it has been accepted by a two-thirds majority of the State Council in 
accordance with the principle contained in Article No. 80 Ceylon (State Council) 
Order-in-Council, 1931. It should also be stated in the assurance that H.M. 
Government would be grateful for assistance of any committee that the Governor, 
after consultation with the Board of Ministers, might decide to appoint for 
preparation of a draft constitution along the lines of the assurance for considera-
tion by H.M. Government. 
Minutes on 150 
This telegram gives us some light on the attitude of the Governor and of the C-in-C, 
but as the Ministers have come back with a reiterated demand for Dominion status 
(and it is now clear that the Governor's limits will be very definitely short of 
Dominion status) it is not obvious that they would be satisfied with the Governor's 
alternative words, especially as they probably know that the Governor intends his 
alternative to be something a good way short of Dominion status. 
The expression "external relations" is quite an indefinite one. If there is to be full 
reservation to His Majesty's Government of control of "external relations" it must 
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require a power of His Majesty's Government to interfere with internal legislation in 
Ceylon, for instance relating to Indians. 
As regards defence, if the reservation to His Majesty's Government is to be full and 
real, there must be reserved powers to the Governor to veto legislation in Ceylon, or 
to take executive action in Ceylon, for security purposes, and to ensure that 
aerodromes for instance are not rendered useless by inappropriate development of 
surrounding lands. 
As regards Minority Communities, there appears to be no safeguard in paragraph 3 
(4) of the Governor's telegram since the Sinhalese have an assured majority of no less 
than two-thirds in a full House in the State Council. The "economic rights" of 
members of the Minority Communities are a very real bone of contention between 
Ceylon and India at present, and I can see no prospect of India, who must be 
consulted in any revision of the Ceylon Constitution, being convinced that there are 
no economic rights of Indians to be safeguarded in Ceylon as a condition of the grant 
of full responsible Government and internal home rule. 
After Departmental discussion, we, therefore, suggest that a telegram should be 
sent to the Governor on the lines of the draft herewith. 
Secretary of State 
G.E.J.G. 
30.1.43 
1. I do not find it at all easy to make up my mind as to the best reply to make to 
Ceylon. I don't like Mr. Gent's draft. The first part of it puts a number of problems to 
the Governor, which he will be in no position to solve because they are ultimately 
dependent upon decisions of policy by H.M.G. in London. A preferable course would 
be for us to state what we think the answers to the problems should be and to ask the 
Governor for his observations on them. Paragraph 9 of the draft gives a further 
assurance which will certainly not satisfy the Ceylon Ministers, and will be 
unsatisfactory from our point of view in that it is not very clear what are its 
implications. 
2. It is satisfactory to note from the Governor's last telegram that "dominion 
status" is not in question. What is asked for is full responsible government and 
internal home rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations. I assume that what 
is desired is a position similar to that occupied by Southern Rhodesia. We are asked 
to give an assurance that full responsible government and internal home rule within 
the British Commonwealth of Nations will be the objective in the discussions which 
will take place after the war. 
3. The following courses of action seem open to us:-
(a) To stand on the previous declaration and to refuse to add to it. 
(b) To accept the Government's proposals, subject to consultation with the other 
Departments concerned. 
(c) To invite the Governor to return home for consultation. 
(d) To invite representatives from Ceylon to come here to discuss the terms of the 
declarat ion with the Secretary of State. 
4. Of the four alternatives mentioned above, I reject (a) on account of the 
considered view of the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor that the effect of 
refusal would be an immediate and progressive loss of co-operation and decrease of 
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war effort. (b) would involve lengthy discussions with other Departments which, 
under war conditions, it would not be easy to bring to an issue quickly. Even if we 
were able to reach agreement with other Departments it would not be very 
satisfactory to have to rely upon telegrams to obtain the Governor's views. (d) seems 
to me to be attended by great difficulties. It would be essential to represent the 
minority as well as the majority and the settlement of the composition of the 
delegation might well lead to very serious dissensions in Ceylon, which would be 
harmful to the war effort. Also the reception of a delegation here would have 
awkward repercussions elsewhere, e.g. Jamaica. I therefore reject (d). There remains 
(c), which I am inclined to think represents our best immediate move. Recent 
experience in the visits of Sir Harold MacMichael, 3 Sir Henry Moore4 and Sir Arthur 
Richards5 has shewn the immense advantage of being able to discuss outstanding 
problems with the Governor himself. I think I can say that in all these three cases 
difficulties have been overcome, and it has been possible to hammer out a policy in a 
way which would have been impossible by correspondence. The Governor may, of 
course, feel that it is difficult for him to leave Ceylon in present circumstances. I am 
inclined to think, however, that we ought to ask him whether, in his opinion, he can 
safely come home. We should also have to consult the Commander-in-Chief. 
5. If it is decided that the Governor should return to confer with the Secretary of 
State, it will be essential that the whole question of constitutional reform in Ceylon 
should be explored by the Department, in consultation with other interested 
Departments. 
3 High commissioner in Palestine, 1938-1944. 
4 Governor of Kenya, 1940-1944. 
5 Governor of Jamaica, 1938-1943; of Nigeria, 1943-1947. 
G.H.G. 
2.2.43 
151 CO 54/982/6, no 34 Jan 1943 
'Ceylon labour for rubber production': CO note on a further dispute 
between the governments of India and Ceylon over a proposal to 
recruit Indian workers for the 1943 rubber drive. Minute by G E J 
Gent 
The main driving personality in Ceylon to increase the Ceylon output of rubber this 
year from 100,000 to about 130,000 tons is the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. 
Senanayake. His measures include "slaughter" tapping1 on part of each estate and 
the special temporary recruitment of 20,000 fresh workers from India who would be 
repatriated at the end of the war. 
The matter of Indian immigration into Ceylon has for many years been a source of 
acute political controversy between the two countries. Ceylon has always feared the 
economic competition of Indians in petty trade and the displacement of Ceylonese 
from employment in the Island. They also fear the prospect of political power in the 
1 For an explanation of which, see 162. 
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self-governing Constitution of the Island being swamped by the votes of Indians in 
Ceylon who are not genuinely domiciled in the Island. 
In 1941 representatives of the two Governments finally achieved agreement on the 
future of Indian immigration and Indians' status in Ceylon on the basis of an 
immigration law being passed in Ceylon which recognised the Ceylon Government's 
authority to control any new Indian immigration into the Island. Subsequently in 
view of war conditions affecting India and Ceylon, it was agreed not to proceed with 
the new immigration law but to maintain the status quo until the end of the 
war-this on the supposition that there would in the interval be no question of a 
resumption of Indian immigration. 
On the new request for the special immigration of 20,000 Indian workers for this 
year's rubber drive, the Government of India have so far refused to consider it except 
on undertakings by Ceylon which completely destroy the basis of the 1941 
Agreement, and which raise again the whole political aspect of Indian immigration.2 
For His Majesty's Government to coerce Ceylon to accept India's terms would 
result in certain non-co-operation by the Ministers and the State Council, and not 
only in rubber production but in other respects would result in a net loss in Ceylon's 
present contribution to the war effort. Rather than this it would be better to abandon 
the attempt to increase the labour force. 
The present drastic schemes for increasing the production of rubber estates are 
definitely being undertaken by Ceylon under the aegis of the Minister of Agriculture 
not in Ceylon's own long-term interests-far from it-but in the interests of the 
United Nations' war effort, and particularly in the interests of American production. 
Therefore it may be possible to suggest that American influence should be brought 
to bear through the Raw Materials Board at Washington to persuade India to treat 
this request for extra labour at this time as a special war-time measure and not an 
occasion for blackmailing Ceylon on a long-standing and deep-rooted political issue. 
That India are responsive to emigration for definite war work (as this can be 
represented to be) is shown by the fact that they have just agreed to allow the 
emigration of 3,000 labourers required by the Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, for 
aerodrome construction work. They must be persuaded to take the same view of the 
importance of this year's rubber production. 
The recent Private Member's resolution and vote in the State Council in Ceylon 
took place in a House less than half full, and the fact that it was a Private Member's 
motion shows that the Ministers gave no support to it. 
Food cultivation schemes in Ceylon 
Apart from the overriding importance of promoting food production the Sinhalese 
labour employed is not rubber estate labour nor is it suitable for estate work. 
2 The position adopted by the GOI in the 1943 labour dispute was that there were at the time in India in 
excess of 20,000 labourers who had previously worked in Ceylon but who were prevented from returning 
because of the GOI's ban on the emigration of unskilled labour. The GOI was prepared to allow up to a 
maximum of 20,000 to return to Ceylon on condition that there would be no compulsory repatriation at 
the end of the war. The Board of Ministers in Ceylon refused to accept the condition and would only accept 
the 20,000 labourers if it was agreed in advance that they would be repatriated at the end of the war (CO 
54/982/6). 
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Minute on 151 
We have added to the file the latest two telegrams from Ceylon and the whole 
situation has been discussed with the Ceylon Dept. and Sir Clifford Figg.3 
We have reached the conclusion that in the impasse which has been reached in the 
negotiations between the Governments of India and Ceylon regarding the supply of 
Indian labour necessary to step-up rubber production in Ceylon by some 20 to 30,000 
tons, there are four possible lines of action for His Majesty's Government to take. 
These are:-
(a) To press Ceylon to accept the proposals put forward by the Government of 
India. This would mean that we should have to ask the Ceylonese politicians to 
swallow Indian demands which they have consistently in the past three years 
rejected and would be bound to lead to the gravest political discontent on the part 
both of Government and a large proportion of the people of Ceylon. 
(b) That attempts should be made to find an alternative source of labour supply in 
the Indian Ocean area. There is not, however, much likelihood that such supply 
would be available. Labour in Mauritius is wholly taken up with keeping up sugar 
production both to meet the demands of the Middle East area and to supplement 
supplies for this country to replace West Indian shipments which have been 
diverted to the United States. There is no surplus labour in the Seychelles and East 
Africa has labour shortage troubles of its own. There remains Arabia and such 
labour as can be found there would be entirely unsuitable to plantation work in 
Ceylon. 
(c) The scheme for increasing Ceylon's output can be abandoned altogether and 
reliance placed upon the continuance of existing arrangements to produce at most 
a slight increase in present output; in this connection it should be noted that the 
extra 20 to 30,000 tons which Ceylon was aiming at, could this additional labour 
be secured, is much more than the total output envisaged from East and West 
African sources on which so much labour and money has already been expended. 
(d) The Government of India could be pressed to reconsider their views. It is 
suggested that the best means of doing this would be to approach the Government 
of India through Sir Ramaswami Mudalyar, the Government of India's representa-
tive on the War Cabinet. Any approach to him should be based primarily on an 
appeal from the standpoint of the war needs of the United Nations and the vital 
interest of the United States in the rubber output of the United Nations for this 
year, to which the output of Ceylon in particular will be the main contribution. If 
the Government of India are not responsive to appeals based on the general needs 
of war production they may well be moved to meet His Majesty's Government's 
request if they apprehend strong United States criticisms of their attitude. 
From the Ceylon point of view the Secretary of State is aware of the long standing 
fear, on the part of the Sinhalese Ministers and people, of the economic competition 
in Ceylon of Indian traders and workers. The Indo-Ceylon Joint Report was a final, 
and apparently successful, effort of the two Governments to achieve some sort of 
3 Deputy chairman, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, 1928-1930; deputy chairman, International Tea 
Committee, 1933-1947 (chairman, 1948); President, Ceylon Association in London, 1937; member, 
Imperial Economic Committee, 1937; unpaid business adviser to CO. 
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agreement on the extent to which Ceylon should be free to restrict this Indian 
competition in Ceylon by local measures to check the immigration and political 
power of the Indian community in the Island. It is this Agreement (never 
implemented in fact or officially approved by the Government of India) which the 
Indian proposals now would completely upset. Ceylon's fears of an unemployment 
problem in Ceylon after the war must make it even more impossible for the Board of 
Ministers now to agree to the proposed Indian conditions. 
There is one further point which has been made in a recent telegram from the 
Ceylon Minister of Agriculture, viz:- that if the present food prospects cannot be 
improved in the Island then the addition of 20,000 Indian labourers would be an 
unpleasant problem from the food point of view, and it is only right to note that at a 
recent meeting of the War Cabinet Shipping Committee it was judged impossible to 
find tonnage to bring cereals from Australia within the next month or two at any 
rate. This is an additional complication; but I think it must be left to be used as an 
additional plank (if the 20,000 new labourers are taken into Ceylon) when we go 
again to the Shipping Committee for cereals from Australia. 
G.E.J.G. 
31.1.43 
152 CO 54/980/5/1, no 54 4 Feb 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott requesting a further appreciation from the governor 
and Admiral Layton on the distinction between dominion status and 
constitutional reform 
Your secret and personal telegram of the 27th January.1 
I am grateful for fuller expression of your views and appreciate distinction you 
make between Dominion Status and constitutional reform which you recommend. 
2. Ministers' request is for Dominion Status; your own advice to me is that 
general political opinion would be satisfied with the lesser assurance you have 
recommended. 
3. You will of course understand that promise now of full responsible govern-
ment on lines you propose could only be given with the approval of the War Cabinet, 
and they would need to be quite clear as to the significance of such promise in each 
of the several fields of interest for which His Majesty's Government have responsibili-
ties. To do this with sufficient clarity would in fact seem to involve virtually the 
drafting of outlines of new constitution now in some detail and in spite of obvious 
great difficulties in attempting to do so. This would require consultation here with 
Service Departments and the India Office, and I cannot see how it would be possible 
to avoid some consultation or at any rate some disclosure to Ministers in Ceylon and 
to other interested official circles (including Government of India) with consequent 
provocation of political claims by all concerned in Ceylon and repercussions in India. 
4. Resulting constitutional decision could not be expected to satisfy both 
Sinhalese and minority demands and I foresee risk of loss of co-operation in 
1 See 150. 
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important fields of war service and war industries by one section or another if this 
course were followed. 
5. The choice is therefore between (a) adherence to present form of declaration, 
and (b) immediate preparation of proposals for new constitution as described in 3. 
Either course is considered likely to involve loss of co-operation and decrease of war 
effort. The balance of advantage between them therefore has to be assessed. 
6. If you and Commander-in-Chief still feel on further consideration of my views 
that it is necessary to adopt course (b) it might be necessary for me to ask you to 
come home for consultation. A discussion with you would be of enormous advantage 
to me. Against this, however, your arrival here even if ostensibly for short leave, 
would be assumed to have significance relative to constitutional demands and, if so, 
might be most unfortunate if His Majesty's Government's decision were against any 
further promise now and gave you nothing satisfactory to take back to Ministers. But 
I should like to know in any case whether you and Commander-in-Chief think 
present political and economic situation in Ceylon would permit your coming home 
for short period for consultation if I desired it. 
7. I want you to be in no doubt that I very fully appreciate and value great 
importance of contribution which Ceylon has made and is making to war effort and 
the co-operation which, under the leadership of Ministers and State Council, has 
made this contribution possible. The future reform of the constitution will be in no 
way compromised by absence of promise now in circumstances which make 
precision impossible and which without sufficient precision can only lead to 
misunderstanding and dispute to the detriment of all concerned in the prime task of 
concentrating on defeating the enemy. 
8. I should have no objection at all to Ministers being so informed as in paragraph 
7 with an assurance that message in my telegram 1411 is sincerely intended as 
promise without qualification and certainly with no feeling of distrust or lack of 
appreciation of Ceylon's participation in the war effort. But the structure of 
self-government must be worked out in detail and in negotiation, and it is not 
possible nor would it be right for His Majesty's Government now to promise results 
which can only be determined after the examination of the problem has been 
completed. 
9. I shall value a further expression of the views of yourself and Commander-in-
Chief on the opinions I have expressed above and particularly in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7 and 8. 
153 CO 54/980/5/1, no 57 17-18 Feb 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) in two parts from Sir 
A Caldecott to Mr Stanley, including a draft statement on reform 
Part I · 17 February 
Commander-in-Chief and I, in consultation with the Chief Secretary, have carefully 
considered all the points in your secret and personal telegram of 4th February.1 
Your paragraph 2. Although in our judgment all moderate political opinion would, 
1 See 152. 
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in actuality, be satisfied with assurance on the lines which we propose this does not, 
of course, mean that there will not be such measure of expressed disappointment as 
is inseparable from any concession less than is asked for. 
Your paragraph 3. We entirely realise that any statement on the lines proposed by 
us must receive the approval of the War Cabinet, but we see no reason why, if 
statement is drafted with due caution, it should involve virtually the drafting of the 
outlines of a new constitution. We strongly deprecate any consultation with the 
Government of India in this matter, beyond keeping the India Office informed of 
developments. Anticipation stated in my telegram of 31st March, that if the Cripps 
scheme eventuated Ceylon might seek admission to the Indian Union, has been 
completely negatived by the failure of his mission, and subsequent Indian events. 
The present position is that even a suspicion that any statement was made by 
permission of the Government of India, would preclude its acceptance in Ceylon. Our 
joint opinion, morever, is that, in view of the definite secessionist tendency in India, 
the security of Commonwealth communications and defence imperatively demand 
that Ceylon should not (repeat not) be subordinated to India, and that any possible 
future movement towards fusion should not (repeat not) be encouraged. Draft of 
statement such as we would propose follows in Part 11 of this telegram. 
Your paragraph 4. We dissent from the view that there is a risk of losing minority 
co-operation in the war effort, if statement on the lines proposed by us is made. It 
must be realised that the minority communities are just as keen to be released from 
Whitehall apron strings as the majority, and that their disagreement with the latter 
is solely in regard to the allocation of Council seats, and share of Government 
appointments, etc., i.e., in regard to machinery and not the essential characteristics 
of the administration which all agree to keep national. 
Your paragraph 5. It follows from the preceding paragraphs, that in our view no 
disadvantage will attach to course (b), whereas course (a) would indubitably induce 
progressive loss of co-operation, slacking of the war effort, and demand for secession. 
Your paragraph 6. We do not regard the present juncture, when the food position 
and India-Ceylon relations besides other tricky political matters require daily 
attention, propitious for my going home. I would prefer indeed to be excused from 
personal consultation, because subsequent reply, if short of present demands, would 
render my position here most difficult. This is because, although recommendations 
made in my published despatch of 13th June, 1938, have been rendered inadequate 
by recent developments, my name is irrevocably associated with those recommenda-
tions, and I should be generally suspected of having opposed any more radical 
reform. 
Your paragraph 7. Against your assurance that the absence of promise now would 
in no way compromise future reform of constitution, must be weighed the certainty 
that, without a promise now, reform will be undertaken in an atmosphere of 
disappointment, distrust and dislike, while in the interval, control will have 
progressively deteriorated as indicated in paragraph 3 (1) of my telegram of 27th 
January.2 
Your paragraph 8. Any information given to the Board of Ministers on this subject 
would need to be communicated by them to the State Council, and we are convinced 
that intimation on the lines of your paragraph 7 would exacerbate, rather than 
2 See 150. 
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appease, both bodies. While agreeing that precision at present juncture is impossible, 
we see no reason why general statement of purpose and intention should lead to 
subsequent misunderstanding and detriment, if plainly and carefully worded. In that 
belief we commend for your consideration draft statement which follows in Part 11. 
Recent election of member for Jaffna as Minister for Home Affairs means that there is 
now minority representation on the Board of Ministers. This fact, in conjunction 
with proposed stipulation that any constitutional change would require approval of 
three-quarters majority (not two-thirds as proposed in my telegram of 27th January) 
of the State Council, will compel the Ministers to take minor interests fully into 
account when evolving constructive proposals. We therefore advise that onus and 
method of constructive effort should be made to lie entirely on them rather than on 
the Governor in consultation with them, as suggested in paragraph 3 (4) of my 
telegram of 27th January. Governor would of course assist if invited by them. 
Part 1/: 18 February 
Second and last part of my secret and personal telegram of 17th February. Draft 
statement. Begins. The post-war re-examination of the reform ofCeylon's Constitu-
tion, to which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the 
grant to Ceylon, by Order of His Majesty in Council, of full responsibility for 
Government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration, but with 
the retention by His Majesty's Government of control, 
(a) over the Island's relations with foreign countries, and with other parts of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, and 
(b) over the provision, construction, maintenance, staffing and the manning of 
such naval, military and air defences, equipment and establishments, as His 
Majesty's Government may from time to time deem necessary for the security of 
the Commonwealth, including that of the Island, the cost thereof being shared 
between the two Governments in agreed proportions. 
The framing of a constitution to implement this undertaking will require such 
an examination of detail, and such precision of definition, as cannot be brought to 
bear so long as the whole (? energies of the) Service and other Departments of His 
Majesty's Government must remain focussed on the successful prosecution of the 
war. His Majesty's Government will however, once victory is achieved, be ready to 
consider any draft instrument that Ministers may in the meantime have found 
themselves able to evolve, subject to the clear understanding that the adoption of 
it or of any other draft will depend 
(a) upon acceptance by His Majesty's Government as being in full compliance 
with the first sentence of this statement, and 
(b) upon its subsequent approval by three-fourths majority of all members of 
the State Council of Ceylon, excluding Officers of State, and Speaker or other 
presiding Member. Ends. 
If statement on the above lines is approved, we suggest it should be accompanied 
by expression of appreciation of Ceylo~·war effort, as indicated in paragraph 7 of your 
telegram. 
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154 CO 54/980/5/1, no 59 26 Feb 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley on Mr Senanayake's request for the earliest possible reply to 
Ceylon's demand for dominion status 
Senanayake requested urgent personal interviews with C.-in-C. and myself yesterday, 
whereat he emphasized the necessity for earliest possible reply to Ceylon demand for 
Dominion Status. He represented that delay was causing many moderate Ceylonese, 
who in reality desire Home Rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations, to 
abandon hope of progress along such lines, and to throw in their lot with India as 
alone offering a prospect of attaining their ambitions. This movement was being 
studiously fomented by the Ceylon Indian Congress, whose members were now 
applying for admission to the Ceylon National Congress at the rate of 500 a day. 
Ceylon Indian Congress was also bringing constant pressure to bear on all Members 
of the Council in whose constituencies the Indian vote might prove the decisive 
factor at the next elections. As a result, public meetings of protest against the 
incarceration of Gandhi had been presided over by such members, and motion 
demanding him to broadcast had been passed by the State Council on a Private 
Member's motion. He himself had resigned from the Executive Committee of the 
Ceylon National Congress rather than be associated with the demand of that body for 
Swaraj outside the British Commonwealth, and he had been gratified to hear that his 
following had caused reconsideration of Congress policy on that point.1 Nevertheless 
his position as the champion of the British connection must progressively suffer, so 
long as there was no promise or prospect of the aspirations of his countrymen being 
realised within the Commonwealth, and Indian politicians would continue to poison 
and disrupt Ceylon politics, and undermine her loyalty. Without a flag to fly he could 
not lead moderate opinion, which he believed even yet to prevail among the majority, 
into battle against Separationists. Preceding representations were made with patent 
sincerity, and obvious apprehensions of the present dangerous trend of local politics, 
and we ourselves are more than ever convinced of the urgent necessity of stopping 
the rot by making a statement on the lines suggested in my telegram of 17th 
February2 before it is too late.3 
1 On 2 Mar 1943 the joint secretaries of the Ceylon National Congress forwarded to Stanley a copy of a 
resolution passed at the 23rd session of the Congress held on 19 Dec 1942 at Kelaniya which read: 'The 
Ceylon National Congress is of opinion that Ceylon's association in a War said to be for democratic 
freedom, is manifestly contradictory and necessarily ineffective, without a guarantee of that very freedom 
to her. This Sessions [sic] therefore calls upon the United Nations to make forthwith a declaration, 
guaranteeing to Ceylon, freedom immediately after the war' (CO 54/980/11, no 29). 
2 See 153. 
3 Stanley replied to this tel on 27 Feb, asking Caldecott to assure Senanayake that while he appreciated the 
urgency of his representations which were being 'urgently and sincerely studied', ministers and other 
leaders of responsible opinion in Ceylon should realise that on a matter of such fundamental importance it 
would be 'neither right nor practicable to rush the War Cabinet on this important decision' (CO 
54/980/511, no 60). 
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155 CO 54/980/5/1, no 61 2-3 March 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) in two parts from 
Mr Stanley to Sir A Caldecott, including a revised draft statement on 
reform for submission to the War Cabinet 
Part 1: 2 March 
My secret and personal telegram of 27th February .1 
I have now completed my examination of draft Declaration proposed in Part 11 of 
your secret and personal telegram of 17th February. 2 Having regard to the 
considerations which you and the Commander-in-Chief have urged so strongly, as 
well as to those stressed by Senanayake in your secret and personal telegram of 26th 
February.3 I have decided to seek approval of War Cabinet for a further Declaration 
by His Majesty's Government of the nature which you suggest, with the object of 
giving greater precision to the assurance given to Ministers in 1941, and of removing 
any doubts regarding His Majesty's Government's intentions in this most important 
matter. 
2. I should propose therefore to submit the Declaration, amended as in text 
which follows in Part 11 of this telegram, to War Cabinet at very early date with a view 
to obtaining their general concurrence in the making of a further declaration of the 
kind indicated on the understanding that the draft will be subsequently discussed 
with other interested Departments and submitted again to the Cabinet for final 
approval. You will realise that I cannot foresee what the War Cabinet's attitude will 
be, and this intimation of my next move is for you and Commander-in-Chief only 
(repeat only). 
3. I fully appreciate point made in third paragraph of your secret and personal 
telegram of 17th February, Part I, but while there is no question of course of action 
being dependent on permission of Government of India it must be for the discretion 
of Secretary of State for India whether he consults authorities in India. The point you 
make however will be borne fully in mind. 
4. As regards amendments to draft:-
(a) I have assumed that "under the Crown" in opening paragraph of your draft 
means "within the British Commonwealth," and that your proposal would 
preserve to the Governor (apart from the special powers relating to reserved 
subjects) only the normal veto powers of His Majesty's Representative in any 
self-governing territory. 
(b) Reservation (a) in your draft is not in itself a restriction on full responsible 
government, and has therefore been included independently in the revised draft. 
(c) The word "security" has been included after "maintenance" in your reserva-
tion (b) to prevent, e.g., the erection of a building on land adjoining an aerodrome 
which might affect its use for Royal Air Force purposes. 
(d) The word "proposals" has been substituted for "instrument," since it might 
prove difficult for Ministers to evolve a satisfactory instrument, the drafting of 
which could probably best be undertaken here, once detailed proposals had been 
accepted by His Majesty's Government. 
1 See 154, note 3. 2 See 153. 3 See 154. 
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5. Please telegraph whether you agree draft Declaration which follows in Part 11. 
Part !I: 3 March 
Draft declaration begins:-
In August, 1941, the following assurance was given to the Board of Ministers in 
Ceylon:-
"His Majesty's Government have had under further consideration the ques-
tion of constitutional reform in Ceylon. The urgency and importance of the 
reform of the Constitution are fully recognized by His Majesty's Government, 
but before making decisions upon the present proposals for reform, concern-
ing which there has been so little unanimity, but which are of such 
importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would 
desire that the position should be further examined and made the subject of 
further consultation by means of a Commission or Conference. This cannot 
be arranged under war conditions, but the matter will be taken up with the 
least possible delay after the war." 
Following consultation with the Governor and the Board of Ministers, His 
Majesty's Government consider that it is in the general interest to give greater 
precision to the foregoing statement with the object of removing any doubts 
regarding His Majesty's Government's intention. Accordingly His Majesty's Govern-
ment have asked the Governor to convey to the Board of Ministers the following 
message:-
"The post-war re-examination of the reform of the Ceylon Constitution, to 
which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the 
grant to Ceylon by Order of His Majesty in Council, of full responsibility for 
Government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration, 
but with the retention by His Majesty's Government of control over the 
provision, construction, maintenance, security, staffing and manning of such 
naval, military and air defences, equipment and establishments, as His 
Majesty's Government may from time to time deem necessary for the security 
of the Commonwealth, including that of the Islands, the cost thereof being 
shared between the two Governments in agreed proportions. 
"Ceylon's relations with foreign countries and with other parts of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations will be subject to the control and direction 
of His Majesty's Government. 
"The framing of such a Constitution to implement this undertaking will 
require such an examination of detail and such precision of definition as 
cannot be brought to bear so long as the whole energies of the Service and 
other Departments of His Majesty's Government must remain focussed on the 
successful prosecution of the war. His Majesty's Government, will, however, 
once victory is achieved, proceed to the examination, by a suitable Commis-
sion or Conference, of such detailed proposals as Ministers may in the 
meantime have been able to formulate, subject to the clear understanding 
that the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of these proposals will 
depend first upon His Majesty's Government being satisfied that they are in 
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full compliance with the preceding portion of this statement, and secondly, 
upon their subsequent approval by a three-fourths majority of all members of 
the State Council of Ceylon excluding officers of State and Speaker or other 
presiding member.4 
"In their consideration of this problem His Majesty's Government have very 
fully appreciated and valued the contribution which Ceylon has made and is 
making to the war effort of the British Commonwealth and the United 
Nations, and the co-operation which, under the leadership of the Board of 
Ministers and the State Council, has made this contribution effective." Ends. 
4 On 13 Mar, in a further tel to Caldecott, Stanley explained what he meant by a three-fourths majority: 'I 
interpret "approval by a three-fourths majority" as meaning "approval by not less than three-fourths of the 
State Council (excluding Officers of State and Speaker or other presiding members)". Subject to your 
agreement on this interpretation I will substitute those words in proposed draft of declaration' (CO 
54/980/5/2, no 66). 
156 CO 54/980/5/2, no 7 4 16 Mar 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott on the labour dispute with India and the effect that the 
attitude of Ceylon might have on the War Cabinet's reception of the 
reforms declaration 
In my immediately following secret and personal telegram I have explained my 
feeling as to course of action you have proposed in your secret and personal telegram 
of 12th March. 1 In this separate telegram (which will have no repeat no distribution 
at this end) · I want to draw your particular attention to the likely effect which an 
intransignet [sic] attitude by Ceylon may have on the reception in the War Cabinet of 
proposal for declaration by His Majesty's Government as to full responsible 
government in internal affairs after the war. I should not expect in any case to find it 
easy to convince some of my colleagues that declaration is advisable on lines you and 
I have agreed, but if Ceylon Government insist upon refusing to compromise on 
arrangement of limited character for labour supply at this critical juncture on 
account of general suspicion of Indian immigration it will obviously add to doubts of 
my colleagues and they will not be impressed by fact that in Ceylon there is intensely 
bitter and suspicious feeling in this matter. On the contrary Ceylon statesmen of the 
future must of necessity take fully into account actualities of Ceylon's position and 
relations with India if Island's prosperity and ability to govern its own affairs are to be 
matters of reality. If India's present offer is to be rejected by Ministers then at least 
1 Caldecott's tel of 12 Mar stated that neither the CO nor the Government of India appeared to appreciate 
the 'intensely bitter and suspicious feeling' in Ceylon over the question of repatriation (see 151). Ceylon 
insisted on compulsory repatriation of the Indian workers in question at the end of the war; India was 
equally adamant on voluntary repatriation. Caldecott was emphatic that there was 'no possibility whatever 
of the Ministers accepting the Indian proposal, or if they did, of their continuing in office'. He also 
explained that Ministers and the State Council had launched a scheme for the recruitment of labour from 
rubber estates; Senanayake was said to be confident that the scheme would produce the maximum output. 
Civil labour battalions arriving from India would ease the problem by freeing Ceylonese labour (CO 
54/982/6, no 83, Caldecott to Stanley, 12 Mar 1943). 
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there remains need for greatest care in method of communicating such a decision to 
Government of India with statesmanlike consideration for Indian susceptibilities and 
bearing in mind future assistance and facilities which Ceylon will in any case have to 
rely on continuing to obtain from India when normal conditions return, such as food 
and other supplies as well as market for copra. 
I should like you to appreciate that I do not wish Ministers to be subjected to 
undue pressure such as might force their resignation but I do mean that they should 
reach their decision with their eyes wide open as far as you yourself can enlighten 
them in such ways as are open to you. 
157 CO 54/982/6, no 89 21 Mar 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley 
Your most secret and personal telegram of 16th March.1 
Commander-in-Chief and I trust that any criticism by the War Cabinet of matters 
mentioned in your telegram may be tempered:-
(a) by consideration of difficulties of Ministers under the present constitution 
(b) by appreciation of the inevitable shock to public opinion of rejection by India 
of the 1941 Agreed Conclusions as a basis even for post-war negotiations 
(c) by the realization of the dilemma in regard to repatriation explained in (f) of 
my preceding telegram.2 
Ministers are not in any sense a Cabinet, and have no Government majority to 
support them in the State Council. On the contrary, they are the creatures of 
Executive Committees, and the Executive Committees, creatures of the State 
Council. They thus inevitably incur criticism as agents rather than command 
support as leaders, and nothing short of radical amendment can remove this cardinal 
defect in the Constitution. My immediately preceding telegram has explained 
position vis-a-vis India, and we do not wish to conceal our joint opinion that the way 
in which they have handled our request was bound to cause reasonable disappoint-
ment and evoke natural feeling. Steps taken since December have reduced the need 
for immigrant tappers, and their request will receive review before reply to be sent to 
Indian telegram No. 1855 is determined. Grateful for earliest possible reply to 
question at the end of (f) in my telegram. 
1 See 156. 
2 Para (f) of Caldecott's unnumbered tel of 21 Mar read: 'We ( Caldecott and Layton] feel it our duty to 
reiterate with emphasis, that after war some 50,000 Ceylonese now employed in or by Services must be 
thrown back upon the labour market, and unless any labourers specially recruited from India can be 
compulsorily repatriated, we do not ourselves see how the position can possibly be met. Would it be 
possible to assure the Ministers that failing eventual agreement between India and Ceylon as to any 
necessary measures of compulsory repatriation dictated by the question of war conditions, H.M. 
Government would be prepared to arbitrate? Ministers cannot possibly face the State Council unless they 
insure countrymen against unemployment attributable to immigration authorised with their consent' (CO 
54/982/6, no 90). 
In the event arbitration by HMG was never considered. Negotiations between India and Ceylon over 
compulsory repatriation (see 151, note 2) ended at the beginning of Apr 1943 as Ceylon launched its own 
local recruitment drive to make good the labour shortage (see 160). 
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158 CO 54/980/5/2, no 79 23 Mar 1943 
[Reforms]: letter from G E Preston (Board of Trade) to CH Thornley1 
on general safeguards for British goods under the proposed reforms 
The Presidentz is grateful to your Secretary of State for letting him see a copy of the 
memorandum3 on the Ceylon Constitution which it is proposed to put before the 
War Cabinet. 
The President considers that in the constitutional and political situation prevailing 
in Ceylon it will be out of the question to make any provision in the new Constitution 
for the continuance of Imperial Preference or for any specific treatment of United 
Kingdom goods. There remains, however, the question whether some general 
safeguard can be provided, such as is contained in the Royal Instructions to the 
Governor of Southern Rhodesia. These provide that the Governor shall not assent to 
certain classes of Bills without the King's instructions or unless such Bills contain 
clauses suspending their operation until His Majesty's pleasure has been signified. As 
the President understands the position in Southern Rhodesia, the classes of Bill 
covered by this provision include "any law of an extraordinary nature and importance 
whereby Our Prerogative or the rights and property of Our subjects not residing in 
the Colony or the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom and its dependencies 
may be prejudiced." 
The President would be quite content that the Secretary of State's memorandum 
should go forward to the War Cabinet, on the understanding that the point 
mentioned above will be examined in the interdepartmental consultations men-
tioned in paragraph 13 of the memorandum. 
1 Private secretary to Stanley. 2 Mr Hugh Dalton. 3 See 161. 
159 CO 54/980/5/2, no 78 24 Mar 1943 
[Reforms]: letter from Mr Amery to Mr Stanley on responsible 
government and the analogy between Ceylon and Burma 
I have no comments on the form of your memorandum 1 about Ceylon of which you 
were good enough to send me a copy. I note that it is intended that the India and 
Burma Offices should be consulted later on the precise wording of the proposed 
declaration. 
I should however like to say that I myself should much prefer to see the phrase 
"full responsible Government", which appears in the present draft, avoided. In 
connection with India, I am more and more driven to the conclusion that the 
communal differences have been much accentuated by the emphasis which has been 
laid in the past on "responsible self-government". In countries such as India, and I 
should have thought also Ceylon, where sharp communal divisions exist, responsible 
Government of the British type is, it seems to me, not feasible, and it is because we 
have led Indians to suppose that self-government and responsible Parliamentary 
Government are identical terms that the Muslims have been driven into the demand 
1 See 161. 
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for a separate Muslim State where a Muslim majority can prevail. Conditions in 
Ceylon may be a good deal different, but nevertheless I feel that it would be wise to 
substitute a more general phrase such as "full self-government under the Crown". 
There is one other point-the case of Ceylon has some analogy with that of 
Burma. Within ten days at the latest I shall be circulating to the Cabinet a paper 
about our future policy in Burma. This will cover a very wide field, including 
material social and economic reconstruction, the direct rule which I think will be 
necessary during the reconstruction period, and also the immediate question of 
political warfare. But in my paper I shall propose that at some appropriate time, for 
example as soon as we have so effectively re-occupied Burma and restored order that 
military administration can give way to civil, we should issue a declaration of our 
policy. This would include an undertaking that after a period of direct rule lasting 
seven years, full self-government of a form congenial to Burman aspirations would 
be granted, not excluding control of foreign relations and defence though we should 
contemplate that provision for securing H.M.G.'s obligations for defence and 
important minorities would be laid down outside the constitution in a treaty between 
Burma and H.M.G. It is, of course, the case that Burma under the Act of 1935 
enjoyed a wider degree of self-government than Ceylon now possesses and in the 
respect that under that Act Burma had control of her relations with other parts of the 
Empire (though not of her foreign relations) she had wider powers than those which 
you are now proposing for Ceylon after the war. lt might I think be felt that we could 
not promise less to Ceylon after the war than we intend to promise to Burma and in 
any case it might be felt that Ceylon ought to be given at least the powers which 
Burma had in respect of relations with other parts of the Empire under the 1935 Act. 
It seems to me, therefore, that although my memorandum on Burma will have to 
cover ground not relevant to the case of Ceylon-questions arising out of re-
conquest, reconstruction and the like due to the Japanese invasion-there might be 
some advantages in having the two cases considered at the same meeting. I do not, 
however, press this if you feel it urgently necessary to secure a decision on the 
Ceylon case. 
160 CO 54/982/6, no 94 26 Mar 1943 
[Rubber production]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr Stanley on the dispute with India and the ministers' 
scheme for increasing rubber production 
Commander-in-Chief and I interviewed the Board of Ministers yesterday and placed 
before them Indian telegram No.1,855 together with subsequent explanatory 
telegrams, and also your telegram No.271. As we expected, Ministers at first pressed 
for immediate and point blank rejection of the Indian offer. 1 They represented with 
considerable heat that they had with honesty and conviction voted with the rest of 
the State Council on the previous day in favour of the Motion introduced by private 
member on 1Oth February, stating that there was local labour available for maximum 
output of rubber, which had been fully debated in the light of full joint report by 
1 cf 151, note 2, 156, note 1 and 157, note 2. 
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Executive Committees of Labour, Industry, and Commerce and of Agriculture and 
Land. They fully recognised the essential duty of Ceylon to produce every possible 
ounce of rubber, but were as fully convinced of their ability to achieve this result 
with labour locally available. They very much hoped the circumstances would enable 
them to continue their co-operation with us as my Ministers, but such co-operation 
required on our part trust in their honest convictions and given undertakings. I 
explained at this point the constitutional position, and emphasised that if their 
assurance of securing sufficient labour for tapping were not fulfilled, the Governor 
would be constitutionally responsible for the rejection of the present Indian offer, 
and that my right to accept it ex proprio motu must be recognised, although my 
desire for continued Ministerial co-operation was not less than theirs. At this they 
again expressed the hope that no decision of mine would force them to resign. 
Discussion having thus taken the course which we had anticipated, C.-in-C. stated 
that proof of their pudding must lie in its eating, and that if by 1st June all tapping 
requirements had not de facto been met by local labour, the deficit would have to be 
imported from India on the only terms available. Ministers temporarily accepted this 
position but with the clear stipulation that their present acceptance would in no 
sense prejudice their freedom to resign office and make public protest if, in the 
event, the Indian offer has to be accepted even in part. It was finally agreed that I 
should draft for the agreement of the Board of Ministers at their regular meeting 
29th March a polite temporary reply to India, which I have done as follows. 
Begins. Your telegram No.l,855. Labour for intensified rubber production. State 
Council have accepted the joint report of the Executive Committees for Labour, 
Industry, Commerce and of Agriculture and Land, to the effect that maximum 
output can be achieved with labour locally available (? and) it has become necessary 
for me to postpone reply to the offer contained in your telegram under reply until the 
position can be reviewed in the light of results obtained from implementing the 
recommendations of the two Committees for provision of labour here. Ends. 
161 CO 54/980/13, no 1, WP(43)129 27 Mar 1943 
'Ceylon constitution': War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Stanley 
I regret that I must again trouble my colleagues on the question of the Ceylon 
Constitution. I only do so because of recent telegrams from the Governor and from 
the Commander-in-Chief and of the wide repercussions which events in Ceylon may 
have upon the war effort of the United Nations. In order to make plain the present 
situation it is, I fear, necessary to [map] out something of the past history of this 
question. 
2. The present constitution of Ceylon is of the nature of a dyarchy. I need not 
trouble my colleagues with the full details of the very complicated scheme, but the 
facts relevant to the present problem are:-
(a) For the normal purpose of legislative and executive action the power is with a 
State Council, almost entirely elected on a system of universal suffrage, and a 
Board of Ministers comprising the elected Chairmen of the seven Executive 
Committees of the State Council, plus the three Officers of State (Chief Secretary, 
Legal Secretary, and Financial Secretary, who are permanent officials). 
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(b) Certain matters, such as external affairs, defence, public services, customs and 
finance, are reserved to the executive control of the Officers of State. 
(c) The Governor retains full powers of certification and veto, extending both to 
executive as well as to legislative action, while additional provision is made for his 
assuming full control of the administration in the event of an emergency. 
3. For some time before the war this constitution was admittedly not proving 
satisfactory, and recommendations for changes were under discussion in Ceylon. 
From the point of view of the present situation, the most important of the suggested 
changes was that the administrative duties hitherto reserved for the Officers of State 
should in future be allocated to the Ministers, except in regard to certain special 
subjects, over which the Governor would retain personal control. Moreover, the full 
powers of the Governor as set out in paragraph 2 (c) would remain without 
reduction. These proposals were debated at length in the Ceylon State Council, but, 
owing largely to minority difficulties, no basis of agreement was reached. Further 
examination of the problem was interrupted by the outbreak of war and, as it became 
increasingly clear that a settlement could not be satisfactorily carried out until after 
the war was over, the Governor was authorised to give Ministers an assurance that 
the position would be further examined and made the subject of further consultation 
by means of a Commission or Conference; that this could not be arranged under war 
conditions, but that the matter would be taken up with the least possible delay after 
the war. 
4. In December of last year, owing to representations from the Governor that 
some further declaration was necessary if we were to retain the goodwill and 
co-operation of the Ceylonese Ministers, and if the whole-hearted participation of 
Ceylon in the war effort was to be continued, I approached the War Cabinet again. 
The War Cabinet then approved of a further statement to Ministers being made in the 
following terms:-
"The re-examination of the reform of Ceylon's constitution after the war, to 
which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the 
fullest possible development of self-governing institutions in Ceylon within 
the Commonwealth partnership, having regard both to the single interest of 
the Island and to the larger interest of the Commonwealth on which the 
Island's security and prosperity ultimately depend. In their approach to the 
question of revision of the constitution in that spirit and intention, there will 
be on the part of His Majesty's Government the fullest appreciation of the 
effort and resolution which Ceylon and her people have shown in defence of 
the Island and in the cause of the Commonwealth." 
5. I have now had an opportunity of seeing the reactions of the Ministers in 
Ceylon to this declaration. Unfortunately, the effect upon them has been far less 
favourable than the Governor believed it would be, and I fear that as far as they are 
concerned it has completely failed in the desired effect. Their reply, to the effect that 
the statement was in far too indefinite and conditional terms to allay the growing 
concern in Ceylon, is included in Appendix 1.1 I have also received telegrams from 
the Governor and a joint telegram from the Governor and Commander-in-Chief 
1 See 148, tel no 71. 
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dealing fully with the position and making certain new proposals. These telegrams, 
together with my replies, are also set out in full in Appendix 1.2 
6. It will be seen from these telegrams that the Governor and Commander-in-
Chief take a very serious view of what may happen if it is not possible, by some new 
declaration, to meet the desires and aspirations of the more moderate element in 
Ceylon. They expect immediate and progressive loss of co-operation and decrease of 
war effort, coupled with the deflection of the great bulk of now moderate opinion 
towards intransigent nationalism and the demand for the right of secession. 
7. The Commander-in-Chief and the Governor, after pointing out these dangers, 
make proposals for a declaration which they feel, though it will not be acceptable to 
all should satisfy reasonable political opinion. I have set out in Appendix 11 the 
declaration which the War Cabinet approved in December side by side with the new 
declaration now proposed by the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief.3 
8. A comparison of the two declarations shows that, while in the proposed 
declaration as in the authorised declaration, no hope is held out of any changes 
during the war, we should now be definitely committed to a far-reaching reform after 
the war. Instead of the aim of "the fullest possible development of self-governing 
institutions within the Commonwealth" we should have given a promise of "full 
responsibility for government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil 
administration." The only matters to be reserved would be external relations and 
defence, while, of course, the proposals do not include any right of secession. Thus, 
constitutionally, Ceylon, while not attaining full Dominion status, would be very 
much in the position now occupied by Southern Rhodesia. 
9. There is, however, one overriding condition. The proposed constitution, when 
it has been worked out by a suitable Commission on [sic] Conference, and provided 
that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that it complies with the reservations in 
paragraph 8, must be approved by three-quarters of the Members of the State 
Council* (excluding Officers of State and the Speaker or other presiding member). 
The object of this condition is to ensure some safeguards for minority interests, as 
the Sinhalese (the majority community) cannot obtain the requisite majority, unless 
some at least, of the minority elements are in agreement with them. 
10. I find the decision in these circumstances a very difficult one to make, but 
after much consideration I have come to the conclusion that I should recommend 
the War Cabinet to endorse the Governor's proposal for a fuller and more definite 
declaration. The arguments in favour of such a course are:-
(1) It is necessary to make such a declaration if we are to prevent the very serious 
deterioration in Ceylon's war effort which the Governor thinks is bound to result 
* The present composition of the State Council is as follows:-
Sinhalese (including 8 Kandyans) ... 
Ceylon Tamils 
Indian Tamils 
Europeans (including 3 Officers of State) 
Muslims 
Burghers ... 
2 See 149, 150, 152, 153, 154. 
39 seats. 
6 " 
4 " 
8 " 
3 " 
1 " 
61 " 
3 See 155, part II. 
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unless we go as far as this. I need not remind my colleagues of the vital importance 
of Ceylon, both as a strategical base and as the source of essential war materials, 
rubber in particular. 
(2) Ceylon has up to now deserved extremely well of the Empire and its war effort, 
and the admittedly difficult constitution has been worked by Ministers with great 
goodwill and, perhaps, an unexpected degree of success. It would be a natural 
thing for them to compare the definite promises made to India, where, with all 
respect to India's war effort, the political element at least has been largely 
non-co-operative, with the indefinite hopes held out to Ceylon, where the elected 
Ministers have thrown themselves heart and souls into war production. This 
comparison may lead to the argument that more can be obtained from His 
Majesty's Government by making trouble than by methods of co-operation; 
(3) The proposed declaration would be an encouragement to Sinhalese politicians 
to turn their minds to settlement with the minorities and to a realistic 
appreciation of their future relations with India; and 
(4) Even under the declaration of December 1942, when we come after the war to 
a discussion of this question, we shall have to offer a great deal, if not all, of what is 
now contained in the Governor's proposed declaration. We shall, however, have 
lost the goodwill which we should gain by making the declaration now, and 
proposals which to-day, it is believed, will stabilise the situation, may by that time 
fall far short of the majority view. 
11. It is only fair, however, to put on the other side the very real difficulties which 
arise if the Governor's proposals are accepted. They are:-
(a) The only definite safeguard, for the various minorities lies in the requirement 
of approval by three-fourths of the State Council. I had feared that the discussion 
of constitutional reform would exacerbate the communal position and that we 
might risk losing the co-operation of the minorities in the war effort, but I have 
received the expressed assurance of the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor 
that they do not share this fear (see the Governor's telegram of the 17th February, 
paragraph 3) .4 
(b) A popular Government will assume for the first time complete financial 
responsibility just at a time when the post-war financial and economic problems of 
Ceylon may be most acute. 
(c) There is no specific safeguard for British commercial interests in Ceylon. It is 
difficult to insert this in view of the fact that the promises made to India contain 
no such provision. Nor is there any definite safeguard for Indian commercial 
interests; but India would not be without bargaining power for this purpose. 
12. Nevertheless, I feel strongly that, even with all these difficulties, the balance 
of advantage lies in making a further declaration forthwith. In coming to this 
conclusion, I attach very great importance to the views expressed by the Governor 
and the Commander-in-Chief (1) that a declaration by His Majesty's Government in 
the terms now proposed will satisfy general political opinion in Ceylon, and (2) that if 
such a declaration is not made there will be a progressive failure of co-operation and 
a progressive tendency of moderate political opinion to become more extreme in its 
demands. 
4 See 153, part I. 
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13. I therefore recommend to my colleagues that general approval should be 
given to the declaration in the terms recommended by the Governor and set out in 
Appendix Il, subject to (1) the examination of the actual wording by other 
Departments concerned, especially the Service Departments, India Office and the 
Board of Trade, in consultation with the Colonial Office, and (2) submission of the 
draft to the War Cabinet for final approval as soon as interdepartmental consultations 
are completed.5 
5 When Stanley's memo was considered by the War Cabinet on 1 Apr 1943, it was pointed out that the new 
declaration would not provide lasting safeguards for the interests of minorities. Concern was expressed 
that this might afford a dangerous precedent in further discussions of constitutional reform in India. It 
also seemed desirable that, if such a declaration were to be made, something should be said at the same 
time about the possibility of a commercial agreement to protect Indian and British commercial interests 
in Ceylon. Sir K Wood, chancellor of the Exchequer, was anxious that currency questions should be 
reserved to HMG and he suggested that there might be other points on which interested departments 
would want to see detailed amendments. Accordingly, the War Cabinet appointed a Cabinet Committee on 
the Ceylon Constitution to consider these issues. It was chaired by Sir J Anderson (lord president of the 
Council); other members were Stanley, Amery, Wood and Dalton (Board of Trade) (CO 54/980/13, no 2, 
WM 47(43)3). To assist the deliberations of the new Cabinet Committee, Stanley requested the governor's 
views on the reservation of currency, other categories of reserved subjects and the machinery by which the 
governor would deal with questions relating to defence and external affairs, enquiring in this latter respect 
whether it was still the intention to create a principal secretaryship to the governor as envisaged in paras 
32-33 of Caldecott's despatch of 13 June 1938 (CO 54/980/5/2, no 88, Stanley to Caldecott, 31 Mar 1943). 
162 CO 852/515/10 2 Apr 1943 
[Rubber production]: minute by S Caine on a disagreement between 
Ceylon and the UK over the question of whether compensation or an 
increased price should be paid to rubber producers for slaughter 
tapping [Extract] 
... It has of course for some time been common ground that Ceylon ought to 
produce the maximum quantity possible of rubber, particularly during the current 
year which is the critical period before synthetic supplies become available in bulk. 
Some months ago the Ministry of Supply sent out a Mr. Fellowes to report on the 
position of rubber production in Ceylon and India and as the result of discussions he 
had with the authorities in Ceylon, the Ceylon Govt. submitted certain proposals for 
a further increase of production there. These proposals do not entirely commend 
themselves to the Ministry of Supply and they have suggested various alternatives. 
Unfortunately these alternatives have not proved acceptable to the Govt. of Ceylon 
and there appears to be no prospect of any compromise. 
In order to understand the differences it is necessary to explain in the first place 
certain technical considerations and in the second the position as regards taxation. 
The principal technical consideration is that by an intensification of the tapping, that 
is by tapping the trees more frequently, it is possible to effect a substantial temporary 
increase in the rate of rubber production at the expense of a deterioration in the tree, 
and a falling off in subsequent production, or, if tapping is sufficiently intense, the 
ultimate destruction of the tree. For practical purposes intensified tapping may be 
dealt with in two stages, first what is known as the Double-three system which means 
making two cuts every three days instead of the usual one cut every other day, and 
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second, the Double-two system which means two cuts every two days. The first 
involves some danger to the trees but if care is taken of them in other ways it should 
not cause permanent damage. The second is fairly certain to kill the trees within a 
year or two. On the technical side the Ceylon proposals aimed at a universal 
enforcement of the Double-three system and the application of the Double-two 
system to 20 per cent of each producer's acreage. In actual practice it is understood 
that a large majority of producers are already tapping on the Double-three system 
and the important new element introduced by the Ceylon proposals was the 20% 
"slaughter tapping". It was clear that producers would not follow a system which was 
bound to destroy a percentage of their plantations as well as jeopardise the remainder 
without some compensation and it is in fact on the terms of that compensation that 
the argument has taken place. It should however be interposed at this point that the 
Ministry of Supply would not themselves have urged the adoption of slaughter 
tapping at all and are still in two minds as to whether it is on balance desirable 
because, although it will mean more rubber now, it will mean less rubber in 
subsequent years. Their attitude has therefore been rather one of unwillingness to 
oppose the Ceylon proposal for fear of damping Ceylon's enthusiasm for rubber 
production, not one of enthusiastic support. 
The taxation point is that in the case of concerns liable to U.K. taxation, that is 
approximately 40 to 45 per cent of the whole production, any additional receipts by 
way of extra price would merely add to the Excess Profits which are already being 
earned and would be wholly absorbed by the Ceylon and U.K. Excess Profit taxes 
which in combination take 100% of the excess profit. Concerns which are liable to 
Ceylon Taxation only are not affected in quite the same way as Ceylon E.P.T. is only 
50 per cent. 
The initial Ceylon proposal, which they have maintained with variations through-
out, was for a straight addition to the price on all rubber produced, conditional on 
the compulsory enforcement of intensified tapping as already described. This 
proposal was originally put forward under the impression that it would be possible to 
exempt such additional price from E.P.T. and as this was not in fact possible the 
Departments concerned at this end put forward as an alternative the payment of 
compensation for actual replanting costs incurred in the replacement of trees 
destroyed by slaughter tapping.1 Ceylon agreed that this method should be applied to 
the London concerns since otherwise they could receive no compensation at all, but 
contended that it would be neither practicable to apply it to the local concerns nor 
attractive to those concerns since what was wanted was immediate cash recompense 
and not a promise of future repayment of replanting costs. The Ministry of Supply 
then put forward a second alternative. They were in any case sceptical of the efficacy 
of an overall payment in actually increasing production and they therefore proposed 
to relate any additional payment to the actual excess over Ceylon's standard 
production (estimated at 100,000 tons). In order to leave the Ceylon Govt. a 
completely free hand as to how they would dispose of such additional payment, they 
proposed to pay the bonus to the Govt. and leave the internal distribution to them. 
Ceylon have however refused to accept this alternative and after further correspond-
ence in which its exact character and the reasons for it had been more amply 
explained, they adhere to the request for a straight increase of price applicable to all 
1 Caine added in the margin: 'This would be a capital payment & not liable to tax.' 
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producers except the London companies who will perforce be dealt with on the 
compensation basis. 
The last two telegrams indicate a very firm and possibly non-cooperative attitude 
on the part of the Ceylon Minister of Agriculture. The discussion has been brought 
sharply into the political arena by the adoption of a Motion in the State Council 
supporting the request for a straight increase of price. Before that, we had hoped to 
settle the matter on technical and commercial considerations, but it is now 
impossible to ignore the political aspects. 
I fear that the above, complicated as it is, deals with only a few of the complexities 
of this subject. I will not attempt to cover them all but other factors which must be 
mentioned are that the Ceylon Minister is, as ever, very much concerned about the 
fortunes of the small peasant producers who are responsible for about 22% of 
Ceylon's rubber production; that in actual fact we are assured by Mr. Fellowes, and 
have every reason to believe, that these producers are already tapping as heavily as 
they possibly can and their production will not be increased by any rise in price; that 
we can probably in any case deal independently with the London Companies so that 
the only increase of production which is really in balance is that resulting from the 
slaughter tapping of Ceylon-owned plantations, amounting to perhaps to 5,000 tons 
per annum; and that on the other hand the Ministry of Supply are very apprehensive 
that a straight increase of price in Ceylon will have to be followed in Africa-British, 
French and Belgian, and is more likely to reduce than to increase production there. 
There is in addition the revenue interest of the Ceylon Gov .... We had feared also 
that there would be another political complication from the American side since if 
Ceylon production in fact falls short, the Americans might be critical of any refusal 
on H.M.G's part to agree to the terms asked by the Ceylon Govt. The Ministry of 
Production, however, believe that there is now a much better realisation of the 
unwisdom of simply offering high prices for everything on the American side and 
that they can deal with any criticisms of that nature. 
As said at the commencement, the situation was discussed at a meeting attended 
by Mr. Ascoli (Rubber Controller), Mr. Peirson and Mr. Pyke, (Ministry of Supply), 
Mr. Morris and Miss Maclean (Min. of Production), Mr. Lee and Mr. Bromley (Trsy.), 
Sir Clifford Figg, Mr. Sidebotham, Mr. Carstairs,2 Mr. Bull and myself. The general 
conclusion was that on the merits of the case no reason whatever was seen to change 
the views previously held and provided that Ceylon's present attitude did not mean 
that they would be unwilling even to cooperate in working the compensation 
scheme, the Ministry of Supply would prefer to confine themselves to an offer of 
compensation as indicated in para. 4 of No. 15. It was however recognised that 
account must be taken of the position if the Ceylon attitude meant that a refusal of 
their proposals in this matter would cause such ill feeling as to jeopardise their whole 
cooperation in the war effort and that it was also essential to find out whether in fact 
their non-acceptance would extend to a refusal to work the compensation scheme. It 
was felt therefore that the first stage should be to get a clear idea of the prospect on 
these two matters by sending a personal telegram to the Governor in reply to No. 
135. I submit a draft accordingly . ... 3 
2 C Y Carstairs, assistant secretary, CO, head of Production Dept; secretary, Colonial Production Research 
Committee. 
3 Not printed. 
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163 CO 54/980/5/2, no 89 3 Apr 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley on reserved subjects 
Your secret and personal telegram of 31st March.1 
1. Commander-in-Chief and I consider that the safeguarding of currency will be 
met by the Governor's obligation to reserve all legislation concerning it vide next 
paragraph. 
2. Provision regarding legislation on reserved subjects, i.e., subjects in respect of 
which the Governor will retain full executive authority, should be incorporated in 
the new constitution and not be left solely for inclusion in future Royal Instructions. 
Following categories in Instruction 4 must be preserved:-
(4), (8), (9), (10), with the omission of the words "or public security" and further 
on, "or control of aerial navigation or aircraft." 
(11) with the omission of the words "any extraordinary nature and" and of "or 
rights and property of our subjects not residing in the Island or trade and shipping 
of any part of our Dominions" vide remarks of the Duke of Devonshire in the 
House of Lords, July, 1942, ending "Guarantees and safeguards are incompatible 
with equal partnership." 
(12) would need redrafting on the following lines: "Any Bill relating to docks, 
harbours, shipping, coastal and inland waters, buildings or land in such manner as 
to affect naval, military or aerial security, local or Imperial." Legislation under the 
omitted headings might of course evoke protest or counteraction of external 
relations. New constitution would need to arm the Governor with powers 
equivalent to those now contained in Article 22 of Order-in-Council in respect of 
his remaining reserved subjects, e.g., in order to preserve friendly relations with 
an external protesting Government, it might become necessary for him to repeal 
or suspend legislation passed by the Legislature if the latter not prepared to do so 
itself. 
3. Paragraph 32 and 33 of my despatch of 13th June, 1938. Anticipated that 
Principal Secretary of the Governor would be Chairman of the Public Services 
Commission. Under the present proposals this is doubtful, and the official designa-
tion of the Governor's right-hand man might await the drafting of the constitution. 
The essential point about him is that he will have no (repeat no) constitutional status 
whatever, and act only at the direction and on the responsibility of the Governor. As 
regards the presentation of motions, bills, etc. , concerning the Governor's reserved 
subjects in the Legislature, this must be done by one of the Ministers after the 
Governor has consulted the Cabinet as envisaged in my despatch, and probably by 
the Chief Minister, but consideration of this point should await the drafting of the 
constitution. It is indeed important that the framework only of the new constitution 
should be definitely determined now, and that details of the design and procedure 
should be left for precise consideration and scrutiny by those entrusted with the 
preliminary and final drafting. 
1 See 161, note 5. 
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164 CO 54/980/13, no 5 10 Apr 1943 
'Ceylon constitution': memorandum by Mr Stanley for the War 
Cabinet Committee on the Ceylon Constitution on reserved legisla-
tion, the safeguarding of minorities and British and Indian commer-
cial interests 
1. My colleagues on this Committee will remember that the statement regarding 
constitutional reform in Ceylon which was submitted to the War Cabinet for approval 
(Cabinet Paper WP(43)12W was criticised on the grounds that (a) the new 
declaration contained insufficient safeguards for the interests of minorities, (b) the 
declaration ought to include some reference to a commercial agreement to safeguard 
Indian and British commercial interests, and (c) currency questions should be 
included amongst the subjects reserved to His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom.2 
2. In order to meet these criticisms I suggest the following alterations. If they 
prove acceptable to my colleagues, I would then consult the Governor as to the 
chances of their being accepted in Ceylon. 
3. Reserved legislation 
I feel that there would be considerable advantage in basing any proposals on a 
precedent, and I should suggest the adoption of the categories of reserved Bills 
contained in the Southern Rhodesia Royal Instructions of 1937. These include the 
following only as reserved:-
( 1) Any law whereby any grant of land or money or other donation or gratuity may 
be made to the Governor; 
(2) Any law affecting the currency of the Colony; 
(3) Any law the provisions of which shall appear inconsistent with obligations 
imposed on Us by Treaty; 
(4) Any law of an extraordinary nature and importance whereby Our prerogative 
or the rights and property of Our subjects not residing in the Colony or the trade 
and shipping of the United Kingdom and its Dependencies may be prejudiced; 
(5) Any law containing provisions to which Our assent has been once refused, or 
which may have been disallowed by Us. 
In addition in the case of Ceylon there would be two further general subjects 
reserved, viz: Defence and External Relations, which are referred to in the proposed 
draft statement. These would provide for the retention by His Majesty's Government 
of all control over 
(a) the provision, construction, maintenance, security, staffing and manning of 
such Naval, Military and Air defences, equipment and establishments as His 
Majesty's Government may from time to time deem necessary for the security of 
the Commonwealth including that of the island, and 
(b) Ceylon's relations with foreign countries and with other parts of the British 
Commonwealth of nations. 
1 See 161. 2 See ibid, note 5. 
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4. Safeguarding of minorities. 
It seems worth trying, whether we can avoid at this stage any attempt to frame 
detailed proposals, although I am not very hopeful as to acceptance in Ceylon. This 
course also has the advantage of following more closely the Indian precedent and 
thus avoiding complications in that quarter. I propose therefore the inclusion in the 
draft statement of a provision which would make the acceptance by His Majesty's 
Government of any proposals for a new constitution dependent upon His Majesty's 
Government being satisfied that the rights and interests of minorities are reasonably 
protected against discrimination. 
5. British and Indian commercial interests 
I propose the inclusion in the draft settlement of a provision for the negotiation of 
trade agreements by Ceylon with other interested members of the Commonwealth 
for the security of the latters' commercial interests in the Island. 
6. I feel that the above proposals should fully meet the criticisms of the War 
Cabinet, and if my colleagues agree, I would refer them to the Governor for his 
report on the likelihood of their proving acceptable to Ceylon Ministers. If he feels 
they would have a reasonable chance of acceptance, we could then proceed with the 
detailed draft for resubmission to the War Cabinet. If, as I fear is more likely, he feels 
that they will prove unacceptable, I do not think I can carry the matter any further 
by this long-range telegraphic discussion. I should then propose that either the 
Governor, or, if he cannot leave, some one representing him should come back here 
for a detailed discussion, which might enable me to frame other proposals for the 
consideration of this Committee. Although that would entail considerable delay, it 
would in my view be essential, if any progress were to be made. 
165 CO 54/980/13, no 6, GEN 3, 1st meeting 12 Apr 1943 
'Ceylon constitution': minutes of War Cabinet Committee on Ceylon 
Constitution on Mr Stanley's memorandum 
The Meeting had before them a Memorandum1 by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in which he suggested certain alterations in order to meet criticisms which 
had been made of the proposed statement regarding constitutional reform in Ceylon 
which had been discussed by the War Cabinet on the 1st April, 1943, (W.M.(43) 47th 
Conclusions, Minute 3) .2 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he felt that the alterations 
suggested in his memorandum should fully meet the criticisms of the War Cabinet. If 
his colleagues shared that view, he proposed to refer the proposed alterations to the 
Governor of Ceylon and to request his views regarding the likelihood of their proving 
acceptable to the Ceylon Ministers. 
In the course of discussion, the following points were raised:-
(a) It was not proposed, in any negotiations with Ceylon Ministers, to refer to the 
precedent of Southern Rhodesia. If any such precedent were quoted, it would 
obviously be difficult in the future to resist demands for the extension to Ceylon of 
1 See 164. 2 See 161, note 5. 
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any further concessions which it might prove possible to make in the case of 
Southern Rhodesia. 
(b) Would not the Ceylon Ministers contend that the provision in regard to the 
safeguarding of minorities which it was now proposed to include in the draft 
statement was so vaguely worded as to afford a pretext for His Majesty's 
Government to reject almost any proposals for a new constitution? 
It was the general view of the Meeting that, though the chances of Ceylon 
Ministers being prepared to accept this provision might be small, the suggestion 
was one which should be explored if only because of the limitations of the majority 
requirement as a means of safeguarding the rights and interests of minorities. 
(c) The protection of the commercial interests of British subjects resident in 
Ceylon would be covered by the provision for the safeguarding of minorities 
suggested in paragraph 4 of the memorandum. The protection of the commercial 
interests of British subjects not resident in the Colony would be secured by the 
reservation referred to in paragraph 3(4) of the memorandum. In these circum-
stances, the proposal to include in the draft statement a provision for the 
negotiation of trade agreements by Ceylon with other interested members of the 
Commonwealth represented not so much a reservation required in order to ensure 
the protection of British commercial interests, as a derogation from the general 
reservation of External Relations (see paragraph 3(b) of the memorandum). 
It was agreed that this should be made clear in any communication sent to the 
Governor of Ceylon. Some words should also be included to indicate that Ceylon 
might expect to receive benefits for such agreements as well as to confer them. 
It was the general view of the Meeting that, subject to the points which had been 
raised in discussion, the alterations suggested in the memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies should meet the criticisms of the War Cabinet. 
In conclusion:-
(!) The Secretary of State for the Colonies was invited to inform the Governor of 
Ceylon by telegraph of the alterations in the draft statement now proposed and to 
request his views on the likelihood of their proving acceptable to the Ceylon 
Ministers. 
(2) The Secretary of State for the Colonies undertook to circulate to the Ministers 
concerned, for their concurrence, a draft of this telegram before its despatch. 
166 CO 54/980/5/2, no 104 19 Apr 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott requesting clarification on the safeguards required to protect 
British and Indian commercial rights and minority interests 
Your most secret and personal of 5th April. Constitution. 
1. I am grateful for your endeavours to find formulae which would meet 
satisfactorily difficulties mentioned in my secret and personal telegram of 31st 
March1 in manner least unpalatable to Ministers. I have carefully considered your 
1 See 161, note 5; also 163. 
[166) APR 1943 257 
suggestions and I have had further consultation with those of my colleagues in the 
War Cabinet who are more particularly concerned.2 
2. In certain respects your proposals in your telegram under reference would not 
have provided successful solution of those parts of the problem which offer special 
difficulty at this end viz:-
(1) safeguarding British and Indian commercial rights and, 
(2) safeguarding interests of the several minority communities. 
If therefore I now proceed to ask for your considered advice on certain conclusions 
which have been provisionally reached in my consultations here without detailing 
our difficulties in adopting your own suggestions I hope that you will not feel in the 
least that your advice has not been most valuable and helpful to me. 
3. These conclusions are as follows:-
(a) categories of reserved Bills. These should be in effect the categories of Bills 
now reserved in Southern Rhodesia although no (repeat no) mention of Southern 
Rhodesia as a model for Ceylon would actually be included in the declaration. This 
would mean Bills of a nature now mentioned in Clause IV (i) Ceylon Royal 
Instructions Numbers (2), (4) (omitting reference to Bank Notes), (8), (11) and 
(17). 
(b) Defence and External Affairs. These subjects would be matters of general 
reservation in the Constitutional instruments. 
(c) Minorities. His Majesty's Government will require adequate safeguards for the 
rights and interests of the various minorities to be provided in any new 
constitution, and the proposed three-quarters majority in new paragraph 5 
suggested in Part 11 of your telegram would not be regarded as adequate safeguard. 
It is most desirable to avoid in present circumstances any attempt to frame 
detailed proposals for this purpose, and therefore, we are in favour of inclusion in 
draft declaration of a provision in general terms only which would make the 
acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any proposals for new constitution 
dependent on His Majesty's Government being satisfied that the rights and 
interests of minorities are satisfactorily protected against discrimination. 
(d) Commercial interests of United Kingdom, India and other members of the 
British Commonwealth. Your proposal for trade agreement between Ceylon and 
His Majesty's Government in which latter would negotiate with Ceylon on behalf 
of all members of Commonwealth would I am sure not only be unacceptable to 
India but also to Dominions, and I am quite satisfied that any negotiations for such 
an agreement would have to be conducted between all interested parties each of 
whom would be signatory. Accordingly I propose the inclusion in the draft 
declaration of a provision for the negotiation of trade agreements by Ceylon with 
other interested members of the Commonwealth for the security of the latter's 
commercial interests in the Island. It would naturally be appreciated in Ceylon 
that the Island might expect to receive benefits as well as incur obligations under 
such agreements. It would also need to be made clear that His Majesty's 
Government's general power to control the Island's external relations would not 
be deemed to be impaired by the negotiation of such agreements by Ceylon nor on 
2 See 165. 
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the other hand would it be deemed to imply the exercise of new powers of control 
by His Majesty's Government which would in future restrict Ceylon's present 
capacity to negotiate local and limited agreements with other countries e.g. postal 
agreements. 
4. I have now to ask you for your candid personal advice on the likelihood of 
declaration modified in above respects being found acceptable to Ministers. If so I feel 
confident that I can obtain His Majesty's Government's approval, but I am equally 
confident that approval will not be forthcoming for early fresh declaration unless 
modified on these lines. If therefore you have to advise that these proposals wo~:~ld 
not repeat not have a reasonable chance of acceptance by Ministers my only course 
would be to ask that you yourself or Chief Secretary should come home for special 
consultation, and if your advice makes that course necessary I should like to know 
whether you would wish to come yourself or whether you would prefer to send the 
Chief Secretary. 
5. I should like to assure you how clearly I appreciate the difficulty you must feel 
in assessing likely reaction of Ministers without possibility of consultation with them 
at this stage, but I know that I can rely upon you with your experience and your 
personal understanding of all aspects of the political situation to give me a balanced 
and carefully considered judgment on this difficult matter. 
6. I have naturally assumed that you will discuss this matter with the 
Commander-in-Chief. 
167 CO 852/515/10, no 155 23 Apr 1943 
'Rubber from Ceylon': letter from F GLee (Treasury) to S Caine 
explaining the chancellor's rejection of an increased price for Ceylon 
rubber 
I am sorry that we have not been able to let you have an earlier decision on the price 
question which was discussed in your room on the 14th April. 1 
The papers have been submitted to the Chancellor together with an account of the 
various considerations which were urged at our discussion on the 14th April and at 
the earlier meetings which we have held on the subject. I am now asked to tell you 
that, while the Chancellor understands that the Colonial Office, the Ministry of 
Production and the Ministry of Supply consider that there is now no alternative but 
to give way to the demand of the Minister (in view of the importance of running no 
risk of a fall in Ceylon production) he is not able to agree that the Ceylon proposals 
should be accepted. I do not think that I need go into any detailed exposition of the 
reasons which have weighed with him in coming to this decision-they are those 
which we have formulated for ourselves on several occasions. Leaving aside what I 
may call the inflation argument and the consideration of repercussions on African 
rubber, the essence of the matter is that we have put forward a scheme which we 
consider fair and reasonable, that the Government of Ceylon has not examined that 
scheme on its merits but is virtually blackmailing us to accept an alternative course 
which would involve heavy additional payments by the Exchequer, with no guarantee 
1 cf 162. 
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whatever that such payments would be matched by any increase in rubber 
production. As I have said, the Chancellor's decision is that we must stand by our 
own scheme (which the Ceylon Government have agreed to operate if necessary) in 
the belief that if we take a firm line the risk that we may not get the full increased 
production from the large Ceylonese-owned estates-a risk which is by no means a 
certainty-will be outweighed by the powerful considerations on the other side. 
I am sending copies of this letter to Morris and Peirson.2 
2 At the Ministries of Production and Supply respectively. 
168 CO 54/980/5/2, no 106 24 Apr 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) in two parts from Sir 
A Caldecott to Mr Stanley, including a redraft of the proposed reforms 
declaration 
Part I 
1. I have discussed your most secret and personal telegram of the 19th April1 
with the C.-in-C., who concurs in the following reply. Part II of this telegram 
contains redraft of proposed declaration, amended and expanded to cover and 
implement fully all conclusions conveyed by your telegram, but in slightly different 
form from that contemplated by you. Reason for the slight difference is that the first 
reaction here to the declaration will be to compare it with the present Order-in-
Council, Letters Patent and Royal Instructions as published in Ceylon Government 
Manual of Procedure, 1940. It is important, therefore, not to give our reservation of 
control over defence, external affairs, commercial interests, minority questions etc. 
greater prominence or emphasis than that given in the existing constitutional 
instruments. Instead, therefore, of limiting categories of reserved Bills to those now 
reserved in Southern Rhodesia, as proposed in your paragraph 3(a), I have included 
in paragraph 4 of Part Il, additional categories based on items (9) (10) (12) (15) of 
Article 4(1) of the Ceylon Royal Instructions. Item (14) thereof is, of course, covered 
by (15), and now that we have extremely vocal Ceylon Indian National Congress, 
there is no occasion to provoke anti-Indian feeling by unnecessary repetition of (14) . 
Results of these additions will be to leave our control over these matters exactly as it 
now is. 
As regards your paragraph 3(b), I consider it advisable explicitly to retain the 
Governor's power of legislation, if necessary, on matters of defence and external 
affairs, and have so provided in paragraph 6, Part II. 
Your paragraph 3(d). I cannot state too emphatically that, so long as His Majesty's 
Government reserves control of Ceylon's external affairs, Ceylon will look to His 
Majesty's Government for assistance, and if necessary, arbitration in negotiations 
with other parts of the Empire. It is essential that His Majesty's Government should 
acknowledge this obligation, and I have worded paragraph 5 of Part II accordingly. 
2. Your paragraph 4. As you are aware, Ministers are neither always consistent 
individually, nor cohesive collectively, and it is impossible for me to advise, with any 
1 See 166. 
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certainty, what the reactions of each of them is likely to be. Successful Ceylon 
National Congress candidate at by-election to the State Council last week stated, in 
public speech after his election, that he attributed his success to Congress demand 
for complete independence, as opposed to constitutional reform. To this sentiment, I 
know Senanayake and a large body of moderate opinion to be at present opposed. 
Their view is that the only alternatives for Ceylon's future are:-
(a) absorption by India 
(b) Internal Home Rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations, with His 
Majesty's Government prepared as Controller of her external relations, to arbitrate 
if need arises, between the conflicting claims of India and herself. If no promise as 
to (b) is given now, trend of all Ceylonese opinion will be towards throwing in their 
lot wholeheartedly with Indian Nationalists, and making the best terms possible 
with them. Commander-in-Chief and I have no doubt, whatever, that (b) and not 
(repeat not) (a) is in the interests of Imperial security and as proposed declaration 
goes further towards (b) than anything hitherto published I have no hesitation in 
advising that it should be made. As you are fully aware of my views and I of yours, I 
do not consider any useful object would be served by the Chief Secretary or myself 
coming home, whereas there are many reasons against it. 
Part If 
l. The postwar re-examination of the reform of Ceylon's constitution, to which 
His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the grant to 
Ceylon by the Order of His Majesty in Council of full responsibility under the Crown 
for internal administration and legislation subject to the following reservations. 
2. H.M. Government will retain control over the provision, construction, 
maintenance, security, staffing and manning of such naval, military and air defences, 
equipment and establishments as H.M.G. may from time to time deem necessary for 
the security of the Commonwealth including that of the Island; the cost thereof 
being shared between the two Governments in agreed proportions. 
3. Ceylon's relations with foreign countries and with other parts of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations will be subject to control and direction of H.M.G. 
4. The Governor will not ratify or assent in the King's name to any measure 
dealing with the following subjects, without previously obtaining H.M. Instructions 
thereon:-
(1) any measure for grant of any land, money, gift or gratuity to the Governor; 
(2) any measure affecting currency; 
(3) any measure inconsistent with the obligations placed upon the Crown by 
treaty; 
(4) any measure interfering with the control of H.M. Forces by sea, land or air; 
(5) any measure relating to questions of defence or affecting naval military or air 
forces, Regular or Volunteers; 
(6) any measure relating to docks, harbours, railways, shipping, coastal and 
inland waters, buildings or land in such manner as to affect naval, military or 
aerial security; 
(7) any measure of importance whereby the Royal Prerogative or rights and 
property of His Majesty's subjects not residing in the Island, or trade and shipping 
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of any part of the Commonwealth may be prejudiced; 
(8) any measure, the principle of which has evoked serious opposition by any 
racial, religious or other community, and which in the opinion of the Governor is 
likely to involve oppression or unfairness to any such community; 
(9) any measure containing provisions to which Royal assent has been once 
refused or which have been disallowed by His Majesty. 
5. The limitation imposed by Clause (7) of the preceding paragraph will not be 
deemed to prevent the Governor from assenting in the King's Name to any measure 
relating to, and conforming with, any agreement which may be entered into by 
Ceylon with any other part of the Commonwealth for security of external commercial 
interests within the Island. It is indeed the purpose of H.M.G. that such matters shall 
be settled by agreement, and H.M.G. will be pleased to assist in any negotiations. 
6. The Governor will be vested with the necessary powers to enable him, in the 
event of default by the Legislature, to enact any direction of H.M.G. in regard to 
matters within the scope of paragraph 2 and 3 of this declaration.2 
7. The framing of a constitution in accordance with the terms of this declaration 
will require such examination of detail and such precision of definition as cannot be 
brought to bear so long as the whole of the energies of the service and other 
Departments of H.M.G. must remain focussed on the successful prosecution of the 
war. H.M.G. will, however, once victory is achieved, proceed to examine by a suitable 
Commission or Conference such detailed proposals as the Ministers may in the 
meantime have been able to formulate in the way of a draft Order-in-Council, subject 
to the clear understanding that acceptance by H.M.G. of any proposals will depend:-
Firstly upon H.M.G. being satisfied that they are in full compliance with the 
preceding portions of this statement, and 
Secondly, upon their subsequent approval by a three-quarters majority of all 
members of the State Council of Ceylon excluding officers of the State and the 
Speaker or other presiding officer. 
8. In their consideration of this problem, H.M.G. have very fully appreciated and 
valued the contribution which Ceylon has made, and is making to the war effort of 
the British Commonwealth and United Nations, and the co-operation which under 
the Leadership of the Board of Ministers and State Council, has made this 
contribution effective. 
2 With the concurrence of Caldecott and Layton, paras 4-6 of this draft were revised by the CO (see 169 for 
the final version of the declaration). Stanley also raised the question of a reservation in respect of the 
public services but he did not anticipate that this would be necessary because they would be under the 
control of ministers through such machinery, eg a Public Services Commission, as they might devise. 
However, he did anticipate that the governor should require a special staff for matters in his reserved field 
and that such staff would have to be under the sole control of the governor and independent of ministers. 
Whether the cost of this establishment would be wholly a charge on Ceylon revenues would be a matter for 
consideration when the constitution was worked out in detail (CO 54/980/5/2, no llO, unnumbered tel, 
Stanley to Caldecott, 6 May 1943) . 
262 WARTIME CONDITIONS [169] 
169 CO 54/980/13, no 8, WP(43)204 15 May 1943 
'Ceylon constitution': War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Stanley. 
Annex: amended reforms declaration 
My colleagues will remember that when I brought this matter before them at the end 
of March (W.P. (43) 129), the War Cabinet invited a Committee under the 
Chairmanship of the Lord President of the Council to examine the draft Statement 
which it was proposed that His Majesty's Government should make on the question 
of Constitutional reform of Ceylon.1 
2. My colleagues on this Cabinet Committee have now completed their examina-
tion of the draft Statement2 and an amended form of the draft is annexed to this 
Memorandum which embodies alterations designed to meet the criticisms raised by 
the Cabinet and suggestions put forward by the Committee. The Governor of Ceylon 
has also expressed his concurrence in the draft. 
3. Particular points which were the subject of special comment at our last 
meeting were:-
(a) The safeguarding of minority rights, and 
(b) The protection of the commercial interests of British subjects not resident in 
Ceylon. 
These matters are specifically referred to in paragraph 5 of the draft Statement as 
now amended under which any Bills in relation to them are to be reserved for the 
signification of His Majesty's Pleasure. 
4. As regards the likelihood of a Statement in this form being acceptable to 
Ceylon Ministers, the Governor has reported that it is impossible for him to advise 
with any certainty what the reactions of individual Ministers are likely to be, though 
he is satisfied that there is a large body of moderate opinion which would be against 
any demand for complete independence as opposed to constitutional reform, and 
that, in its view, apart from absorption by India, the only other possibility for 
Ceylon's future is internal home rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations 
with His Majesty's Government prepared, as controller of her external relations, to 
arbitrate if need arises between the conflicting claims of India and herself. The 
Governor considers that if no promise as to internal home rule within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations is given now, the trend of all Ceylonese opinion will be 
towards throwing in their lot whole-heartedly with the Indian Nationalists, and of 
making the best terms possible with them. The Governor and the Commander-in-
Chief have no hesitation in recommending that, as the proposed Statement goes 
further towards internal home rule within the British Commonwealth of Nations 
than anything hitherto published, it should be made. 
5. The Board of Ministers in Ceylon have urged that a final reply to their request 
for reconsideration of the draft Statement approved by the War Cabinet in December 
last (W.P. (42) 564) should be made before the 25th May when the State Council 
reassembles and the question of constitutional reform will immediately be raised. 
The Governor has reported to me that notice of a motion demanding complete 
independence has already been tabled. The present Ministers who champion the 
1 See 161. 2 See 164 & 165. 
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British connexion will be the subject of an attack by the Nationalist hot-heads unless 
the Leader of the State Council is in a position to make a satisfactory statement on 
this subject. 
6. My colleagues on the Sub-Committee have unanimously approved of the 
amended Statement being submitted to the Cabinet with a view to its receiving the 
formal approval of His Majesty's Government, and I trust that this will now be 
forthcoming. 
Annex to 169 
In 1941 the following assurance was given to the Board of Ministers in Ceylon:-
"His Majesty's Government have had under further consideration the question of 
constitutional reform in Ceylon. The urgency and importance of the reform of the 
Constitution are fully recognised by His Majesty's Government, but before making 
decisions upon the present proposals for reform, concerning which there has been 
so little unanimity, but which are of such importance to the well-being of Ceylon, 
His Majesty's Government would desire that the position should be further 
examined and made the subject of further consultation by means of a Commission 
or Conference. This cannot be arranged under war conditions, but the matter will 
be taken up with the least possible delay after the war." 
After further consideration, His Majesty's Government have decided that it is in 
the general interest to give greater precision to the foregoing statement with the 
object of removing any doubts regarding His Majesty's Government's intentions. 
Accordingly, His Majesty's Government have asked the Governor to convey to the 
Board of Ministers the following message:-
1. "The post-war re-examination of the reform of the Ceylon Constitution, to 
which His Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the grant 
to Ceylon by Order of His Majesty in Council, of full responsible Government under 
the Crown in all matters of internal civil administration. 
2. His Majesty's Government will retain control of the provision, construction, 
maintenance, security, staffing, manning and use of such defences, equipment, 
establishments and communications as His Majesty's Government may deem 
necessary for the Naval, Military and Air security of the Commonwealth, including 
that of the Island, the cost thereof being shared between the two Governments in 
agreed proportions.3 
3. Ceylon's relations with foreign countries and with other parts of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations will be subject to the control and direction of His 
Majesty's Government. 
4. The Governor will be vested with such powers as will enable him, if necessary, 
to enact any direction of His Majesty's Government in regard to matters within the 
3 Compare para 2 with the same para in Caldecott's draft (see 168, part Il, para 2). The change was made at 
the request of the governor and Layton to enable HMG to insist, if necessary, upon roads and railways 
being kept up to the required military standards and upon possibly unremunerative sections of railways 
essential to defence (eg that to Trincomalee) not being abandoned (CO 54/908/5/2, no 114, unnumbered 
tel, Caldecott to Stanley, 8 May 1943). 
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scope of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Declaration; and his assent to local measures 
upon these matters will be subject to reference to His Majesty's Government. 
5. The present classes of reserved Bills in the Royal Instructions will be largely 
reduced under a new Constitution. Apart from measures affecting4 Defence and 
External Relations it is intended that these shall be restricted to classes of Bills 
which-
( a) Relate to the Royal Prerogative, the rights and property of His Majesty's 
subjects not residing in the Island, and the trade and shipping of any part of the 
Commonwealth; 
(b) Have evoked serious opposition by any racial or religious community and 
which in the Governor's opinion are likely to involve oppression or unfairness to 
any community; 
(c) Relating to currency. 
6. The limitations contained in the preceding paragraph will not be deemed to 
prevent the Governor from assenting in the King's name to any measure relating to, 
and conforming with, any trade agreements concluded with the approval of His 
Majesty's Government by Ceylon with other parts of the Commonwealth. It is the 
desire of His Majesty's Government that the Island's commercial relations should be 
settled by the conclusion of agreements, and His Majesty's Government will be 
pleased to assist in any negotiations with this object. 
7. The framing of a Constitution in accordance with the terms of this Declaration 
will require such examination of detail and such precision of definition as cannot be 
brought to bear so long as the whole of the energies of the service and other 
Departments of His Majesty's Government must remain focussed on the successful 
prosecution of the war. His Majesty's Government will, however, once victory is 
achieved, proceed to examine by suitable Commission or Conference such detailed 
proposals as the Ministers may in the meantime have been able to formulate in the 
way of a complete constitutional scheme, subject to the clear understanding that 
acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any proposals will depend. 
First, upon His Majesty's Government being satisfied that they are in full 
compliance with the preceding portions of the Statement; and 
Secondly, upon their subsequent approval by three-quarters of all members of the 
State Council of Ceylon, excluding the officers of State and the Speaker or other 
presiding officer. 
8. In their consideration of this problem His Majesty's Government have very 
fully appreciated and valued the contribution which Ceylon has made and is making 
to the war effort of the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, and the 
co-operation which, under the leadership of the Board of Ministers and the State 
Council, has made this contribution effective."5 
4 The CO draft included the word 'concerning' here. Caldecott and Layton requested that it be changed to 
'affecting' in order to prevent any building, planting etc prejudicial to the safety or efficiency of ports and 
airfields (ibid) . 
5 Stanley informed Caldecott on 21 May that Churchill had approved the statement and that an 
announcement would be made by the secretary of state in reply to a question in the House of Commons on 
26 May (CO 54/980/5/3, no 140). 
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170 CO 54/980/5/3, no 154 A & B 8 June 1943 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 1054 in two parts from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley transmitting the ministers' statement on the reforms 
declaration 
[In view of the controversies that arose over the interpretation of the declaration of May 
1943 (see 208 and 209), it is important to identify some of the preliminary stages in the 
evolution of the ministers' policy. Since there is little or no information on this in the 
official documents, it is necessary to turn to the Jennings manuscripts and, in particular, 
to his typescript 'Notes on the ministers' procedure, 1943--44'. The first stage, Jennings 
points out, was a preliminary memo circulated by Senanayake at a meeting of the Board 
of Ministers on 31 May 1943. This memo-drafted by Jennings-contained two points . 
First, that if the ministers were to prepare a scheme of responsible government which 
adhered to the limits set out in the May declaration, that scheme would be accepted by a 
commission or conference meeting immediately after the termination of hostilities. 
Secondly, the scheme would be implemented by an order-in-council if it were accepted by 
three-quarters of all members of the State Council other than the speaker and the officers 
of state. The memo proposed that the ministers prepare a draft constitution. Senanayake 
took no risks on this matter; he showed the memo to Drayton and it was also seen by 
Caldecott. Neither objected to this interpretation of the meaning of the declaration. Once 
the ministers agreed to undertake the task, it was decided that Senanayake should make a 
statement in that sense to the State Council. Jennings points out that there were three 
drafts of the statement, apart from the text that was ultimately approved by the Board of 
Ministers at their meeting of 7 June. The two points referred to above were incorporated 
in all these drafts and the final text. They also contained the following statement: 'It is 
important, too, that we should be able to draft our own Constitution and not be 
compelled to accept a Constitution thrust upon us by some commission sent from 
overseas.' The second draft was shown to Drayton who again said that he thought it quite 
fair. Drayton also saw the third draft which he amended himself to the point of producing 
his own version. The following extract from Jennings's 'Notes on the ministers' 
procedure, 1943-1944', clarifies the next stage in the evolution of the ministers' policy: 
'4. The Board of Ministers sat for eight hours on the 7th June 1943, and considered the 
draft statement at great length. They then adjourned for the production of clean copies. 
O.E.G[oonetileke] fetched me and told me that the C[hief] S[ecretary] had phoned to 
suggest that I should go through the draft. He tried to keep the drafting straight, but he 
thought that I should check it. Accordingly, I went through it with D.S. [Senanayake], 
and we agreed that the draft might stand. The Board met again the same evening, and 
approved the draft, which was read to the State Council the following day .. . .' The 
ministers' statement of 8 June is printed in Reform of the Constitution SP XVII, 1943, 
p 4.] 
Part I 
Your telegram No. 609. 
Following is text of statement which Board of Ministers unanimously agreed 
should be made by Leader shortly after 2.p.m. when the State Council meets 
today:-
Statement begins. 
The Board of Ministers have given careful consideration to declaration by His 
Majesty's Government on constitutional reform. It is in essence an undertaking that 
if the Board can produce a constitution which, in the opinion of a Commission or 
Conference, satisfies the conditions set out in paragraphs (2) to (6) thereof and if that 
constitution is subsequently accepted by three-quarters of all members of the State 
Council excluding officers of the State and the Speaker, His Majesty in Council will 
put that constitution into operation. 
2. The most important part of the declaration is that which undertakes to confer 
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full responsible Government in matters of internal civil administration. As we shall 
explain presently, we read it as going further than that, for it is obviously intended 
that even defence and external relations should be vested in the first instance in 
responsible ministers. Since our most urgent need, however, is to develop our own 
resources and determine our own way of life free from external control, it is to an 
unqualified undertaking for full responsible government in internal matters that 
emphasis must be laid. Among the consequences which would follow from that 
undertaking would be:-
Firstly, the abolition of officers of the State and transfer of their functions to 
responsible ministers; 
Secondly, the acquisition of complete control over public services, the disappear-
ance of present Public Services Commission and abolition of present powers of the 
Governor and the Secretary of State in respect of appointments, conditions of service 
etc; 
Thirdly, the acquisition by the Legislature of full control over finance; and 
Fourthly, the abolition of all special powers conferred on the Governor by the 
present Constitution. 
It is important, too, that we should be able to draft our own constitution and not 
be compelled to accept a constitution thrust upon us by some commission sent from 
overseas. 
3. All these would be substantial gains, and their (? there) would be no 
qualification to internal self-government except the Governor's power to reserve a 
Bill for the Royal Assent. The classes of measures in respect of which the Governor 
would be instructed to reserve would be reduced from 16 to 6, of which 2 would 
relate to defence and external affairs. Of the other 3, 2 would be of no great 
importance. One would deal with currency and we do not think that any government 
or legislature in Ceylon would wish to do anything to depreciate our currency. A 
second is designed for protection of racial or religious communities. It has not been 
necessary to use this provision in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that it 
will be necessary in the future. Nevertheless, it gives the various communities in the 
Island a protection of which we would not wish to deprive them, though we do not 
think that they will ever need it. 
The third is of greater importance. It is not expressed in the declaration in formal 
language, but we assume that it would be inserted in the terms found in the 
Governor's present instructions, namely: 
"Any Bill of any extraordinary nature and importance whereby our prerogative or 
rights and properties of our subjects not residing in the Island, or trading and 
shipping of any part of our Dominions or maybe prejudiced". 
This provision would not be peculiar to Ceylon, for it has been in operation in all 
Dominions with responsible Government (?and still) is in some. In such territories it 
has acquired a definite and limited meaning which would have to be applied in 
Ceylon. Furthermore, if such a provision were inserted in instructions to the 
Governor of a self-governing Ceylon its force would be weak compared with its force 
in present instructions. It is applied at present on the advice of officers of the State by 
a Governor with power ample enough to put policy of British Government into 
operation. In a self-governing Ceylon the Governor would have no advisers save 
responsible ministers, and if he chose to exercise powers to the prejudice of Ceylon 
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he would run the risk of being unable to find ministers prepared to work the consti-
tution as he interpreted it. We think it unlikely that powers would be abused, but if 
it (?was) we feel sure that responsible ministers would know what action to take. 
Part !I 
4. The restrictions in relation to defence and external affairs are in quite another 
category. We have already mentioned that the declaration does not assert that 
defence and external affairs would be withdrawn from the scope of self-government. 
These subjects would be transferred from the Chief Secretary to responsible 
ministers. In respect of certain closely defined matters of defence, however, the 
Governor would have an independent power of legislation in order to enact any 
direction from the British Government and he would also be instructed to reserve 
bills dealing with any of those matters. In respect of external affairs he would have a 
similar power of legislation and would be instructed to reserve bills other than those 
giving effect to Ceylon's trade agreements with other parts of the Commonwealth. 
We appreciate that Ceylon is not yet in a position to defend herself against aggressive 
powers. On the other hand, we do not believe that the Island can be defended without 
the assistance of her people. The declaration acknowledges the valuable contribution 
which Ceylon has made and is making to the war effort of the British Commonwealth 
and United Nations. There is no reason to suppose that it would fail to render a 
similar contribution if unfortunately similar circumstances should arise again. For 
this reason we do not think that special provisions relating to defence and external 
relations are necessary. We regret therefore that we are not to be regarded, as Canada 
and Australia are regarded, as potential allies in any just cause. 
5. Imperial forces were stationed in the Dominions until they were fully prepared 
to take over the whole burden of their defence. Any Imperial force stationed in 
Ceylon would be for our protection as well as for protection of the Commonwealth as 
a whole. The Legislature would, however, determine what proportion of the cost 
should be borne by Ceylon. Unless the whole cost were to be met by Great Britain, 
therefore, the co-operation of the Legislature would be necessary. Nor does the 
declaration contemplate that external relations of the Island would be exclusively in 
the hands of Great Britain. The British Government would have the direction and 
control, but the initiative would rest with the Government of Ceylon. This would be 
true of trade agreements with other parts of the Commonwealth and, where any such 
agreements were concluded by the Government of Ceylon with other parts of the 
Commonwealth, with the approval of the British Government, the Governor would 
not be instructed to reserve the bills giving effect to them. Where it was convenient 
for Ceylon to be separately represented, as at New Delhi, there is nothing to prevent 
such a step being taken. It is essential to remember too that international 
agreements often relate to matters of internal civil administration, which are 
specifically left by the declaration to responsible ministers. In all matters of external 
relations, therefore, the responsible Government of Ceylon could make its influence 
felt and its wishes respected. The status of Ceylon would be quite different when a 
minister is responsible from what it is now, when external relations are vested in the 
Chief Secretary. 
6. Even in respect of defence and external relations, therefore, the declaration 
marks a definite advance. It does not promise everything for which we have asked. 
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We do not like the qualifications which we have mentioned. We think, however, that 
the offer should be accepted in the belief on the one hand that qualifications are 
unnecessary, and on the other hand that they would decay from disuse as similar 
qualifications have decayed elsewhere. We also wish to point out that responsible 
Government, and that Government alone, will be entitled to speak for Ceylon in 
conferences of the British Commonwealth and Council of Nations. 
7. We would add that every matter which is not defence or external affairs can 
only be regarded as a matter of internal civil administration, for example, determina-
tion of composition of the population of Ceylon, protective duties, trade and shipping 
subjects, only as regards trade and shipping, to reservations considered in paragraph 
3 above. 
8. The acceptance of a constitution satisfying these conditions is dependent upon 
its approval by three-quarters of all members of the State Council excluding officers 
of the State and the Speaker. This is a difficult condition but we believe that the State 
Council possesses the larger patriotism that transcends sectional differences. We 
propose therefore to draft a constitution in accordance with interpretation to 
declaration which we have given in the foregoing paragraphs. If we feel that we can 
commend it to the country, we shall, in due course, submit it to the State Council in 
the belief that it will obtain the necessary support. We shall do our best to secure the 
requisite majority, but not at the expense of the future welfare of Ceylon. We should 
like to make it plain however that if we fail we shall not stop there. 
9. The declaration states that commission or conferences which will examine 
whether our draft constitution satisfies the declaration cannot meet until victory is 
achieved. We do not regard this condition as necessarily binding. The war may enter 
a phase in which consideration of these constitutional problems will become possible 
earlier. We therefore propose to make draft with all possible despatch. The 
undertaking will, however, give us an additional reason for hope that victory will not 
be long delayed. 
10. We have given the declaration the interpretation that we think it is intended 
to bear and we propose to inform the Secretary of State that we are proceeding to 
frame a constitution in accordance with our interpretation. 
Statement ends. 
I telegraph this at Minister's request. 
171 CO 54/980/5/3, no 161 18 June 1943 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley on the response of the Board of Ministers to the secretary of 
state's message about their statement 
Your secret and personal telegram of 11th June. 
Message contained in your telegram No. 6481 was communicated to the Board of 
1 Tel 648 of 11 June from Stanley to Caldecott referred to the ministers' statement (see 170) and read: 
'Please inform Board of Ministers that I have read their statement with great interest. They will not, I am 
sure, expect any detailed comments on it at this stage for the reason given in paragraph 7 of the Statement 
by H.M .G. [see 169). But Ministers may rest assured that once victory is achieved, H.M.G. will be most 
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Ministers at their weekly meeting on 14th June. I have reason to anticipate that at 
their next meeting on 21st June Ministers will go back on paragraph 10 of their 
statement, contained in my telegram No. 1054,2 and decide that failing acceptance 
by you of their own interpretation of the declaration by H.M. Government, they will 
not proceed further in the matter. However regrettable and disappointing this 
prospect may be, position must remain as stated in your secret and personal 
telegram of 9th June and I shall not feel myself able to advise any concession to what 
I consider entirely unreasonable attitude. Ceylon Daily News and affiliated news-
papers are certain, however, to applaud it and the purpose of this telegram is to 
acquaint you with probable developments before any anticipatory mention of them 
appears in the Press. 
ready to examine any scheme which they have formulated in accordance with the terms of H.M.G.'s 
Statement' (CO 54/980/5/3, no 160). 
2 See 170. 
172 CO 54/982/6, no 117 29 June 1943 
'Labour for rubber estates': inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr Stanley expressing concern over the labour shortage. 
Minutes by S Caine and Sir C Figg1 
Reference your secret and personal telegram of 7th June. 
Labour for rubber estates. 
Position continues to cause the C.-in-C. and myself grave anxiety, and was reviewed 
in the War Council yesterday. In spite of Resolution of the State Council reported by 
my telegram No. 627, no labour has yet been recruited by or through Ceylon 
Government, and any increases have been entirely due to the efforts of estate 
managements.2 Figures adduced by the Minister of Agriculture and Lands in the War 
Council, indicated that over 6,000 tappers are still required, and we impressed upon 
him imperative necessity of making good this shortage at once. He and the Rubber 
Commissioner took over responsibility for the supply of labour only four weeks ago, 
and it is too early to pronounce on their effort which has been hitherto largely 
exploratory and statistical only, but the C.-in-C. made plain to the Minister that his 
pressure for increase of prices, vide my telegram No. 1190 could not (repeat not) of 
itself effect any increase of output on those very many estates which suffer from lack I of labour. In any reply to that telegram, we suggest that this point might be made, 
X and any increase of prices allowed to be contingent on the Government guarantee-
! ing the necessary supply of labour for maximum production. Although shortage 
of 3,500 tons on our estimated output for the first six months may, to certain extent, 
be ascribed to the unusual amount of rain, Minister admitted in the War Council 
that unless there is early improvement in production, our output for 1943 will not 
exceed 105,000 whereas we have undertaken the minimum of 110,000. In conclu-
sion, with reference to your secret and personal telegram of 24th June on the subject 
of the Rubber Commissioner's salary, we wish to assure you that there has never 
been any suspicion whatever of this officer withholding his maximum co-operation, 
but that on the contrary he has always worked all out. 
1 See 151, note 3. 2 cf 156, note 1 and 160. 
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Minutes on 172 
The official telegram No.l190 referred to reported the outcome of the offer of 
monetary compensation for slaughter-tapping and attempted to reopen the question 
of an over-all increase of price which had previously been rejected by H.M.G.3 The 
actual figures of acceptances of the offer of compensation certainly appear dis-
appointing although they were not in fact worse than we here had been prepared for. 
In that telegram the Ceylon Government also indicated that they saw little prospect 
of production in the next twelve months exceeding the figure of 110,000 tons which 
was the minimum asked for by H.M.G. Since, however, the decision had been taken 
on the basis that so long as that figure was attained we need not be seriously 
concerned, the new information did not present a very strong case for reopening the 
price issue. None the less, we understand that the Ministries of Production and 
Supply are still considering the matter, and we are still awaiting their views. 
The further telegram now received admits what has always been the view held here 
that the real limiting factor is not price but labour. Unless some really considerable 
improvement can be made in the labour field, and it is difficult to see how that can be 
done unless Ceylon comes to terms with India, it may well be that productionwill in 
fact fall short of the 110,000 ton level; but whether any improvement can be achieved 
by making a concession on the price issue is more dubious and will similarly be a 
matter for discussion with the other Departments concerned. 
In the meantime, pending such discussion, an interim acknowledgement of Sir 
Andrew Caldecott's telegram in the terms of Mr. Sidebotham's draft appears 
desirable. 
s.c. 
1.7.43 
I agree. We have all along taken the view that labour was the crux of the matter in so 
far as the estates were concerned i.e. units that cannot be tapped by the owner and 
his family . It is t rue that the smallholder has recently been holding up his rubber -
hoping, I think, for a higher price. If and when he is told there is going to be no 
increase he may decide to go ahead and take what he can get. 
It is true, I am afraid, that the inevitably long delay in coming to a decision on this 
compensation question has given rise to the impression in Ceylon that the Ministry 
of Supply is no longer in urgent need of maximum production from Ceylon, and I did 
my best at a meeting of the Ceylon Association Council to-day to dispel this. 
I am frankly not happy about the Governor's suggestion at "X" in 117. How can the 
Ceylon Government guarantee the necessary labour supply? 
I am disturbed too at recent telegrams asking for further allocations of new 
planting from the l.R.R.C. It now appears that they estimate that 30,000 acres will be 
planted by the end of this year. I cannot believe that there has been surplus labour for 
this amount some of which could not have been used for tapping. 
3 cf 162 and 167. 
C.F. 
1.7.43 
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173 CO 54/980/5/3, no 175 6 July 1943 
[Reforms]: inward telegram (reply) no 1280 from Sir A Caldecott to 
Mr Stanley transmitting a message from ministers expressing their 
dissatisfaction with HMG's reply to their statement on reform 
Your telegram No. 648. 1 
Ministers have requested me to telegraph following message. 
Begins. We are not satisfied with reply of H.M. Government to the statement made 
by us in State Council on 8th June, 1943,2 on Reform Declaration by H.M. 
Government and duly conveyed to Secretary of State. 
It will be recollected that in our reply to message of H.M. Government, conveyed 
to us by the Governor by letter dated 13th December, 1942, we stated "We regret that 
your reply is in far too indefinite and conditional terms to allay growing concern 
regarding our political status".3 
It is recognised in the Declaration made by H.M.G. that it is in the general interest 
to give greater precision to the statement made in 1941 with the object of removing 
any doubts regarding H.M.G.'s intentions. 
This Declaration itself, however, though in some respects more precise than 
previous statements, still in certain important and even vital matters, is, in our 
opinion, too indefinite in the general interests which the Secretary of State himself 
had in mind in making the Declaration. 
We therefore made statement referred to above embodying our interpretation of 
certain Clauses of the Declaration, in order to give that precision which we 
considered necessary before proceeding to draft a Constitution as suggested in 
paragraph 7 of the Declaration. 
We regret, however, that in reply of H.M.G. to our statement, there is no 
indication whatever that our interpretation is in accord with principles of the 
Declaration. Without such indication it will not be possible for us to undertake 
drafting of a Constitution in terms of the Declaration. 
We would therefore request H.M.G. to state whether our interpretation falls within 
the Declaration. Ends. 
1 See 171, note 1. 2 See 170. 3 See 148, tel no 71. 
17 4 CO 54/980/5/3 , no 177 9 July 1943 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott transmitting the secretary of state's response to the 
ministers' message 
Your secret and personal telegram of 6th July.1 
I am grateful to you for your estimate of importance to be attached to Ministers' 
change of front, and for your suggestions as to the reply to be made to the message 
from them contained in your telegram No. 1280 of the same date. 
1 See 173. 
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If you see no objection, I propose to reply in the following terms which may 
perhaps afford Ministers some assistance when the Motion referred to in your secret 
and personal telegram of 1st July is debated. 
Begins. Please inform Ministers that I have learnt with regret that they are not 
satisfied with the reply which was given to their statement on the recent declaration 
by His Majesty's Government on post-war constitutional reform in Ceylon: that it is 
in view of the inability of His Majesty's Government in present wartime conditions to 
undertake the necessary detailed examination of proposals for constitutional reform, 
for the reasons explained in paragraph 7 of their declaration, that the declaration 
itself has had to be confined to a statement of broad principles. I feel sure that 
Ministers will appreciate that it would not have been possible for me to comply with 
their request without seeking from them further elucidation of their interpretation 
on a number of points, and to do so would have involved those detailed discussions 
which cannot be undertaken until after the war. In these circumstances it would 
clearly have been impossible for His Majesty's Government to express their definite 
acceptance of the interpretation of those various matters which Ministers' statement 
contained. Practical effect of such interpretation could only be seen in the detailed 
provisions of a new draft constitution, but Ministers may be assured that I have not 
found in their statement anything which must be regarded as essentially irreconcil-
able with the conditions contained in His Majesty's Government's statement. 
Ministers have, I trust, realised that His Majesty's Government's declaration was 
made in all sincerity and with a very real desire to meet the wishes of the people of 
Ceylon within the framework which the declaration provides. I should wish Ministers 
to understand that even if they do not now feel themselves able to respond to the 
invitation to formulate a draft constitution the declaration stands in its entirety and 
the offer remains open. I should, however, deplore any delay in reaching a final 
settlement after the war which lack of preparatory work now would seem certain to 
involve, and I trust that on re-consideration Ministers may decide to adhere to the 
course which with such statesmanlike promptitude they proposed in their original 
statement to adopt. Ends. 2 
2 Stanley's message was communicated to ministers on 11 July and they decided the following day (a) that 
the reply was sufficiently satisfactory for them to proceed with the draft of a new constitution, (b) that if 
further elucidation became necessary, they would seek information from HMG before proceeding with the 
draft, (c) that the leader of council would refer to the position in the course of his budget speech. 
Accordingly, an announcement was made in council on 15 July. Caldecott reported that public reception 
of the announcement had been good (CO 54/980/5/3, no 180, inward tel no 1340, Caldecott to Stanley, 17 
July 1943). 
175 CO 54/980/5/3, no 187 3 Sept 1943 
[Reforms]: minute by W M Clyde1 to J B Sidebotham on the drafting 
of the constitution 
Here is the note which you suggested I should make:-
Senanayake, at my final meeting (1st August, 1943) with him in Ceylon-a lunch 
1 Adviser to the secretary of state for the colonies on wartime food supplies. 
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party attended also by Goonetilleke and Jennings-spoke of the Constitutional 
question and said:-"We shall get down to drafting the new Constitution as soon as 
the Budget debate is over. The debate usually lasts for about three weeks. I wish the 
Secretary of State to know that we shall get ahead with the drafting as quickly as we 
can. In fact, at the moment, Jennings is drawing up a first draft for us. Then, about 
December, we hope to come to London to discuss the matter-Goonetilleke, 
Jennings and myself." 
These are his own words, as far as I can now recall them. Jennings, however, was 
not so confident as Senanayake that the Board of Ministers would reach agreement 
upon the terms of the proposed new Constitution in time for the visit to be made to 
London in December, 1943. Jennings says in his last letter to me "There is, as D.S." 
[Senanayake] "was careful to explain, a chance of our meeting again soon, though I 
think he was not making · sufficient allowance for difficulties and disagreements on 
the Board." 
176 WO 203/5174, COS(43)251 6 Sept 1943 
[War]: report by the Defence of Bases Committee for the COS 
Committee on the importance of Ceylon for future operations in 
South-East Asia 
At their Meeting on the 26th July, 1943 the Chiefs of Staff approved a telegram to the 
Commander-in-Chief, India, giving the revised scale of attack for Ceylon. 
2. The Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in his telegram No. 1116Z of 12th 
August stated that in his view an attack by Japanese carrier-borne aircraft on Ceylon 
ports is considered, once the Eastern Fleet is established in force in that area, to be 
more than a "remote possibility". The Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, is also of the 
opinion that the scale of air attack has been underestimated. 
3. We are inclined to agree with the above views and have accordingly amended 
the scale of attack in our revised defence plan. 
4. We wish to emphasise the importance of Ceylon for future operations in South 
East Asia. So long as there is a threat from Japanese carrier-borne aircraft and 
aircraft based in the Andamans and Northern Sumatra, we consider that not only can 
no major reductions in the defences be recommended, but they should be 
maintained in excess of that required to meet the scale of air and sea attack at present 
assessed. 
5. The scale of the Anti-aircraft guns now embodied in the plan agrees with the 
scale deemed necessary for the defence of vital points and airfields by the 
Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, in the circumstances outlined in para. 4 above. These 
figures show a reduction of 24 H.A.A. and 16 L.A.A. guns against those embodied in 
the plan prepared in September, 1942. 
6. Chiefs of Staff are now asked to approve revised Defence Plan at Annex.1 
1 Not printed. 
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177 CO 54/980/5/3, no 194 15 Nov 1943 
[Reforms]: letter from Government of India, Department of Indians 
Overseas, to India Office on the proposed post-war constitutional 
reforms in Ceylon 
I am directed to address you in regard to the proposed post-war constitutional 
reforms in Ceylon and to say that the Government of India will be grateful for further 
elucidation of the term "external relations" occurring in the statement1 made by His 
Majesty's Government on the proposal, as they are anxious to know whether it would 
apply to India vis-a-vis Ceylon. I am also to request that His Majesty's Government 
may kindly be moved to be good enough to accord to the Government of India the 
fullest opportunity of examining the draft constitution and offering their comments 
on it, so far as it affects the future of the Indian communities resident in the Island, 
in such time as would allow full consideration of them by His Majesty's Government 
before they take a final decision.2 
1 See 169, annex. 
2 In amplification of the point made in this letter, Mr Aney, representative of the Government of India in 
Ceylon, informed Caldecott on 23 Dec 1943 that in drawing up a draft constitution, Ceylon ministers 
should not assume that the joint report on Indo-Ceylon relations of Sept 1941 afforded any guidance for 
determining the status, political or otherwise, of Indians in Ceylon. Caldecott conveyed this message to 
the Board of Ministers (CO 54/986/5/1, no 1, despatch from Caldecott to Stanley, 12 Jan 1944). 
In Feb 1944, the Government of India repeated its request to be allowed the earliest opportunity to 
comment on the reform proposals; it felt strongly that 'questions regarding the status of Indians in Ceylon 
should be satisfactorily settled before the new constitution is introduced' (CO 54/986/5/1, no 14, RN 
Gilchrist, India Office, to CO, 2 Mar 1944, enclosing tel from Government of India, 28 Feb). 
178 WO 203/5832 29 Nov 1943 
[SEAC]: minutes (item 91) of the 60th meeting of the Ceylon War 
Council on the establishment of the supreme headquarters of SEAC at 
Kandy 
[In the preface to his edition of Mountbatten's personal diary for 1943-1946 Philip 
Ziegler points out that the idea of appointing a supreme commander to take cont;ol of all 
allied forces in South-East Asia had been mooted in May 1943. Mountbatten was far from 
being the first choice. Churchill was at first not very enthusiastic when Amery suggested 
Mountbatten's name but later he agreed. The secretariat of SEAC headquarters was 
established first. in New Delhi in Oct 1943. It was expected that the headquarters would 
mov~ to. Kandy m Mar 1944; Mountbatten and his staff arrived in Kandy in mid-Apr 1944. 
In ~1s d1ary entry for 1.5 Apr ~944, Mountbatten noted: 'The set-up here [in Colombo] is 
cunous: the governor 1s defimtely under the Commander-in-Chief's orders in all matters 
pe~tait;1in~ to the defence of the Island, and operations generally. The Commander-in-
Chief IS d1rectly under my orders as Ceylon is part of the South-East Asia Command so 
p~esumably, t~e Governor is in~irectly under my orders also' (P Ziegler, ed, Perso'na! 
dwry of Admzral the Lord Louzs Mountbatten, supreme allied commander Southeast 
Asia, 1943-1946 (London, 1988) p 99).] 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief announced that Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, had 
decided to transfer his headquarters to Ceylon. The Kandy area had been chosen, and 
the target date for the completion of the move was 15th March, 1944. 
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It was realised that the fact that this move is being made is bound to become 
generally known in time, but instructions have been given that for the present all 
correspondence in this connection is to be treated as secret, and no reference to the 
movements of the Supreme Commander or his headquarters will be permitted in the 
Press or in private correspondence. 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief asked:-
(i) the Civil Defence Commissioner to examine the A.R.P. measures in Kandy 
and the provision of food supplies for labour working in the scheme; 
(ii) the Hon. Minister of Health to go into the question of sanitation in the areas 
to be occupied; 
(iii) the Hon. Minister of Home Affairs to look into Police requirements; and 
(iv) the Hon. Minister for local Administration to consider what steps could be 
taken to prevent the 'mushroom' growth of undesirable boutiques near camp sites. 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief said that he would circulate to Ministers 
a sketch map of the areas to be used for this scheme. He had made it clear that there 
was to be no tree felling in the Botanical Gardens area at Peradeniya, and there would 
be no interference with public access to the flower gardens there. 
A certain amount of inconvenience to the public could hardly be avoided, but in a 
war operation of this kind this would have to be accepted. 
His Excellency the Governor said that the Board of Ministers would be glad to 
know that he had offered King's Pavilion, Kandy, to the Supreme Commander as his 
personal residence. 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief went on to say that the move would entail 
no change in the present form of Government and administration in Ceylon, though 
they would have some additional Service authorities in the island to deal with. He 
had made it quite clear that there were no further sources of labour to be tapped in 
the island, and they would rely, for the extra labour required, on Indian labour 
battalions. He had also emphasised that most of the materials, apart from bricks and 
timber, would have to come from outside. He understood that the total personnel 
involved in the move (excluding labour units) was estimated at about 4,000, but 
thought it quite likely this would be increased in practice. 
179 CO 54/980/8, no 38 1 Dec 1943 
[Reforms]: resolutions passed by the Ceylon Indian Congress Commit-
tee at Hatton on 21 Nov 1943 
1. The Ceylon Indian Congress is strongly of opinion that, for a prosperous and 
happy Ceylon, it is of paramount importance that a system of equalised distribution 
of wealth be introduced in the economic and political structure of the country. To 
achieve this end, the C.I.C. considers a joint action by the progressive elements of all 
the communities in the island essential, making it possible for the development of 
political parties in the country, on the basis of political and economic issues. In the 
present state of the political development of Ceylon, the C.I.C. considers that such a 
development of political parties cannot be achieved unless the fears of the minorities 
are allayed and they are offered their due place in the body politic of the country. 
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During the period intervening between the formation of political parties and the 
present one, it is necessary that the principle of Balanced Representation between 
the minorities on the one hand, and the majority community on the other, be 
introduced in the forthcoming Reforms of the State Council, as a solution of the 
minority problem. The C.I.C. therefore hereby pledges itself to the principle of 
Balanced Representation in the State Council as a medium of achieving communal 
harmony for the purpose of paving the way for formation of political parties on 
economic issues, to achieve the goal of equalised distribution of wealth and socialised 
form of economy of the country. 
2. The Ceylon Indian Congress is strongly of the opinion that any scheme of 
Reforms before it is presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, should be 
discussed in the country and by the State Council with particular reference to:-
(a) The Status of the country in the Reforms, 
(b) The status of the Indians, and 
(c) The solution of the Minorities's [sic] problem. 
The Ceylon Indian Congress appeals to the Board of Ministers to get to their 
scheme the backing of the country and the State Council as a whole, and also that of 
the Indian community and the other minorities in the island. As deviation from this 
principle may prove injurious to the best interest of the country, the Ceylon Indian 
Congress hopes that the Board of Ministers will not violate the elementary principle 
of constitution-making for the country. The Ceylon Indian Congress appeals to the 
Secy. of States for Colonies, not to permit a disregard of the wishes of 10 lacs of 
Indians in the island and the other 10 lacs composing of other minorities by 
considering the scheme of the Board of Ministers before the same has been discussed 
in the country and opinion of the State Council obtained on the scheme, with 
particular reference, as outlined above, namely, that of the status of the country in 
the new Reforms, status of Indians and the solution of the problem of the minorities. 
180 CO 952/514/14, no 414 24 Dec 1943 
'Ceylon rubber prices': memorandum by C Y Carstairs1 on the cam-
paign for higher prices 
After the loss of the Far East rubber producing territories, the most urgent action 
became necessary to increase production in the remaining sources of natural rubber. 
Of these, by far the most important is Ceylon, of which the production is of the order 
of 100,000 tons a year. 
2. In order to underline the need for rubber, and to stimulate production, the 
price paid by the Ministry of Supply, who purchase the whole output, was raised from 
lld per lb. to 1/2d, in spite of the fact that, at the time (i.e. early 1942) lld 
represented an adequately remunerative price. 
3. 1942 production did not come up to expectations, and costs of production rose 
sharply for a variety of reasons, including the increased cost of foodstuffs, supplies of 
all kinds, transport difficulties and severe competition for labour. The need for 
1 See 162, note 2. 
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rubber has not grown less, and it was suggested that, in order to bring forward 
maximum supplies during the period of greatest need (i.e. to about mid 1944), 
without excessively impairing production thereafter, arrangements should be made 
for slaughter tapping about 20% of trees, the remainder being tapped on the 
"double-three", the severest regime which the trees can stand without permanent 
injury. 
4. As slaughter tapping involves of necessity the destruction of an asset which 
would otherwise continue to be productive, the Ceylon Government accepted a 
recommendation made by Mr. Fell owes, who visited Ceylon on behalf of the Ministry 
of Supply, that a deferred bonus of 15 cents per lb. should be paid over and above the 
current price of rubber, in order to afford some compensation. While it was agreed in 
London that some compensation was justifiable, the Ceylon proposal was held to be 
impracticable for fiscal reasons, since under E.P.T. it was not permissible to earmark 
reserves for replanting purposes. The scheme was accordingly modified to provide a 
replanting grant of £45 per acre to those producers who slaughter tapped 20% of 
their acreage within a specified period, while tapping the remainder on "double-
three". This proposal met with a fair response from those producers (mainly the 
London-registered Companies) which are paying E.P.T. at 100%, but it did not prove 
attractive to the Ceylon-registered companies, which pay 50% E.P.T. only. The 
feeling therefore spread that H.M.G. had deliberately designed a scheme benefiting 
the U.K.-owned concerned producers only, and there resulted a renewed demand for 
a flat price increase, which was reinforced by a further rise in costs of production. 
5. The Ceylon Government then (February 1943) proposed an overall increase of 
5d per lb., except for those producers opting for the compensation scheme, but this 
was rejected by H.M.G. (March 1943), and the counter-suggestion made of a bonus 
for all tonnage in excess of 100,000, to be distributed at the discretion of the Ceylon 
Government. This in turn the Ceylon Government rejected and the campaign for a 
higher price continues. This demand has crystallised into a slogan of"rupee rubber", 
i.e. a price of l/6d per lb. to the producer. This has been endorsed by a Resolution of 
the Ceylon State Council, supported by Europeans and Ceylonese alike. When 
various charges are added, this is equivalent to l/7d f.o.b., or an increase of 5d per lb. 
Discussions have been proceeding with Mr. Saravanamuttu2 on the basis of this 
proposal. 
6. The pertinent considerations include as follows:-
(i) The 1944 "target" on the present basis is 110,000 tons. Mr. Saravanamuttu 
advises, however, that expectations have been so raised that if some concession is 
not granted, productive effort may suffer a set-back. 
(ii) The advice of the Ceylon Government is that with the proposed price increase, 
production in 1944 may be raised by 10,000 to 15,000 tons: i.e. the difference 
between price increase and no price increase may be, not that between 110,000 
tons and 120,000 plus, but between 100,000 tons and 120,000 tons plus. 
(iii) The increase may be expected to come from (a) the smallholders and others, 
cultivating poor rubber, whose yields do not permit them at present price levels to 
pay current wages for tappers, and (b) the large Ceylon-owned estates, paying 
E.P.T. at 50%, who may be making a profit at present prices, but who will make 
2 Rubber commissioner, Ceylon. 
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extra efforts for a greater price. It is agreed that a price increase offers no 
additional incentive to the producers now paying 100% E.P.T. 
(iv) That rubber is no longer so profitable as it was a year or so ago is shown by a 
marked decline in purchases of rubber estates, which for a time were changing 
hands freely at very high prices. 
(v) The effect of often-repeated statements by U.S. authorities regarding the 
adequacy of supplies of synthetic rubber has been, in Ceylon as elsewhere, to 
spread the impression that an "all-out" effort is no longer necessary, especially one 
involving the destruction of capital assets by severe tapping. Mr. Saravanamuttu 
advises that mere announcements to the contrary are likely to be ineffective unless 
accompanied by some tangible evidence of a strong continuing demand, in the 
form of a price concession. 
7. The proposal for a flat increase of 5d per lb. was considered inter-
departmentally and rejected, on the ground that it would provide greatly excessive 
profits for a large part of the industry, even although in many cases 100% and in 
others 50% of the increase would return in E.P.T. Departments were however 
anxious to consider some means of meeting the needs of the marginal producers, and 
of providing an additional incentive to such others as would respond to it. The 
following alternatives were put forward:-
(a) a differential price scheme of paying a higher price to those producers in need 
of it. 
(b) a bonus scheme linked to performance, whereby price would be adjusted 
quarterly in accordance with the amount by which the industry's production in 
the preceding quarter had exceeded an agreed "target" figure. 
(c) a "rebate" scheme whereby the proposed flat price increase would be granted, 
but repaid 100% by those producers paying 100% E.P.T. and 50% by those paying 
50% E.P.T. 
8. (a) was rejected on administrative grounds, in that the numbers of small 
producers involved would be very large indeed, and the practical task of assessing and 
identifying their production, insuperable. (c) has also been rejected on various 
grounds of principle and expediency. There therefore remains to be considered (b), to 
the principle of which, as indicated in para. 5 above, the Ceylon Government is 
opposed. The reasons for this opposition are as follows:-
(i) the incentive will not apply to the individual producers, who may except to 
benefit by the exertions of his neighbours, or alternatively to lose through their 
apathy. 
(ii) increased production can only come about through increased expenditure, 
and producers will be unwilling to undertake this expect in exchange for a spot 
increase in price, not a problematical subsequent bonus. 
9. To these objections, which related to a scheme providing for the division of the 
bonus earned, if any, according to the efforts of each producer, there may be added in 
respect of the revised "quarterly" scheme, the danger that if in the first quarter 
production does not beat the datum figure, and the price does not therefore rise, the 
scheme will in all probability be killed as a means of increasing production, and the 
psychological reaction may be great. 
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181 CO 54/986/5/1, no 9, enclosure 9 Feb 1944 
[Constitutional reform]: letter from Mr Senanayake to Sir A Caldecott 
on the ministers' draft constitution 
[On 2 Feb 1944 Senanayake sent Caldecott a letter enclosing a copy of the ministers' draft 
constitution, requesting that both should be sent to Stanley. Caldecott obliged in a 
despatch to the CO which included a copy of his letter of reply to Senanayake of 3 Feb. In 
this letter the governor explained that while he had undertaken only a 'cursory perusal' of 
the constitution (submitted in the form of a draft order-in council), he noted from 
Senanayake's letter that ministers contemplated a 'radical departure' from para 7 of 
HMG's declaration (see 169, annex) in that (a) ministers had not formulated a complete 
constitutional scheme and had left crucial questions regarding the form of legislature, 
franchise and representation to be considered otherwise than by a commission or 
conference 'required by the Declaration', and (b) that Senanayake's letter (specifically 
paras 2 and 3(1)) appeared to envisage the immediate consideration by HMG of the 
ministers' proposals without previous examination by the stipulated commission or 
conference and the introduction of a new constitution before the achievement of victory 
in the war (CO 54/986/5/1, no 8, Caldecott to Senanayake, 3 Feb 1944). Caldecott sent a 
despatch to London on 10 Feb 1944, enclosing a copy of Senanayake's reply to his letter 
which is reproduced here.] 
I have consulted my colleagues on the terms of the second paragraph of Your 
Excellency's secret letter of the 3rd February, 1944, and we wish to submit to Your 
Excellency the following points for transmission to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies for consideration by him at the same time as Your Excellency's letter under 
reference. 
2. Regarding Your Excellency's comment in paragraph 2(a) of your letter, viz., 
that the Ministers have not framed a complete Constitutional Scheme, etc., we wish 
to make the following observations:-
(a) The first omission to which Your Excellency refers is that of "the form of the 
legislature." Presumably the reference is to Article 6 of the draft which empowers 
the Parliament of Ceylon to establish a Senate. We have already informed Your 
Excellency that we have decided upon a uni-cameral system. We consider, 
however, that the new Parliament should be able by ordinary legislation to 
establish a bi-cameral system if and when it so desires. In this connexion, it may be 
observed that the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia has been empowered 
to establish a bi-cameral system if it so desires. 
(b) Your Excellency next refers to the absence of provisions relating to the 
franchise. In Canada, Australia, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the existing 
election laws were maintained, but were made subject to alteration by the 
respective legislatures. We would have been glad to have followed these examples 
were it not that the present Elections Order-in-Council is in urgent need of 
alteration. That Order is defective not only in respect of the franchise but also in 
respect of election law generally. Regarding the former (viz., franchise), we wish to 
make it clear that we do not intend to propose any variation in adult franchise. 
Regarding the latter (viz., election law generally), a Select Committee of the State 
Council has already proposed numerous amendments (Sessional Paper XIV of 
1938) and recent experience suggests that even more radical changes may be 
necessary. Further, the election law should be changeable by the Parliament of 
Ceylon in the same manner as in Canada, Australia, South Africa and Southern 
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Rhodesia and other parts of the British Commonwealth. For these reasons, we 
followed the example set by His Majesty's Government in 1931, and provided for a 
separate Elections Order-in-Council-vide Article 16(2) of the draft. We assume it 
to be our duty to prepare a new Elections Order-in-Council, and to bring the 
matter under early consideration. 
(c) Your Excellency further refers to "representation." We have submitted a 
complete scheme on this subject, and have thus satisfied the terms of the 
Declaration. We must point out, however, that His Majesty's Government has 
required that the draft constitution be accepted by three-quarters of the members 
of the State Council. In paragraph (8) of our Statement/ we said that we would do 
our best to satisfy this difficult condition, but that if we failed we would not stop 
there. We have produced a scheme which will, we hope, enable the condition to be 
satisfied. We have also provided an alternative in case this part of our scheme is 
not agreed to by the requisite majority. 
It will thus be seen that we have prepared a Constitutional Scheme as complete as 
is necessary for any purpose reasonably contemplated by the Declaration. 
3. In view of the reference in Your Excellency's letter to the question of 
immediate consideration of our draft Constitution, we would like to set out our 
position at greater length: 
(a) Your Excellency has already drawn attention in a published despatch (Session-
al Paper XXVIII of 1938) to the inherent difficulties of working the present 
Constitution. The experience of another five years has not in any way diminished 
those difficulties. 
(b) The difficulty of working the Constitution in time of peace has been enhanced 
in time of war. Subjects like food and price control, which were never contem-
plated by the Special Commissioners, have become of fundamental importance 
and have been fitted into the strait-jacket of the Constitution only with a great deal 
of friction and difficulty. 
It is surprising that this Constitution has worked at all. The continuance of the 
present Constitution is not conducive either to the good government of the Island or 
to the full collaboration of the people of Ceylon in the war effort of the United 
Nations. It is essential both for Ceylon and for the war effort that the Constitution be 
changed as soon as possible. 
4. It is no longer true, as it may have been in May, 1943, that the whole energies 
of the Departments of His Majesty's Government are "focussed on the successful 
prosecution of the war." His Majesty's Government and the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom are in fact spending much energy on the formulation of plans for Post-War 
Reconstruction. Such plans are as necessary in Ceylon as they are in the United 
kingdom, but under the present Constitution no authority has the necessary power 
for formulating them effectively. Nor is it possible for any such plans to be made in 
ignorance of the form of the Constitution under which they will be carried out. 
5. For these reasons, the immediate consideration of our proposals is necessary. 
This may be done in whatever manner (as suggested in the Declaration or otherwise) 
His Majesty's Government may consider to be the best. 
1 See 170. 
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182 CO 54/986/5/1, no 6 15 Feb 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 333 from Sir A Caldecott to Mr Stanley 
transmitting a message of protest from G G Ponnambalam on behalf of 
the minorities 
Following submission is telegraphed at the request of Ponnamabalam, [sic] who 
states that he has obtained signature thereto of all the minority members of the State 
Council, except Mahadeva Razik and Pereira, of whom the last named has authorized 
him to subscribe on his behalf. 
Begins. On behalf of minority communities, representing more than one third of 
the population of Ceylon, we beg leave to apprise you that neither His Majesty's 
Government's declaration on the reforms of May, 1943, nor the Ministers' interpreta-
tions thereon, have been debated by the State Council. 
The Ministers have refused to disclose in Council, or even in informal talks, their 
draft proposals which we understand they are submitting for your approval. The 
Ministers' procedure, therefore, prevents minority communities' view point regard-
ing these proposals being disclosed to you. 
Consideration by you of any proposals without reference to the opinion of the 
minority communities would cause grave apprehension in view of vital difference of 
opinion, particularly regarding:-
(a) Quantum of representation of different communities, 
(b) Status of Indians and Europeans resident in Ceylon, 
(c) The system of Executive Committees, 
(d) The establishment of a second Chamber. 
We therefore request you to withhold consideration of Ministers' proposals till 
they are submitted to the State Council, to enable you to have full knowledge of the 
opinion of all sections and interests before a Commission or Conference is 
summoned. 
The Ministers' procedure has aroused strong misgivings and resentment amongst 
minority communities. Ends. 1 
1 Stanley responded in tel 257 of 28 Feb to Caldecott: 'I should be grateful if, provided you see no 
objection, you would inform Ponnambalam that his submission has been received: that as he is aware, the 
acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any Constitutional scheme which Ceylon Ministers may 
formulate is conditional on such a scheme being eventually adopted by three-quarters of all the Members 
of the State Council: and that the discretion of Ministers as to the procedure which they may adopt in 
framing a new draft Constitutional Scheme is not a matter with which I should consider it right to 
interfere' (CO 54/986/5/l, no 7). 
183 CO 54/986/5/1, no lOA 21 Feb 1944 
[Reforms]: letter from Sir A Caldecott to G E J Gent on the ministers' 
proposals for a new constitution. Enclosure: minute by Admiral 
Drayton to Caldecott, 6 Feb 1944 
In my personal letter of 8th February I wrote that I proposed to send in an early 
282 MINISTERS' DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND SOULBURY COMMISSION [183] 
despatch my comments on the Ministers' proposals for a new constitution. On 
reconsideration however I feel that this would be a mistake, as sooner or later there 
is likely to be a demand for publication of official correspondence regarding the 
proposals and it is wise to avoid the contingency of having in such case to withhold 
anything. Moreover the invitation to put forward detailed proposals (paragraph 7 of 
the Declaration of His Majesty's Government) was extended to the Ministers alone 
and I should open myself to criticism if I butted in at this juncture, without waiting 
to be asked for it by the Secretary of State, with my own personal appraisement of 
their proposals. I have therefore decided to write this personal letter to you in order 
that you may be in a position to represent various aspects of the present position to 
the Secretary of State in connection with his consideration of the Ministers' 
communication. 
2. As stated in my previous letter the Ministers have never once mentioned to me, 
much less discussed with me, the progress of their deliberations. They received, I 
have reason to believe, the constant co-operation of Dr. Ivor Jennings who, however 
great an authority on the British and other constitutions, naturally knows less about 
Ceylon politics than the Ministers themselves and is not a legal draughtsman. I 
understand also that the Ministers sought the views of the Officers of State but that 
these are not reflected in the draft scheme. 
3. In tackling their task the Ministers, if not temporarily deaf and blind, must 
have known that there were three crucial points on which any successful scheme for 
constitutional reform must hinge. 
(1) Franchise. During the Ministerial deliberations the Indian Government 
through their representative, Mr. Aney, stated that "in drawing up any draft 
constitution for Ceylon the Ministers should not proceed on the assumption that 
the. Joint Report on Indo-Ceylon Relations of September, 1941, affords any 
guidance for determining the status political and otherwise, of Indians in 
Ceylon."1 I reported this by my Confidential despatch of 12th January, 1944. In 
paragraph 2(b) of the enclosure to my Secret despatch of lOth February current 
Senanayake wrote "we wish to make it clear that we do not intend to propose any 
variation in adult franchise."2 In subsequent conversation however he has told me 
that by this is meant only that the Ministers intend no departure from the 
principle of adult franchise but that they will insist on implementation of the Joint 
Report of 1941 in this regard! 
(2) Minority representation. This question is at the bottom of nearly all political 
and communal disagreement in Ceylon. The Ministers had two courses open to 
them:-
( a) to put up their own reasoned solution without present reference to minority 
1 See 177, note 2. 
2 See 181. Caldecott queried this sentence in conversation with Senanayake on 11 Feb. He then wrote to 
Senanayake on 12 Feb, explaining that it had transpired during the conversation that the sentence was not 
intended to carry the meaning 'which appeared to me to attach to it'. In order to obviate any possibility of 
misunderstanding, the governor therefore requested amplification of the sentence in a further letter. 
Senanayake replied on 28 Feb: 'When we stated that we did not intend to propose any variation in adult 
franchise we were concerned solely with the franchise to persons possessing a domicile of origin. The 
other qualifications for the franchise referred to in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the existing Elections 
Order-in-Council require our further consideration' (CO 54/986/5/1, no 19, despatch from Caldecott to 
Stanley, 29 Feb 1944, enclosures 1 & 2). 
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representatives, and to leave any discussion thereon to the Commission or 
Conference which will examine their proposals; 
(b) to consult minority leaders now and to frame their proposals with reference 
to such consultation. 
Having started off along course (a) the Ministers subsequently allowed themselves 
to be side-tracked into course (b), and then, having invited and granted a number 
of interviews (I have privately seen the Notes of one given to the European and 
Burgher representatives) and having promised others which did not eventuate, 
they headed back to course (a). 
As a result they have got nowhere and have satisfied nobody. The Minority 
Members' Message contained in my telegram No.3333 was the inevitable outcome 
of this shilly-shallying. 
(3) Form of legislature. Although the Ministers have advocated a single chamber 
endued with power to create a second chamber one of them, Bandaranaike, in his 
paper "The Nation" has written consecutive leading articles on the need for a 
second chamber. In subsequent conversation Senanayake has indeed told me that 
he considers a second chamber essential to good government when the Governor's 
present restraining powers are removed. The reason he gave for not pressing the 
necessity was that he did not think a bicameral constitution would be approved by 
75% of the State Council whereas the creation of a second chamber might be 
passed by a bare majority of one or two. The idea that the Ministers might educate 
and lead public opinion in this and other matters had not occurred to him. Nor 
apparently had he or the other Ministers realized that the creation of a second 
chamber might facilitate a solution of the Indian franchise impasse and of 
minority representation. This failure is extraordinary in the light of pointers that 
were given in the course of the interview granted to European and Burgher 
representatives. I can only infer that Dr. Ivor Jennings' known theoretical and 
doctrinaire preference for unicameral constitutions weighed more with them than 
practical local considerations. 
4. I enclose with this letter copies of personal letters from Drayton and Nihill 
dealing seriatim with the Ministers' "Scheme", also a copy of a minute by the 
Commander in Chief, paragraph 4 of which requires slight correction.4 Paragraph 
39(b) of the Ministerial Scheme does not reproduce paragraph (2) of His Majesty's 
Government's Declaration. The insertion by the Ministers of the words "for such 
Forces, other than the Ceylon Defence Force and the Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve" has completely altered and narrowed the scope of the reservation and 
cannot of course be accepted. 
5. In an interview which he sought of me on 11th February Senanayake 
represented his own political position to me as follows:-
(i) Left wing politicians in the Island were out to bring about a period of 
non-cooperation and, in the matter of constitutional reform and world status, to 
throw Ceylon in with India; 
(ii) he (Senanayake) had resigned from the Ceylon National Congress because of 
its decision to admit members of the Ceylon Communist Party (N.B. Not to be 
3 See 182. 4 Only Drayton's minute to Caldecott is reproduced here. 
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confused with the proscribed Sama Samajists; the new party is Stalinist and 
allegedly pro-Allies); 
(ii i) if he was to be successful in arresting a leftist landslide there must be an early 
response by His Majesty's Government to the Ministers' constitutional scheme; 
even though (as he gathered from my letter acknowledging it)5 I might not think 
that it met requirements. 
6. I may here say that in my judgment Senanayake has recently undermined his 
position as Leader of the State Council to a very dangerous extent by weakness and 
instability. I am not thinking in this connection of his hysteria! attack on myself in 
State Council-for which he has since atoned-but of his recurring failure to have 
things out with Bandaranaike. Here is an example of how he allows Bandaranaike to 
queer his pitch. As I reported some three years ago Bandaranaike has been flirting for 
a long time with the idea of a second chamber. At last the suggestion comes up for 
serious consideration with, I understand, Senanayake in support. Bandaranaike, 
determined that either he shall get sole credit for the idea or that it shall miscarry, 
suggests an impossible composition for the chamber, and Senanayake instead of 
standing up to him weakly drops the whole proposal; whereupon Bandaranaike 
promotes it with renewed enthusiasm in "The Nation"! Similarly in regard to 
Congress; Senanayake did not attend the meeting whereat the admission of 
Communists was approved; instead of fighting the issue he resigns post facto. Now 
he appeals for an early response from His Majesty's Government to a document in 
which, owing to his failure to captain the team, our Ministers have failed to suggest 
answers to the three cardinal questions in any scheme of democracy of who are to be 
represented? How are they to be represented? and On what are they to be 
represented? 
7. The only form which, it appears to me, an early response to the Ministers' 
scheme can take is an immediate examination of the clauses of the draft Order-in-
Council which refer to the reserved control of Ceylon's defence and external 
relations. They are clearly defective and unacceptable as they stand, and some 
headway will have been made if His Majesty's Government could have adequate 
clauses drafted now for incorporation in any constitution that may ultimately 
emerge. 
8. Another form of response that might suggest itself is an earlier appointment 
than that promised of an investigatory Commission or Conference. The Ministers' 
scheme does not, however, provide the "something to bite on to" which I regard as 
essential to a speedy and successful outcome of any such Commission or Conference. 
There is, as I have stated many times before, no possibility of agreement by consent 
in this matter. A scheme has got to be prepared, examined by the Commission or 
Conference, accepted as a fair offer by His Majesty's Government and then put before 
the State Council for acceptance by a 75% majority. The scheme will have to be put 
before State Council to be swallowed whole or not at all. There can be no further 
arguing of particular points after the Commission or Conference has recommended a 
scheme and His Majesty's Government have offered it: the question must be yes or 
no; take it or leave it. 
9. The question for immediate consideration therefore is:- Who, the Ministers 
5 See 181, note. 
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having left so many points unanswered or indeterminate, is to prepare an alternative 
scheme for examination by the promised Commission or Conference? 
P.S. Since drafting this letter I have received from the Censor an intercept of a 
letter written by Jennings, of which I annex a copy.6 This confirms my allusion to 
him in paragraphs 2 and 3(3). 
Enclosure to 183 
It is a pity that these proposals do not include the establishment of a Senate, because 
whatever is decided, the discussion of such proposals would at least demonstrate 
some of the functions and advantages of a Second Chamber. 
2. The proposal that the establishment of a Senate should depend on the 
initiative of the State Council is likely to result in there not being a Senate, as it 
seems highly improbable that a State Council would voluntarily surrender some of 
its powers, when, broadly speaking, it will probably already regard those powers as 
inadequate. 
3. There is nothing however in the Declaration by His Majesty's Government 
which prohibits the Board of Ministers from proposing a single-Chamber govern-
ment, and there remain the two further stages of the examination of these proposals 
by a post-war Commission and their submission to the State Council, in which this 
policy might be changed. 
4. As to the details of the proposals in relation to Defence, the definition of the 
reservation in paragraph 39 may give rise to considerable argument, but as it is the 
definition as laid down by His Majesty's Government in so many words in the 
Declaration, the Board of Ministers can hardly be criticised on this account. It will be 
for His Majesty's Government itself to take the initiative if it is felt on reconsideration 
that, for instance, the word "Communications" should be made more specific. I 
regard it as essential that it should be made clear once and for all that Communica-
tions include Railways, Ports, Air Ports, Land Telegraph, and W/T. Again, it has 
occurred to me that in the course of the discussion last year, His Majesty's 
Government stated that the word "Security" included such matters as the control of 
building in the vicinity of airfields. 
On the point whether such matters are or are not reserved, the draft Order leaves 
the final decision to the Supreme Court of Ceylon. At least; this appears to be the 
intention of paragraph 41 (3). This can not be accepted as the issue may well be one of 
Imperial importance from the point of view of defence. 
5. The mention of "Shipping Services" in paragraph 40 seems unlikely to have 
any undesirable repercussions on Defence: in peace time such matters are dealt with 
on a commercial basis. 
6 Not printed. 
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184 CO 54/980/5/1, no 12 11 Mar 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott on the procedure for examining the ministers' scheme 
Your secret despatches of 3rd and lOth February.1 
Ceylon Constitution. 
Question whether His Majesty's Government will be prepared to depart from 
decision that examination of any scheme prepared by Ministers for new Constitution 
would have to be deferred until victory is achieved is a matter which will require most 
careful consideration, and I am not in a position to express any opinion as to whether 
that decision can be varied or to commit His Majesty's Government in any way. 
2. But in the meantime I should be grateful for your personal advice by telegraph 
as to whether in the event of it being decided to proceed with the examination of the 
Ministers' scheme, this examination could best be carried out by (a) Commission or 
(b) Conference; and, whichever of these two procedures might be adopted, (c) where 
the examination should take place, and (d) how the examining body should be 
constituted. 
3. It would be very definitely understood that in the event of His Majesty's 
Government deciding to proceed with the appointment of a conference or commis-
sion they were not on that account in any way committed to accepting the Ministers' 
proposals as satisfying the first of the two conditions set out in paragraph 7 of His 
Majesty's Government's Declaration.2 
4. I have just received your secret telegram of 9th March, and note the action 
which you propose to take in paragraph 4 and your strong recommendation in 
paragraph 7 that, if at all possible, examination of scheme should be proceeded with. 
5. I will give fullest consideration to your suggestions but I am anxious that in con-
versations with Ministers you will take opportunity to make it clear that His Majesty's 
Government cannot be expected to take hasty decisions on matters of this kind. 
1 See 181, note. 2 See 169, annex. 
185 CO 54/986/5/1, no 21 17 Mar 1944 
[Reforms] : inward telegram no 542 from Sir A Caldecott to Mr Stanley 
transmitting a message from the Board of Ministers requesting an 
early decision on the ministers' scheme 
Your telegram No. 321. 
Ministers have asked me to transmit the following message. 
Begins. The Ministers note with gratification that you will give consideration to 
their request for immediate examination of the scheme submitted by them for a new 
constitution for Ceylon. While they fully realize that His Majesty's Government 
would not wish to take a hasty decision, they desire to submit that urgent local 
circumstances make early decision a vital necessity, in that, unless the life of the 
present State Council is extended by an Order-in-Council, it must be dissolved before 
the end of this year, so that a general election can take place early next year. While 
the Ministers have no doubt that, in the interest of the war effort, a general election 
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at this time would be undesirable, a further extension of the life of the State Council 
is not likely to be acceptable to public opinion, unless the country were fully satisfied 
that plans · for a new Constitution were under active consideration and that the next 
general election would be held under the new Constitution and within a reasonable 
time. The Ministers would be grateful if His Majesty's Government would, in view of 
these considerations, expedite their decision. Ends. 
186 CO 54/980/5/1, no 22 18 Mar 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley recommending the appointment of a commission to 
examine the ministers' scheme 
Your secret and personal telegram of 11th March. 1 
In conversation with the Ministers, 14th March, I impressed on them the points 
emphasised in your paragraphs 1, 3 and 5. 
2. Before communicating to them the text of your telegram No. 321, I deleted 
therefrom the words "Board are accordingly," because the Board includes Officers of 
State, whereas the invitation to formulate Constitutional Scheme was, vide para-
graph 7 of His Majesty's Government's Declaration, to the Ministers only. 
3. Minister's reply is contained in my telegram No. 542.2 
4. Your paragraph 2. Strongly advise Commission and not (repeat not) Confer-
ence, because the latter could only be productive if some measures of consent were 
reached, and this, as explained in my letter to Gent of 21st February, paragraph 8, 
cannot be anticipated. 
5. Venue should certainly be Ceylon, or else complaint of inaccessibility would be 
made. From the Commissioners' own standpoint also, first-hand experience of local 
atmosphere important. 
6. Strongly advise that the Ministers should be requested, well in advance of the 
arrival of the Commission, to supplement their scheme by definite proposals on the 
three crucial questions, mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of enclosure (iii) to my 
despatch of 3rd February. 3 
7. Invite also attention to suggestion in paragraph 7 of my letter to Gent4 in 
regard to reserving control of Defence and External Affairs. 
8. Venture to suggest that the Commission should consist of three members 
only, of whom one should have experience in the Upper or both Houses of the British 
Parliament, one experience in the Lower House of a Dominion Parliament, and the 
third, British Treasury experience. Following names, though not perhaps of persons 
likely to be available, are indicative of the three types required-Soulbury, Bruce5 
and Leith Ross.6 In my judgment, dons, or other constitutional theorists, must be 
studiously avoided. Essential also that none of the three should have had any 
previous association with Ceylon or other Colonial Administration, or with India. 
1 See 184. 2 See 185. 3 See 181, note. 4 See 183. 
5 Stanley Bruce (lst Viscount Bruce of Melbourne er 1947); prime minister of Australia, 1923-29; 
Australian high commissioner in London, 1933-1945; member of War Cabinet from 1942. 
6 Sir F Leith-Ross, deputy controller of finance, Treasury, 1925-1932; chief economic adviser to UK 
government, 1932- 1946. 
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187 CO 54/986/5/1, no 25 31 Mar 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott explaining why HMG is not able to commit itself to the 
early appointment of a commission 
Your secret and personal telegram of the 18th March.1 
I have given most careful consideration to the question whether it is practicable 
for His Majesty's Government in present circumstances to take active steps to 
examine by a Commission or Conference the constitutional proposals which 
Ministers have formulated. 
2. In their statement of the 8th June, 1943,2 Ministers referred to the passage in 
His Majesty's Government's Declaration which made it clear that examination by 
Commission or Conference cannot be undertaken until victory is achieved. The 
Ministers contemplated however that the war might enter a phase in which His 
Majesty's Government might find it possible to proceed at an earlier date. I sincerely 
appreciate the energy and expedition with which they have formulated their scheme; 
and if I were able to take the view that the war is now entering a phase in which the 
Ministers' proposals could be fully examined by a Commission or Conference of the 
requisite calibre it would have been very welcome to me, as I fully appreciate the 
desirability of pressing on with this most important matter with the least possible 
delay. 
3. The war is in fact entering on a momentous phase and I have regretfully come 
to the conclusion that with the best will in the world it is impracticable for His 
Majesty's Government at such a time to commit themselves to vary their undertak-
ing by the earlier appointment of a Commission or Conference to examine the 
scheme in detail. 
4. Nevertheless, I am prepared to undertake to re-examine the situation on the 
capitulation of Germany with the hope that His Majesty's Government may then find 
it practicable to go ahead. If this should prove to be the case I am confident that it 
would be their desire to do so. It will be understood that my undertaking is without 
any commitment as to His Majesty's Government's eventual decision. It is impossible 
at the present stage to estimate how long it may be before the actual re-examinat ion 
can start. I hope however that in the interval Ministers will supplement their scheme 
by more complete proposals on the three crucial questions to which you refer in 
paragraph 6 of your secret and personal telegram under reference. 
5. I appreciate that the conclusion in paragraph 3 above means that the matter of 
extending the life of the present State Council, or, alternatively, holding an election 
must now be decided, and I will consider this after receiving your reply to paragraph 
7 of this telegram. 
6. I should like you to know the reasons which have caused me to come to the 
conclusion mentioned above. The first is the impracticability of securing the services 
of thoroughly suitable personnel of the types you mention for a Commission in the 
present situation, but I hope that this stringency may be eased as soon as Germany 
surrenders. Secondly, it is impossible before victory is achieved, at least in Europe, 
for the hard pressed operational and planning staffs of the Services to formulate the 
1 See 186. 2 See 170. 
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defence requirements of His Majesty's Government in Ceylon in the post-war 
situation, and unless the Commission or Conference can be given prior general 
guidance on that matter, which must be of the greatest importance to His Majesty's 
Government, it would be unable to do its work effectively. 
7. I should like your advice as to (a) the method of communicating this decision 
to Ministers, having regard to the disappointment it must cause to them, and as to 
(b) probable political and other repercussions in Ceylon. Meanwhile I should like you 
to know that I am very sensible of the personal disappointment which you yourself 
will feel at this decision, especially since it is not now likely to be possible before the 
conclusion of your term of office as Governor to decide upon the final stages of 
constitutional reform to which you have devoted so much thought and sympathy, 
and on which your advice has been so consistently valuable to His Majesty's 
Government. 
188 CO 54/986/7, no 14 4Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: letter from G G Ponnambalam to Sir A Caldecott forward-
ing a message for the secretary of state 
A meeting of the Representatives of the Minority Communities in Council who 
desired you to send the last cablegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 
the subject of Constitutional Reforms was held again to consider his reply .1 They 
have asked me to request you to be good enough to forward the following reply:-
"We have considered carefully your cablegram and are greatly disappointed 
with its text and tenor. We protest strongly against your appointing a 
Commission or Conference to consider only the Constitutional Scheme 
framed by Ministers all but one of whom belong to the Singhalese commun-
ity. We feel this would be quite contrary to the spirit of your earlier 
declarations in which you stated that the position generally would be 
examined by a Commission or Conference. We constitute at least one quarter 
of the House and we claim the right of participation in or an opportunity of 
prior contribution to the deliberations of the Commission or Conference in 
the first instance." 
We shall thank you to forward this by cable to the Secretary of State.2 
1 See 182, note 1. 
2 Caldecott replied to Ponnambalam in a letter on 6 Apr: 'I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your 
letter dated the 4th April current in which you communicate the text of a telegraphic protest for 
transmission to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Colonial Regulation 185 requires every such 
transmission to be accompanied by a report from the Governor, and before I can be in a position to make 
such a report in the present connection it is necessary that I should myself clearly comprehend what it is 
that is protested against and on what grounds. I have however been unable to find anything in the 
Secretary of State's message conveyed to you by my Secretary's letter of the 7th March at all inconsonant 
either in letter or in spirit with his earlier declarations, and have therefore to seek further elucidation from 
you before sending any telegram or despatch. I shall be grateful also to be informed why the word 'only' 
has been placed before the words "the constitutional scheme" in the second sentence of your draft 
telegram?' (CO 54/986/7, no 14). 
290 MINISTERS' DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND SOULBURY COMMISSION 11891 
189 CO 852/605/9, no 118, enclosure iv 4Apr 1944 
'The rubber position': memorandum by R L Buell on the strategic 
priority of rubber from Ceylon 
[Buell was the American consul in Colombo. He presented his memo at an interview with 
Drayton in Apr 1944. W S Lockwood, the American representative on rubber at the US 
embassy in London who visited both India and Ceylon in the spring of 1944, was also 
present at the interview. Caldecott forwarded the memo to Stanley, together with a 
record of the interview and three other enclosures on the rubber situation, in his 
despatch of 18 Apr 1944 on the same file .] 
1. Natural rubber is the A-1 priority strategic material of which there is an 
insufficient supply to meet the requirements of the United Nations. 
2. An adequate supply of natural rubber is vital to victory. 
3. Despite drastic restrictions as to its use, consumption for essential military 
purposes exceeds production. 
4. Ceylon at present produces about 60% of all the natural rubber available to the 
United Nations. 
5. Supplies of natural rubber from other presently available sources cannot be 
materially increased during the war. 
6. Therefore, the production of natural rubber is the A-1 responsibility and the 
chief contribution of Ceylon towards victory. 
7. Although the high price of rubber will no doubt stimulate production, Ceylon 
faces the challenge of producing every pound of rubber possible. This is not being 
done today. 
8. The goal of maximum production can be achieved only with an abundant 
supply of good labour and contented labour. 
9. There is a serious shortage of labour to meet the requirements of the 
industries, food production campaign and military programs of Ceylon. 
10. Effort during the past year to recruit sufficient labour to meet such 
requirements have not solved the problem. 
11. Because of its essentiality to the war effort, the rubber industry should have 
priority over all other industries in its claim for labour, materials and transport. 
12. Food production, however essential, is for the duration of the war, secondary 
to rubber production since the United Nations can exchange food for rubber, but can 
obtain sufficient rubber only from Ceylon . 
13. Every measure is warranted to induce an adequate supply of competent 
labour to work on rubber estates, such as, (a) classifying rubber workers as essential, 
(b) supplying extra food rations, (c) providing such additional forms of compensation 
as may be deemed necessary. 
14. Even with the adoption of the foregoing necessary steps, however, the only 
solution to the problem of the labour shortage in Ceylon is more labour. 
15. To obtain more labour it is essential to remove restrictions on the immigra-
tion of labour for the duration of the emergency. 
16. The solution of this problem rests with the Governments of Ceylon and India 
and is vital to the military program of the United Nations. 
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190 CO 54/986/5/1, no 28 5 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 48 from Admiral Layton to Mr Stanley 
urging the appointment of a commission 
Your secret telegram1 to the Governor has been shown to me. I feel that I must lose 
no time in expressing to you my deep concern regarding the effect on the war effort 
in Ceylon, and on the co-operation of the Ceylonese, of refusal to appoint a 
Commission. In my opinion, this would inevitably lead to a general election, which 
would hinge on secession to India or loyalty to the Empire and, in the prevailing 
political temperature, the former would start hot favourite. 
2. At the moment we are setting up Headquarters, South East Asia Command, in 
Ceylon (a choice, I believe, strongly influenced by the more loyal atmosphere of 
Ceylon as compared with India) and we are making (? colossal corrupt group) 
preparations for onward offensive move. The success of this will be seriously 
jeopardised if we cannot count on the loyal co-operation of the Ceylon Government 
and people and I cannot say too strongly how much I should deplore any action 
which might undermine this. 
3. With regard to paragraph 6 of your telegram, as the subject of defence 
(including communications) is to be reviewed anyway, I do not understand why it 
should be necessary now to formulate defence requirements of His Majesty's 
Government in Ceylon in post-war situation. 
4. I fully appreciate the difficulty in finding three suitable men to form the 
Commission, but the danger we are faced with, at this vital moment of the war, 
demands, in my opinion, that this difficulty should be surmounted. 
5. I further consider that possible risk to the security and success of their 
operations should be placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
6. I hope you will forgive the straight speaking in this telegram, but I feel that 
nothing else would be justified. 
1 See 187. 
191 CO 54/986/5/1, no 29 5 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley arguing that Ceylon might demand inclusion in a future 
independent India if a commission is not appointed 
Your most secret and personal telegram of 31st March. 1 
My advice requested on two points in paragraph 7 is as follows:-
(a) Political exigencies will inevitably force Ministers to demand the publication 
forthwith of my secret despatches of the 3rd and lOth February with their 
enclosures,2 your telegram No. 321, my telegram No. 5423 and your reply thereto. 
Reply must therefore be worded suitably for such publication, and paragraphs 2 and 
3 of your telegram appear to me to provide basis. Reference to the first reason given 
in your paragraph 6 should be avoided because difficulties of sending suitable 
1 See 187. 2 See 181, note. 3 See 185. 
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Commission for the short period necessary (which I of course fully appreciate) may 
not be generally understood here, in view of visits recently made by persons from the 
United Kingdom to Ceylon and other parts of the Empire. I am not sure that I 
appreciate the validity of the second reason given in your paragraph 6. Is it not 
constitutional powers in regard to defence and not defence requirements in the 
post-war situation which have to be formulated, and have not such powers been 
satisfactorily formulated in Acts like the Government of Burma Act, 1935? In regard 
to paragraph 4 I advise most strongly against the giving of any undertaking which 
does not commit His Majesty's Government. Ceylon public, being ignorant of 
constitutional niceties, regards you impersonally as the mouthpiece of His Majesty's 
Government vis-a-vis the Colonies. Any suggestion indeed of a Spenlow and Jorkins 
technique would at once arouse in the circumstances criticism and antipathy. Nor in 
my judgement will Ministers be in a position to fulfil the hope expressed by you in 
the last sentence of paragraph 4, not only because they are bound to be discredited in 
the public view, but also because publication of their present proposals will prevent 
addition thereto or variation thereof. 
(b) I have no doubt that the political result of your reply will be a death blow to 
Senanayake's ideal of Ceylon as an internal self-governing unit of the British 
Commonwealth, and a general demand for inclusion in a new federal India, whose 
future right to secede has been explicitly conceded. In view of his past political 
history, vide paragraph 10 of my "Things Ceylonese" of the 20th August, 1940,4 I 
anticipate that Bandaranaike will take a lead in this demand unless Senanayake 
should forestall him by a complete volte face and the enforced abandonment of his 
present ideal. Ceylon National Congress is already orientated towards India, and Mr. 
Aney, representative of the Government of India in Ceylon, takes every opportunity 
of emphasising in his public speeches Ceylon's cultural, economic, geographical, 
ethnical and historical unity with India. In short, the only course which could hold 
up political landslide towards demand for inclusion in a future independent India was 
complementary appointment of a Commission to examine Ministers' scheme, and 
now that this proves impossible there is nothing else to keep our already (?) 
dangerously fissiparous Ministry together or to obviate the necessity for general 
election, which may take place either next January after the passing of a vote on the 
Budget, and possibly gubernatorial reservation thereof, or almost (corrupt group) if 
Ministers desire to avoid the responsibility of another Budget. In this gloomy picture 
there is not even the consolation that present Ceylon relations will improve, because 
it is the shibboleth of native politicians on both sides of the Palk Straits that all 
differences are due to the present alien capitalist administrations, and could soon be 
settled between the emancipated peoples of both countries. Meanwhile the various 
Congresses will continue to stimulate rather than compose disagreement. 
2. I most gratefully appreciate the kind regard for my personal feelings expressed 
in your paragraph 7, but I have tried throughout this correspondence to prevent any 
personal considerations weighing with me. Indeed my present admittedly sore 
disappointment is personal only in the sense that it is that of an Englishman who 
after 37 years in the Colonies believes whole-heartedly in the British Empire and 
deplores the prospects of its premier Colony being allowed to fall into the arms of a 
soon seceding India. 
4 See 64. 
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192 CO 852/605/9, no 100 13 Apr 1944 
'Ceylon rubber situation ': letter from R D Fennelly (Ministry of 
Production) to S Caine. Enclosure: memorandum by L S Thompson 
toP D Reed, 22 Mar 1944 
[Lewis S Thompsoh and Philip D Reed were members of the American embassy in 
London. Reed was a US businessman who entered war work in 1941 with the Office of 
Production Management and its successor, the War Production Board, upon which he 
was chief of the Bureau of Industry Branches responsible for organising peacetime 
industries to war production. He was chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in London 
(MEAL) between Oct 1943 and Dec 1944. The statement, 'Critical natural rubber 
situation', and table, 'Combined United Nations crude natural rubber situation', were 
attached to Thompson's memo.) 
Philip Reed of M.E.A.L. recently handed the Minister of Production a memorandum 
on the Ceylon rubber situation, copy of which I enclose. 
As you will see there is nothing in the memorandum that is new to us and the 
questions raised are those which were discussed in detail a year ago, between 
Ministers, without any definite conclusion being reached. I understand that the 
impasse between India and Ceylon over the additional labour was never broken, but 
that the amount of labour then required was obtained by a labour drive in Ceylon 
itself. 
You will agree, I think, that before we could consider suggesting new negotiations 
between India and Ceylon, it would be necessary to be assured that additional labour 
at this juncture would result in a sufficiently big increase in the output of rubber to 
warrant the agitation which might be caused. I, myself, do not feel that anything like 
the 25,000 tons mentioned in Mr. Thompson's memorandum would be forthcoming 
and in this the Ministry of Supply agree. It would however perhaps be opportune, as 
it is now some time since this aspect of the Ceylon rubber situation was considered 
here, to make further enquiry as to whether the situation has changed at al l. 
If you have not got the information already would you consider the possibility of 
sending a telegram to the Governor, asking him whether in his view additional 
labour would at the present juncture result in a substantial increase in the rubber 
output and whether he could give any figure of what that increase might be. I realise 
this would have to be done tactfully. 
I may say that this enquiry does not emanate from the Combined Raw Materials 
Board. So far as I can gather it was a more or less general enquiry from the American 
side and much of the detailed suggestion comes from Stanton. 
Enclosure to 192 
I understand you are lunching with Mr. Oliver Lyttelton1 tomorrow and I thought 
you might wish to bring this matter to his attention. 
Under date of March 15th, we received a cable from the Combined Raw Materials 
Board stating their acute concern over the labor situation for rubber production in 
1 Minister of production, 1942- 1945. 
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Ceylon. Upon investigation with those most familiar with the rubber production 
situation in Ceylon, it was determined:-
!. That the price difficulties had been ironed out. 
2. That with 20,000 additional rubber tapping laborers, an additional 25,000 tons 
of rubber per annum would be produced. 
3. That the 20,000 rubber tapping laborers are available in Southern India. 
4. That there is an impasse in importing these laborers, because the Indian 
Government refuses to send the laborers to Ceylon unless Ceylon will agree to 
allowing these laborers to remain in Ceylon after the war. That Ceylon is agreeable 
to the importation of 20,000 laborers, but insists on returning them to India after 
the war. 
5. That there are two possible methods of breaking this deadlock and getting out 
this much needed additional 25,000 tons of rubber (25,000 tons is equal to better 
than 50% of the total annual production of the Western Hemisphere):-
(i) that the War Cabinet intervene in this matter to use its influence to break 
the deadlock between India and Ceylon 
(ii) that the Armed Services induct 20,000 Indians with rubber tapping 
experience, place them in some type of uniform, and work out an arrangement 
for their use on the rubber estates of Ceylon, then demobilise them through the 
normal channels of troop demobilisation. 
I would appreciate hearing from you your thoughts, after talking with Mr. 
Lyttelton, on this subject, as we must cable the Combined Raw Materials Board in 
the very near future. 
CRITICAL NATURAL RUBBER STATION 
1. Stocks of natural crude rubber, including liquid latex, in the United Nations 
(excluding the U.S.S.R.) totalled 555,000 long tons in January 1, 1943. By December 
31, 1943, they had declined to approximately 220,000 long tons . Stocks of natural 
crude rubber in the United States during this 12-month period dropped from 
423,000 tons to 139,000 tons . These and other figures mentioned below are reflected 
in the attached table . 
2. In spite of the tremendous achievement in the construction and high volume 
operation of synthetic rubber plants in the United States during 1943, many types of 
large size aircraft, military, and essential commercial vehicle tyres still cannot be 
made exclusively from synthetic rubber but require the addition of substantial 
quantities of natural crude rubber. Crude rubber must still be used also in the 
manufacture of landing craft, self-sealing fuel cells and many other important war 
products. 
3. It is estimated that such minimum essential use of natural crude rubber by the 
United Nations in 1944 will total 260,000 long tons. It is estimated that 174,000 tons 
of that amount will be consumed in the United States, 30,000 tons in Great Britain, 
24,000 tons in Russia, 14,000 tons in Canada, 8,000 tons in Australia, and additional 
essential amounts totalling 10,000 tons in supplies to South Africa, Latin America, 
Spain, Sweden and other countries. India, Brazil, and Peru are either self-supporting 
or have an exportable surplus. 
4. World production of natural crude rubber available to the United Nations is 
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estimated at 192,000 tons in 1944, including 110,000 tons from Ceylon and the 
exportable surplus from India, 30,000 from Latin America, including Mexican 
guayule, 16,000 from Liberia, 34,000 from other African sources and 2,000 from 
miscellaneous sources. Allowing for estimated allocations of 260,000 tons and 
production of only 192,000, the United Nations stocks by the end of 1944 would be 
reduced from 220,000 to approximately 152,000 long tons. 
5. The stock position outlook in the United States is even more critical. With the 
safe arrival of 50,000 tons of rubber from Ceylon in 1944, which represents a 30,000 
ton increase over 1943 receipts from Ceylon, total imports cannot be expected to 
exceed 96,000 tons. Domestic consumption of 17 4,000 tons and re-exports to Canada 
and other countries of 13,000 tons would reduce our stocks during the year from 
139,000 to 48,000 tons. The Branch Committee recommended that United States 
stocks should not fall below a danger line of 100,000 tons. 
6. In view of the number of grades comprising the balance, and of the hundreds 
of rubber manufacturers who have to consume it, and of the unavoidable delay in 
effecting deliveries, 48,000 is insufficient for uninterrupted production of finished 
goods, and would leave practically no stocks for use against 1945 requirements. The 
risk is obvious of reducing United States stocks to any such level. Therefore either 
the United States must drastically cut consumption in both essential military and 
vital transportation items or find ways and means to import more rubber. 
Conclusion: There is no likelihood of substantially augmenting production from 
existing sources of supply. Therefore, as the year 1944 progresses, the shortage of 
crude rubber will have the effect of reducing military consumption and military 
programs. Therefore, the rapid completion of preparations now being made by the 
Washington and London Far Eastern Emergency Rubber Committees for the 
immediate procurement of rubber on reoccupation of presently enemy occupied Far 
Eastern territories is an essential first step toward providing for 1945 requirements. 
This Committee believes the shortage of natural crude rubber must be considered 
as an important factor affecting strategic plans for the reoccupation of occupied 
areas. 
COMBINED UNITED NATIONS CRUDE NATURAL RUBBER POSITION 
1. Estimated United Nations Stocks (exc. USSR) 
31/12/42 
2. Estimated United Nations Stocks (exc. USSR) 
31/12/43 
3. Estimated World Production available to 
United Nations during 1994: 
From: Ceylon and India 
Latin America 
Liberia 
Other Africa 
Miscellaneous 
110,000 
30,000 
16,000 
34,000 
2,000 
4. Estimated Total Available to United Nations 
during 1944 
5. Estimated Minimum Essential Consumption 
during 1944 
6. Estimated United Nations stocks as of 31112/44 
U.S. only 
555,000 long tons 423,000 
220,000 long tons 139,000 
192,000 96,000 
412,000 
260,000 
152,000 long tons 
187,000 
48,000 
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193 CO 54/986/7, no 7 13 Apr 1944 
'Reform of the Ceylon constitution': letter from the Ceylon Associa-
tion, London to CO supporting the views of the minorities 
I have the honour to inform you that we have been advised of the terms of the cable 
addressed to you by Minority Representatives of the State Council on the refusal of 
the Board of Ministers to disclose their draft proposals which, it is understood, they 
are about to submit to the Secretary of State for approval, reading as follows:-
"On behalf of the Minority Communities representing more than one-third of 
the population of Ceylon we beg leave to apprise you that neither His 
Majesty's Government's declaration on Reforms of May 19431 nor the 
Ministers ' interpretations thereon have been debated by the State Council. 
The Ministers have refused to disclose in Council or even in informed talks 
their draft proposals which we understand they are submitting for your 
approval. The Ministers' procedure therefore prevents minority communities' 
viewpoint regarding these proposals being disclosed to you. 
Consideration by you of any proposals without reference to opinion of 
minority communities would cause grave apprehension in view of vital 
differences of opinion particularly regarding:-
(a) Quantum of representation of the different communities. 
(b) Status of Indians and Europeans resident in Ceylon. 
(c) The system of Executive Committees. 
(d) The establishment of a Second Chamber. 
We therefore request you to withhold consideration of the Ministers' 
proposals till they are submitted to State Council to enable you to have full 
knowledge of opinion of all sections and interests. 
The Ministers' procedure has aroused strong misgivings and resentment 
amongst minority communities." 
We have noted that, in the declaration made by H.M. Government in May last, it is 
stated that measures relating to the rights of H.M. subjects not residing in the Island 
will be included in the class of reserved Bills and also that H.M. Government does not 
propose to enter into detailed discussions until victory has been achieved, but at the 
same time this Association wishes to support the request put forward by the Minority 
Representatives. 
1 See 169, annex. 
194 CO 54/986/7, no 14 13 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: letter (reply) from G G Ponnambalam to Sir A Caldecott 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 6th April current in 
which you desired to elucidate further what it is that is protested against in our 
communication of the 4th instant. 1 I shall endeavour to assist you. You will recall 
1 See 188. 
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that in the last representation transmitted by you on our behalf to the Secretary of 
State we protested against the Ministers' procedure in that it prevented the opinion 
of the minority communities being disclosed to the Secretary of State and we 
requested him to withhold consideration of the Ministers' proposals till they are 
submitted to the State Council in order that he may have full knowledge of the 
opinion of all sections and interests in the country before a Commission or 
Conference was summoned. 
The Secretary of State however, in his message which you communicated to us, 
does not reply to our request but asserts that "acceptance by His Majesty's 
Government of any constitutional scheme which the Ceylon Ministers may formulate 
is conditional on such a scheme being examined by a suitable Commission or 
Conference and being eventually accepted by three-quarters of all members of the 
State Council". The only interpretation that we have been able to place on this 
passage is that the Ministers' constitutional Scheme alone would be examined by a 
suitable Commission or Conference. This we feel would be clearly contrary to the 
spirit of his earlier declaration that "no substantial changes in the constitution could 
be introduced without further opportunity for examination of the conflicting views of 
the various interests concerned". There is nothing in his last message to us from 
which we could discern that the views of the minorities would also be heard and 
examined by the contemplated Commission or Conference. In these circumstances I 
would respectfully request your Excellency to forward our protest by cable at your 
earlier convenience to the Secretary of State.2 
2 Caldecott replied to Ponnambalam in a letter on 20 Apr: 'I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of 
your letter dated the 13th April current. Despite its assistance I have been unable to discover anything in 
the Declaration of His Majesty's Government, or in the message from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies conveyed to you by my Secretary's letter dated the 7th March, which would justify an inference 
that the promised examination by a suitable Commission or Conference of the Ministers' Constitutional 
Scheme will be without consideration of the position generally or without opportunity being afforded for 
examination of the conflicting views of the various interests concerned. I have therefore seen no 
justification for telegraphing the message contained in your letter of the 4th April but have transmitted it 
by the official Air Mail together with copies of the letters that have subsequently passed between us' (CO 
54/986/7, no 14). 
195 CO 54/986/5/1, no 33 13 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott requesting amplification of the governor's views before 
the War Cabinet is consulted over the appointment of a commission 
I have now had opportunity of studying your own and Commander-in-Chiefs top 
secret and personal telegrams of 5th April. 1 The whole question is clearly one on 
which it will be necessary for me to consult the War Cabinet but before doing so 
there are certain points on which I should be grateful for an amplification of your 
views. 
2. You will appreciate that since their Declaration of May, 1943, His Majesty's 
Government have not abrogated in any subsequent correspondence the condition 
1 See 190 & 191. 
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that the examination of any constitutional scheme prepared by Ministers could not 
be undertaken until victory had been achieved. On the contrary, they have 
re-asserted it. It was only on such a condition that in May, 1943, His Majesty's 
Government were prepared to make the Declaration which they then made. 
3. It is clear therefore that His Majesty's Government will need to be convinced 
that there are at present stage fresh reasons of overriding effect and importance 
requiring them to reconsider their condition. Such fresh reasons at this crucial stage 
will obviously be judged by their force in direct relation to our military purposes and 
capacity. Commander-in-Chief's telegram has shown special reasons of that charac-
ter having Ceylon in view as base of South East Asia Command operations, and steps 
will be taken to place his view before the Chiefs of Staff. But I should also be grateful 
for your own appraisement of the possible repercussions of an announcement on the 
basis contemplated in most secret and personal telegram of the 31st March2 on (1) 
the general internal security position in Ceylon, especially having regard to the 
present state of efficiency of the Ceylon Police Force, (2) on essential war production 
of vital commodities (rubber, tea, foodstuffs, etc.) in the Island and (3) nature and 
effect of Ceylonese non-co-operation which might result from political landslide 
apprehended in paragraph 1 (b) of your telegram. Would you expect for instance that 
loyalty of Ceylonese officers in general administration would come into question? I 
should like clearest estimate you can make which I can use if necessary to justify my 
recommending His Majesty's Government to advance from their previous decision. 
4. I note from paragraph 7 of your secret telegram No. 490 that you consider it 
doubtful whether Ministers would not oppose a further extension of the life of the 
present Council, even if His Majesty's Government were to agree to the appointment 
of a Commission or Conference at the end of this or early next year, to examine their 
constitutional scheme. 
I appreciate your difficulty in making any confident assessment of Ministers' 
probable attitude without being able to consult them, but if the doubt you express is 
well founded and a general election had to be held in any case, resulting in a 
landslide towards secession to India, what advantage would accrue if His Majesty's 
Government were to consider meeting Ministers' wishes by agreeing to the early 
appointment of a Commission or Conference? Would it not be open to criticism as a 
step which in those circumstances could be nothing more than a useless attempt at 
appeasement. I should be glad if you would consider this point also and furnish me 
with your advice. 
Please show this telegram to the Commander-in-Chief. 
2 See 187. 
196 CO 54/986/5/1, no 36 20 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley 
Your secret and personal telegram of 13th April.1 
Before replying to the three points in your paragraph 3 I will deal with points 
1 See 195. 
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raised in your paragraph 4. Doubt expressed paranthetically in paragraph 7 of my 
secret telegram No. 490 was subsequently allayed in the course of my conversation 
with the Ministers 4th March, reported in my secret and personal telegram of 18th 
March,2 and by the terms of their message transmitted by my secret telegram No. 
542.3 Any statement promising the appointment of Commission this year should 
contain also statement that Article 19 of Ceylon State Council Order-in-Council of 
1931 will be further amended by the substitution of 10 years for 9 years, and I do not 
contemplate that such statement if (repeat iO accompanied by such promise will 
meet with any wide or serious disagreement. My personal appraisement is that it 
would be generally welcomed whatever some few politicians might say or pretend to 
think. 
2. Your paragraph 3 (1) . Without any desire to be alarmist I cannot contemplate 
without the gravest apprehension the effect on internal security if, in addition to the 
present strain placed upon the police by:-
(a) The presence here of so many fighting forces and now of the S.E.A.C. 
(b) Ensuring the safe working of ports and the guarding of so many vulnerable 
points. 
(c) Policing so many war time controls and ration schemes, and 
(d) Implementing whole body of Defence Regulations over and above the normal 
maintenance of law and order, 
there should be superimposed the task of police supervision over general election. 
During the election campaign, consistency of His Majesty's Government (vide your 
paragraph 2) in stating that consideration of constitutional changes must await 
victory would be denounced from the hustings as British persistence in delaying 
reforms which are a necessary antecedent to the efficient future handling of 
problems of reconstruction which will demand immediate and wholetime attention 
as soon as hostilities cease. There is indeed no doubt whatever in my mind that 
political slogans would become increasingly anti-British as the election progressed, 
and that lasting political deterioration would ensue. Members of the State Council 
would, of course, find it politically necessary to stump the Island with similar slogans 
if the life of the present State Council were further prolonged without the 
simultaneous appointment of a Commission, and there would follow equally great 
deterioration of political morale and continuous burden upon the police. 
3. Your paragraph 3 (2) . The effect of a general election, or alternatively of a 
political campaign against its unconditional postponement, conducted in the 
circumstances indicated in my preceding paragraph would, without any doubt 
whatever, unsettle both the peasantry and estate employees, besides involving 
absences from work on polling day, and temporary dislocation of transport, and 
would result in increased labour unrest and diminution of output of rubber, tea, 
foodstuffs, etc. Further politicization of labour at the present juncture would be 
particularly dangerous and deplorable. 
4. Your paragraph 3 (3). I do not fear disloyalty in the ranks of our permanent 
public services, but I do gravely fear the reduction in their operative efficiency and 
leadership which would follow the loss by them of co-operation on the part of the 
public, if the latter were permitted to become engulfed in a wave of nationalism and 
2 See 186. 3 See 185. 
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anti-British propaganda that will be inevitable if a general election were held or 
refused while consideration of constitutional reform remains relegated to an undated 
future. 
5. In conclusion, it will of course be realised how greatly a general election in 
England differs from one in Ceylon, where many constituencies are still in an 
Eatanswill category of development, and electors far more emotional than their 
British counterparts. 
6. I have supplied the Commander-in-Chief with a copy of your telegram and of 
this reply in which he concurs. 
197 CO 54/986/5/1, no 37 28 Apr 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott requesting a further appreciation 
Your top secret and personal telegram of 20th April. 1 Ceylon constitution. 
2. I have carefully reviewed the information and advice furnished in your own 
and in the Commander-in-Chief's recent telegrams on this matter and on the basis of 
those telegrams the following appear to me to be the adverse results, in effect, to be 
apprehended on defence grounds if His Majesty's Government do not agree to 
proceed with the examination of Ministers' scheme at an earlier stage:-
(a) Resignation of Ministers and general policy of non-co-operation adopted by 
Ceylonese political and other leaders and people which will have active anti-British 
nature and is likely to be successful in substantially interfering with war effort 
generally, internal security, and production of essential commodities. 
(b) This deterioration would be likely to involve all sections of the community 
including police and other Government services, as well as essential labour at 
ports and on estates, and may be expected to be marked by general and prolonged 
civil disturbances. 
(c) As Ceylon is to serve as the headquarters and operational base for operations 
planned on largest scale against Japan, such a situation in the Island would 
seriously jeopardize the success of these operations. 
3. Please let me know whether you agree with the above estimate, and whether 
there are any further likely factors directly bearing upon the strategic situation 
which as stated in my top secret and personal telegram of 13th Apri12 must at this 
crucial stage of the war be determining factors in His Majesty's Government's 
decision. 
4. As explained in that telegram a decision by the War Cabinet will be necessary; 
but at this critical moment of the war when matters of greatly transcending 
importance are occupying the attention of His Majesty's Government it would be out 
of the question for me to bring up this matter for decision in present circumstances, 
and I must have all possible time and latitude to choose the appropriate moment at 
which to do so. 
5. I appreciate that a decision must be taken sometime before end of year but you 
1 See 196. 2 See 195. 
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and Commander-in-Chief will at the same time realize that His Majesty's Govern-
ment may find it less difficult to take decisions according with your advice in respect 
of Ceylon if war operations in Europe in the meantime have made good progress. 
I should like therefore to have your considered advice as to period for which 
decision can be deferred. Can situation be held until early autumn (say September) 
without risk of consequences developing which would interfere with operational 
efficiency of the Island? If not what is your estimate? 
6. Please give Commander-in-Chief a copy of this telegram and consult with him. 
I want to be sure that I know your mind as clearly as possible. I assure you how 
conscious I am of great difficulty which you must feel in your personal judgment on 
these matters and how grateful I am for your readiness and ability to give me definite 
personal advice. 
198 CO 54/986/5/1, no 39 5 May 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley 
Your top secret and personal telegram of 28th April.1 
I fully realize the difficulty of presenting in precis form appraisement of a 
complicated situation, but I fear that the summary set out in your paragraph 2 would 
afford grounds for two inferences:-
(1) that the attitude of Ceylon towards the war is one of mere indifference, or 
alternatively governed solely by self interest and 
(2) that Ceylon is in reality undeserving of any further measures of self 
Government, neither of which inferences would be true to fact. Such inferences 
appear to me to arise from the omission of all reference to what I consider the 
nodal point of the present situation, i.e., the imminence and inevitability, unless 
extraneously prevented, of general election. This imminence has already begun 
though not yet gravely, to divert attention from the war effort to political 
manreuvres, and the position is bound to deteriorate progressively as the election 
looms nearer. Nor is there any doubt that the Ministers correctly represented to 
you in my telegram No. 5422 that any further extension of the present State 
Council, so long as consideration of reform remains relegated to an undated 
future, would not be acceptable to public opinion. Unless therefore His Majesty's 
Government can promise to send Commission within the next eight months we 
are on the horns of the following dilemma; either we have 
(a) dissolution in October and general election in January, at the latest, or 
(b) enforced and unacceptable postponement of it by Order in Council, 
and in either case the consequences summarized in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my 
telegram of 20th ApriV which I cannot render more succinctly. 
2. Your paragraph 2 omits also all reference to the drift towards India mentioned 
in paragraph (b) of my telegram of 5th April,4 which would inevitably derive impetus 
1 See 197. 2 See 185. 3 See 196. 4 See 191. 
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from general election, or from any postponement of it unaccompanied by simul-
taneous consideration of reforms. 
3. On the points of details in your paragraph 2:-
(i) I do not contemplate resignation of the Ministers if His Majesty's Government 
refuses their request, but rather that the State Council will force me to dissolve it 
under Article 69 or Article 18. 
(ii) I anticipate rapidly lessening co-operation rather than sudden total non-co-
operation. 
(iii) As already indicated in paragraph 4 of my telegram of 20th April I do not 
predict that political deterioration will directly affect the police or any other public 
service, but that their efficiency will be impaired by the absence of co-operation 
from the public. 
(iv) I do not apprehend general or long civil disturbances which, if they should 
eventuate, would be far easier to deal with than rapid decrease and cessation of 
co-operation which I definitely foresee. 
4. Your paragraph 5. While I might be able for a little while longer to induce the 
Ministers to remain patient, on the ground that the door has not been closed, on 
their request or reply given to my telegram No. 542, I cannot hope to keep the 
position stabilized for more than a few weeks because the Ministers must already be 
questioning their ability to present the 1944-1945 Budget in the State Council in 
early July with any hope of its being accepted if they prove unsuccessful in their 
request, and dissolution is due in October.5 
5. General background is that the State Council is in its ninth year, but Ceylon, 
unlike the United Kingdom, has no real direct impact of the war, and does not 
possess a National Government, an obedient Government majority or a party system 
which can ensure that the public regards the war effort as not only paramount but 
exclusive. 
6. Commander-in-Chief, to whom I gave copy of your telegram, desires me to add 
expression of his emphatic opinion that any further delay in announcement by His 
Majesty's Government that they will appoint Commission on reform this autumn and 
simultaneously postpone general election would be so prejudicial to the interests of 
the South Eastern Asia Command and the war efficiency of the Island generally, that 
reference to Chief of Staff should be immediate. 
5 On 6 May 1944, Caldecott transmitted to Stanley the following message from Senanayake: 'The Ministers 
desire to be informed whether His Majesty's Government has considered the constitutional scheme 
formulated by them, and what further measures His Majesty's Government propose to take in that 
connection. As the present State Council is due for dissolution not later than early next year, the public 
are also anxious to know reasonably early, the circumstances in which the next general election will be 
held.' Stanley replied to Caldecott in tel 583 on 15 May asking him inform Senanayake that the message 
had been received and that the views of HMG would be sent to the governor as soon as possible (CO 
54/986/5/1, nos 41 and 46). 
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199 WO 203/5412 18 May 1944 
'Constitutional reforms in Ceylon': minutes of a meeting of Advanced 
Headquarters, SEAC, at Queen's House, Colombo. Appendices: "A" 
and "B", notes by Sir A Caldecott and Admiral Layton 
His Excellency the Governor began by explaining the constitutional position, 
regarding which he circulated a short appreciation which is attached as Appendix 
"A". He summarised the position by stating that in view of a request from his 
Ministers for immediate consideration of their constitutional proposals he had asked 
His Majesty's Government to agree before the Budget Session in July to appoint at a 
date before the end of 1944, commissioners to consider them. If this request was not 
accepted it would be necessary either to face a General Election some time in the 
Autumn or New Year with consequent dislocation of War Effort, labour and public 
services, and a possible permanent embittering of relations; or, failing this, to extend 
once more the life of the State Council by an Order in Council which, without the 
appointment of a Commission, would precipitate grave political discontent, of which 
the attendant consequences would be similar to those of an election. 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief 1 read a paper which he had prepared 
setting out his views, which is attached as Appendix "B". In this, he outlines the 
reaction affecting the War Effort which he considered likely if it were decided not to 
accept the Ministers' request for the appointment of a Commission. He particularly 
emphasised the effect on labour, and the possibilities of disturbances and riots which 
would lead to a demand for troops. 
The Governor explained briefly the history of his communication with the 
Secretary of State, and the Commander-in-Chief explained that he had requested the 
Colonial Secretary to place the matter before the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff 
in order to link the question with its effect on the War Effort. It was no doubt as a 
result of this that the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to express his 
views as to the extent to which non-co-operation by the bulk of the local population 
and disturbances might affect military operations in his Command. 
The Supreme Allied Commander pointed out that the political aspects were much 
wider than those merely affecting Ceylon. The attitude of His Majesty's Government 
had so far been that they could not give their attention to the detailed working out of 
constitutional reforms in India, Burma, Malaya or Ceylon until victory was 
achieved. Any consideration of the claims of Ceylon at this stage would affect by 
implication these other countries as well. 
The Governor pointed out that in the case of Ceylon the proposals were much less 
far reaching than those put forward by India and Burma. Defence, and external 
affairs would be reserved subjects and remain in British hands, while bills affecting 
currency, minorities and the property of non-residents would be reserved bills. 
Further, the announcement now that Commissioners would be appointed before the 
end of the year would be sufficient. From the date of their appointment the 
Commissioners m.ight take eight or nine months to frame their proposals which 
would then require consideration by H.M. Government and the Ministers and 
ultimate submission to the State Council, and the probability therefore was that the 
1 Admiral Layton. 2 Admiral Mountbatten. 
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war with Germany would be over, and the war with Japan might be hoped to be 
nearing its end, before proposals would require any detailed consideration by His 
Majesty's Government. 
The Supreme Allied Commander said that he had not appreciated these points, 
which he thought should be made clear to the Chiefs of Staff. He went on to say that 
if the need for troops arose, British troops in South East Asia were most unlikely to 
be available, as there was a grave shortage of them. He asked whether Indian or 
African troops could be used. 
The Governor and the Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the use of Indian 
troops to deal with riots in I915 had caused much political ill-feeling and was still 
remembered with bitterness. The same consideration would apply in a greater degree 
to the use of African troops, whose relations with the native population were in any 
case not altogether satisfactory. 
Lieut-General Sir Henry PownalP asked whether there was any possibility that the 
political feeling which would result from the refusal to accede to the Ministers' 
request would be confined to the politically minded classes and would not spread to 
the labour. The Governor was definitely of the opinion that both the dislocation 
connection with the election and any subsequent political non-co-operation would 
affect the labour. The first act of election agents and political agitators would be to 
address large bodies of men collected together in the form of organised labour. They 
would, he considered, go first to rubber and tea plantations, docks, factories, and the 
labour collected for airfields and other large works. 
The Supreme Allied Commander agreed that it was essential that the dislocation 
· consequent upon elections should be postponed if possible until victory was attained, 
and undertook to despatch a signal to the Chiefs of Staff supporting the request for 
the appointment of a Commission. He suggested that the signal should, in the first 
place, stress the limited nature of the request now made by the Ministers, and should 
go on to point out the unfortunate results which refusal of the request was likely to 
have on:-
(a) the rubber industry. 
(b) the movement of coal, and consequently communications. 
(c) dock labour and therefore the port of Colombo and Trincomalee as a fleet 
base. 
(d) the tea industry. 
He considered that the signal should state that if disturbances were caused, there 
were no British troops in South East Asia available to deal with them, and that the 
Governor was not prepared to accept the use of Indian or African troops for this 
purpose. 
Mr. Keswick4 pointed out that disturbances on a wide scale, or even widespread 
political disaffection, would have a most adverse effect on American opinion, which 
was at the present stage of the utmost importance; while a gesture of conciliation 
would have a correspondingly good effect. Similarly, disaffection in Ceylon would 
have a very adverse effect on our propaganda in Burma and Malaya, and to some 
extent Sumatra while a conciliatory move would assist in combatting Japanese 
propaganda regarding the freeing of these areas by S.E.A.C. 
3 Chief of staff, SEAC. 4 Acting political adviser, SEAC. 
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Lieut-General Sir Henry Pownall pointed out that the request by the Ministers at 
present was moderate, and that if it was refused, it was unlikely that, at a later date, 
public opinion would be content with so little. 
Major-General Harrison5 explained that the minority of the labour employed on 
works projects was uniformed or imported. If trouble occurred among Ceylon labour 
before the end of 1944, a number of projects would be affected. By 1945, however, it 
should be possible to complete works projects remaining with uniformed labour, and 
although delay would be caused, it would be much less. It was pointed out that 
imported labour also would be affected if a breakdown in communications caused 
any difficulties in food supply. 
The Supreme Allied Commander directed Major-General Harrison to prepare an 
estimate of the delay in work which would be caused by labour trouble, recognising 
that such an estimate must vary widely within limits according to the date of the 
trouble. 
The Governor said that he did not consider that the trouble would spread to the 
public services, though it might cause a reduction in effort and a general loss of 
efficiency. 
The Supreme Allied Commander directed his staff to draft a signal to the Chiefs of 
Staff which would be shown to His Excellency the Governor and to the Commander-
in-Chiefbefore despatch; and a brief for Sir Henry Pownall in case he had to discuss 
this subject in London. 
Appendix "A" to 199: 'Short appreciation of position': note by Sir A Caldecott, 18 
May 1944 
1. Under Article 19 of the Ceylon (States Council) Order-in-Council, 1931, the 
term of a State Council expires not later than five years from the last general 
election. Under this Article a general election was due in January, 1941. 
2. By Order-in-Council, 1940 the term was extended to seven years; by Order-in-
Council, 1942, the term was extended to nine years. 
3. The Council is now in its ninth year and unless a further extension is enacted 
by Order-in-Council there must be a general election in January, 1945. 
4. The 1940 and 1942 extensions were recommended by me in the knowledge 
that they would be acceptable to the Ministers, to the State Council and to the public 
of Ceylon. If they had not been acceptable I should before now have been forced to 
dissolve the Council under Article 18 (for obstruction, or non-cooperation, and it 
must be remembered that in Ceylon the State Council constitutes the executive as 
well as the legislative authority) or under Article 69 (for refusing to find necessary 
funds). 
5. A further extension of the life of the State Council will be acceptable to the 
Ministers only if their constitutional scheme is examined in the immediate future. If 
there is no promise of such examination the Ministers, even if they wanted to remain 
in office, would have no support from the public and would incur intense opposition 
from the Press. They would be forced to request dissolution and I to grant it under 
Article 18. 
5 Engineer-in-chief, SEAC. 
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6. Unless therefore the term of State Council is extended further by an 
Order-in-Council accompanied by an announcement of an early Commission to 
examine the Ministers' constitutional scheme we must have a general election in 
January at the latest; and my own anticipation is that one will be forced earlier, 
probably next month before introduction of the budget in July. If a budget were 
passed, with a general election immediately ahead in January, I foresee a vote-
catching irresponsible financial programme and a consequent necessity for guber-
natorial reservation of the Supply Bill. The result of this on Ceylon politics at the 
threshold of a general election could only be disastrous. 
7. A general election in England takes a month or so. Local conditions 
(availability of police, transport, etc.) renders it impossible in Ceylon to accomplish it 
under three months. The superimposition of three months electioneering turmoil on 
top of our present problems of labour, crime and transport cannot be reconciled with 
security or even moderate efficiency in the present vital stage of South East Asian 
hostilities. 
8. There are no political parties in Ceylon to keep candidates for election under 
the restraint of policy or programme. The nearest approach to parties are the Ceylon 
National Congress (who recently ignored the Governor and sent a demand for 
complete independence direct to the Prime Minister and others) and the Sinhala 
Maha Sabha, which was first in the field some years ago with the demand for absolute 
independence. 
9. General public opinion in the Island is not at present behind the Congress or 
the Sabha in the demand for independence. It would be found to be in support of the 
Ministers in their acceptance of partnership in the British Commonwealth on the 
terms laid down in His Majesty's Government's recent declaration. 
10. At a general election however His Majesty's Government's declaration would 
be represented as mere procrastinative bluff in the light of their reluctance to give 
immediate consideration to the Ministers' constitutional scheme, and the electoral 
slogans will be anti-British and secessionistic. The effect of such a release of poison 
gas from the hustings up and down the Island on the morale of labour and peasantry 
cannot be over-rated. 
11. The Ceylon Indian Congress has recently been flirting violently with the 
Ceylon National Congress, and secessionism from Britain will be largely associated in 
the speeches of many candidates, with an Indo-Ceylon Anschluss and Gandhi-ism. 
12. If there are those who consider that the holding of a general election with the 
inevitably concomitant 
(a) dislocation of transport; 
(b) interference with hours and days of labour on military works, estates, public 
works, factories and food production; 
(c) political stunting and distraction of attention from the war effort; 
(d) diversion of police activities from the detection and prevention of crime to the 
supervision of elections; and 
(e) fanning of discontent among all classes 
can be reconciled with the selection of Kandy as Headquarters of the South East Asia 
Command or with Ceylon's pivotal position as a base for hostilities further East, I am 
definitely not one of them. The Ceylonese, although like other tropical Orientals they 
require continuous prodding into action, have been far from non-cooperative. They 
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know that when I was appointed Governor in 1937 I was commissioned to report on 
constitutional reform and that I did so in June 1938. They have read the report 
(Sessional Paper XXVIII of 1938) in which I roundly condemned the present 
constitution as utterly inefficient, and they feel that something must be done about 
replacing it before they are faced with all the problems and work of post-war 
reconstruction. Taking either a short or a long view from a military or civil 
standpoint I think that it would be a great blunder to give these people ground for 
non co-operation because of the (admitted) difficulty of finding three Commissioners 
to come out here during the next seven or eight months. 
Appendix "B" to 199: note by Admiral Layton [nd) 
The following are the reaction [sic] affecting the war effort which I consider likely in 
the event of an unfavourable decision on the Ministers' request for the early appoint-
ment of a Commission on Constitutional Reform. 
2. It will be necessary for the Ministers at once to turn their attention mainly to 
their own political future, and in their own interest to divert the attention of the 
public to this. This is bound to react unfavourably on the administration of the 
Ministers' departments, which, even in normal times, requires constant drive and 
supervision to maintain efficiency. 
The occasion is bound to be one in which political division will impair the already 
feeble cohesion of the Ministers as a Government. They will inevitably themselves be 
more impatient of the demands and restrictions occasioned by the War. 
They will have to find some slogan which will go down with the uneducated 
populace, and there is little doubt that the suggestion that Ceylon should throw in 
her lot with India would in the circumstances command a good deal of public 
support. Any opposition to this policy would involve the resuscitation of many bitter 
political controversies between Ceylon and India and certainly hinder co-operation 
between the two countries on the War Effort. 
To sum up, on the Ministerial level we must expect a general tendency to lose 
interest in the War and pay little attention to its needs. The attitude would probably 
be that the Allies are bound to win the war, and that there is no need for the 
Ceylonese to do anything but look to their own interests and achieve what they can of 
their aims and aspirations in spite of British obstruction and delay. 
In their public speeches the Ministers would hardly be able to avoid attacking H.M. 
Government as being false to the principles of the United Nations in suppressing 
Ceylonese aspirations to freedom. 
3. This change in the Ministerial attitude is bound to be reflected in the 
departments under their control. There will be inevitably a tendency to revive the 
importance of things concerning Ceylon only, as opposed to those connected with 
the War. There will be an increasing tendency to treat European heads of 
departments and other officials as being here on sufferance, and to be replaced by 
Ceylonese as soon as may be. 
4. The State Council is, as a body, practically unanimous that the proposals of 
H.M. Government hitherto have been inadequate and ungenerous. As far back as 
March, 1942, the Council passed a resolution demanding Dominion Status and the 
Ministers in expressing their deep disappointment and dissatisfaction at the reply of 
H.M. Government certainly did so with the full approval of the Council. There exists 
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a considerable body of members who think that the Ministers have not insisted 
nearly strongly enough on their demands. If the latest request of the Ministers is 
refused, there is little doubt that this body of opinion in the State Council will vent 
itself in some extremely inflammatory speeches in the Council and that, if the 
Ministers do succeed in working out a united policy to put to the country at an 
election there will be opposition to it from a more extremely nationalist angle, 
designed to sever the British connection at all costs and as soon as possible. 
5. Our main needs for war purposes from Ceylon are:-
A. Efficient public services, e.g., 
Road and Rail Transport; 
Ports and Harbours; 
Posts and Telegraphs; 
Police. 
B. A contented and efficient labour force for employment on Service Works. 
C. Maximum output of certain important products such as rubber, tea, copra and 
timber. 
D. Harmonious relations between the populace and the various units of British 
and Allied Forces. 
The maintenance of each of these four things is in any case a task of some difficulty 
and magnitude. It is indisputable that that task must be gravely hampered by an 
atmosphere in which the people are told by their own leaders that their natural 
aspirations are being thwarted by the same extraneous government which is 
constantly urging them to accept further restriction and hardship and make greater 
efforts in the name of the War Effort. 
As regards labour in particular, there have been increasing signs recently of 
restlessness and attempts to exploit the situation by strike action. The main reason 
for this is the feeling that now is the time, while the demand for labour so greatly 
exceeds the supply, to bring pressure to bear to achieve better conditions. 
The labour leaders also feel that now is the time to acquire influence and prestige 
amongst the workers. The introduction of a specific cause of political discontent is 
bound to be seized on by such leaders and to lead to more and more agitation. 
It is in this direction that outbreaks of violence are most to be feared. These are 
more likely to arise from our efforts to break strikes which might hamper the War 
Effort than from any other cause. A large-scale strike in the harbour area at 
Colombo, and efforts to break it in a time of extreme political tension might well lead 
to serious riots, which would in our present situation be disastrous. 
Relations between troops and populace in Ceylon have on the whole been good up 
to date, but they have required constant watching. Small incidents which subside 
quickly in normal times would equally quickly be exaggerated and spread in a 
political atmosphere which would encourage the exploitation of anti-British feelings 
by politicians. 
7 [sic]. I do not anticipate any disloyalty or specific refusal of co-operation on the 
part of the Police, nor indeed on the part of any of the Public Services. What is to be 
expected is rather a loss of goodwill and enthusiasm on the part of the populace in 
general. This would be such as would, in my opinion, make the already cumbersome 
and dilatory procedure of administration through the executive committees an 
impossible hindrance to the achievement of the maximum War Effort. 
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8. I would finally draw attention to the almost complete absence of British (U.K.) 
military forces from the Island, particularly infantry. If we were faced with internal 
unrest, the security of the base will demand a substantial allotment of these troops, 
as we must have a really reliable body of men who are available instantly to put down 
trouble without prejudice to any other operations. 
200 WO 203/5412 22 May 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no SAC 2636 from Admiral Mountbatten 
to Chiefs of Staff assessing the probable impact on the activities of 
SEAC if an election is held in Ceylon 
Your 2544 of 15 May. 
1. I have had a discussion1 with Admiral Layton and the Governor, from which 
the following factors affecting the general position have emerged:-
(a) His Majesty's Government in 1943 definitely promised constitutional reforms 
aiming at responsible government under the Crown in all matters of internal civil 
administration. H.M.G. to retain control of defence and external affairs. 
(b) At the same time they stated that they cannot give proposals to achieve (a) 
above the necessary attention until victory is achieved. 
(c) The Ministers of Ceylon have now asked that their proposals should be 
examined immediately. 
(d) The Governor considers that if announcement of an early commission to 
consider this is not received before the next Budget Session in July, the Ministers 
may ask for a dissolution which would involve a General Election in the Autumn. 
In any case unless a special Order in Council is passed a dissolution in October and 
General Election in January are inevitable. 
(e) The Governor and Admiral Layton consider that a General Election would 
involve serious dislocation of the life of the colony during the three months of the 
election activities and considerable political ill-feeling thereafter, the conse-
quences of which are set out in my para. 2 below. 
(0 The Governor and Admiral Lay ton considers that the life of the State Council 
could safely be prolonged and a General Election postponed by order in council for 
a further period of two years, if, but only if, announcement were made now that a 
commission would be appointed before the end of the year. They point out that 
report of the commission would not be ready for some eight or nine months and 
that any scheme based on it would have to go before the State Council. Attention 
of H.M.G. is not therefore likely to be required until a period when it is to be hoped 
that victory will have been achieved at least against Germany. 
2. Consequences of dislocation at time of election and of subsequent political 
ill-feeling. 
Immediate general strike and general declaration of non-cooperation are not 
anticipated. What is believed probable is a rapid decrease and cessation of c-operation 
[sic) with following results:-
1 See 199. 
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(a) Adverse affect on labour, affecting:-
(i) Production and export of rubber, to a serious extent. 
(ii) Movement of coal, and therefore communications. 
(iii) Operation of ports and particularly Trincomalee as a fleet base. 
[200] 
(iv) Construction of Naval installations and airfields for Fleet Air Arm and 
R.A.F. 
(v) Production and export of tea for H.M.G. 
(b) Breakdown of communications might lead to local shortages of food, which, 
coupled with excitement of inter-communal feeling caused by electioneering, 
would increase probability of riots. Strikes (though not an immediate general 
strike) would also be probable. For political reasons, Governor insists that use of 
Indian or African troops to restore order is unacceptable, and British troops 
essential. As you are aware, shortage of British troops in my command is already 
acute and is affecting all my plans. They could only be found for Ceylon at the 
expense of current operations. The knowledge that we were even contemplating 
such a possibility would immediately cause deterioration in American relations 
(see (c) below) . 
(c) Deterioration in political position in Ceylon would have adverse effect on 
American opinion. Any conciliatory step would be correspondingly valuable 
vis-a-vis Americans. 
(d) Japanese propaganda is at present playing up grant of freedom to occupied 
territories. My task in Burma, Malaya, and to a lesser extent, Sumatra, would be 
made more difficult by fact of strained relations in Ceylon, while appointment of a 
commission to examine Ministers' proposals would be of positive assistance. 
(e) Although it is not expected that actual disaffection will occur among the 
uniformed services, e.g., police, semi-military labour, etc, a loss of efficiency and 
keenness is to be expected. 
3. Based on the above summary of position as interpreted by Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief, I estimate the effect on military operations in my command as 
follows:-
(a) Slowing up of preparations to receive the Fleet and particularly the Fleet Air 
Arm. Completion of current projects would be delayed by an indeterminate period 
not less than six months. 
(b) In event of strikes, which would be probable, existing military labour would be 
insufficient to clear ports or maintain communications. Although it is not 
proposed to mount operations from Ceylon, resulting paralysis might mean that 
the Fleet would have to be based elsewhere, with consequent increased difficulties 
in the assembly and sailing of convoys. 
(c) Situation which might involve use of British troops in Ceylon would affect 
current operations seriously and accentuate (d) below. 
(d) Deterioration of relations with Americans. 
(e) Considerable increase in difficulties of propaganda warfare. 
4. Outside my Command, it appears to me that the major military consequences 
would be reduction in the export of essentials such as rubber, tea and copra, of which 
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undoubtedly rubber is the most important in view of the known serious shortage of 
crude rubber.2 
2 This tel was shown to Churchill who minuted: 'It would be a great folly to have an election in Ceylon in 
the next few years. They are making heaps of money out of us at the present time, and the whole area must 
be regarded as a war zone' (PREM 4/50/16, Churchill to General Ismay for COS Committee, 25 May 1944). 
201 CO 54/986/7, no 18 5 June 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 1033 from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting a message from G G Ponnambalam urging the 
appointment of a commission and the undesirability of an election 
My despatch No. 96. 
Following submission is telegraphed to you at the request of Ponnambalam on 
behalf of Members of the Minority Community in the State Council. Begins. 
1. The Representatives of the Minority Community on the State Council of Ceylon 
are strongly of opinion that a Commission or Conference should be appointed as 
early as possible within the next twelve months to examine the constitutional 
proposals of the Ministers, as well as the criticisms of the Minority [sic] thereon, 
including their alternative proposals. 
2. The Representatives of the Minority Community in the State Council strongly 
urge the undesirability of holding another General Election under the present 
Constitution for the following reasons:-
(a) The circumstances mentioned by the S. of S. in his despatch published on 
14th June, 1940 for postponing General Election namely: 
(i) The general dissatisfaction with the present Constitution. 
(ii) The necessity for arriving at decision regarding franchise and delimitation of 
constituencies remain unaltered. 
(b) The circumstances mentioned by the S. of S. in his despatch of lOth February, 
1942, with. regard to the necessity for not distracting the people and the 
Government of Ceylon from a total war effort remain unaltered if not aggravated. 
(c) The reduction in the present proportion of Minority Members to those of the 
Major Community, which is possible in a new Council elected under the present 
Constitution may have a fatal bearing on the issue of the Constitutional Reform, 
which is to be ultimately decided by a three-quarter majority of the Council. 
(d) Constitutional reform is likely to be delayed in the event of a General Election, 
due to possible changes in the personnel of the Board of Ministers. 
(e) From the point of view of the Minority Community it is of the utmost 
importance that amendment of the present Constitution, which has already 
operated to their detriment, should precede a General Election. Ends. 
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202 CAB 66/50, WP(44)299 7 June 1944 
'Ceylon constitution ': War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Stanley 
recommending the appointment of a commission 
1. I am sorry that at this particular time I should have to trouble my colleagues 
with this matter, but owing to its operational implications I feel that only the War 
Cabinet can take the decision. 
2. A year ago a Declaration was made, with the approval of the War Cabinet, of 
the intentions of His Majesty's Government regarding Constitutional reform in 
Ceylon (W.P. (43) 204). I attach the Declaration as Annexure I1 to this memoran-
dum, but the point of importance in relation to the present difficu lty is that while the 
Ministers were invited forthwith to formulate proposals for a new Constitution, it 
was specifically stated that the examination of these proposals by His Majesty's 
Government could not be undertaken until after victory had been achieved. 
3. The Ceylon Ministers immediately set themselves to the task of formulating 
their proposals, and have now submitted them to me with an urgent request that the 
further examination of their proposals should not be delayed until the end of the war 
but should be undertaken now. By that they mean that a Commission from this 
country should be sent to Ceylon not later than the end of the year and that His 
Majesty's Government should give an assurance now that this will be done. They 
point out the increasing difficulties of working the present admittedly unsatisfactory 
form of Constitution in war conditions and the great difficulty of undertaking the 
necessary post-war planning in ignorance of the likely form of the Constitution 
under which the plans will have to be carried out. 
4. There is, unfortunately, a political complication which makes it impossible to 
ignore this demand. The life of the present State Council has already been extended 
for a period of four years beyond its statutory limit. This extension has been secured 
by an annual amendment of the Order in Council with the consent of Ministers in 
order to avoid a General Election in the Island in war conditions. Unless a further 
extension is arranged, the dissolution of the Council will be necessary this autumn, 
and a General Election will follow in January next. I am advised by the Governor 
most specifically that the Ministers will not consent to a further extension unless 
they can be assured that progress will be made with the examination of their 
Constitutional proposals. 
5. Even if, in our desire to avoid the obvious evil results of a General Election, the 
life of the State Council were to be extended by an amendment of the Order in 
Council, without the consent and indeed in opposition to the wishes of the Ministers, 
and we were prepared to face the probability of their consequent non-co-operation, it 
is doubtful whether we should secure our object. Under the present Constitution a 
defeat of Ministers in the State Council on a major issue requires a dissolution and 
consequent elections within three months. It would be an easy matter for the State 
Council to reject the Budget in July and thereby force an election. It appears, 
therefore, that His Majesty's Government must either accept the Ministers' demand 
and proceed with the examination or face a General Election within the next few 
months. 
1 See 169. 
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6. From the purely Colonial Office point of view, the choice between these two 
courses is not easy to make. Against the decision to proceed with the examination are 
the following arguments:-
(a) we deliberately stipulated in our Declaration last year that we could not go 
ahead with the Constitutional question until we had won the war, and to vary that 
decision now would have the appearance of weakness and of giving way to the 
Ministers' clamour; 
(b) there may be a real practical difficulty in finding men of sufficient calibre to 
undertake the work of this Commission during the coming winter; 
(c) the mere presence of the Commission and the necessity for various minority 
interests to state their claims will lead to political excitement in Ceylon, even 
though that may be of a much less damaging character than would be caused by a 
Ministerial crisis or a General Election. 
In favour of accepting the proposals are the arguments that:-
(a) the present Constitution is admittedly an awkward and difficult one, and the 
Ministers are right in claiming credit for the fair measure of success with which 
they have worked it in war conditions; 
(b) we have consistently pursued a course designed to avoid political excitement 
in Ceylon during the war. The necessity of this is even more obvious in the coming 
months. Insistence on the letter of our Declaration last year would quite clearly, in 
the opinion of those qualified to advise, land us in the most acute difficulties with 
the Ministers and the State Council. • 
7. I confess that if I had to reach a conclusion on purely political considerations I 
should find the issue difficult to decide, but the determining factors obviously must 
be the position of Ceylon as an essential operational base in the coming months in 
the Far East, and the effect a political crisis might therefore have upon future 
operations. 
8. I accordingly put the whole position to the Chiefs of Staff for their advice on 
that aspect. They have obtained the considered advice of the Supreme Allied 
Commander, South-East Asia Command, in the telegram attached as Annexure 11.2 
They endorse his view, which is emphatically in favour of accepting the Ministers' 
demands. 
9. Moreover in view of the present urgency of rubber supplies, in which respect 
Ceylon is by far the most considerable source for natural rubber, I have been assured 
by the Minister of Production that a very serious view must be taken of any 
diminution of these supplies. Paragraph 2 (a) (i) of the Supreme Allied Commander's 
telegram refers particularly to that risk. 
10. I accordingly have no hesitation in recommending to my colleagues that His 
Majesty's Government should take the decision now that a Commission should be 
appointed to proceed with the examination of the Ministers' Constitutional propos-
als, and should visit Ceylon for this purpose about the end of this year, and that the 
life of the present State Council should be prolonged by the necessary amendment of 
2 See 200. 
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the Order in Council for a further term of two years as recommended by the 
Governor and Admiral Layton.3 
3 The Army Council Secretariat prepared a brief for Sir J Grigg (secretary of state for war) on Stanley's 
memo. The brief outlined the political situation and the views thereon of Mountbatten. It explained that 
the COS had endorsed the recommendation that a commission should be appointed before the end of the 
year. The General Staff had nothing to add but the quarter-master general had observed that, from the 
administrative aspect, 'any dislocation in Ceylon would be a serious embarrassment entailing commit-
ments which would be hard to meet. Uniformed labour would have to be imported for the work required 
by the Navy and Royal Air Force; British troops would be required for internal security. Both these 
commitments would involve administrative overheads to maintain them apart from camp construction. 
Moreover, the production and export of rubber is essential for our general military needs which would 
affect the construction and working of the India base'. The brief concluded that the secretary ofstate for 
war should support the recommendation for the appointment of a commission (WO 32/10099, ACS/B/931, 
12 June 1944). 
Subject to the understanding that the appointment of a commission did not entail for HMG any further 
commitment than that contained in the 1943 declaration, the War Cabinet approved the recommenda-
tions in para 10 of Stanley's memo on 13 June 1944. In discussion, Amery urged that the announcement of 
the appointment of a commission should include a statement that fac ilities would be accorded to the 
Indian and other minorities in Ceylon to express their point of view before the commission (CO 54/986110, 
no 14, WM 77(44)4). 
203 CO 54/986/5/1, no 52 14June 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott on the appointment of a commission 
My secret telegram No. 583.1 
His Majesty't Government have decided to accede to Ministers' request fo r the 
appointment of a Commission, which will, it is hoped, visit Ceylon at the end of the 
year, to examine their constitutional scheme. This step does not, of course, involve 
any modification of the conditions set forth in the Declaration by His Majesty's 
Government in May, 1943, as to eventual approval by His Majesty's Government of 
any new constitution. 
2. This decision will be embodied in a fresh Declaration by His Majesty's 
Government, but I shall naturally want time to consult you as to precise wording. 
The Declaration would at the same time, state that with the object already declared of 
avoiding a general election in Ceylon during the war and consequent dislocation of 
Ceylon's war effort, the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council would be amended 
to prolong the life of the existing constitution for further period of two years . This is 
as contemplated in discussions between Supreme Allied Commander S.E.A.C., 
Admiral Layton and yourself. 
3. I am anxious to relieve Ministers' anxieties with the least possible delay in 
anticipation of formal statement which will be made as early as is practicable, and 
should be grateful, provided that you have no objection to this course, if you would 
in confidence now communicate to Senanayake for the personal information of 
himself and his ministerial colleagues His Majesty's Government's decision to 
proceed with the appointment of the Commission and to extend the life of the 
existing State Council for a further period of two years for the reasons stated above. 
4. Please show this telegram to Admiral Layton. 
1 See 198, note 5. 
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204 CO 54/986/5/1, no 53 18 June 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley on the appointment of a commission and Mr Senanayake's 
reaction 
Most grateful for your secret and personal telegram of 14th June1 which reached me 
16th June marked "without priority" on which date, having communicated its sense 
orally to Senanayake, I confirmed my conversation by secret and personal letter2 
which he could show to his colleagues. In both my oral and written communications, 
I amended first sentence of your telegram to read "His Majesty's Government have 
decided to accede to Ministers' request for immediate examination of their constitu-
tional scheme by appointment of a Commission which, will it is hoped, visit Ceylon 
at the end of the year." This amendment was necessary because (vide paragraph 2 (b) 
of enclosure No. 3 to my secret despatch of 3rd February forwarding their scheme) 
the Ministers did not (repeat not) request appointment of Commission but, on the 
contrary, hoped to avoid one. I also substituted the word "Council" for "Constitu-
tion" in penultimate sentence of your paragraph 2. On hearing the news, Senanayake 
smiling said "that should make things easier for us" and I have no doubt that if the 
Declaration by His Majesty's Government can be expedited, things will at once 
become easier for everybody. Grateful therefore if drafting of Declaration may receive 
easiest (?earliest) possible attention of His Majesty's Government. I suggest that it 
need not be long but should be confined to statement on the lines of your telegram. 
1 See 203. 
2 Dated 16 June 1944, the final sentence of Caldecott's letter to Senanayake read: 'I shall be grateful if you 
will be so good as to impress upon your colleagues the personal and secret nature of this anticipatory 
communication pending issue of the formal statement by His Majesty's Government' (WO 203/5412). 
205 CO 54/986/5/1, no 54 19 June 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott transmitting a draft declaration announcing the appoint-
ment of a commission 
My secret and personal telegram 14th June. 1 Following is provisional draft of fresh 
Declaration by His Majesty's Government on which I should be grateful for 
observations of yourself and Commander-in-Chief. 
Begins. In their Declaration of 1943 on the subject of the reform of the Ceylon 
constitution, His Majesty's Government invited the Ceylon Ministers to submit 
proposals for a new constitution, and promised that once victory was achieved such 
detailed proposals as the Ministers might in the meantime have been able to 
formulate in the way of a complete constitutional scheme would be examined by a 
Commission or Conference. Ministers have now submitted their draft scheme with 
an urgent request that arrangements may be made for its examination at an earlier 
date than that contemplated in the Declaration. 
1 See 203. 
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His Majesty's Government, have accordingly decided to appoint a Commission to 
examine the Ministers' proposals, which would visit Ceylon for this purpose towards 
the end of the present year. The adoption of this course does not entail in other 
respects any modification of the Declaration by His Majesty's Government in regard 
to the eventual approval by His Majesty's Government of any new constitution. It is 
the intention of His Majesty's Government that the appointment of the Commission 
should provide full opportunity for consultation to take place with the various 
interests, including the minority communities, concerned with the subject of 
constitutional reform in Ceylon and with the proposals which Ministers have 
formulated. . 
Further, in accordance with the object already declared of avoiding a general 
election in Ceylon during the war, with consequent dislocation of Ceylon's war effort, 
the Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931, will be amended so as to prolong 
the life of the existing State Council for a further period of two years. Ends. 2 
2 Stanley made this announcement in the House of Commons on 5 July 1944. 
206 CO 54/986/5/1, no 63 27 June 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley reporting a press leak about the appointment of a commission 
Since replying to your secret and personal telegram of 24th June I have seen Ceylon 
Daily News this morning wherein article by its political correspondent carries the 
following three headlines:-
(i) Reforms despatch from Whitehall. 
(ii) Two years more for the present Council. 
(iii) One-man Commission coming out. 
Article begins as follows:-
"Two Ministers and a State Councillor speaking at the annual sessions of the 
Sinhala Maha Sabha last Saturday gave important information regarding the 
contents of a despatch recently received from Whitehall which had so far been 
kept secret." Article proceeds to quote the speech of the President Bandar-
anaike which contains nothing of the nature alleged. It then continued as 
follows: "That Kannangara, Minister for Education, revealed that an intima-
tion had been received from Whitehall and all he could say was that there was 
no need to regret the extension of the present State Council." Speech of 
Jayasuriya M.S.C. is next reported, but contains nothing of the nature 
alleged. Political correspondent concludes by paragraph which contains the 
following statements and comments: "leaders of Sabha dropped other hints to 
some of their more trustworthy followers from outside, and from enquiries 
made in these circles I have been able to learn that the Secretary of State's 
despatch contains two important decisions (described as in headlines (i) and 
(ii) above). Public will understand why leaders of Sabha were so eager to be 
1 See 204, note 2. 
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the first with the news and perhaps take all the credit for it when the despatch 
is actually announced." 
2. On reading the above I instructed the Chief Secretary to apprise the 
Information Officer that any statements that may have been recently made here by 
any person concerning constitutional reform have been entirely without authoriza-
tion, and that I have nothing to communicate on this subject. I also summoned 
Senanayake and told him that I must have explanation from him and his colleagues 
as to disclosure of communication confided to them under absolute secrecy .1 
3. Later this morning Senanayake brought Bandaranaike and Kannangara to 
interview me, both of them indignant at what they represented as slander by the 
Ceylon Daily News in regard to which they intend to take legal opinion. Former 
showed me manuscript of his Presidential address which contained no disclosure, 
and latter reported that the following question had been put to him while taking the 
chair at the afternoon session in the absence of the former: "Is the Chairman, being a 
Minister, in a position to explain the present position to us?"-to which he replied 
"as regards the present situation there is no need to despair, but as regards what is 
contained in the despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies I am not at 
liberty to disclose anything." I have impressed upon him that such a reply lent itself 
to the inference that some despatch on the subject has been received, but knowing 
his integrity I do not doubt that the Daily News, which is very hostile to Maha Sabha, 
took advantage of such inference to father upon the two Sabha Ministers information 
which they had obtained from other sources. I have reason strongly to suspect the 
Minister for Health, George Silva, as the main source, but the Chief Secretary 
informs me that he understands Oldfield and Ponnambalam to have mentioned 
receipt of private advices from London indicating early Commission. 
4. There is no further action which I can take, except to await information as to 
what legal advice is given to Bandaranaike, but Senanayake asks me to express his 
extreme regret that so discreditable a development should have occurred. 
207 CO 54/986/5/1, no 69 9 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting a resolution of the Working Committee of the 
Ceylon National Congress rejecting the declaration announcing the 
appointment of a commission 
See my immediately preceding secret and personal telegram.1 
Whereas the original Declaration by His Majesty's Government on constitutional 
reform, read out in the State Council on 26th May, 1943, was declared by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and understood by the Board of Ministers and the 
people of this country, to mean that, if the Board of Ministers could produce a 
constitution which, in the opinion of a Commission or Conference, satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs 2 to 6 thereof, and that constitution is subsequently 
accepted by threequarters of all the Members of the State Council, excluding the 
1 Not printed; the tel in question referred to a meeting of the Working Committee of the Ceylon National 
Congress on 8 July which approved the above declaration. 
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Officers of State and the Speaker, His Majesty in Council will put that constitution 
into operation and, whereas the latest Declaration of His Majesty's Government, 
made on 5th July, 1944, is a gross violation of that undertaking in that a Commission 
is to be sent out to explore the whole subject of constitutional reforms in Ceylon, this 
Congress fears that this is an attempt to take away from the people of Ceylon the 
undoubted right that they have to draft their own constitution and to impose upon 
them a slave constitution drafted by the foreign ruler, and calls upon the country and 
the State Council. 
(a) To reject the Declaration made by His Majesty's Government on 26th May, 
1943, and subsequent Declarations. 
(b) To boycott such Commission or Conference. 
(c) To make a united demand for the immediate recognition of Ceylon's right to 
independence and for a free constitution. 
This Congress authorizes the Working Committee to summon a special session of 
the Congress to take all steps necessary to implement this resolution. This Congress 
demands the immediate dissolution of the State Council and the holding of a general 
election on the issue of complete independence. 
208 CO 54/986/5/1, no 72 11 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram no 127 4 from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting a message from ministers contesting the terms of 
reference for the commission 
Constitutional reform. Following communication, marked by them secret, is 
telegraphed to you at the request of Ministers. I will send you my report thereon after 
due consideration and in the light of anything that may be said on the subject in the 
State Council this week. Message begins:-
Your Excellency. 
The Ministers have given careful consideration to statement on constitutional 
reform1 made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on the 5th July, 
1944. While they would have welcomed decision to consider their draft scheme at an 
early date, they regret to find that the statement of 5th July contains, in their 
opinion, a fundamental departure from the Declaration of 1943, which authorized 
them to submit detailed proposals in the way of a complete constitutional scheme 
subject to conditions set out in paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration. 
2. Ministers' interpretation of their mandate-an interpretation on which alone 
they were prepared to act-was made plain in statement made by the Leader of the 
State Council on 8th June, 1943.2 In paragraph 1 it was asserted that the Declaration 
was "in essence an undertaking that if the Board can produce a constitution which, 
in the opinion of a Commission or Conference, satisfies the conditions set out in 
paragraphs (2) to (6) thereof, and if that constitution is subsequently accepted by 
threequarters of all the members of the State Council, excluding Officers of the State 
and the Speaker, His Majesty in Council will put that constitution into operation." In 
1 See 205. 2 Seel70. 
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their message dated 6th July, 1943, which was telegraphed to the Secretary of State, 
the Ministers stated "We regret, however, that in reply of His Majesty's Government 
to our statement there is no indication whatever that our interpretation is in 
accordance with the principles of the Declaration. Without such indication it will not 
be possible for us to undertake the drafting of a constitution in the terms of the 
Declaration. We would, therefore, request His Majesty's Government to state 
whether our interpretation falls within the Declaration."3 The Secretary of State in 
his reply communicated by Your Excellency's letter of 11th July, 1943, stated "the 
Ministers may rest assured that I have not found in their statement anything which 
must be regarded as essentially irreconcilable with the conditions contained in His 
Majesty's Government's statement."4 
3. Having received this assurance, the Ministers felt justified in assuming that, 
instead of a constitution being framed for this country by His Majesty's Government, 
the Ministers in their capacity as representatives of the people of this country, were 
to frame a constitution which His Majesty's government undertook to accept subject 
only to two conditions:-
(a) that His Majesty's Government should be satisfied that it was in full 
compliance with paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration, and 
(b) that it was subsequently approved by threequarters of all the members of the 
State Council of Ceylon excluding Officers of the State and the Speaker or other 
presiding officer. 
Compliance with the first condition was obviously intended to satisfy His Majesty's 
Government that restrictions contemplated by them in their Declaration were 
satisfactorily provided for; compliance with the second condition was as obviously 
intended to satisfy His Majesty's Government that there was sufficient support in the 
country for Ministers' proposals to justify their acceptance. It should further be 
noted that in reply to representations by Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, M.S.C., on behalf 
of some of the minority members of the State Council, the Secretary of State merely 
repeated the substance of paragraph (7) of the Declaration: "as he is aware 
acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any constitutional scheme which Ceylon 
Ministers may formulate is conditional on such a scheme being examined by suitable 
Commission or Conference and being eventually accepted by threequarters of all the 
members of the State Council: and that discretion of Ministers as to procedure which 
they may adopt in framing a new draft constitutional scheme is not matter with 
which I should consider it right to interfere."5 
In reply to representations from Ceylon Congress, Secretary of State did not even 
mention "Commission or Conference": "it will be appreciated that one of the 
conditions of acceptance by His Majesty's Government of a new constitutional 
scheme which may be formulated by Ceylon Ministers, is that scheme should 
eventually be accepted by threequarters of all the Members of the State Council and 
that I am not prepared to interfere with discretion of Ministers as to when and in 
what manner they should formulate a scheme with this object." 
These representations arose because the leader of the State Council, in answer to 
question in the Council on 16th November, 1943 stated that "a finished product" (i.e. 
the scheme as approved by His Majesty's Government) and not "an unfinished 
3 See 173. 4 See 174. 5 See 182. 
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product" (or draft scheme) would come before the Council in due course (Ceylon 
Hansard 1943, Page 2455). It is thus clear that the Secretary of State approved 
Ministers' interpretation of the Declaration and that he considered any protection 
which minority members needed was to be found in requirement that "the finished 
product" required the approval of threequarters of all the members of the State 
Council. 
4. In statement of 5th July, 1944, however, His Majesty's Government stated that 
Commission proposed to be appointed for the purpose of examining Ministers' 
proposals is to be provided with "full opportunities for consultations to take place 
with various interests, including minority communities concerned with the subject 
of constitutional reform in Ceylon and with the proposals which Ministers have 
formulated." This clearly means that function of the Commission is not to be limited 
to determining whether Ministers' draft conforms with paragraphs (2) to (6) of 
Declaration of 1943. For such a purpose, consultations with "various interests" 
would not be necessary. Consultations would be of use only if the whole problem was 
to be considered afresh and the constitutional requirements of Ceylon were to be 
determined not by Ministers and at least threequarters of the State Council, but by a 
Commission appointed by the Secretary of State. The undertaking to put into 
operation any scheme framed by the Ministers which:-
(a) satisfied His Majesty 's Government that it was in full compliance with 
paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration of 1943, and 
(b) was subsequently approved by threequarters of all the Members of the State 
Council excluding the Officers of the State and the Speaker or other presiding 
officer, has been withdrawn. 
5. This fundamental alteration the Ministers are unable to accept. It has been 
made, too, without any consultation with, or even notice to the Ministers. It was not 
even mentioned in the personal letter which Your Excellency sent to the Leader of 
the State Council on 16th June, 1944. Had we been informed that this Commission 
was not only to examine whether the constitutional scheme of the Ministers satisfied 
paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration but also to consider all the Ministers' 
proposals in consultation with "various interests" the Ministers would immediately 
have protested. We were not so informed until the morning of 5th July and Your 
Excellency then stated that it was too late for representations to be made to the 
Secretary of State. His Majesty's Government has not only broken what we 
understood to be an undertaking, but has done it in such a manner that we have been 
given no opportunity of questioning it. 
6. In the circumstances the Ministers have no alternative but to decline to take 
any part in the deliberations of the proposed Commission. They are prepared to stand 
by the Declaration of 1943, to discuss with the Commission whether their scheme 
satisfied paragraphs (2) to (6) of that Declaration, and, on His Majesty's Government 
being satisfied on this point, to submit the scheme to the State Council. 
7. We should be grateful if Your Excellency would telegraph this memorandum 
to the Secretary of State.6 
6 The Board of Ministers were distressed at what they regarded as a clear change of policy. Until the first 
weeks of Jan 1944 they had not been given any indication that their interpretation of the meaning of the 
declaration of May 1943 was unacceptable, either to Caldecott and the officers of state or to the secretary of 
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(Signed) D. S. Senanayake, 
Vice-Chairman, 
Board of Ministers and Leader of the State Council. 
Colombo, 11th July, 1944. 
Message ends, and is followed by copy of following letter addressed by Mahadeva to 
Senanayake: 
"While I am in agreement with interpretation placed on the Declaration by 
Ministers, I am still of the opinion that the question of representations, on 
which alone I was not able to agree with my colleagues, should be referred to 
a Royal Commission, and that we should abide by its decision." 
state and his officials. As Senanayake's constitutional adviser and the person responsible for the general 
principles of the ministers' draft constitution, Jennings was equally upset. In para 5 of his typescript 'Notes 
on the Ministers' procedure, 1943--44', he explained: 'It seems to me that the documents [see 170, note] 
cannot be interpreted in any way other than that the ministers assumed that the commission or 
conference would examine their draft constitution and that draft constitution only. These documents were 
seen by the Officers of State and the Governor. The Chief Secretary was consulted about both documents 
before they were circulated, and had one of them amended. The Ministers' statement was considered in the 
Board of Ministers while the C[hief] S[ecretary] was presiding and the other Officers of State were present. 
The C[hief] S[ ecretary] himself tried to keep the drafting straight. If the Officers of State considered the 
ministers were misunderstanding the whole procedure, they should surely have said so. More than that, 
considering the part taken by the C[hief] S[ecretary] in drafting of the statement, he would surely have 
said so. I can therefore draw only one conclusion, that the Governor and the Officers of State considered 
that the ministers had correctly understood what they were being asked to do, and that at this stage there 
was no idea, at least in Ceylon, that a commission would be sent out to examine not merely the ministers' 
scheme, but the proposals of "various interests" including minorities. If this is so, either the local 
representatives of HMG were themselves misinterpreting the intentions of the Secretary of State, or the 
policy was subsequently changed and the Secretary of State has gone back upon his undertakings.' 
209 CO 54/986/5/2, no 93 July 1944 
[Reforms]: memorandum by Sir A Caldecott explaining his own 
position in regard to the ministerial protest against HMG's declaration 
of 5 July 1944 
1. In paragraph 39 of my Reforms Despatch of 1938 (Sessional Paper XXVIII-
1938) I expressed no opinion as to whether a Commission should be sent out as a 
result of my report or not. I had on file representations which I had invited from all 
communities and I suggested that, if a Commission came, it should work and find on 
these. Needless to say I contemplated that, if a Commission were to be sent, it would 
arrive in 1938 or 1939. I did not suggest that representations made to me in 1938 
should be taken to be of permanent sufficiency, any more than I now feel myself 
bound to my recommendations of 1938 as indicating the maximum of constitutional 
reform that could be justified today. The representations then made to me, as well as 
my recommendations, are over six years old, and neither could sensibly or 
reasonably be taken by anybody as final. 
2. The Ministers' view that the representations and recommendations made in 
1 See 208. 2 See 205. 
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1938 formed a sufficient basis for determination of constitutional reform in 1941 
was put forward by them on 1st October, 1941, vide Document No.6A in Sessional 
Paper XIII-1943.3 Document 9 therein explained His Majesty's Government's 
inability to accept this Ministerial view; they "had reluctantly reached their 
conclusion that in the face of wide measures of local disagreement no substantial 
changes in the existing constitution could be introduced without further opportunity 
for examination of the conflicting views of the various interests concerned, which is 
impracticable in war conditions but will be taken in hand as soon as peace is won".4 
The wording of the similar passages in the public statement that followed (Document 
No.lOA) ran as follows:-"Before taking decisions upon the present proposals for 
reform, concerning which there has been so little unanimity, but which are of such 
importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would desire that 
the position should be further examined and made the subject of further consulta-
tion by means of a Commission or Conference. This cannot be arranged under war 
conditions, but the matter will be taken up with the least possible delay after the 
war". The dissatisfaction of the Ministers with the attitude of His Majesty's 
Government and a repetition of their view that there was no need for any further 
consultation by means of a Commission or Conference is contained in Document 
No.ll and the Secretary of State's acknowledgement of the receipt of their 
communication is in Document No.l3.5 
3. The declaration by His Majesty's Government of 26th May, 1943, began by 
citing the 1941 assurance quoted in the preceding paragraph and went on to convey a 
message to give greater precision to it. In paragraph (7) of this message it was stated 
as follows:-
"His Majesty's Government will however, once victory is achieved, proceed to 
the examination by a suitable · Commission or Conference of such detailed 
proposals as the Ministers may in the meantime have been able to formulate 
in the way of a complete constitutional scheme; subject to the clear 
understanding that the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any 
proposals will depend, firstly, upon His Majesty's Government being satisfied 
that they are in full compliance with the preceding portion of this statement 
and, secondly, upon their subsequent approval by three quarters of all the 
members of State Council excluding the Officers of State and the Speaker or 
other presiding Officer". 6 
I understand the present claim of the Ministers to be that this portion of the Message 
could only be construed as limiting the function of any Commission or Conference 
appointed to examine the complete constitutional scheme which they were invited to 
put forward to ascertaining whether it satisfied or not the stipulations contained in 
paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Message: that is to say that it abrogated the original 
purpose of a Commission or Conference as explained in the documents quoted in my 
paragraph 2 supra, i.e. examination of the conflicting views of the various interests 
concerned in view of the little unanmity there had been on my 1938 proposals. 
4. The possibility of such a limitative interpretation seems to me clearly 
precluded on two grounds (1) nobody would think of appointing a Commission or 
Conference to examine and report upon points that require scrutiny and answer by 
3 See 107. 4 See 109. 5 See 111, 112. 6 See 169, annex. 
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constitutional lawyers and draughtsmen (2) a Message issued for the explicit purpose 
of giving precision to a former statement cannot be rightly interpreted as abrogating 
a clear and pivotal provision in such statement. 
5. The Ministers however, I understand, maintain that the Secretary of State has 
actually approved such a limitative and abrogative interpretation because it was 
precisely this interpretation that was set out in the first paragraph of their Statement 
of June 8th, 19437 (Sessional Paper :XVII/1943) wherein he had not found "anything 
that must be regarded as essentially irreconcilable with the conditions contained in 
His Majesty's Government's Statement."8 The Secretary of State's telegram from 
which this is a quotation is printed on page 6 of Sessional Paper :XVII- 1943. The first 
part of it explained why His Majesty's Government had been unable to express 
definite acceptance of the Ministers' interpretation of various matters in their 
Statement. The reason was that they could not do so without seeking further 
elucidation, a process which would have involved detailed discussions that could not 
be undertaken until after the war. What the Secretary of State expressed was not an 
acceptance of any of the Ministers' interpretations but an assurance that he had 
found nothing in them irreconcilable with the conditions contained in the Statement 
of His Majesty's Government. A clear road indeed stood open towards a conciliation 
of the first paragraph of the Ministers' statement with the purpose of His Majesty's 
Government that there should be 'further opportunity for examination of the 
conflicting views of the various interests concerned'. The Ministers could (as I and 
probably many others anticipated that they would) have consulted with representa-
tives of the various interests and have supplemented their scheme with a record of 
the representations made and of their conclusions thereon. The whole position 
would then have been before His Majesty's Government (the views of the various 
interests having been invited and recorded) and the Commission or Conference 
would after perusal of the records have needed only final consultation with the 
Ministers on any points requiring elucidation or discussion. 
6. The event however was otherwise. On the 2nd February, 1944, I received 
together with the Ministers' scheme a letter from the Vice Chairman of the Board of 
Ministers, in which no mention was made of any consultation with the various 
interests concerned but in which it was stated 
(A) that the Ministers bore in mind the possibility of a modification or alteration 
by the State Council of their recommendation in regard to (i) the question of a 
unicameral or bicameral form of government (ii) Representation (that is to say it 
was not a scheme that was to be put before State Council for acceptance or 
rejection, but with opportunities for alteration); 
(B) that the Minister for Home Affairs (the only Minister belonging to a Minority 
Community) was not in agreement for the proposals in regard to Representation 
and that he considered that "the entirety of this question, which is a matter of 
considerable controversy, should be settled by a Royal Commission." 
6. In acknowledging the Vice-Chairman's letter and the accompanying Scheme I 
pointed out:-
(a) that the Scheme was not a "complete constitutional scheme" as contemplated 
7 Seel70. 8 Seel74. 
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by paragraph (7) of the Message in His Majesty's Government's declaration of 26th 
May, 1943, because such crucial questions as the form of legislature, franch ise and 
representation were left for consideration "otherwise than by the Commission or 
Conference required by the Declaration"; 
(b) that two passages in the letter "appeared to envisage the immediate considera-
tion of His Majesty's Government of the Ministers' proposals without previous 
examination by the stipulated Commission or Conference". 9 
7. In reply to (a) the Vice-Chairman on February 9th submitted certain points as 
explanatory of the omissions for transmission to the Secretary of State for 
consideration. These were duly forwarded. Incidentally the draft of a new Elections 
Order in Council therein foreshadowed has not yet been submitted. In regard to (b) 
the Vice-Chairman ended his letter with the following paragraph:-
"For these reasons the immediate consideration of our proposals is necessary. 
This may be done in whatever manner (as suggested in the Declaration or 
otherwise) His Majesty's Government may consider the best." 
There is no suggestion here that consideration of the form of legislature, franchise 
and representation (none of them matters impinging on paragraphs (2) to (6) in the 
statement of His Majesty's Government) were to be considered only in relation to 
those paragraphs! 
8. On 15th February, 1944, I sent a telegram to the Secretary of State containing 
a submission from Mr. Ponnambalam on behalf of all except two minority members 
of State Council. It complained that the Ministers had refused to disclose their 
proposals and thus prevented the minority communities view-point being repre-
sented. It ended by asking the Secretary of State to withhold consideration of the 
Ministerial proposals till they were submitted to State Council, in order that he 
might have a full knowledge of the opinions of all sections and interests before a 
Commission or Conference is summoned. The Secretary of State on the 7th March 
replied that the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any constitutional 
scheme which the Ceylon Ministers might formulate was conditional on such a 
scheme being examined by a suitable Commission or Conference and being 
eventually accepted by three quarters of all members of State Council; and that the 
discretion of the Ministers as to the procedure which they might adopt in framing a 
new draft constitutional scheme was not a matter in which he (the Secretary of 
State) should consider it right to interfere. 11 
9. On the 14th March I conferred with the Ministers in connection with a 
personal telegram which I had received from the Secretary of State.12 The Secretary 
of State intimated that "if His Majesty's Government were to see their way to 
proceeding with the appointment of a Commission or Conference before achieve-
ment of victory they were not on that account in any way committed to accepting the 
Ministers' proposals as satisfying the first of the two conditions set out in paragraph 7 
of His Majesty's Government's Declaration" "(i.e. that the proposals must be in full 
compliance with the stipulation in paragraphs (2) to (6))." I pointed out to the 
Ministers that this meant that any Commission or Conference would concern itself 
only with examination of the local provisions of their scheme in or after consultation 
9 See 181, note. 10 See 181. 11 See 182, note 1. 12 See 184, 185. 
[209] JULY 1944 325 
with the various interests concerned and that the scheme's compliance with 
stipulations (2) to (6) would need independent examination by His Majesty's 
Government's legal advisers and draughtsmen. I state that this was quite clear also 
from the reply given to Mr. Ponnambalam which could only mean that the 
minorities need not be apprehensive because the contents of the Ministers' scheme 
would be examined by a Conference or Commission which would ascertain their 
views, and that any constitution that might emerge from His Majesty's Government's 
consideration of the Commission's or Conference's report would still require 
acceptance by 75% of the State Council. It transpired that the Ministers had not all of 
them yet seen Mr. Ponnambalam's message, which I had transmitted in an open 
telegram, and that none of them had seen the Secretary of State's reply as it had 
arrived only a week ago. I attached a copy of both therefore to my personal letter to 
Mr. Senanayake of 15th March in which I confirmed the communications which I 
had made at the conference on the Secretary of State's authority. 
10. I consider that if Mr. Senanayake or any of his colleagues attached the 
different, and to my mind untenable, interpretation to these telegrams which he has 
now put forward in paragraph 3 of the Ministers' present protest to the Secretary of 
State I had the right to expect that I should be informed of the fact. I was not. 
11. On 22nd April I addressed to the Secretary of State my open despatch No. 96 
in which I wrote "the main purpose of a Commission or Conference to examine the 
Ministers' constitutional proposals will obviously be to invite and investigate 
criticisms thereof'. This despatch was circulated to the Board of Ministers on the 2nd 
May. I received no comment on it from any of the Ministers, but it is now stated in 
paragraph 3 of their present protest that the equivalent passage in the recent 
announcement of the Secretary of State was "without consultation with or even 
notice to the Ministers". A sufficient reason for not mentioning the passage in my 
personal letter to Mr. Senanayake of 16th June 1944, (not incidentally as stated in 
the present protest, addressed to him as Leader of the State Council because its 
contents were for communication to the Ministers only, though their substance 
came somehow to be communicated to the Press)13 was that the announcement had 
not yet (as I pointed out in the letter) been drafted; but I may add that if I had been in 
a position to foresee the inclusion of the passage I should not have thought of 
mentioning it in my letter because the position lay as described in my two preceding 
paragraphs. 
12. My first apprisal of the fact that the Ministers would object to the Commis-
sion's consulting with the various interests concerned was when Mr. Senanayake 
made and explained his verbal request to me (at 10.15 a.m. on 5th July) that the 
announcement should be stopped-a request which I said it was too late to consider. 
The preceding paragraphs of this memorandum will have indicated the measure of 
surprise and astonishment with which I have listened to his request, and to the 
reason for it. 
13 See 204, 206. 
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210 CO 54/986/5/2, no 84 20 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram in five parts from Sir A 
Caldecott to Mr Stanley transmitting a draft reply to the ministerial 
protest 
[Having set out his own position in a separate memo (see 209), Caldecott drafted the 
following reply to ministers which was to be issued by the secretary of state.) 
My immediately preceding secret and personal telegram of 20th July. 
First of five parts of draft reply referred to. 
Begins. 1. I have read with much care the Ministers' message to me telegraphed 
by the Governor on 11th July, 1944. It is a great disappointment to me that the 
misunderstanding which underlies their present representation should ever have 
arisen and, in this reply to their message, I will, therefore, clearly state the position 
as I see it. 
2. For this purpose, it is necessary for me to go back to Document No. 6A in 
Ceylon Session Paper XIII-1943, wherein the Ministers put forward their views that 
the appointment of a Commission or the holding of a Conference for a further 
investigation of the question of constitutional reform (the need for which I had 
stated in the message reproduced in Document No. 5) was unnecessary and 
undesirable, in view of the Governor's consultation with all sections of opinion in 
1938, and of the careful consideration given to his recommendations by the State 
Council in 1939. 
3. Document No. 9 informed the Ministers in reply that His Majesty's Govern-
ment had reluctantly reached the conclusion that, in the face of wide measure of 
local disagreement, no substantial change in the existing constitution could be 
introduced without further opportunity for the examination of the conflicting views 
of the various interests concerned. 
4. The statement of His Majesty's Government communicated to the State 
Council on 26th October, 1942, (Document No. lOA) declared that, before taking 
decision upon the present proposals for reform, concerning which there had been so 
little unanimity, but which were of such importance to the well-being of Ceylon, His 
Majesty's Government would desire that the position should be further examined by 
means of a Commission or Conference. 
5. This statement was cited word for word at the beginning of the Declaration by 
His Majesty's Government dated 26th March, 1943, printed as Section (1) of Ceylon 
Session Paper XVII-1943. The remainder of the Declaration was for the explicit 
purpose of "giving greater precision to the foregoing statement, with the object of 
removing any doubt regarding His Majesty's Government's intentions." 
Part 2 
6. It never for a moment occurred to me that a Declaration made for the explicit 
purpose of giving precision to a previous statement could, much less would, be 
interpreted in any responsible quarter as abrogating a cardinal point of the previous 
statement. I have explained (paragraph (3) Session Paper XVII-1943) that war time 
conditions precluded a detailed examination of the Ministers' statement of 8th June, 
1943 (paragraph (2)) , but I may say that even if such examination had been possible, 
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I could not for the above reason have construed paragraph 1 of that statement as 
aiming at depriving His Majesty's Government of all means of having before them the 
up to date views of the various interests concerned on any Ministerial proposals, 
before submission to the State Council of a complete constitutional scheme. 
7. There was no indication in the Ministers' statement of 8th June, 1943, of the 
claims now put forward in paragraph 3 of their present communication, that they 
have been entrusted with the framing of a constitution "as Representatives of the 
people of Ceylon." This representative capacity does not pertain to them and the 
invitation to formulate a scheme was extended to them as Ministers under the 
present constitution. 
8. My assurance (paragraph 5 Session Paper XVII-1943) that I had not found in 
the Ministers' statement of 8th June, 1943, anything which must be regarded as 
essentially irreconcilable with the conditions contained in His Majesty's Govern-
ment's statement of 26th May, 1943, was one from which I have nothing to retract. It 
was open to the Ministers to implement the purpose of His Majesty's Government, 
(made known to them by documents 9 and lOA in Session Paper XIII-1943 and by 
the first paragraph of His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 26th May, 1943), by 
consulting all interests concerned and transmitting record of such consultations at 
the same time as their constitutional scheme for review by Examinatory Commission 
or Conference. This of course, would have avoided original and independent 
consultations with the various interests by the Commission or the Conference. 
Part3 
9. It is now necessary for me to refer to the actual events. On the 3rd February, 
1944 the Governor sent to me the Ministers' printed scheme together with copy of a 
forwarding letter from the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers in which he 
explained 
(a) That the Ministers had in mind the possibility of the State Council modifying 
or altering their recommendations in regard to the form of legislature and 
representation (i.e., their scheme in regard to the two cardinal points was not one 
for acceptance or alternatively for rejection by the State Council but one for 
possible modification by it) and 
(b) That the Minister for Home Affairs was not in agreement with the proposal 
regarding representation, the entirety of which question was a matter of 
considerable controversy and should, in his opinion, be settled by a Royal 
Commission. 
10. The Governor also sent me a copy of the letter whereby he had acknowledged 
receipt of Ministers' scheme and of the Vice-Chairman's forwarding letter. In his 
acknowledgement the Governor pointed out:-
(a) That the scheme was not a "complete constitutional scheme" as contemplated 
by paragraph (7) of the message in His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 26th 
May, 1943, because such crucial questions as the form of legislature, franchise and 
representation were left for consideration "otherwise than by the Commission or 
Conference required by the Declaration." 
(b) That two passages in the letter "appeared to envisage the immediate (immedi-
ate) consideration of His Majesty's Government of the Ministers' proposal without 
previous examination by the stipulated Commission or Conference." 
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11. On the lOth February, the Governor sent me a copy of the Vice-Chairman's 
reply to his letter. In it the Vice-Chairman in regard to (a) tendered the reason for 
regarding the scheme "as complete as is necessary for any purpose reasonably 
contemplated by the Declaration," and in regard to (b) ended his letter with this 
paragraph:-
"For these reasons immediate consideration of our proposal is necessary. This 
·may be done in whatever manner (as suggested in the Declaration or 
otherwise) His Majesty's Government may consider best." 
I must frankly confess my inability to reconcile this statement with the Ministers' 
present protest. 
Part 4 
12. In paragraph 3 of the latter, the Ministers note the omission of any reference 
to a Commission or Conference in a reply given by me to certain representations by 
the Ceylon Indian Congress. The inference which the Ministers apparently wish to be 
drawn from this omission is directly negatived by the answer, which I sent on the 
same date, to a representation relating to the eligibility of ex-convicts to sit in the 
Legislature under any new constitution. I replied that, as Mr. X "is no doubt aware 
from the statement made by His Majesty's Government at the end of last May, it is 
their intention that detailed proposals under any new scheme for constitution reform 
formulated by the Ministers should, in due course, be examined by a suitable 
Commission or Conference, and that I cannot anticipate such examination." I am 
informed by the Governor that my despatch directing this reply to Mr. X was 
circulated to the Board of Ministers, simultaneously with my despatch directing the 
reply to the Ceylon Indian Congress. The date of circulation was 1st February, 1944, 
and I do not see justification for a citation of the latter without the former. They were 
indeed immediately consecutive despatches. 
13. In their paragraph 3, the Ministers also attach to a reply, sent to me to 
representations by Mr. Ponnambalam, a meaning contrary to what I consider its 
clear import. The Governor, moreover, informs me that, at a Conference with the 
Ministers on 14th March, he explained to them that my telegram could only mean 
that the minority need not be apprehensive because the contents of the Ministers' 
scheme would be examined by a Commission or Conference, which would ascertain 
their views, and that any Constitution that might emerge from His Majesty's 
Government's consideration of the Commission's or Conference's report would still 
require acceptance by 75 per cent. of the State Council. He sent copies of telegrams 
relating to Mr. Ponnambalam's representations and to my reply to the Vice-
Chairman next day. Telegrams were also circulated to Members in the ordinary 
course. 
13. On 22nd April, the Governor addressed to me an open despatch in which he 
wrote as follows:-
"The main purpose of a Commission or Conference to examine the Ministers' 
Constitutional proposals will obviously be to invite and investigate criticism 
thereof." 
The enclosures to this despatch related to the further representations made by Mr. 
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Ponnambalam. A copy of the despatch and its enclosures was circulated to the Board 
of Ministers on 2nd May. 
PartS 
15. I am unable to reconcile the facts given in the two preceding paragraphs with 
representations in paragraph 5 of the Ministers' present message. When the 
Governor wrote his letter of 16th June to the Honourable Mr. D. S. Senanayake (not 
incidentally to the leader of the State Council), he was not aware of the form which 
His Majesty's Government's coming Declaration would take. The letter in fact 
explained this. If, however, he had been in a position to know that it would contain a 
reference to the consultation by the Commission with various interests including the 
Minority Community, I do not suppose that it would have occurred to him to apprise 
the Ministers again of what he had already told them. He has indeed reported to me 
that the representations, made to him orally by the Vice-Chairman on the morning 
of 5th July, caused him the greatest astonishment and surprise. 
16. In conclusion, I greatly regret the Ministers' decision not to take any part in 
the deliberation of the Commission, except to discuss with it whether their scheme 
satisfies paragraphs (2) to (6) of His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 26th May, 
1943. As the Governor explained to the Ministers by my direction on 14th March (and 
confirmed by letter to the Vice-Chairman the following day) , the possible event 
(since fulfilled) of His Majesty's Government proceeding with a Commission or 
Conference, before the achievement of victory, would not mean that they would on 
that account be "in any way committed to accepting the Ministers' proposals as 
satisfying the first of the two conditions set out in paragraph 7 of His Majesty's 
Government's Declaration" (i.e., the requirements of paragraphs (2) to (6)) . Any 
discussion, therefore, in regard to the subject mentioned in those paragraphs, that 
may take place between the Commission and the Ministers, will in no degree 
prejudice the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government in relation to them. 
17. In the vital interest of Ceylon's welfare, I earnestly invite a reconsideration of 
the Ministers' decision in order that the Commission may, in the execution of its 
onerous task, enjoy the fullest possible local co-operation. Ends. 
211 CO 54/986/5/2, no 87 21 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting an extract from Mr Senanayake's budget speech 
to the State Council 
My secret and personal telegram of 21st July. 
I do not think I have given members of this House an opportunity of seeing how 
essential freedom in our trusteeship is if we are to make any effective progress in 
improving life in Ceylon. I do not think members realise how strong is the 
stranglehold of the Colonial Office when it comes to a question between the interests 
of the people of Ceylon and the preserves of vested interests. In this connection it 
would be better to get accustomed to a new term which recent correspondence on 
the reforms has introduced. The new description of vested interests is various 
interests rather an effective disguise. I have referred to the present position in regard 
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to the Crown Lands Bill. This Bill was introduced in this House on 29th May, 1940. 
Its second reading was passed on 27th June, 1940. The committee stage of the Bill 
took nearly thirty months. Vested interests now termed various interests intervened 
at this stage. The Bill passed its third reading on 2nd December, 1942. His Excellency 
the Governor reserved his assent to the Bill but recommended to the Secretary of 
State that the Ordinance be tendered for his Majesty's assent. Vested interests rather 
than various interests now turned their attention to London. Sections of the Bill 
affecting those interests are still under discussion between the Colonial Office and 
the Government of Ceylon. In the meantime the whole land policy of Ceylon has to 
be implemented by means of circulars. Sir, isn't this a remarkable instance of how 
powerful are the voices of monied groups in the Chambers of our Rulers in London. 
A Commission of Inquiry. There is yet another outstanding example of similar 
treatment by the Colonial Office. Since 1935 the Board of Ministers have been trying 
to get the rate of interest reduced from 8 per cent. to 6 per cent. on the balance of the 
Widows' and Orphans' Pension Fund. We do not want this money we are forced to 
keep it and to pay 8 per cent. The reduction of this rate of interest was one of the 
Budget adjustments of several years ago. The Fund is bursting its bounds and 
pensions have been doubled and trebled. The investment return on this Fund is 
barely 3 per cent. but we have to find from general revenue an additional 5 per cent. 
on a sum of over Rs. 12,000,000. I was informed few days ago by the Financial 
Secretary that the Secretary of State has at last given way and that the details will be 
available to the Ministers on Monday next. Empire propagandists often describe the 
present constitution of Ceylon as a great experiment in freedom that is freedom of a 
type. I do hope that a Secretary of State for the Colonies does find the time at least to 
read the Budget proceedings of a not too unimportant part of the Colonial Empire. In 
that expectation may I suggest that one of the earliest responsibilities not only of 
himself but also of the Cabinet and of the House of Commons is to set up a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate into the working methods of the Colonial 
Office. I submit that in this brave new world which is said to be round the corner so 
far as places like Ceylon go the blood that is being shed on the fields of Normandy 
and on the plains of lmphal would have been shed in vain unless the whole of the 
Colonial Office procedure is altered and reorganised. One indispensable requirement 
is the building of impenetrable walls through which vested interests cannot poison 
the mind of a Secretary of State against the people whom he has to protect. Another 
requirement is an accurate knowledge and proper understanding of the needs of the 
people. A knowledge and understanding which cannot be acquired only from the 
reports of those who know neither our language nor our customs, nor our people. 
Constitutional reforms. In introducing the Budget last year I informed the House 
that the Ministers would apply themselves at once to the very great responsibility and 
privilege of formulating a new constitution in accordance with the Ministers' 
statement on His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 1943. I added to quote my 
words the war is already entering a phase which gives us every reason to hope that 
the examination of this draft constitution could be proceeded with before the hour of 
final victory. Sir, in accordance with this settled procedure a draft constitutional 
scheme was submitted to the Secretary of State through His Excellency the Governor 
on 2nd February, 1944. As I had indicated to the House twelve months ago the 
Ministers asked for an immediate examination of their draft scheme. I was informed 
on the 16th of last month by His Excellency the Governor that the Secretary of State 
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had agreed to the Ministers' request for an immediate examination of their proposals. 
In a statement issued by His Majesty's Government on the 5th of this month there 
appeared, however, a fundamental alteration of the 1943 Declaration which the 
Ministers were unable to accept. This alteration was made without any consultation 
with or even notice to the Ministers. The Ministers have therefore informed the 
Secretary of State that in the circumstances they have no alternative but to decline to 
take any part in the deliberations of the proposed Commission. The Ministers have 
asked permission to table in this House their communication dealing with this 
matter. The House will soon be aware of the full story. Once again our hopes have 
been rudely shattered. One would have thought that after Malaya, Burma, and India 
our Colonial Administration and its advisers would have learnt their lessons. No, sir, 
we are seeing again the same old stock in trade of half truths, excuses and broken 
pledges. The plan of campaign is still the same divide and rule. The whole proceeding 
would have been humorous were it not so dangerous. We have seen in the last few 
weeks how the witches cauldron has been heated and stirred up. I can see the chief 
actors quite clearly. I only propose to tell them this much now you are playing with 
explosives. Deepening gloom. Through this year Members of this House have shown 
their confidence in the Ministers in their acceptance of His Majesty's Government's 
Declaration and the procedure followed in drafting a constitution. The document 
when tabled by me will show clearly the Ministers present attitude and the reasons 
therefor. Sir, nobody regrets more than I the deepening gloom of all this. But I am 
not without hope. There are many in this House like myself who have had a long and 
close connection with the technique of Colonial administration. Sir, it is often for us 
a long and weary road. Life is a moving curve of flattery, optimism, misrepresenta-
tion thinly veiled intimidation and pessimism. It is a great school of experience 
however. You get tough. After some time you do not get easily disheartened. Sir, the 
American Vice-President Wallace said recently that the coloured peoples of Asia were 
on the march. He said that America must ensure a free Asia with even erring Japan 
having her proper place in it. Sir, Ceylon is a blessed country. I cannot believe that 
whilst the rest of Asia, including Japan, is free, Ceylon's reward is to be national 
disunity, bondage and serfdom. No, sir, some day we shall get our due if not at the 
bar of English public opinion then at the bar of world opinion. Ceylon too will march 
on with the rest of Asia. 
212 CO 54/986/5/2, no 90 25 July 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott on the proposed reply to ministers 
Your secret and personal telegrams of 20th July. 
I am glad to learn that you do not anticipate that Ministers are likely to publish 
their message without waiting my reply, but I am very grateful for the detailed draft 
reply to Ministers which you have sent me. 1 
2. But on a close study of all the papers available to me here, I must let you know 
that I am not entirely satisfied that I have in fact a complete answer to Ministers' 
1 See 210. 
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protests. The protest is, as I understand it from paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 
12742 in particular, not (repeat not) that a Commission is to be appointed to examine 
Ministers' proposals, but that Commission is to consult with "various interests 
including minority communities" over the whole field of the Ministers' scheme, 
whereas under terms of His Majesty's 1943 Declaration the field of examination by 
means of a Commission was expressly limited, and separate provision was made for 
minorities to be safeguarded by the requirement that acceptance of any constitution-
al scheme by His Majesty's Government would depend on the approving vote of 
three-quarters of the State Council. 
3. It is my intention to wait your fast Air Mail despatch before deciding upon 
terms of reply to Ministers' messag~1 and I shall particularly search in it for full 
exposition of facts on which I can rely to dispose of the apparent and important 
discrepancy which Ministers claim to see between His Majesty's Government's 1943 
Declaration and His Majesty's Government's Statement of 5th July, 1944. 
4. This is obviously a matter of importance since, if Ministers are right, it seems 
that within the terms of the 1943 Declaration locus of Commission in respect of 
consultation with various interests including minorities in Ceylon will have to be 
confined to reporting to His Majesty's Government as to:-
(i) whether the Ministers' scheme satisfactorily provides for His Majesty's 
Government's requirements under paragraph 5 of the 1943 Declaration, and 
(ii) whether the Ministers' proposals are sufficiently formulated as a complete 
constitutional scheme, so that His Majesty's Government may be satisfied that 
condition of subsequent approval by three-quarters of the State Council will be 
based upon full understanding of whole scheme of reform to be finally adopted. 
5. With reference to my telegram No. 852, Amending Order in Council is now 
prepared, and unless I hear from you to the contrary, it will be submitted to His 
Majesty in Council at a very early date. 
2 See 208. 
213 CO 54/986/5/2, no 93A 27 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley on the proposed reply to ministers 
Your secret and personal telegram of 25th July .1 I am greatly disturbed by the terms 
of your paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 which seem to me to forbode disaster. Ministers' case is 
not (repeat not) that recent Declaration by His Majesty's Government is contradic-
tory to 1943 Declaration but that it is contradictory to paragraph (1) of their 
interpretation thereof in their statement of 8th June, 1943 and that message 
authorized by your telegram No. 791 printed as document (5) in session paper 17 of 
1943 was an unconditional acceptance by you of that interpretation. 
2. As I have pointed out in my despatch of 13th July and my secret and personal 
telegram 20th July (corrupt group) such an acceptance would have abrogated 
1 See 212. 
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essential element of preamble to His Majesty's Government's Declaration which was 
reiteration of assurance given in 1941. 
3. You will remember that by my secret and personal telegram of 6th July, 1943 I 
drafted a reply to the Ministers' interpretation which declined any degree of 
acceptance and if I had thought for a moment that your own reply to document (5) 
was meant as, or could be reasonably represented to be, such an unconditional 
acceptance of Ministers' interpretation as to rob minorities of assurance given in 
1941 Declaration that they would be consulted in formative stage of any new 
constitution, I would have advised most strongly against making that reply. You 
stated therein, however, that practical effect of their interpretation could only be 
seen in detailed provisions of a new draft constitution and you only accorded a 
negative of essential irreconcilability. 
4. The only way of reconciling Ministers' interpretation with your reply was for 
them to consult minorities and report their views to you when forwarding their 
proposals. This they have omitted to do and it is clear enough now that the Ministers 
intended paragraph 1 of their interpretation as a ramp for excluding minority 
consultation from formative stage of their scheme and are now representing your 
reply as acquiescence by you therein. 
5. It will of course be realized that I cannot serve my remaining weeks here with 
honour or indeed retire with honour unless the Ministers, State Council, and the 
public are made aware of my own position as set out in my despatch and in my 
suggestions for a reply to the Ministers' protest. If, as now seems indicated in your 
telegram, a different view from mine is taken by you, an explanation of my position 
will still be necessary. On a review of all papers I have been unable to trace any 
divergence between our views and have always understood the intention of His 
Majesty's Government to be as expressed so clearly in paragraph 2 of your despatch 
No. 19, which was in my hands when I commented on the Ministers' proposals vide 
paragraphs 10 and 11 of my suggestions for reply to the Ministers' protest. 
6. Reference your paragraph 5, amending Order-in-Council should not (repeat 
not) be proceeded with before reply to Ministers' protest is made public and 
accompanied by unequivocal statement that Commission is coming. Senanayake's 
Budget outburst illustrates what would be and would in any case have been 
declaimed from every election platform all over the island in the event of general 
election this year or next and I cannot reconcile such prospect with the interest of 
South East Asia Command or war effort generally. 
7. With reference to your secret and personal telegram (1) of 25th July, 
Senanayake did not get your communication until the morning after his Budget 
speech.2 In his recent mood, speech would undoubtedly have been even worse if he 
had received it before. He is now on tour and I have no opportunity of talking to him 
on this subject but in any case I do not advise any approach by me until your reply to 
Ministers' protest has been settled. 
8. In conclusion notice of the following motion has been given in State Council 
by private member Javasuriya [sic]3 who is usually the mouthpiece of Bandaranaike. 
Begins. That this Council is of opinion that Ministers should immediately prepare 
a draft constitution for Ceylon in consultation with any sections of people of this 
country that may be necessary and without reference to the 1943 Declaration of the 
2 See211. 3 This was A P Jayasuriya. 
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British Government and bring it before the State Council for consideration. Ends. 
This does not portend any demand for early dissolution even if State Council 
should not like whatever reply is sent to ministerial protests. Motion is indeed 
interesting as reflecting necessity for consultation with sections of people before any 
scheme is launched. 
214 CO 54/986/5/2, no 96 29 July 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley on the reply to ministers and the functions of a commission 
Reforms. 
Assume that you have now received my secret despatch of 13th July of which 
duplicate went by airmail on 17th July. May I suggest that, if possible, reply be sent 
to the Ministers' protest before the State Council meets 8th August. 
2. Whatever form reply may take I think it should conclude with a summary of 
Commission's functions bringing out the following points:-
(a) Commission advises His Majesty's Government, who are free to accept or 
reject the advice tendered: it is in no sense a tribunal making award which binds 
anyone, 
(b) Its main purpose is to invite and investigate criticism of the Ministers' 
proposals, and is to advise His Majesty's Government thereon: it is not to examine 
and investigate the problem of constitutional reform de novo, 
(c) If the Ministers' proposals had constituted a complete and detailed scheme, 
the work of the Commission would have been reduced to the minimum, and would 
have held out prospect of greatest and most speedy measure of success, and there 
is still t ime for the Ministers to remedy this defect. If they do not do so the 
Commission will, in some degree, be compelled to go outside (b). 
3. Such a summary would take the place of paragraph 16 of the draft reply 
submitted by my telegram of 20th July1 and would form suitable preface to appeal for 
reconsideration suggested by paragraph 17. 
1 See 210. 
215 CO 54/986/5/2, no 104 [6Aug1944] 
[Reforms]: text of Mr Stanley's reply to ministers 
I have studied the Ministers' message as telegraphed by the Governor on July llth. 1 I 
would invite the Ministers' attention to the correspondence published in Sessional 
Papers XIII and XVII of 1943. In particular I would refer to numbers 5, 6(a) and 9 of 
the first Sessional Paper above referred to and to the Declaration made by His 
Majesty's Government in 1941 that "before taking decisions upon present proposals 
for Reforms concerning which there has been so little unanimity, but which are of 
such importance to the well being of Ceylon, His Majesty's Government would desire 
1 See 208 (for subsequent cross references, see 209). 
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that the position should be further examined and made the subject of further 
consultation by means of a Commission or Conference." 
2. That Declaration was specifically repeated in the Declaration made by His 
Majesty's Government in May 1943 which was expressly designed to give greater 
precision to the 1941 Statement "with the object of removing any doubts regarding 
His Majesty's Government's intentions". The Ministers cannot justifiably claim that a 
Declaration made for such a clearly stated purpose could abrogate a cardinal point of 
the previous Statement. 
3. I am unable to accept the argument contained in paragraph 2 of the Ministers' 
message for reasons that will be apparent to any one who reads the whole of 
Document No.5 in Sessional Paper XVII of 1943 and in particular the second, third 
and fourth sentences thereof. 
4. It is now necessary for me to refer to actual events. On the 3rd February, 1944, 
the Governor sent to me the Ministers' printed scheme together with the copy of a 
forwarding letter from the Vice Chairman of the Board of Ministers in which he 
explained (a) that the Ministers had in mind the possibility of the State Council 
modifying or altering their recommendations in regard to the form of the legislature 
and representation (i.e. their scheme in regard to two cardinal points was not one for 
acceptance or alternatively for rejection by the State Council but one for possible 
modification by it) and (b) that the Minister for Home Affairs was not in agreement 
with the proposals regarding representation, the entirety of which question was a 
matter of considerable controversy and should in his opinion be settled by a Royal 
Commission. 
5. The Governor also sent me a copy of the letter whereby he had acknowledged 
receipt of the Ministers' Scheme and of the Vice Chairman's forwarding letter. In his 
acknowledgement the Governor pointed out:~ 
(a) that the Scheme was not a "complete constitutional scheme" as contemplated 
by paragraph (7) of the Message in His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 26th 
May, 1943, because such crucial questions as the form of legislature, franchise and 
representation were left for consideration "otherwise than by the Commission or 
Conference required by the Declaration". 
(b) that two passages in the letter "appeared to envisage the immediate considera-
tion by His Majesty's Government of the Ministers' proposals without previous 
examination by the stipulated Commissi~n or Conference". 
6. On the lOth February the Governor sent me a copy of the Vice Chairman's 
reply to his letter. In it the Vice Chairman in regard to (a) tendered reasons for 
regarding the Scheme "as complete as is necessary for any purpose reasonably 
contemplated by the Declaration", and in regard to (b) ended his letter with this 
paragraph:-
"For these reasons the immediate consideration of our proposals is necessary. 
This may be done in whatever manner (as suggested in the Declaration or 
otherwise) His Majesty's Government may consider to be best." 
I must frankly confess my inability to reconcile this statement with the Ministers' 
present message. 
7. In paragraph 3 of the latter the Ministers note the omission of any reference to 
a Commission or Conference in a reply given by me to certain representations by the 
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Ceylon Indian Congress. The inference which the Ministers apparently wish to be 
drawn from this omission is directly negatived by the answer which I sent on the 
same date to a representation relating to the eligibility of ex-convicts to sit in the 
legislature under any new Constitution. I replied that, as Mr. X "is no doubt aware 
from the statement made by His Majesty's Government at the end of last May, it is 
their intention that the detailed proposals under any new Scheme for Constitutional 
reform formulated by Ministers should in due course be examined by a suitable 
Commission or Conference, and that I cannot anticipate such examination". I am 
informed by the Governor that my despatch directing this reply to Mr. X was 
circulated to the Board of Ministers simultaneously with my despatch directing the 
reply to the Ceylon Indian Congress. The date of circulation was 1st February, 1944, 
and I do not see the justification for a citation of the latter without the former. They 
were indeed immediately consecutive despatches. 
8. In their paragraph 3 the Ministers also attach to a reply sent by me to 
representations by Mr. Ponnambalam a meaning contrary to what I consider its clear 
import. The Governor moreover informs me that at a Conference with the Ministers 
on 14th March he read to the Ministers both Mr. Ponnambalam's telegram and my 
reply, explaining that they could only mean that the minorities need not be 
apprehensive because the contents of the Ministers' Scheme would be examined by a 
Commission or Conference which would ascertain their views and that any 
Constitution that might emerge from His Majesty's Government's consideration of 
the Commission's or Conference's Report would still require acceptance by 75% of 
the State Council. He sent copies of the telegrams relating to Mr. Ponnambalam's 
representations and to my reply to the Vice Chairman next day. The telegrams were 
also circulated to the Ministers in the ordinary course. 
9. On the 22nd April the Governor addressed to me an open despatch in which he 
wrote as follows:-
"the main purpose of a Commission or Conference to examine the Ministers' 
constitutional proposals will obviously be to invite and investigate criticisms 
thereof'. 
The enclosures to this despatch related to further representations by Mr. Ponnamba-
lam. A copy of the despatch and its enclosures was circulated to the Board of 
Ministers on the 2nd May. 
10. If the Ministers did not accept that interpretation of the Commission's 
functions or found any divergence between it and the 1943 Declaration by His 
Majesty's Government I should have expected them to bring the matter to the 
immediate notice of His Majesty's Government. On the contrary they made no such 
intimation to me until their present message. I cannot too strongly emphasize that 
at no time has His Majesty's Government contemplated nor indeed would His 
Majesty's Government contemplate taking decisions on matters of such constitution-
al importance as those now under consideration without a full knowledge of the 
opinion of the various interests concerned. 
11. In conclusion the purpose of His Majesty's Government is that the Commis-
sion should advise them on the Ministers' proposals and not that it should examine 
and investigate the problem of Constitutional reforms de novo. For the proper 
fulfilment of this function it is necessary that the Commission should be in a position 
to study all aspects of the Ministers' proposals and to elicit further information from 
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them on any part of the proposals which may appear insufficiently complete and 
detailed. The examination of the Ministers' Scheme will include examination of any 
criticisms of it by various interests in the Island which are concerned. The 
Commission will then tender its advice to His Majesty's Government and, in the light 
of such advice and of all other relevant factors, His Majesty's Government will then 
reach their conclusions. The Ministers have indeed made a special and valuable 
contribution in that, despite the stress and pre-occupations of war time, they have 
succeeded in formulating a scheme for constitutional reform as they were invited to 
do. I feel that I can fairly ask the Ministers to give their attitude towards the work of 
Commission further consideration. 
12. In acceding to the Ministers' request thattheir message be published I also 
authorise the publication of this reply. I consider also that the need for a full and 
proper understanding of the position requires the publication of all the correspond-
ence referred to in the Ministers' message and in this reply and I trust that they will 
concur in this course. 
216 CO 54/986/5/2, no 113 18 Aug 1944 
[Reforms] : inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting the text of a letter from ministers contesting the 
secretary of state's reply 
Reform. I have received, this morning, the following letter from Ministers, 
accompanied by the request that it be immediately telegraphed to you. My comments 
will follow when I have had time for careful consideration of it. 
Letter begins. The Ministers have studied with care the reply of the Secretary of 
State enclosed with Your Excellency's letter S.l/11 of the 6th August, 1944.1 They 
regret to find that the Secretary of State for the Colonies's interpretation of 
Declaration of 1943 is quite inconsistent with the basis on which they undertook to 
prepare a draft constitution. They gave to the Declaration of 1943 what still appears 
to them to be the only reasonable meaning. That meaning they expressed in 
statement made by the Leader of the State Council on the 8th June, 1943. "It (the 
Declaration of 1943) is, in essence, an undertaking that if the Board can produce a 
constitution which, in the opinion of a Commission or a Conference, satisfies the 
conditions set out in paragraphs (2) to (6) thereof, and if that constitution is 
subsequently accepted by three-quarters of all members of the State Council 
excluding officers of the State and the Speaker, His Majesty in Council will put that 
constitution into operation." That statement was agreed upon at a meeting of the 
Board of Ministers over which the Chief Secretary presided and at which other 
officers of State were present. Though officers of State took an active part in 
discussion of (draft) statement, no suggestion was made by them that any other 
interpretation was possible than that given by Ministers on the question of the 
precise procedure intended to be followed in dealing with constitutional proposals 
formulated by Ministers. Before, however, undertaking to draft a constitution in 
1 See 215. 
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terms of the Declaration of 1943, the Ministers expressly enquired of the Secretary of 
State whether interpretation placed on the Declaration by them in their statement of 
8th June, 1943, was in accord with the principles of that Declaration and the 
Secretary of State assured them that he had not found in their statement anything 
that must be regarded as essentially irreconcilable with conditions contained in the 
Declaration. The Ministers have, all along, acted on that interpretation and they did 
not at any stage either contemplate or indicate in any manner even a modification of 
that interpretation. In fact, in November, 1943, the Leader of the State Council (Vice 
Chairman of the Board of Ministers) made it clear in replying to a question asked him 
in the State Council, that procedure being followed was that indicated in their 
statement of the 8th June, 1943. 
2. It would now transpire that, even on preliminary question of procedure, the 
Secretary of State disagrees fundamentally from views of Ministers as clearly 
expressed in their statement of the 8th June, 1943. The Ministers would have 
expected that the Secretary of State, as soon as he realised that there was a 
divergence of opinion on such an important matter, would at least have brought it 
directly to the notice of the Ministers who would then have been in a position to 
make representations on it before any definite action was taken by the Secretary of 
State contrary to the Ministers' interpretation. It is, perhaps, significant that the 
Secretary of State does not in his last reply refer to the Ministers' interpretation of 
the declaration of 1943, which interpretation was further emphasized in their 
message of 11th July, 1944. 
3. The Ministers wish again to make their position perfectly clear. In their 
statement of 8th June, 1943, they stated that Declaration of 1943 did not promise 
everything for which they have asked and that they did not like the qualification(s) in 
it. They were, nevertheless, prepared to accept the offer in the Declaration if the 
Secretary of State agreed that their interpretation of it was in accord with the 
principles of that Declaration. One of the chief points in that interpretation and one 
chief reason that led them to that decision was the recognition by His Majesty's 
Government that this country should not be invited merely to accept a constitution 
framed by His Majesty's Government, but that ministers, on behalf of the people, 
should prepare a constitutional scheme. His Majesty's Government was only 
concerned with the constitution in so far as it embodied provisions referred to in 
paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration of 1943. The difficult and unusual 
requirement that the Ministers' scheme should subsequently obtain the approval of 
three-quarters of the members of the State Council could only mean that, having 
entrusted to the Ministers the task of preparing a constitution, His Majesty's 
Government considered the requirement as sufficient proof that the Ministers' 
scheme was generally acceptable to the country. 
4. The decision of His Majesty's Government to appoint a commission to carry 
out investigations with terms of reference now proposed radically changes the 
situation. It is quite possible that the constitution to be placed before the State 
Council will not be the Ministers' proposals (subject only to the Secretary of State 
being satisfied that paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration have been complied with) 
but an entirely different scheme. In other words, it will not be a constitution 
prepared by the Ministers but a constitution acceptable to His Majesty's Government, 
not only with reference to provisions in paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Declaration, but 
with reference to every detail of it. 
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5. As the basis on which the Ministers agreed to frame, and did frame, their 
constitutional scheme has now been radically changed by the Secretary of State, the 
Ministers are obliged to withdraw their scheme, which they do with regret. 
6. The Ministers desire at the same time that this letter and the documents 
referred to in Your Excellency's letter of 6th August, 1944, but excluding the 
constitutional scheme forwarded with their letter of 2nd February, 1944 should be 
published as a Sessional Paper. Letter follows. Ends. 
217 CO 54/986/5/2, no 117 19Aug 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley transmitting the draft of a reply to the ministers' letter 
Reforms. 
I think it will be most convenient to tender my comments on the Ministers' 
latest message in the form of the following draft reply for your consideration. 
Draft Begins. 1. I have read the Ministers' communication of 16th Auguse with 
the same careful attention that I gave to their previous message of 11th July. 
2. With regard to its first paragraph, I have already given the reasons for my 
inability to accept the Ministers' interpretation of the Declaration of 1943 in any 
sense abrogative of the essential purpose of that Declaration, which was to give 
greater precision to the previous Declaration of 1941. 
3. I again invite reference to the second, third and fourth sentences of Document 
5 in Session Paper XVII of 1943. There might have emerged nothing irreconcilable 
between the Ministers' interpretation and the purpose of the Declarations of 1941 
and 1943, if the Ministers had obtained and recorded the views of all interests 
concerned and appended them to their scheme. 
4. With reference to paragraph 2, the Governor by his letter of 3rd February, 
1944, drew immediate attention to two points on which the Ministers appeared to 
contemplate a radical departure from the procedure stipulated by the Declaration of 
1943. I felt it superfluous to endorse the Governor's views after reading the passage 
in the Vice-Chairman's answer quoted in paragraph 6 of my reply to the Ministers' 
message of 11th July. 
5. In regard to paragraph 3, the invitation extended to the Ministers in paragraph 
7 of the 1943 Declaration was addressed to them only in their capacity under the 
existing constitution. The fact that they have been unable to tender a unanimous 
recommendation .on so basic a matter as the representation illustrates the degree to 
which a reference to them as possessing a "capacity as representatives of the people" 
would have been unjustified. It also clearly confirms the necessity for the Commis-
sion or Conference required by the 1941 and 1943 Declarations. 
6. I note with regret that the scheme put forward by the Ministers is now 
withdrawn by them and that, at their request, it will not be published before the 
arrival of the Commission. I cannot, however, keep the Commission in ignorance of 
the contents of the scheme, but will inform them that it no longer possesses 
ministerial authority or support of the draft. Ends. 
1 See 216 where the date is recorded as 18 Aug. 
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I have not thought it necessary or desirable to refer to the insinuation that Officers 
of State were privy to the Ministers' interpretation of the 1943 Declaration. As you 
are aware, Officers of State have no vote in the Board and the question of agreement 
or disagreement was never put to them nor could they have answered if it had been 
without prior reference through me to you. 
I will proceed with the preparation of Session Paper, which will, of course, include 
the Ministers' latest message and whatever reply you may decide to send. 
218 C054/986/5/2, no 119 23Aug 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Sir A Caldecott on the proposed reply to ministers 
Thank you for your telegram secret and personal (2) of 19th August. 1 
2. I note with regret that Ministers now withdraw their scheme, but in view of the 
decision taken and announced by His Majesty's Government on the strength of the 
communication to me of the scheme by Ministers, I could not agree that proposed 
publication of messages and other relevant documents could exclude text of scheme. 
It seems to me indeed to be necessary to include that document in order that His 
Majesty's Government's concern to consult all interests affected may be appreciated 
by public. It would of course be made clear that Ministers no longer wish to sponsor 
that scheme. 
3. As regards question of reply to Ministers' message of 18th August, I accept 
your advice if you feel that it is desirable for me to send some further reasoned reply 
but in that case I should prefer to delete paragraph 5 from your draft as it seems to 
me perhaps unnecessarily provocative. Final paragraph also will need reconsidera-
tion in light of paragraph 4 of this telegram in respect of Commission. 
4. Keeping our main immediate purpose always in view, viz., to avoid at this 
juncture serious political trouble in Ceylon detrimental to military operations in the 
Far East, it is important to study means of helping Ministers to extricate themselves 
from their present position without of course yielding any major point in our own 
case. I should much like to know what plan they have in mind now that they have 
thrown overboard their scheme and presumably with it their request for its 
examination by His Majesty's Government. It remains the view of His Majesty's 
Government that the framing of proposals for constitutional reform should properly 
be the task of statesmanship in Ceylon and our aim should be to restore effort in that 
direction. 
5. Important immediate question is whether in present situation we are to 
proceed with appointment of Commission to visit Ceylon this winter. You and 
Commander-in-Chief consider it important that the Commission should proceed as 
planned. But purpose of Commission as stated in His Majesty's Government's 
Declarations in 1943 and July 1944 was examination of scheme formulated by 
Ministers. Without prejudice to eventual decision as to Commission I should like to 
have your views as to what would be function of Commission if Ministers continue to 
disown their scheme, and whether our main purpose mentioned above would be 
likely to be damaged if Commission had non-co-operative reception in Ceylon. 
1 See217. 
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6. There remains also need for early decision regarding deferment of general 
elections-see paragraph 6 of your secret and personal telegram of 27th July,2 and 
your secret and personal telegram of 21st August. 
7. In view of above considerations I should now like to have considered advice of 
yourself and Commander-in-Chief with appreciation of political situation which may 
be expected to develop as affecting our main present purpose in the Island. 
2 See 213. 
219 CO 54/986/5/2, no 121 26 Aug 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley on the proposed reply to ministers 
Reforms. Your secret and personal (1) telegram of 23rd August, 1 paragraphs 4 and 5. 
Political position and outlook may be shortly but adequately summarized as 
follows:-
(i) Ministers as usual lack unity and cohesion, and there is little prospect of 
further constructive effort by them jointly or on their own initiative. 
(ii) On the other hand anticipation of Commission has given rise to growing 
demand for inter-sectional consultations in the hope of evolving some agreed 
suggestions to place before it. In such consultations Ministers may individually if 
not collectively take part. 
(iii) If the Commission were now cancelled or postponed all sections including 
Ministers would proclaim it as breach of undertaking, and the whole Island 
become disaffected with disastrous effect on the war effort. 
2. Your paragraph 2, Ministers will sooner or later be forced into publication of 
their scheme by public opinion, and in our judgment it would be unwise to make 
publication of rest of correspondence conditional on its inclusion. We recommend 
however, substitution of the following for paragraph 6 of draft reply submitted by my 
telegram of the 19th August.2 
Begins. I note with regret that the scheme put forward by Ministers is now 
withdrawn by them. I cannot however consistently with recent statements of His 
Majesty's Government withhold it from the Commission, nor preclude the Commis-
sion from consulting various interests regarding it, although it will be made clear it 
no longer has Ministerial endorsement. Its exclusion from correspondence which 
Ministers are agreed to publish causes me great disappointment because, as stated in 
my reply to Minister's message of 11th July, I regard its formulation as having been a 
special and valuable contribution by them, which could be made the base of pregnant 
consultations between various interests in anticipation of the Commission's arrival. 
Ends. 
3. Your paragraph 3. 
If no reference at all is made to claim by the Ministers to represent the people of 
Ceylon, they will regard this claim as admitted. We recommend therefore substitu-
tion of the following paragraph for paragraph 5 in my previous telegram. 
1 See 218. 2 See217. 
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Begins. With reference to paragraph 3, the invitation extended to Ministers in 
paragraph 7 of 1943 Declaration was addressed to them in their capacity within the 
present constitution, whereunder only the State Council can be said to represent the 
people. Whatever the degree or nature of the Ministers' representative capacity, the 
opinion of the only members of a minority of the community among them, that the 
entire question of representation requires settlement by a Royal Commission, could 
not have been justifiably ignored. Ends. 
4. We strongly urge that reply suggested in my secret and personal (2) telegram 
of 19th August with the above two amendments should be given at the earliest 
possible date, and that sessional paper be issued immediately thereafter containing 
documents listed in my secret and personal (1) telegram of 19th August mihus 
Ministers' scheme (omission of which will be explained by footnote referring to 
paragraph 6 of their message of 18th August) plus that message and your reply 
thereto. 
5. We also recommend that as proposed in paragraph 6 of my telegram of 27th 
Jull amending Order in Council to proposed elections be enacted as soon as 
sessional paper mentioned in previous paragraph has issued. 
6. Above paragraphs contain joint recommendations of Commander-in-Chief and 
myself. As the Chief Secretary is in continuous contact with the Ministers and the 
State Council, I asked him for independent report in regard to the points raised in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of your telegram. His report, which corroborates our own 
summary, follows in my immediately following telegram.4 
3 See 213. 4 Not printed. 
220 CO 54/986/5/2, no 123 28 Aug 1944 
[Reforms]: outward telegram (reply) from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott on the proposed reply to ministers 
Very much obliged for your two secret and personal telegrams of 26th August.1 
1. I of course accept advice of Commander-in-Chief and yourself that I should 
send reply in sufficient detail to Ministers' message and I have carefully reconsidered 
your suggested draft as now revised. Terms of reply which I should prefer to send to 
them, unless Commander-in-Chief and yourself see any strong objection, are not 
identical with your draft as you will see from my immediately following secret 
telegram No. 1035. The chief points of difference are:-
(a) Omission of second sentence in your paragraph 3. 
(b) Redraft of paragraph 5. On latter point I feel that your draft may be open to 
misrepresentation as effort on my part to cause jealousy between Board of 
Ministers and State Council and also exacerbate difference between Mahadeva and 
rest of Ministers. 
2. I fully appreciate your valuable advice about Commission and I agree that we 
should maintain our purpose in this respect. I hope to be able shortly to telegraph 
about its composition, and, in the meantime, I should be glad to receive your views 
1 See 219. 
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as to suitable terms of reference. Lord Soulbury has already consented to act as 
Chairman. 
3. I agree to publication of Sessional Paper as proposed in paragraph 4 of your 
secret and personal telegram (1) of 26th August. 
4. I also agree that amending Order in Council to postpone elections should be 
submitted for His Majesty's approval as soon after publication of Sessional Paper as 
possible. 
5. I note particularly in Chief Secretary's report that there has been influential 
demand made by speakers in State Council in favour of formulation of agreed 
constitutional scheme in anticipation of Commission's arrival, and I hope that 
' Ministers may give early and favourable consideration to this course. 
221 CO 54/986/5/2, no 124 [28 Aug 1944] 
[Reforms]: final text of Mr Stanley's reply to ministers 
I have read the Ministers' communication of August 18th1 with the same careful 
attention that I gave to their prevous message of July 11th. 
2. With regard to its first paragraph I have already given reasons for my inability 
to accept the Ministers' interpretation of the Declaration of 1943 in any sense 
abrogative of the essential purpose of that Declaration which was to give greater 
precision to the previous Declaration of 1941. 
3. With reference to paragraph 2 the Governor in his letter of February 3rd 1944 
to the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers drew immediate attention to two 
points on which the Ministers appeared to contemplate a radical departure from the 
procedure stipulated by the Declaration of 1943. I felt it superfluous to endorse the 
Governor's view after reading that passage in the Vice-Chairman's answer quoted in 
paragraph 6 of my reply to the Ministers message of July 11th. 
4. With reference to paragraph 3 the invitation extended to the Ministers in 
paragraph 7 of the 1943 Declaration was addressed to them in their capacity within 
the present constitution, and it is fair for me to point out that on the important 
question of representation the Minister for Home Affairs recorded his dissent from 
the Ministers' Scheme. 
5. I note with regret that the Scheme put forward by the Ministers is now 
withdrawn by them. I cannot however consistently with the recent statement of His 
Majesty's Government withhold it from the Commission nor preclude the Commis-
sion from consulting various interests regarding it, although it will be made clear 
that it no longer has Ministerial endorsement. Its exclusion from the correspondence 
which the Ministers are agreed to publish causes me great disappointment because, 
as stated in my reply to Ministers' message of July 11th, I regard its formulation as 
having been a special and valuable contribution by them which could be made the 
basis of fruitful consultations between various interests in anticipation of the 
Commission's arrival. 
1 See 216. 
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222 WO 203/5412 30 Aug 1944 
[Reforms]: letter from Admiral Layton to Admiral Mountbatten on the 
appointment of the Soulbury Commission 
In continuance of my letter of 27th July on the subject of the Constitutional Reform 
question in Ceylon, I am now sending for your information a copy of 
1. Secretary of State's reply to the Ministers' message of 11th July 1944.1 
2. A further message from the Ministers dated 18th August 1944.2 
3. The Secretary of State's further reply to 2.3 
These three documents will be published later this week together with all the 
other papers, except the Ministers' draft scheme. The replies of the Secretary of State 
were drafted in consultation with the Governor and myself. I also enclose for your 
personal information a copy of a telegram giving a report by the Chief Secretary on 
the political situation;4 this is of course 'Secret' and will remain so. The references 
are to a message from the Secretary of State which you have not seen, but they do 
not affect the general sense at all. 
We have since been assured that the Commission will definitely come out, and that 
Lord Soulbury will be its Chairman. It seems unlikely that the Ministers can 
maintain their proposal to boycott it, in face of the general interest displayed by 
everyone else, and you will see from the Chief Secretary's report that Senanayake's 
attitude has not commanded any support in the Budget Debate. 
The Commission will presumably have to start by studying the Ministers' scheme, 
which accordingly will have to be published some time between now and then. It is a 
very faulty and incomplete document (which is possibly why the Ministers have 
hurriedly abandoned it as soon as it looked like seeing the light of day), but it is the 
only one in the field unless the State Council manage to produce another. 
Our general expectation therefore is that the Commission will successfully absorb 
the political energies of the country and thus avoid the necessity for a general 
election. 
1 See 215. 2 See 216. 3 See 221. 4 Not printed. 
223 CO 54/986/7, no 35 1 Sept 1944 
[Tamils]: letter from S Ponniah to Mr Stanley emphasising the 
differences between 'Tamil Ceylon and the rest of Ceylon' 
With reference to the future political reforms to be granted to Ceylon, I beg to state 
that the Tamil speaking part of Ceylon (re: comparison of other minor communities 
with the Tamils) is a well defined territory where Tamil only is spoken. Besides, it 
had its own history, civilization, politics and Kingdom for roughly about 1,500 years 
or perhaps more. It had been and is different from the rest of all Ceylon by history, 
race, language, creed, culture, customs and manners, politics, civilization and the 
ideals of life. 
1 Ponniah was a Tamil doctor from South Arcot in southern India. 
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Tamil Ceylon is a unit by itself. If Tamil Ceylon with Jaffna as centre is created a 
separate political unit by the World Protecting British Nation, the story will be 
different. Jaffna will play the part of a bond of union between Mother India and 
Daughter Lanka (Ceylon) and of a buffer political unit medium between these two 
countries for the happy betterment of their mutual feelings and their economic, 
political and cultural progress. The best of understanding has still to be reached 
between these two countries and it is essential and vital that it should be reached 
soon as attested by war time troubles. 
Some politicians will try to plaster over the differences between Tamil Ceylon and 
the rest of Ceylon but it is extremely difficult to make the two ends meet. The 
promises of these politicians are with selfish motives, short-lived and ideologic. They 
are ambitious and power-loving; they want to satisfy their feelings of supremacy and 
to bring all Ceylon under one umbrella. If the ideas and ideals of these politicians are 
carried through, the Tamil people of Ceylon will be reduced to the position of ryots 
and serfs. Almost all the coveted high posts will be occupied by the major community 
as was the beginning [sic] seen during the past decade or two. All the public money 
will be spent to better their own lands and people. The Tamils will suffer 
economically and they will deteriorate and degenerate mentally and morally. The 
Tamillanguage and culture will slowly disappear, the beginning of which is seen in 
the Ceylon University. Whereas in India they are Tamilising sciences and are 
beginning to teach Mathematics and Sciences in Tamil in the schools and colleges. 
Incidentally I may add a Jaffna University has to come into being sooner or later. 
During the present war myself and a good part of the Tamil people who share my 
views had our mouths shut loyally. That being so, I beg to request your honour to 
give us a period of two years after the signing of peace and grant Ceylon's fate 
deciding reforms after that period. To grant reforms on war time political activity is 
not fair . It is not fair to base these all important reforms on the recommendations of 
a Commission that comes in a hurry from a distant part of the globe perhaps as first 
visitors to the island. To base reforms on memorials, deputations, audiences with the 
highest authorities in Ceylon and London and by other general methods, is more 
reliable and fair. 
I request your honour not to commit us irretrievably into the hands of any 
community by hurried measures. I may add that the difference between Tamil 
Ceylon and the rest of Ceylon is greater than that between Spain and Portugal or 
Norway and Sweden or Holland and Belgium or Equdor [sic] and Brazil or Ulster and 
the rest of Ireland. 
224 CO 54/986/5/3, no 131 1 Sept 1944 
[Reforms]: inward telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr Stanley on the 
terms of reference for the Soulbury Commission 
Your secret and personal telegram of 28th August. 1 Paragraph 2. 
Recommend that terms of reference should:-
(a) enable the Commission to examine not only Ministers' recently withdrawn 
1 See 220. 
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proposals, but also any agreed scheme which may evolve between now and their 
arrival, 
(b) preclude examination of any scheme which is not designed to implement His 
Majesty's Government's Declaration of 28th May, 1943, 
(c) entitle the Commission to fill in gaps in any proposals submitted to them, as it 
is unlikely that any local scheme will be found comprehensive or sufficiently 
detailed. Wording on the following lines would appear to meet this threefold 
requirement. 
Begins. To visit Ceylon in order to examine and invite criticism of any proposals 
for reform in the Island which have the object of giving effect to the Declaration of 
His Majesty's Government on that subject dated 26th May, 1943, and to advise on all 
measures necessary to obtain (? attain intended) that object.2 Ends. 
2 Stanley replied on 4 Sept: 'I agree generally with (a), (b) and (c) but as Ministers' present decision is to 
disown their scheme I think terms should also enable Commission to consider any other schemes in 
pursuance of His Majesty's Government's 1943 Declaration which may be available for their consideration. 
2. I also feel that I should adhere to the assurance in His Majesty's Government's 1944 Statement that 
Commission's visit should provide full opportunity for consultation with various interests concerned 
including minorities. I have therefore redrafted suggested terms of reference as follows and should be glad 
to know whether you and Commander-in-Chief concur. 
Begins. (1) To examine any proposals for constitutional reform in Ceylon made in pursuance of His 
Majesty's Government's Declaration of the 26th May, 1943; 
(2) To visit Ceylon in order to consult with the Governor, the Board of Ministers and representatives of 
the various interests in the Island (including the minority communities) concerned with the subject of 
constitutional reform, with a view to making a Report to His Majesty's Government on all measures 
necessary to attain the object stated in their Declaration of the 26th May, 1943. Ends. 
3. Neither above terms of reference nor those suggested by yourself contain specific provisions for 
consultation with Commander-in-Chief or other Service authorities in Ceylon. Do you and Commander-
in-Chief consider such provision to be necessary? If so please suggest suitable additional words' (CO 
54/986/5/3, no 132). 
225 CO 54/986/5/3, no 136 8 Sept 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram (reply) from Sir A Caldecott 
to Mr Stanley on the terms of reference for the Soulbury Commission 
Your secret and personal telegram of the 4th September.1 
As regards paragraph (I) of your alternative draft it would seem that only the 
Ministers' scheme could with literal accuracy be said to be "in pursuance of' His 
Majesty's Government's Declaration, and that was why our draft provided for the 
examination of any proposals which have the object of giving effect to the 
Declaration of His Majesty's Government. As regards paragraph (2) mention of 
Governor and Board of Ministers would appear unnecessary, while mention of the 
latter would enable Congress politicians to force the Ministers into announcement of 
a boycott, thus entailing subsequent amendment of the terms of the Commission. 
For the above reasons the Commander-in-Chief and I advise the adoption of the 
draft submitted by my previous telegram (which was designed to meet important 
1 See 224, note 2. 
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point mentioned in your telegram), but with the substitution of the following for the 
last 18 words thereof. 
Begins. dated 26th May, 1943, and, after consultation with various interests in the 
island, including minor communities concerned with the subject of constitutional 
reform, to advise on all measures necessary to attain that object. Ends. 
This substitute passage will emphasize the essential consultative function of the 
Commission, while mention of invitation of criticism, which is essential antecedent 
to consultation, will remain as at the beginning of my draft. We do not think the 
terms of reference should contain reference to Commander-in-Chief or other Service 
authorities. 
Grateful if terms might be referred to us in final draft before receiving your 
approval. 
226 CO 54/986/5/3, no 138 12 Sept 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir A Caldecott to Mr 
Stanley on ministerial intentions to table their constitutional scheme 
in the State Council 
I have just received letter from Senanayake stating that Ministers will table in the 
State Council to-day their constitutional scheme, together with a long explanatory 
memorandum dated 11th September. This action of theirs is in my judgment to be 
welcomed, though they might have given me longer notice. 
2. Political events since I came to Nuwara Eliya a week ago have moved rapidly, 
and with some promise of tangible results. On 7th September Bandaranaike gave a 
dinner to members of the State Council, at which 44 members were present, who 
afterwards formed themselves into a conference for the purpose of drawing up united 
demand for political reform. Senanayake and Kotalawala were not present. After 
discussion they set up Committee of 26 members to frame a constitutional scheme. 
Committee comprises 5 Ministers excluding the two just mentioned, 6 Lowland 
Sinhalese, 3 Kandyans, 4 Ceylon Tamils, 3 Muslims, 2 Indian Tamils, 2 unofficial 
British, 1 Burgher. The conference instructed this Committee to proceed without 
delay and to report to the conference by the end of this month. Committee agreed to 
have its first meeting this evening, 12th September. I am indebted to the Chief 
Secretary for all the information contained in this paragraph, as no communication 
on the subject has been addressed to me by Bandaranaike or anybody else. 
3. It is too early to assess the probable results of this movement, but so far there 
seems no prospect of the Commission being opposed, much less boycotted. 
Senanayake has clearly lost ground to Bandaranaike, and has recently shown neither 
restraint nor leadership. 
348 MINISTERS' DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND SOULBURY COMMISSION [228] 
227 CO 54/986/5/3, no 151 18 Sept 1944 
[Reforms]: outward unnumbered telegram from Mr Stanley to Sir A 
Caldecott on the terms of reference for the Soulbury Commission 
Your secret and personal telegram of 15th September. 
I appreciate the special advantages of an announcement of the kind mentioned in 
paragraph 2. of your telegram. As, however, I have not yet been able to complete 
membership of Commission apart from Lord Soulbury as Chairman, announcement 
I could make at this moment would be on the following lines. 
Begins. His Majesty's Government have already announced their decision to send a 
Commission to visit Ceylon towards the end of the year for consultation on the 
question of constitutional reform. Lord Soulbury has accepted my invitation to be 
Chairman of the Commission whose terms of reference will be as follows (terms as 
now agreed with you will then be quoted) . It is expected that the membership of the 
Commission will be completed and announced shortly. Ends. 
Please telegraph with the least possible delay whether you have any amendment1 
to suggest to the above announcement which I hope to release for publication in the 
morning papers of Thursday, 21st September.2 
1 Caldecott in a tel of 19 Sept had 'only one small amendment to suggest in the proposed announcement, 
i.e. towards the end of the first sentence, instead of "for consultation on question of' substitute "in 
connection with". Reason for proposed amendment is that the purpose of the commission is set out in the 
terms of reference, and it might prove impolitic to emphasize its consultative as distinct from its 
examinational functions' (CO 54/986/5/3, no 152). 
2 The press announcement of 20 Sept 1944 on the appointment of the commission read as follows:-
'His Majesty's Government have already announced their decision to send a Commission to visit Ceylon 
towards the end of the year in connexion with constitutinal reform. Lord Soul bury has accepted the 
invitation to be Chairman of the Commission whose terms of reference will be as follows:-
"To visit Ceylon in order to examine and discuss any proposals for constitutional reform in the Island 
which have the object of giving effect to the Declaration of His Majesty's Government on that subject 
dated 26th May, 1943; and, after consultation with various interests in the Island, including minority 
communities, concerned with the subject of constitutional reform, to advise His Majesty's 
Government on all measures necessary to attain that object". 
It is expected that the membership of the Commission will be completed and announced shortly.' 
228 CO 554/986/7, no 28 21 Sept 1944 
[Kandyan treaty rights]: minutes by Trafford Smith and J B Side-
botham 
[These minutes were written in response to a tel sent on 17 Sept 1944 by TB Panabokke, 
president of the Kandyan National Assembly, to Mr Stanley which read: 'The Kandyan 
National Assembly representing three fifths Ceylon and two million people submits 
Kandyan rights in treaty of 1815 is [sic] part of Ceylon laws. Reform proposals of 
ministers and of minorities violate treaty rights of Kandyan nation. Request terms of 
reference of commission on Ceylon constitution include rights guaranteed by His 
Majesty. Memorial follows.'] 
The Kandyan Convention of the 2nd March, 1815, will be found at Appendix V of the 
Donoughmore Report (my copy herewith which I should like back in due course). 
This Kandyan question will probably come before the Commission in Ceylon, and 
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we are likely to hear a good deal more of it before the new Constitution is produced. 
If I read it correctly, the present telegram requests that the Commission's terms of 
reference should include the rights guaranteed by the Convention of 1815. How this 
is to be achieved is not immediately obvious, and perhaps the Kandyan National 
Assembly are really asking that the Convention rights should be respected in the new 
Constitution. At all events, the action required now appears to be to telegraph the 
text of (28) to the Governor and ask him, if he sees no objection, to inform the 
President of the Assembly that the Secretary of State has received his telegram, and 
to draw his attention to the terms of reference of the Commission which have now 
been announced in Ceylon. ? So proceed, pending the arrival of the promised 
memorial. 
T.S. 
21.9.44 
The Kandyan claim is dealt with at length in Chapter VI of the Donoughmore Report. 
The conclusion reached on page 106 of that report that "the solid fact remains that 
for almost 100 years, or three-quarters of the whole period of British rule in Ceylon, 
the Kandyan Provinces have been merged for all administrative purposes with the 
remainder of the Island" and that "the time has long since passed when an 
experiment of granting to each of the three largest communities a separate 
Government for the area principally occupied by them could have been attempted 
without the certainty of inflicting hardship on one or all of them" is as sound to-day 
as when it was written in 1928. 
I should take action on the lines proposed by Mr. Trafford Smith, but by fast air 
mail, and note this telegram for communication to the Commission, together with 
the memorial when it is received. 
J.B.S. 
21.9.44 
229 CO 852/605/11, no 213 13 Oct 1944 
'Ceylon rubber': outward telegram from Mr Lyttelton1 to Sir C 
Hambro2 (Washington) explaining why there is little or no prospect of 
obtaining additional labour for Ceylon rub~er plantations 
Would you please pass following message to . Batt.3 Begins. "Am sorry to say that 
there seems to be little or no prospect of obtaining additional labour for the Ceylon 
rubber plantations. Ministers concerned here have given considerable thought to the 
problem and explored various ways of overcoming the political differences between 
Ceylon and India which are involved in any transfer of labour. It is now clear that 
these cannot be resolved at present and that any attempt to force the issue might 
have results quite the opposite of those intended. 
1 Minister of production, member of War Cabinet, 1942-1945; later secretary of state for colonies, 
1951-1954. 
2 UK member, Combined Raw Materials Board and head of British Raw Materials Mission, Washington, 
1944-1945. 
3 US member, Combined Raw Materials Board. 
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2. I am sure you will agree that Ceylon has done a fine job during the war in 
achieving a considerable rise in rubber output of the island at the expense I fear of 
future productivity through slaughter tapping. The pressure to increase food 
production h~s in itself affected the amount of labour available for rubber as have the 
intensive efforts made to turn the island into a base for Far East operations. Quite 
apart from the political and other practical reasons which weigh against effective 
pressure being directed to induce the Government of India to moderate their 
attitude, I should not like to be a party to any step which might affect Ceylon's 
co-operation in the war and I hope you will agree that we are right in the 
circumstances in not forcing this issue with either India or Ceylon." Ends. 
230 CO 54/988/2, no 4 27 Oct 1944 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: inward telegram no 2014 from Sir R Drayton 
to Mr Stanley on the response of the Board of Ministers to a 
representation from the Government of India concerning the rights 
and status of Indians in Ceylon 
[On 2 Sept Aney informed Caldecott that the GOI was ready to enter negotiations with the 
Ceylon government for a settlement of the general question of the rights and status of 
Indians in Ceylon. The GOI believed that a settlement was 'eminently desirable at the 
present time' when constitutional reform in Ceylon was under discussion. It was hoped 
that this declaration would serve 'to remove the apprehension which seems to prevail in 
some quarters in Ceylon that the Government of India want such negotiation to take 
place at the end of the war and not before' (CO 54/988/2, no 5). Stanley requested 
information about the reaction of the Board of Ministers, in response to which Drayton 
(officer administering the government in the interval between the end of Caldecott's 
governorship and the arrival of Sir H Moore), sent this reply.] 
Your secret telegram No. 1320. 
Board's views may be summarized as follows:-
(a) They regard general question of rights and status of Indians in Ceylon as 
substantially a different matter from particular problem of constitutional reform 
which is the subject of enquiry by Commission. Former question is, in their view, 
proper subject for negotiation between the Governments concerned and, while 
Commission will have to concern itself with problems of franchise and representa-
tion as affecting Indians among others in Ceylon, they should not concern 
themselves with the many other matters that fall into category of rights and status 
of Indians in Ceylon. They do not, therefore, regard Royal Commission's task as 
necessitating a resumption of negotiations on the general question. 
(b) They do not want case for Indian community in Ceylon to be presented or 
openly sponsored before Commission by Government of India. 
(c) They do not think any agreed basis exists today for resumption of negotiations 
and, unless such a basis were found before negotiations were resumed, they would 
be bound to fail. 
(d) They do not want to appear hostile to resumption of negotiations as soon as a 
favourable opportunity occurs and Government of India is, therefore, being asked 
for their views as to a possible basis for resuming negotiations. 
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2. Reply to Aney's letter will follow the lines of (a) and (b) above. Text will be sent 
by air mail very shortly. 
3. I agree with opinions expressed in Sir A. Caldecott's secret despatch of 5th 
October, with which Ministers' views are not in conflict. 
231 CO 54/986/5/3, no 171 11 Nov 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir R Drayton to Mr 
Stanley on the appointment of a new reforms committee 
Caldecott's secret and personal telegram of 15th September. 
It is announced in the local Press that the Reforms Committee referred to has 
dissolved without reaching agreement on any point. 
2. It is also stated that, after most of the minority Members had withdrawn, 
another Committee was formed at the suggestion of Bandaranaike, who, according 
to the Times, said that he was now frankly not prepared to stand by the Declaration of 
the Secretary of State and that he was for a free Ceylon and that it was on that footing 
that he suggested that a constitution should be drafted. He proposed that it should be 
referred to the State Council, if possible before the arrival of the Reforms 
Commission, or at any rate before its departure. 
3. Papers differ as to the proposed constitution of the new Committee, but I 
understand on good authority that, in addition to fotir Ministers namely Bandar-
anaike, Kannangara, Corea, and George De Silva, the Members for Panadure [sic], 
Dumbara, Galagedara, Galle, and Colombo Central were also chosen. Last named is 
the only minority Member proposed. It is not known how many have accepted. Corea 
and De Silva were not present when the Committee was proposed. 
4. No reporters were present when any of the proceedings described above took 
place and I have not received any official report on the matter. 
5. It is impossible to conjecture at present whether the proposed Committee will 
come into being or be active if it does. On the other hand, it must be admitted 
that:-
( a) The attitude imputed to Bandaranaike is consistently that which he expressed 
in the Board of Ministers when the Committee was being discussed last year. 
(b) There is no real agreement between Bandaranaike and Senanayake on the 
question of reform. 
(c) If the four Ministers do serve on the Committee, it will have the appearance of 
leaving Senanayake in a minority which consists of Conservative capitalist, as 
opposed to more advanced, non-capitalist, elements in the Board. 
6. The meeting of the State Council next week may result in Senanayake being 
compelled to reveal his attitude towards the proposed Committee. I will inform you 
of any further developments as soon as I have any authentic news. 
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232 CO 54/986/5/3, no 203 19 Dec 1944 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir H Moore to Mr 
Stanley conveying Mr Senanayake's views on the procedure for the 
Soulbury Commission 
Reference my secret and personal of to-day's date. I have had full discussions with 
Senanayake and the Chief Secretary, as to the procedure to be adopted on the arrival 
of the Commission, and he expressed general agreement with (a) and (b) of my 
telegram No. 2343, and draft communique is being prepared on these lines for the 
approval of Lord Soul bury, on arrival. 
I also conveyed to him, in confidence, substance of statement referred to in your 
secret and personal telegram of the 30th November, but he strongly deprecated any 
reference being made to the three-quarter majority proviso in any public announce-
ment to be made by Lord Soulbury on first arrival, as being likely not only to create 
lack of confidence in His Majesty's Government's honesty of purpose in appointing 
the Commission, but also to make his own position more difficult in co-operating 
with the Commission, as he intends to do. His contention is that the three-quarter 
proviso could reasonably be insisted upon for a locally devised scheme, but since any 
recommendations of the Commission, even if based on the Minister's published 
scheme, will now result in a Commission made, and not a Ceylon made, constitu-
tion, the Secretary of State should be free to approve of it provided that he and the 
Commission are satisfied that minority interests are adequately safeguarded whether 
or not it obtains a three-quarter majority on presentation to the State Council. 
I therefore propose to advise Lord Soulbury to avoid all reference to this in the first 
announcement, but since the Commission may be challenged on the point later, I 
should be glad for guidance as to the reply I should give to Sananayake's [sic] 
personal representations. His view appears to be that any constitution which the 
Commission is likely to recommend will fail to obtain three-quarters majority, but 
that if there is a substantial majority including minority opinion, in favour of it in 
the State Council, the Secretary of State should be free to adopt it. The Chief 
Secretary, who concurs in the above, points out that the fact, however, cannot be 
overlooked that it has been publicly represented that in the interests of minorities, 
both safeguards of examination by the Commission and of a three-quarters majority 
were provided in regard to the Minister's scheme. 
233 CO 54/988/2, no 15 13 Jan 1945 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: despatch from Sir H Moore to Mr Stanley on 
the re-opening of negotiations. Enclosures 1 and 2 
I have the honour to refer to Sir Robert Drayton's secret despatch of 31st October, 
1944, enclosing correspondence with the Government of India relating to the 
re-opening of negotiations regarding the rights and status of Indians in Ceylon. 
2. I enclose a copy of a further message from the Government of India which was 
received by me at the hands of Mr. Aney, their Representative in Ceylon, on 19th 
December, 1944. 
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3. The Board of Ministers considered the message and concurred in the reply 
dated 11th January a copy of which is enclosed. 
Enclosure 1 to 233: letter from M S Aney to Sir H Moore, 19 Dec 1944 
I have been asked by the Government of India to communicate to the Government of 
Ceylon the following reply to the Chief Secretary's letters No. CF. 68/44 dated 21st 
October, 1944, and 27th October, 1944:-
"The Government of India thank the Government of Ceylon for their letters 
dated 21st and 27th October. They have noted the views of the Government of 
Ceylon. They feel that while in theory it may be possible to distinguish 
between questions of constitutional reform and other questions it is virtually 
impossible to maintain this distinction in practice. 
2. They would however like to add that the appointment of the Royal 
Commission on constitutional reforms was not the only reason for suggesting 
the reopening of negotiations. The Government of India had had reports of 
statements made by Ceylon Ministers that they would welcome such 
negotiations but that they thought that the Government of India wanted the 
Indian question to be left over until the war was won. These statements of 
Ceylon Ministers were the immediate occasion for the Government of India to 
intimate their readiness to resume negotiations as they were anxious to dispel 
any misapprehension that might have been caused by the Ministers' state-
ments. The Government of India will be able to indicate their views as to basis 
for negotiations after the Government of Ceylon have--signified their willing-
ness to resume negotiations." 
Enclosure 2 to 233: letter from Sir R Drayton to M S Aney, 11 Jan 1945 
I have the honour to refer to the communication of the Government of India 
regarding the resumption of negotiations between the two Governments, dated the 
19th December, 1944, which was handed to His Excellency the Governor by Mr. 
Aney, the Representative of the Government of India in Ceylon, on the same date. 
2. The Board of Ministers note that the Government of India do not think that the 
resumption of negotiations must be left over until after war is won. 
3. What appears, however, to the Board to be of first importance is that, before 
negotiations are resumed, there should be, as was the case when negotiations were 
resumed in 1941, an agreed basis for such resumption. This basis would normally 
have been specifically the Joint Report of 1941: that Report is still a basis acceptable 
to the Government of Ceylon but the Government of India have indicated that they 
do not envisage it as being a basis of resumed negotiations. The Government of 
Ceylon trust that the Government of India will find it possible to reconsider their 
attitude on the point and accept the agreed conclusions of the Joint Report of 1941 as 
being the basis for the resumption of negotiations. If, however, the Government of 
India find it impossible to adopt this attitude, the Government of Ceylon have no 
doubt that the Government of India will realize that no other basis for the 
resumption of negotiations could be considered by the Government of Ceylon if that 
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basis rejected in advance any of the agreed conclusions contained in the Joint Report 
of 1941. The Government of India will readily appreciate that any agreed basis must 
not preclude the possibility of resumed negotiations resulting in an agreement over 
the whole field which is at least as acceptable to Ceylon as the agreement contained 
in that Report. If an agreed basis for the resumption of negotiations can be found, the 
Government of India may rest assured that the Government of Ceylon would be ready 
to resume negotiations at a date most convenient to both Governments. It was with 
this object in mind that the request which is contained in paragraph 3 of the Acting 
Chief Secretary's letter dated 21st October, 1944, was made and the Board desire me 
to repeat that request. 
234 CO 54/988/2, no 16, enclosure 14 Jan 1945 
[Indo-Ceylon relations]: letter from Sir H Moore to Lord Wavell on 
the re-opening of negotiations 
[In a covering letter of the same date to Gent at the CO, Moo re explained that he had sent 
this letter to Wavell 'in the hope, I fear a vain one, that he may be able to get the 
Government of India to suggest a formula for the resumption of negotiations which the 
Ceylon Ministers can reasonably be expected to accept'. He added; 'At the present time 
Aney has shown no sign of being willing as a war-time measure to consider examining the 
labour problem as distinct from the general franchise and constitutional issues involved' 
(CO 54/988/2, no 16).) 
With reference to my letter of the 8th of December, Mr. Aney called on me shortly 
after I wrote to you to present to me officially the Government of India's reply to my 
Chief Secretary's letters of the 21st and 27th of October, 1944. 
For convenience of reference I enclose a copy of that communication together 
with a copy of the Chief Secretary's reply thereto of the 11th January, 1945.1 You will 
no doubt be informed of this correspondence through the usual official channels. 
As I wrote to you earlier my immediate concern is lest the continuation of the 
present state of affairs should have an adverse effect on Ceylon's war effort 
particularly in respect of rubber output owing to labour difficulties. The object of this 
letter therefore is to say that although the reply of the Ceylon Ministers may from 
India's point of view not appear to carry us much further my personal belief is that 
among the majority of them at any rate there is a genuine desire to resume 
negotiations if a basis can be found which contains some promise of success. I trust 
therefore that the Government of India will read the Ministers' reply in that light and 
may feel able to suggest a basis for the resumption of negotiations which will enable 
the Ceylon Ministers to feel that they are free to exercise an unfettered judgment as 
negotiations proceed. 
1 See 233, enclosure 2. 
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235 CO 54/986/6/1, no 24 23 Mar 1945 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir H Moore to Mr 
Stanley on the timetable for the Soulbury Commission 
Following is tentative timetable to which Lord Soulbury is working. 
I Third week in June. Report (possibly not in the final form) to be addressed to 
you. 
11 Copy to be sent simultaneously to me for my personal observations. 
III Before the last week in July, my observations and those of your Advisers to be 
in your hands. 
IV Last week in July, Senanayake to be invited by you, in his capacity as Vice 
Chairman of the Board of Ministers and Leader of the House, for personal 
consultations on the draft Recommendations. 
V Report to be published as soon as possible thereafter with a view to submission 
to the State Council in September. 
From the local point of view, it is of the first importance, if Senanayake's general 
agreement is secured in London, that the Report should be brought before the State 
Council with the least possible delay. I do not, of course, know whether the date of 
the United Kingdom General Election has yet been fixed and, if so, whether it need 
affect the proposed timetable, but I should be grateful for the earliest possible 
expression of your views. Nihill has applied for leave and should go at once so as to be 
back in the autumn, or earlier if necessary. He would then be available for 
consultations in London in May, which Lord Soulbury would welcome. 
Soulbury and Drayton concur in the above. 
236 CO 54/986/16/1, no 4 11 Apr 1945 
[Reforms]: despatch from Sir H Moore to Mr Stanley on the debate in 
the State Council on the Free Lanka Bill 
[Informing Stanley in Dec 1944 that this bill (also referred to as the Dominion Status or 
Sri Lanka Bill) had been prepared by Bandaranaike and gazetted over his signature, 
Moore explained: 'As far as I can gather, Senanayake thinks that Bandaranaike is making a 
mistake and does not propose to stop him. I have reason to believe that Senanayake 
intends to co-operate fully with the [Soulbury) Commission and do not think that 
Bandaranaike's Bill need be taken very seriously' (CO 54/986/5/3, no 200, Moore tel to 
Stanley, 19 Dec 1944). Senanayake was said by Moore to regard the subsequent debate on 
the bill as 'rather a joke' (CO 986/6/1, no 10, tel, 10 Feb 1945) and when the debate ended 
the governor sent the following summary of the result on 23 Mar: 'Dominion Status Bill 
passed third reading by forty to seven, with one declining to vote. Chief Secretary Reports 
as follows:-Amendments made unimportant. Majority falls short of three fourths by two. 
It comprised three Ceylon Moors, two Ceylon Tamils and one Indian Tamil supported by 
Senanayake voted for the Bill. Mahadeva declined to vote. Minority comprised three 
Europeans, one Burgher, two Indians and one Ceylon Tamil. Ponnambalam and 
Aluwihare disliked many of its provisions, but did not wish to be represented as opposed 
to claims included in the Dominion status. Notable feature, however, is the support to the 
Bill given by the three Ceylon Moors. Some secret accord with Bandaranaike may safely 
be presumed' (ibid, no 23).) 
have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 106 of even date by which 
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transmitted to you for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure an Ordinance to 
provide for a new Constitution for Ceylon. 
2. I enclose a memorandum by the Chief Secretar/ on the debates in the State 
Council on this Bill. The Memorandum provides a most valuable commentary on the 
passage of the Bill through the Council, and I find myself in general agreement with 
the views expressed therein. In addition I propose in this despatch to summarise the 
events which led up to the introduction of the Bill and to give you my views generally 
as to its political significance. 
3. As appears from paragraphs 2 and 5 of Secret and Personal telegram of 
November 11th, 1944,2 addressed to you by the Officer Administering the Govern-
ment, it was in that month that the Minister for Local Administration gave the first 
real indication of his intention to repudiate the Declaration of 1943 and to embark 
upon a political strategy with which he knew the Leader of the State Council strongly 
disagreed. 
4. The motion requesting the Ministers to introduce a Dominion Status Bill into 
the State Council, although moved by a private member, was admittedly inspired by 
the Minister for Local Administration and moved at his instigation. The debate on 
this motion was noteworthy for the fact that the Minister for Local Administration 
repudiated the suggestion that the introduction of the Bill would imply a boycott of 
the Soulbury Commission (see paragraph 3 of the Secret and Personal telegram of 
November 24th addressed to you by the Officer Administering the Government). As 
appears from paragraph 8 below the Minister's attitude on this point changed as the 
Bill progressed and its passage through the Council seemed more assured. You will 
recollect that the Leader of the State Council, the Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Minister for Communications and Works refrained from voting on this motion which 
was passed on November 24th 1944. 
5. The following extract from the Minutes of the meeting of the Board of 
Ministers held on December 18th 1944 reveals the attitude of the Leader of the State 
Council and the other Ministers to the Bill:-
"The Financial Secretary referred to the draft Ceylon Constitutional (Domin-
ion Status) Bill in the name of the Minister for Local Administration. It had 
been forwarded to the Government Printer by the Secretary to the Board with 
a note that the Minister for Local Administration had desired that it should be 
published in a Gazette Extraordinary. He stated that it appeared doubtful 
whether it was correct for a Minister to introduce a Bill dealing with a subject 
which was not allocated to his Executive Committee under the Constitution 
and he would like the Board to examine that aspect of the question. 
The Vice Chairman (Leader of the State Council) stated that the Bill was 
being introduced in accordance with the wishes of the State Council and that 
it was being sponsored by the Minister for Local Administration on behalf of a 
majority of the Ministers. He added that although he was in favour of a 
Dominion Status Constitution for Ceylon he was nevertheless prepared to 
accept the constitution prepared by the Ministers in accordance with the 
Secretary of State's Declaration of May 1943. He was therefore of the view 
that the present time was not an opportune moment to introduce the Bill in 
1 Not printed. 2 See 231. 
[236] APR 1945 357 
regard to which he desired to retain his freedom of action. He therefore 
preferred that the Bill, which a majority of the Ministers wanted introduced 
now, should be introduced by a Minister who was keen on its immediate 
introduction. 
The Minister of Health was of the view that the decision of the State 
Council on a matter of this importance should be implemented by the Board, 
and that the Bill should be introduced by the Leader of the State Council 
himself. The Chairman however pointed out that the Officers of State could 
not be associated with a Bill which they had not seen. 
After discussion the Ministers agreed to the introduction of the Bill by the 
Minister for Local Administration." 
6. The point made by the Financial Secretary in the Board of Minutes which is 
referred to in the opening sentence of the extract of the minutes set out in the 
previous paragraph had first been raised by him with me. The Financial Secretary 
had asked for my direction in the matter, but I felt that it would not be wise for me to 
intervene and it was on my suggestion that the Financial Secretary raised the matter 
in the Board of Ministers. 
Subsequently, in the debate on the Bill, the point whether the Bill had been 
properly introduced was taken and the Speaker held that it had. 
7. The mover's speech on the first reading was noteworthy for two points:-
(a) he made it quite clear that he regarded the Bill as having the dual object of 
embarrassing the Secretary of State when he came to consider the recommenda-
tions of the Soulbury Commission and of being a lever by which greater 
concessions might be obtained; 
(b) he indicated a mild opposition to a Second Chamber (vide paragraph (e) of my 
Secret and Personal telegram of January 19th), an attitude which, I am informed, 
was inconsistent with the attitude that he adopted when conferring with the 
minorities in 1943 but was probably inspired by his knowledge of the fact that the 
Leader of the State Council then favoured a Second Chamber. 
8. In the second reading the mover joined in the general condemnation of the 
Second Chamber as soon as he realised that there was almost unanimous opposition 
to such a Chamber but it may well be that he regards the rejection of the conception 
of a Second Chamber solely as a strong bargaining counter. 
In the same debate the mover notwithstanding his attitude to the Soulbury 
Commission in November, 1944 (see paragraph 4 above) declared that it was wholly 
inconsistent for any member of the State Council to appear before the Commission. 
9. The mover of the Bill may be said to have started slowly and finished strongly: 
as appears from this despatch he did not scruple to change his attitude as he felt his 
strength. 
The support given by the Ceylon Moslems to the third reading and the fact that the 
Leader of the State Council voted for the third reading cannot be ignored and it must 
be admitted that he has temporarily weakened the Leader's position. 
The latter's task in getting the country to accept a new constitution which is based 
on the 1943 Declaration has been made more difficult by the passage of this Bill and, 
if the Leader were to fail in this task, the Minister for Local Administration will have 
strengthened his position to succeed him and negotiate for higher stakes. 
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10. While the above is, I believe, a fair appreciation of the political effect which 
the passage of this Bill has had on the relative position of the Leader of the State 
Council and the Minister for Local Administration in the State Council, it would in 
my view be a mistake to suppose that much importance has been attached to its 
passing by the country as a whole. The facts are that its staging contemporaneously 
with the sittings of the Soulbury Commission was generally regarded as a piece of 
political play-acting which should not be taken very seriously. Public interest 
throughout was chiefly centered on the proceedings of the Commission, and the 
debates on the Bill itself suffered from an atmosphere of unreality which was 
reflected not only in the light-hearted manner in which clauses of major importance 
were disposed of, but also by the poor attendance of members themselves. Had any of 
them seriously believed that there was any likelihood of a Bill of such great 
importance receiving the Royal Assent, it would not have secured a passage through 
a depleted house in a matter of 16 days. 
237 CO 54/986/6/1, no 30 18 Apr 1945 
[Reforms]: CO record of a discussion with members of the Soulbury 
Commission 
The Duke of Devonshire welcomed Lord Soulbury and his colleagues on their return 
from Ceylon and said that from all reports so far received their visit to the island 
seemed to have been a great success. He explained the Secretary of State's inability to 
welcome the Commission personally in view of his illness. 
Lord Sou/bury said that he assumed that it was the view of the Colonial Office that 
the new Constitution should be one which was acceptable to the interests concerned 
in Ceylon, especially to the present Government and State Council, rather than that 
it should be imposed by H.M.G. All the discussions he had had with Mr. Senanayake 
and others showed that time was the important factor, especially as the former was 
not in robust health. Mr. Senanayake had undertaken to do his best to carry the new 
Constitution through the State Council, assuming its provisions were reasonably 
satisfactory to him, and discussions with him had given no grounds for doubting that 
the recommendation the Commission at present had in mind would, with the 
exception of one or two difficult questions, be acceptable. 
Lord Soulbury therefore proposed that the Commission and the Colonial Office 
should endeavour to follow a timetable, of which a copy is attached. (See also 24 and 
25 on this file.) Notwithstanding the Secretary of State's telegram at 25, Lord 
Soulbury pressed that every effort should be made to adhere to this timetable, which 
he had discussed with Mr. Senanayake, especially in regard to the latter's proposed 
visit to England at the end of July. 
The difficulties surrounding this visit, at a stage when the Secretary of State could 
hardly have had time to consult the Cabinet and be in a position to give a clear 
indication of H.M.G.'s intentions, were discussed at length; it was finally considered 
that since Mr. Senanayake knew of the proposed arrangements, it would probably be 
necessary to issue an invitation in any case, though this would have to be on a purely 
informal basis and with a clear understanding that the Secretary of State could not 
be in a position to give any promises or enter into any commitments as to the future 
Constitution. 
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It was pointed out that the Tamil Minority leader, Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam, would 
inevitably ask for facilities to fly to this country and interview the Secretary of State. 
The general opinion was that the Secretary of State could hardly refuse to see him. 
The question of discussion of the Defence reservations in the new Constitution 
with the Service Departments was briefly raised. It was decided that the Commission 
should send a letter to those concerned, setting out the present position and 
suggesting that a meeting should be held at 3 p.m. on 11th May at the Colonial Office 
to discuss whatever points the Service Departments might have to raise. 
It was also arranged that the Secretary of State should see the Commission during 
the morning of 11th May and that, if necessary, a further session should be held on 
that date with Mr. Norman Young of the Treasury on the subject of currency. 
238 CO 54/986/6/1, no 31 24Apr 1945 
[Reforms]: inward unnumbered telegram from Sir H Moore to Sir G 
Gater on the question of inviting Mr Senanayake to London 
I do not know whether the Secretary of State has had opportunity of discussing with 
Lord Soulbury paragraph IV of the tentative programme outlined in my secret and 
personal telegram of 23rd March. 1 
With the appointment of Goonetilleke as Financial Secretary, which has been well 
received, I have been considering the possibility of Drayton taking some leave, in 
which event there would probably be no local objections now to Collins acting. 
There has been no (repeat no) official suggestion that the Secretary of State would 
invite Senanayake home for discussions at some appropriate stage, but I have no 
doubt that person named expects it. In order to assist me in deciding when Drayton 
could best be spared, I would be grateful for any further information you can give me 
as to procedure, and whether the Secretary of State would prefer Drayton and 
Senanayake to be home at the same time. I am inclined to think that Senanayake 
would welcome some such arrangement, though I have naturally not discussed it 
with him, but I could sound Goonetilleke on the point if you could indicate a general 
line by next Saturday. 
1 See 235. 
239 ADM 116/5546 25 Apr 1945 
[Reforms]: letter from Trafford Smith to A P Shaw (Admiralty) on 
consultation with the service departments on defence issues 
May I refer to C.O.S. (44)996(0) of 28th November, 1944, dealing with the effect of 
the political situation in Ceylon on operations? You will see from that Paper and the 
Chiefs of Staffs Committee's decision that it was agreed that there was no need for 
the Chiefs of Staff to see the Commission on Constitutional Reform before their 
departure. 
The Commission has now returned to this country and Lord Soul bury, the 
Chairman, has asked me to approach the Service Departments in order to arrange a 
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meeting at which any questions they may wish to raise in connection with the 
reservation of Defence under the new Constitution can be discussed before the 
Commission finally formulates its recommendations. For convenience of reference, I 
enclose a copy of the Declaration of His Majesty's Government dated 26th May, 
1943, 1 referred to in the Commission's terms of reference which are set out in the 
Chiefs of Staff paper under reference. 
As will be obvious from these terms of reference, the Commission's Report will be 
primarily concerned with political issues affecting the new Constitution, and, insofar 
as they have at present considered the Defence question, the Commissioners feel 
inclined to confine themselves to a recommendation in general terms relating to the 
disposition of the portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs under a new Constitution 
and to some recommendation as to the channels of communication between the 
Ceylon Government and His Majesty's Government in these matters . 
The Service Departments would no doubt have views on this latter question and 
also on various other issues which arise, such as the extent to which Emergency 
powers of control over, for example, communications and harbours in Ceylon should 
be reserved as a necessary attribute of Defence notwithstanding the fact that these 
departments fall within the province of a Ceylon Minister and would ordinarily be 
regarded as "Internal Affairs". 
Lord Soulbury proposes to have a meeting for the purpose of a general exchange of 
views on these and other relevant questions, and has asked me to suggest 3 o'clock 
on the afternoon of Friday, 11th May, in the Colonial Office Conference Room 
(Downing Street Building) as the Commission (which is at present working in 
Cardiff) will be in London on that date. I shall be glad if you will let me know whether 
a representative of the Admiralty will be able to attend. I am writing similarly to 
Nangle at the War Office and Dickson at the Air Ministry. 
1 See 169, annex. 
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